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Abstract 
A full study of the conception of wilāya in a variety of juridical trends, theological 
schools, and mystical doctrines across the Islamic world in general, and in the Shīʿa 
intellectual history in particular, is too ambitious a project to undertake in one thesis. 
Therefore, the author has chosen to limit herself to considering a handful of intellectual 
developments in the Shīʿa world from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. She 
addresses a number of issues by delving into the conceptions of wilāya through the 
examination and interpretation of key texts. The main interest of the author is to study 
the influence of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism, with regard to the conception of wilāya, on his 
Shīʿa successors and expositors in later centuries. This research also discusses the 
development and transformation of the conception of wilāya over two hundred years.  
In a corresponding approach to Akbarīan mysticism, wilāya occupies a central 
place in Ṣadrīan ḥikma, and in the thought of the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and 
Qum, as the crystallization of this discipline of philosophy. Wilāya is inseparable from 
imamate and from the status of imāms, namely the walī, ḥujja, and ghawth. In the 
esoteric School of Shaykhīsm, the conception of wilāya is overshadowed by concepts 
such as ẓuhūr (appearance), qīyāmat (Day of Judgement), intiẓār (expectation), al-
Qāʾim, and is finally replaced by the doctrine of Rukn-i Rābiʿ. A study and critical 
analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of wilāyat al-faqīh exposes his fascination for 
the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. However, the politicization of wilāya in Khomeini’s theory 
can be regarded as the climax of jurisdictional developments dating back to the writings 
of the jurists of the early Qajar period.  
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Unlike mysticism, jurisprudence underwent significant changes and revisions in 
a number of terms, such as wilāya in socio-political affairs. Khomeini’s theory was 
challenged by his student, Ayatollah Muntaẓirī who revisited it, placing more emphasis 
on the role of people and their rights in the Islamic Government. Muntaẓirī’s reform 
movement was similarly transformed by Muhsin Kadivar, who finally rejected the 
theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in favour of a democratic government.  
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Transliteration and Usage 
I follow the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES) 
transliteration system for Arabic, Persian and Turkish. I also naturalize other frequently 
used terms such as Sufi, Sufism, Ayatollah, Khomeini, Allah, imamate, Imamite, names 
of the cities, names of the Imāms, name of the Prophet, etc. As for the dates, except for 
the Julian or Georgian calendar, those dates referring to the solar Islamic calendar as it 
is used today in Iran are indicated clearly by shamsī, and lunar dates are marked by H 
(Hegira/hijrī-yi qamarī).  
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Introduction 
Guardianship (wilāya/walāya) is a key concept in Islamic theology, 
jurisprudence and mysticism. Etymologically, it is derived from the etymon of ‘w l y’, 
which means to place two things next to or close to each other, to the extent that there 
is no distance between them. ‘W l y’, therefore, means closeness and affinity, whether 
spatial or spiritual. From the root, there engendered a number of derivatives, such as 
walāya (sainthood, affinity, sanctity) wilāya (authority, dominion) and mawlā (master, 
protector, patron). The Muslim scholar of Qurʾānīc exegesis and the Arabic language, al-
Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d. 502 H/ 1108 or 1109), in his al-Mufradāt fī Gharīb al-Qurʾān 
(Terminology of the Peculiar Qurʾānīc Terms) emphasizes the significance of ‘closeness 
and attachment’ in applying the terms wilāya/walāya for something. He translates 
walāya as domination/victory (nuṣra), and wilāya as authority and incumbency 
(taṣaddī-ya amr), though he reminds us that both can be used interchangeably; 
referring to one reality which is to exercise authority and domination over the other, 
and in the same way, the terms walī/mawlā can embrace both affinity and authority 
(al-Iṣfahānī, 1413 H/1992, p. 885).  
As one of the terms most frequently used in the Qurʾān, walī appears in different 
ways; as a noun one hundred and twenty-four times, and as a verb one hundred and 
twelve times. It is divided into two groups: positive/recommended and negative. By 
using in the term in the first usage, the lawgiver asks believers to be walī of each other, 
and by the latter, he warns them to reject the domination and authority of non-Muslims. 
Murtiḍā Muṭaharī calls upon the positive wilāya, walāy-i Ithbātī-ya Islāmī (the Islamic 
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positive wilāya), and divides it into two groups: general (ʿāmm) and specific (khāṣṣ). 
The former refers to the general wilāya that is possessed and exercised by every 
believer, and the latter belongs to the Prophet and his household. Wilāyat al-khāṣṣah 
uses different forms, such as walāy-i muḥabbat (the wilāya of love), walāy-i imamate 
(the wilāya of imamate), walāy-i zaʿāmat (the wilāya of leadership) and walāy-i taṣarruf 
(the wilāya of disposal) (Muṭaharī, 1390, pp. 13-17).  
Al-Rāghib, whom I mentioned earlier, brings many verses in which walī, wilāya, 
mawlā, and other paronymous terms appear (al-Iṣfahānī, 1413 H/1992, pp. 885-887). 
On the basis of the Qurʾānīc usages, God is the Protector [walī] of those who believe [2: 
257, 7: 196, 3: 68, 47: 11, 66: 4] and has bestowed wilāya upon every believer [9: 71].1 
In addition to the divine wilāya and the wilāya of believers over each other, the Qurʾān 
acknowledges the wilāya of the Prophet and the Imāms, which is bestowed upon them 
from God [5: 55, 4: 59, 9: 119],2 in order to guide people to the righteous path.  
In the Qurʾān, awlīyā have a number of features and are described as individuals 
who have no fear, nor will they grieve. Muḥammad Hossein Ḥusseynī Tehrānī gives his 
exegesis of verses sixty-two to sixty-four of the sūrah of Yūnus which state that “Behold! 
Truly the friends of God, no fear shall come upon them, nor shall they grieve, those who 
believe and reverent. For them are glad tidings in the life of this world and in the 
Hereafter” (Nasr, 2015, p. 558). He maintains that since piety (taqwā) and fearing God 
come immediately after the description of awlīyā, the office of wilāya requires a strong 
faith (īmān), which is only achieved by doing good and avoiding bad. This type of wilāya 
is called wilāyat al-ilāhīya (divine wilāya), in which the veil (ḥijāb) between the servant 
(ʿabd) and God, is removed as a result of self-abnegation (Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419 
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H, p. 37). According to him, the term “awlīyā” in these verses refers to those who have 
attained an exalted kind of faith as the result of their righteous deeds, purification of 
their hearts, strong piety and remembering God (Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419 H, pp. 
37-39). Wilāya equates to blessing, because walī is the resident of the world of unity 
(Ḥusseynī Tehrānī, vol. 5, 1419 H, pp. 40-41). 
Along with the Qurʾān, ḥadīth al-qudsī is another source of authority for Muslim 
scholars, specifies the features of awlīyā. According to the famous ḥadīth that relates 
“My friends are hidden under my mantle (qibāb, ḥijāb), no one knows them except for 
Me” (Hujwīrī, n.d., p. 38),3 the office of wilāya, entails secrecy and latency - unlike that 
of imamate. Except for the Imāms and the Prophet who are known to people, the 
holders of the office of wilāya remain hidden from people.4 In interpreting this ḥadīth, 
Sufi Muslims have developed arguments regarding the attributes of awlīyā, such as the 
significance of sirr (inmost being), or maqām al-sirr for understanding the office of 
wilāya. They argue that awlīyā are owners – or preservers - of divine sirr, and since the 
Deity desires to keep His secrets, He has chosen awlīyā to preserve them (Himmatī, 
1391, pp. 6-9).5  
The authority of the Prophet and his Sunna including ḥadīth makes the second 
pillar of Islam and is equal to that of the Qurʾān; a fact which is endorsed by the Book 
itself, though as Fazlur Rahman is certain, this authority “refers to the verbal and 
performative behaviour of the Prophet outside the Qurʾān” (Rahman, 1968, p. 52). What 
follows from this is that the Prophet’s authority, “has been accepted willingly by all 
people without bickerings in certain quarters, [and] the Qurʾān would not have 
intervened” (Fazlur Rahman, p. 53). The logical consequence of this is that the Prophet’s 
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words and behaviour have been an unchallenged authority, “outside the Qurʾān in 
giving judgments and moral and legal precepts” (Rahman, p. 53). As for the authority 
of sayings of Imāms, as Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī (d. 1110 H/1698) is certain, the 
authenticity of the akhbār (lit. sayings, sing. khabar) of Imāms is absolute and definite, 
because these figures are intermediaries of emanation from God to His people, and 
therefore their aḥādīth embrace divine knowledge, truths and gnosis which are 
emanated to people, even to other prophets and angels, through them. In their absence, 
Majlisī maintains, believers should recourse to their akhbār in order to receive 
emanation and blessing from Him (Majlisī, n.d., vol. 1, p. 103). 
Sayings of Imāms on wilāya/walāya and imamate are scattered throughout the 
vast body of literature, which is called “ḥadīth compilations”, covering the two genres 
of kalāmī (theological) and juridical writings. The most well-known of these are the 
four ḥadīth compilations which constitute the early Imamite doctrine, and in 
chronological order includes al-Kāfī (Uṣūl al-Kāfī) by Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī 
(d. 328-9 H/939), Man lā yahẓaruhu-l-Faqīh (for One Who Does Not Have accessibility 
to Jurist) by Abu Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Bābawayh al-Qumī, commonly known as 
Ibn Bābawayh (Persianized form: ibn Bābūyi) or al-Shaykh al-Ṣadūq (d. 381 H/991), 
Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām (the Refinements of the Laws) and al-Istibṣār (to Ask for Insights), 
both by Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn Ḥassan Ṭūsī (d. 460 H/1067). A number of scholars 
have drawn upon them to extract the components of the early Imamite doctrine, though 
the main Imamite sources including ḥadīth compilations are not limited to these four, 
and include older texts as well. For example the kalāmī text, Baṣāʾir al-Darajāt fī ʿUlūm-
i Āl-i Muḥammad wa Mā Khaṣṣahum ul-llāh Bihī (Insights into the Degrees, on the 
Knowledge of the Family of Muḥammad and That with which Allah Endowed Them) by 
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Al-Shaykh a-Ṣaffār al-Qumī (d. 290 H/902-903) is one of the oldest Shīʿa ḥadīth 
compilations, in which al-Qumī spreads around one thousand eight hundreds and 
eighty ḥadīth on different issues, including wilāya from Imāms.  
One can add to this tradition countless other texts such as the Book of Sulaym 
ibn Qays by Sulaym ibn Qays al-Hilālī al-ʿĀmirī (d. 70-76 H/689-695);6 Uṣūl a-Sita 
ʿAshar (Sixteen Principles) by a number of writers belong to the third century of 
Hegira/ninth century; The Ṣaḥīft al-Riḍā (Book of al-Riḍā, also known as Musnad al-
Imām al-Riḍā) which is a collection of two hundreds and forty ḥadīth attributed to ʿAlī 
ibn Mūsa al-Riḍā (which is one of the first ḥadīth compilations and has been collected 
by Abu al-Ḥassan ʿAlī ibn Jaʿfar ʿArīdhī, the son of the sixth and the brother of the 
seventh Imām); A-Zuhd (abstemiousness) and Al-Muʾmin (the Believer), both by 
Hossein ibn Saʿīd al-Kūfī al-Ahwāzī (2nd and 3rd century of Hegira/ ninth century); and 
the writings of the Imāmī theologian and transmitter (muḥaddith) Faḍl ibn Shādhān 
Neyshābūrī (d. 260 H/873). There exist more than twelve ḥadīth compilations 
transmitting ḥadīth from Imāms including their sayings on wilāya, and all of them are 
composed before al-Kāfī which belongs to the fourth century. These writings 
encompass the early Imāmī conceptions of wilāya. Some of them are not available 
today, but are documented in, and named by later sources.7 
In terms of the authenticity of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth, they “constitute the 
only two authorities, absolute and complementary, to which the faithful should refer 
for all matters regarding their religion” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 23). These compilations 
are not studied here, as scholars like Muhammad Ali Amir-Moezzi and Hassan Ansari 
have drawn upon them to extract the components of the early Imāmī doctrine. As Amir-
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Moezzi rightly maintains, “Shīʿīsm is centered on the notion of walāya/[wilāya]. Shīʿas 
refer to themselves as ‘the people of walāya (ahl al-walāya), [and] the charisma of 
imām, the very nature of his Person, seems entirely focused on this concept” (Amir-
Moezzi, 2011, p. 231).8  
In classical Shīʿa thought, wilāya is firmly tied to the imamate and Imāms are 
regarded as walī, ḥujja and quṭb. Wilāya is also connected to the notion of the Divine 
Truth (al-ḥaqq), which is a double-faceted reality and refers to Imāms; the fourteen 
luminous entities. Wilāya is the esoteric side of the Truth, or the mission of Imāms, as 
the continuation of the prophetic mission which started with Adam. The mission is 
divine knowledge (ʿilm) in general, and the true interpretation (taʾwīl) of the Holy Book 
in particular. So, walī is the only preserver of the meaning of the Book (Amir-Moezzi, 
1994, p. 29). In terms of walī as ḥujja (proof), there exists a belief that “the earth can 
never be without living Proof of God, or else it would be annihilated” (Ansari, 1392, p. 
139 & Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 43),9 therefore, walī/the Shīʿī imām, has constituted a 
continuous, uninterrupted, chain of proofs since the beginning of humanity, “a chain 
that guarantees universal salvation” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 43). Wilāya, as it is 
portrayed in these sources, is the important component of the early Imāmīsm, itself a 
“nonrational esoteric tradition … which prevailed up to the middle of the fourth/tenth 
century [and] it represents the pre ‘kalāmīc’ and pre-philosophical phase of the 
doctrine” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 28).  
One can add more into it by listing features such as generosity, abstemiousness 
(zuhd), veracity (ṣidq), valor (shujāʿa), precedence in accepting Islam (sābiqa) and ʿilm 
(both religious and general knowledge) as the attributes of the legitimate leadership 
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among Shīʿas (Afsaruddin, 2002, pp. 80-112). Afsaruddin argues that the excellences 
(faḍīlas) that Shīʿa scholars held for their imāms were different from their Sunni 
counterparts; though both emphasized common attributes as well. Shīʿas mostly 
believed that “the possession of knowledge, in combination with other virtues” 
(Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 113), superseded more ‘physical’ attributes, such as lineage to the 
Prophet or maturity in accepting Islam. ʿIlm referred to a vast range of categories and 
embraced taʾwīl (the Qurʾānīc interpretation), knowledge of religious precepts and 
duties, issuing fatwā, legal decision-making, and relating traditions from the Prophet. 
Along with these definitions, Shīʿa authors emphasized “the esoteric and intuitive 
aspect of ʿilm which was granted to Ali [as well as other imāms, as opposed to other 
Rashidun caliphs] as a special dispensation” (Afsaruddin, 2002, pp. 114 ff).  
The possession of esoteric and exoteric knowledge by imāms was an inseparable 
component of the doctrine of wilāya, and most paramount, by which they demanded 
fully-professed submission and loyalty of “every human, animal, and inanimate object” 
in order to win salvation. Therefore, “belief in walāya demarcates the “saved” from the 
“unsaved” in all of Creation, making for a holistic worldview in which every living 
earthly being, non-living thing, and celestial being is subject to, and judged by, this 
cosmic setoriological imperative” (Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 106). Afsaruddin rightly 
maintains that “religious knowledge invested in the Shīʿī imām is ontological”, because 
it has “to exceed, even bypass that of the ordinary person’s; thus it can only be obtained 
by special divine dispensation” (Afsaruddin, 2002, p. 144). 
The concept of light (nūr/noor), or primordial light merits particular attention 
as well. The ‘light of wilāya’, which is drawn from divine light, was created a few 
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thousand years before the creation of the world and was stored in every imām (Amir-
Moezzi, 1994, p. 30 ff). Wilāya is also a sacred pre-temporal covenant (mīthāq/ʿahd, 
innuendo of allegiance, loyalty), which was taken in pre-eternity, when the pre-existent 
entities of the Fourteen Luminous entities were created “from the light of His glory”, 
and their names derived from His own names (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 31 ff). The term 
al-mīthāq is used more than twenty times in the Qurʾān and most probably means “an 
Alliance between God and humanity, and with the prophets in particular” (Amir-
Moezzi, 1994, p. 34).   
Wilāya is the sacred mission of imāms, and the spiritual and temporal direction 
of the faithful. It is one of the pillars of the sacred, if not to say of Islam, and its 
acceptance and submission to it is a precondition for all the rest of the canonical 
obligations. Amir-Moezzi has listed a number of aḥādīth and sayings of imāms in which 
walāya is included separately as one of the five pillars of the Faith, after prayers, alms, 
fast, and pilgrimage to Mecca. Moreover, even the shahāda per se contains walāya, and 
stands after unicity of God and the prophethood of the Prophet, which testifies to the 
fact that walāya, as the core of imamate, itself the heart of nubuwwa, is the 
indispensable complement to the mission of the Prophet; it is the bāṭin of the ẓāhir 
(Amir-Moezzi, 2011, pp. 241 ff).  
A. Wilāyat al-Takwīnīya  
The idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, or the absolute right of the walī/imām to act 
upon the cosmos, has a long history in Shīʿa tradition. From the formation of Shīʿīsm in 
the early second century, and precisely from the time of the fifth Imām, al-Baqir, there 
existed a number of companions who claimed the metaphysical attributes and powers 
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for the Imāms, and held extremist ideas on the knowledge of them, for instance, imām’s 
immortality, and attributing peculiar karāmas (miraculous grace/charismata) to them. 
Another extremist view regarding imāms has to do with the metaphysical status of the 
imamate in creating the cosmos and imām’s involvement in creation. Ghullāt 
(extremists) had reasons for their beliefs, such as their extreme love and devotion to 
imāms, their enmity and even hatred toward the household of the Prophet, and their 
intention of promoting promiscuity by removing the sharīʿa and introducing imāms as 
God. Ṣālihī Najafābādī maintains that these three factors makes an “ominous triangle” 
which has had a harmful effect on Islam over history (Ṣālihī Najafābādī, 1385, pp. 77-
78).  
Regardless of the time of their appearance,10 one can claim that ghuluw is almost 
as old as Shīʿīsm, and though appearing under different fronts, the core remains 
unchanged. Ghullāt held divine attributes for imāms, among them immortality and 
imāms’ involvement in creation are most prominent. As we mentioned above, Imām al-
Baqir had a number of companions, such as Mughayra-t-ibn Saʿīd, who himself had 
followers who fabricated false aḥādīth and incorporated them into the ḥadīth books of 
the companions of the Imām. This method of fabricating ḥadīth, which apparently 
began with them, continued during Imām al-Sadiq (d. 148 H/765) and reached its 
climax during Imām al-Rida (d. 203 H/818). During the time of the sixth Imām it took 
an organized form, to the extent that people such as Abū Khaṭṭāb formed a group that 
systematically created false aḥādīth and incorporated them into the ḥadīth books, 
sending them to different cities. The Imām wasted no time in renouncing them, and in 
some cases even cursed them (Ṣālihī Najafābādī, 1385, passim).  
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With regard to the relationship between the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya and 
ghuluw, wilāyat al-takwīnīya is the crystalized form of ghuluw which has made its way 
into the conceptions of wilāya from the School of ibn ʿArabī onward, becoming an 
inseparable component. Wilāya, therefore, came to be understood relative to wilāyat 
al-takwīnīya; to the extent that other features of wilāya, such as ʿilm, piety, valor, 
spiritual abstinence and repentance were overshadowed by it. The culmination of this 
trend is Shaykhīsm and the Schools of Tehran and Qum (which will be discussed in 
chapters two and three, respectively), in which the fourteen luminary infallible figures 
are vested with supernatural attributes and are regarded as God’s aids in creating the 
world. One can relate this development to the “popularization of Shīʿīsm” which had 
been realized by Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī in the Safawid era, and “had secured the 
religious royalty of the masses” (Amir Arjomand, 1984, p. 219) to hierocracy. The 
incorporation of Shīʿīsm into popular rituals, and the mob’s interest in exotic images 
and miraculous attributes of imams, should be understood from this perspective.  
As the twentieth century drew near, the traditional criterion of wilāya became 
prominent again, particularly in the writings of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. His emphasis is on 
piety and asceticism, repentance, and spiritual conduct; hence, God-given attributes 
such as wilāyat al-takwīnīya - as an inseparable component of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah - is 
eclipsed. Wilāyat Nāmih (the Book of Wilāya) of Ṭabāṭabāʾī, which contains his 
conceptualization of wilāya, can be regarded as a return to the classic ʿirfānī tradition, 
and is significant from this perspective. Khomeinism, another contemporary discourse 
on wilāya, allocates no room to wilāyat al-takwīnīya, because of the prevalence of 
jurisprudence over other discourses on one hand, and the politicization of wilāya on the 
other (which will be discussed in chapters four and five).  
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Addressing early Shīʿa and Sunni sources, including imāms’ aḥādīth (ironically 
those that have been used by Amir-Moezzi to prove the supernaturality of imāms), 
Hossein Modarressi develops arguments to invalidate the narratives of the Ghullāt and 
the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya. He also shows the reaction of contemporaries of the 
extremists: “the Imamite scholars and transmitters of ḥadīth in Qum … reacted very 
harshly to the Mufawwiḍa’s expansionism” (Modarressi, 1993, p. 34). They started 
their endeavour by exhorting people to declare: “anyone who attributed any sign of 
super-humanity to the Prophet or to imāms as extremist and to expel such people from 
their town” (Modarressi, 1993, P. 34). The people of Qum, in fact, did not differentiate 
between ghuluw and tafwīḍ,11 and believed that anyone who attributed supernaturality 
to imāms to be heretics and nonbelievers (Modarressi, 1993, pp. 35-36). 
B. Research Questions  
We may identify three main research questions which this thesis will attempt to 
address. Firstly, how has wilāya (guardianship) been conceptualized during the period 
of eighteenth to twentieth centuries; with particular reference to the thought of 
Ayatollah Khomeini? Have the conceptualizations of wilāya remained stagnant and 
unchanged? And, how has ibn ʿArabī’s theory on wilāya impacted on later scholars? 
C. Discourse on Method  
This section discusses some trends in the history of ideas that facilitate 
exploration of the way in which the present study will be carried out. In recent years, 
“intellectual history” has been studied from different perspectives by many scholars. 
Intellectual history in its new forms is engendered from trends such as the hermeneutic 
methods of German thinkers like Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey; the 
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new literary history of French critics such as Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve; the “new 
history” of culture which was born in America; and the new historicism of the Italian 
philosopher, Benedetto Croce (Kramer, 2004, p. 85). 
There are other trends, such as analytic philosophy and post-modernism, that 
have helped to shape intellectual history. Kramer emphasizes the “eclectic nature” of 
intellectual history, and argues that it is this “eclectic desire to understand, 
contextualize, and take seriously the truth claims of every philosophical or cultural 
tradition [that] has given intellectual historians their distinctive disciplinary identity” 
(Kramer, 2004, p. 85). Thus, intellectual historians create a dialogue with ideas, 
cultures, and interpretations of human experience (Kramer, 2004, p. 85). 
Having said this, I will first discuss Quentin Skinner’s approach in his book 
Visions of Politics, and focus on factors such as the relationship between language and 
power, text and historical context, and structure and agency. I will also emphasize the 
significance of social conventions, the mythology of perennial questions in the history 
of ideas, and the issues of author’s intentions and motives. Then, building upon Mark 
Bevir’s critiques on Skinner’s conventionalism, which are reflected in his book “the logic 
of the History of Ideas”, I will construct a methodology for this research. 
C.1. Skinner’s Conventionalism 
In his Visions of Politics Skinner argues that if a historian of ideas wishes to 
understand any serious utterance, he needs “to grasp something over and above the 
sense and reference of the terms used to express it” (Skinner, 2002, p. 104). A historian 
of ideas needs to find means to recover what the agent may have been doing in saying 
what he said, and therefore understanding what the agent may have meant by issuing 
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an utterance with just that sense and reference (Skinner, 2002, pp. 140 ff). The 
significance of language and the speech acts theory, which entailed the history of ideas, 
brought to his attention the connection of power and language.  
In terms of the nexus between these two, Skinner maintains that concepts and 
beliefs do not have merely communicative power, but authoritative claim and 
emotional force as well. Besides, Skinner proposes that to uncover the meaning of the 
past, one should start with investigating the “texture of moral, social and political 
thinking as it was actually carried on in the past” (Skinner, 2002, p. 6). The result would 
be a deep interconnection between philosophical arguments and claims to social power 
(Skinner, 2002, p. 7). In terms of the relationship between structure and agency, 
Skinner gives priority to agency over structure in social explanation and believes that 
social agents are able to operate within social structures and shape their world 
(Skinner, 2002, p. 7). Skinner criticizes common assumptions pursuing perennial 
themes, eternal questions and universal agendas in the history of ideas, and believes 
that these expectations have led “to a series of confusions and exegetical absurdities 
that have bedeviled the history of ideas for too long” (Skinner, 2002, p. 58). Employing 
Skinner’s terminology, he addresses some dangers, as well as “various kinds of 
historical absurdity” (Skinner, 2002, p. 59), guiding a historian of ideas to look at 
historical texts to find “a given author’s doctrines on all the mandatory themes” 
(Skinner, 2002, p. 59). “The mythology of doctrines” (Skinner, 2002, p. 59), along with 
“the mythology of coherence” (Skinner, 2002, p. 67) and “the mythology of 
parochialism” (Skinner, 2002, pp. 74-75), are three main mythologies that can distort a 
historian of ideas from interpreting past ideas.  
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Skinner’s methodology is composed of three main components in reading and 
understanding historical texts. At the first step, after suggesting the primary steps a 
historian of ideas should tread to better grasp meaning and understanding, Skinner 
turns to his main elaboration on textualism and contextualism and examines their 
fundamental tenants. By rejecting the idea of the self-sufficiency of texts, he maintains 
that by choosing an appropriate method, a historian of ideas will not only be able to 
give an account of the meaning of what was said in the past, and of “what the writer in 
question may have meant by saying what was said” (Skinner, 2002, p. 79) - which is the 
intention of authors - but also will pay due attention to the intentions and purposes of 
a text per se.  
To summarize, a historian of ideas cannot be hopeful of reaching “a sense of the 
context of utterance” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84) and be optimistic about solving the 
difficulty of past text; “for the context itself may be ambiguous. Rather, [he] shall have 
to study all the various contexts in which the words were used – all the functions they 
served, all the various things that could be done with them” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84). He 
cannot be wishful in his search for the author’s intention toward the understanding of 
a given idea, because these ideas and the terms in which they were expressed “are likely 
to have been used … with varying and incompatible intentions” (Skinner, 2002, p. 84). 
Skinner states that the appropriate focus should be on linguistic context(s), and 
all the facts about the social context of the given text12 should be embodied “as a part of 
this linguistic enterprise” (Skinner, 2002, p. 87). The priority of the linguistic context 
over the social context leads Skinner to claim that the latter should be treated “as the 
ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings 
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it might, in principle, have been possible for someone to have intended to 
communicate” (Skinner, 2002, p. 87). Another important component of Skinner’s 
approach is the term “convention” and its role in the performance of actions in the 
relevant social contexts. Skinners suggests that in reading the history of ideas a 
historian should turn his focus from individuals to a more holistic unit, social 
conventions, and with this, he ties “understanding” to social conventions. Therefore, 
“grasping what is conventional” (Skinner, 2002, p. 142) does not only mean that a 
performed action should be understood according to a convention, but rather “includes 
the wider notion of understanding the established assumptions and expectations of a 
given culture” (Skinner, 2002, p. 142).  
C.2. Post-Analytic Philosophy and Bevir’s Intentionalism 
One of the main critics of Skinner’s approach, particularly his idea of intention, 
is Mark Bevir, who has discussed in depth intellectual history from a post-analytic 
perspective. Bevir defines the logic of the history of ideas as the concern with “the way 
historians of ideas reason about historical data, not with historical data itself” (Bevir, 
2004, p. 8). So, the logic provides historians with “a normative account of reasoning 
[appropriate to it], not a historical, sociological, or psychological one” (Bevir, 2004, p. 
8), or the “conceptual form and content of an ideal type of reasoning” (Bevir, 2004, p. 
9). 
Like Skinner, Bevir’s approach is inspired by Wittgenstein and the relationship 
between philosophy and language. On the significance of language, Bevir argues that 
forms of justifications and explanations involve the study of language rather than 
reality, because language is a part of reality. In some cases, the study of language ensues 
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even at the expense of other parts of reality (Bevir, 2004, pp. 11 ff). Bevir explains that 
the work of philosophers in clarifying the meanings of words, is in principle an effort to 
unpack the grammar of concepts (Bevir, 2004, p. 14). By language, however, Bevir 
means “the concepts of ordinary language” (Bevir, 2004, p. 16) than a specialized 
language; the latter is used in the natural sciences and not in philosophy (Bevir, 2004, 
p. 16). Therefore, the logic of the history of ideas is “the understanding of the world 
expressed by a given set of concepts” (Bevir, 2004, p. 26). 
Bevir explains that the subject matter of the history of ideas is meaning, and 
therefore interpretation. By “meaning” he suggests a hermeneutic meaning, in contrast 
to semantic and linguistic meanings, which denotes being “understood in terms of truth 
conditions” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). Hermeneutic meaning leads a historian of ideas to 
intentionalism, because “the hermeneutic meaning of an utterance derives from the 
intentions of the author in making it” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). Distinguishing between 
“weak intentionalism” and “strong intentionalism”, Bevir explains that a historian of 
ideas should concern him/herself with the former, as it “allows for the unconscious and 
for changes of intent during the act of making an utterance” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27), while 
the latter “regards intentions as conscious and prior to utterances” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27). 
Bevir concludes that “weak intentions are individual viewpoints” (Bevir, 2004, p. 27), 
and a historian of ideas studies works “in order to recover hermeneutic meanings 
understood as expressions of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, p. 28).  
Rejecting contextualists like J. G. A. Pocock, conventionalists like Skinner, as well 
as atomic individualism of scholars associated with intentionalism, Bevir argues that 
human beings are able to act creatively in any given social context, while at the same 
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time recognizing the significance of the social context which necessarily influences 
what people see, believe, and say (Bevir, 2004, p. 33). Therefore, intentionalism - which 
is based on individual beliefs as weak intentions or hermeneutic meaning - is 
compatible with the social context. In terms of his critiques on Skinner’s 
conventionalism, Bevir rejects the central belief of conventionalism (along with 
Wittgenstein), that “the hermeneutic meaning of a given utterance comes from its 
conventional meaning” (Bevir, 2004, p. 41). He calls this a “fallacy” (Bevir, 2004, p. 46).  
Bevir suggests that in order to establish a theory of meaning in the history of 
ideas, one should re-define “hermeneutic meaning” through accepting change as a 
formative component of this kind of meaning. Thus, we have to abandon all attempts to 
fix hermeneutic meanings by reference to any type of social meaning” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 
48-49). Hermeneutic meanings, Bevir argues, are both irreducible to social conventions 
and to semantic/linguistic meanings, which are abstract and social, and are “defined by 
what an author meant by a particular utterance on a particular occasion” (Bevir, 2004, 
p. 50). Therefore, hermeneutic meanings - that only concern historians - derive from 
intentions (Bevir, 2004, pp. 52-52). One of the key terms in Bevir’s approach is “the 
expressed beliefs”, which are individual viewpoints or weak intentions, defined as “the 
meaning an utterance had for its author or a later reader, whether consciously or 
unconsciously” (Bevir, 2004, p. 171). He maintains that if the task of the historian of 
ideas is “to study only the meaning of the action” (Bevir, 2004, p. 135), then he needs 
to concern himself only with the beliefs it expresses (Bevir, 2004, pp. 135 ff).  
Bevir uses the term “webs of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190 ff) to imply that “the 
objectivity of a belief depends on its relationship to various other beliefs, [because] 
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there cannot be any self-supporting beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190-191). Webs of beliefs, 
which are “boundless, spherical networks, not hierarchical pyramids” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 
191), constitute networks of interconnected concepts with the concepts and the 
connections between them; being defined in part, by beliefs about external reality 
(Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff). Bevir believes that we cannot say what constitutes webs of 
beliefs, but we know that there exists a reciprocal relationship between it and an 
inherited tradition, because “neither makes sense without the other” (Bevir, 2004, p. 
195).  
An inherited tradition is a common heritage which already exists, and people 
adopt their webs of beliefs against it; therefore, individuals are capable of altering the 
traditions they inherit by changing the totality of the beliefs they hold (Bevir, 2004, pp. 
196-197). Here, Bevir emphasizes the possibility of agency and the ability of individuals 
to not only change an inherited tradition, but also to migrate from this tradition to 
another (Bevir, 2004, pp. 197 ff). The freedom of agents and their power to adopt this 
or that web of beliefs, as well as their capability to alter inherited tradition is one of the 
most fascinating aspects of Bevir’s approach (Bevir, 2004, pp. 199 ff).  
In a nut shell, a tradition or social context is “a set of understandings someone 
acquires as an initial web of beliefs during a process of socialization” (Bevir, 2004, p. 
200), in the sense that we cannot conceive of anyone ever holding a belief separate from 
its tradition as a starting point, yet individuals do respond selectively to it (Bevir, 2004, 
pp. 200-202). Along with Bevir’s emphasis on the freedom of individuals to interact 
with tradition and respond to it selectively, another significant aspect of his approach 
is the idea of fluidity of tradition which stands against essentialists who “equate 
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traditions with fixed essences to which they ascribe variations” (Bevir, 2004, p. 202). 
Rejecting Foucault’s notion of episteme and the governance of one single episteme in 
each epoch, Bevir holds “a plurality of traditions that [are] present at any given time” 
(Bevir, 2004, p. 211) on one hand, and the power of choice that every historian has to 
define his traditions, on the other (Bevir, 2004, p. 211). 
Having said all this, in the present research, I construct a methodology on the 
basis of Skinner’s conventionalism and Bevir’s critiques of it; particularly Bevir’s 
individualism seems to be significant. His emphasis on the role of individuals in 
selecting a web of beliefs freely, migrating from one tradition to another, or the 
existence of a number of inherited traditions in every epoch, instead of one dominant 
episteme, will help us to observe how many different scholars from the eighteenth to 
the twentieth century have interacted with the intellectual traditions of their time, and 
stepped beyond them to develop arguments for the conceptions of wilāya. Therefore, 
from the work of Skinner and Bevir we may identify the following main methodological 
points which will be deployed in this thesis: the importance of agency over structure, 
authoritative claim and emotional force of concepts and beliefs, evolution of themes 
over time, and the role of individuals in adopting their webs of beliefs against an 
inherited tradition and change it to their liking.  
D. Definition of Terms 
I use the following terms: 
D.1. Theoretical mysticism (ʿirfān-i naẓarī): “the type of speculative mysticism or 
theosophy associated with ibn ʿArabī as philosophized and systematized by his disciple 
Qūnawī and the later members of the ibn ʿArabī School” (Koushki, 2012, p. 30)13, such 
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as the ḥakīms of the Schools of Isfahan, Tehran and Qum. It also found some advocates 
among lettrists such as ibn Turkah Iṣfahānī.  
D.2. The School of Isfahan (Isfahan School of Philosophy): “a philosophical and 
mystical movement patronized by the court of Shah ʿAbbās I (r. 1588-1629), centered 
in the new Safawid capital of Isfahan, and initiated as part of the wider Safawid cultural 
renaissance associated with his reign” (Rizvi, 2012, p. 1). The term was coined for the 
first time by contemporary scholars Henry Corbin (1903-78) and Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
(1933- ), and refers to a phase which is marked by the rise in “metaphysical speculation 
and mystical experience” (Rizvi, 2012, p. 1) as opposed to the juristic hierocracy.  
D.3. Al-ḥikmat al-Mutaʿālīya (ḥikma): refers to the doctrine and philosophy 
developed by Ṣadr a-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā, d. 1045/1635-36). In order to 
understand ḥikma (lit. wisdom) in the Ṣadrīan sense of the term, first we need to know 
the nature of philosophy in Islam. For Muslim philosophers, philosophy had relevance 
to practical life, and “was a practice and an art whose goal was wisdom” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 
34), and for Mullā Ṣadrā it pursued the ultimate goal (summum bonum) and the highest 
good “of enlightened engagement (maʿrifa) and goodly action” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 34). 
Therefore, for Ṣadrā as well as other medieval philosophers, philosophy was regarded 
as “a religious commitment that obscures the conceptual boundary between theory and 
practice” (Rizvi, 2009, p. 34). 
D.4. Khomeinism: By Khomeinism, I mean the dominant political culture of pre-
revolutionary Iran which was “built around a political and pragmatist reinterpretation 
of religious scripture that evolved into revolution, and is neither symbolic of a pre-
modern movement nor a post-modern phenomenon”. Khomeinism is different from 
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traditionalism, as it departs from the Shīʿa tradition of political quietism in favor of an 
activist antagonistic ideology advocating socio-political change. Likewise, it is not 
fundamentalism, as fundamentalism was generated from American Protestantism. 
Although it criticizes modernity, it is a modern phenomenon, as Khomeini “insists on 
some absolute, a priori foundation as the basis of its ideology” (Mahdavi, 2014, pp. 55-
56).  
D.5. The wilāya Apparatus: one of the key terms here is “apparatus”, to formulate 
ideas, theories, and doctrines of wilāya into a coherent framework and provide a better 
understanding of the conceptions of wilāya, as well as its historical functions.14 The 
term “apparatus” was used for the first time by Michel Foucault as a technical term in 
his strategy of thought. In an interview about his books, as well as his preference for the 
new terms such as “apparatuses” and “disciplines”, Foucault explains: 
“With the notion of apparatus, I find myself in a difficulty which I 
haven’t yet been properly able to get out of. I said that the apparatus is 
essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of 
a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a 
particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, etc. The 
apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always 
linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an 
equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies 
of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge. In 
seeking in The Order of Things to write a history of the episteme, I was still 
caught in an impasse. What I should like to do now is to try and show that 
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what I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the episteme; or 
rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the 
apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its 
elements being much more heterogeneous” (Foucault, 1980, pp. 196-197). 
The term “apparatus” was frequently used by Foucault from the mid-1970s 
onward when he began to concern himself with what is called “governmentality”, or the 
“government of men”. He never offered any complete definition of the term though, and 
instead, used the term “positivite” or positivity which is an etymological neighbor of 
dispositif, though he did not define this term either (Agamben, 2009, p. 3). The Italian 
philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (1942 - …), further elaborated on the term, and by 
referring to “a set of practices and mechanisms (both linguistic and nonlinguistic, 
juridical, technical and military) that aim to face an urgent need and to obtain an effect 
that is more or less immediate” (Agamben, 2009, p. 8). What was important for 
Agamben was the role of the apparatus in the play of power, in the administration of 
body, of house, and of government, and more generally management (Agamben, 2009, 
pp. 8-10). Agamben expanded his definition, and called the apparatus:  
“literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, 
orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behavior, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, 
prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, 
disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection with power 
is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, 
philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular 
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telephones, and – why not – language itself, which is perhaps the most 
ancient of apparatuses – one in which thousands and thousands of years ago 
a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing 
the consequences that he was about to face” (Agamben, 2009, p. 14). 
For Agamben, there are two great classes: living beings (or substances) and 
apparatuses, and between them, as a third class, subjects. Subject is the one that results 
from the relation, or “from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses” 
(Agamben, p. 14), though in some cases these two overlap, and it happens when the 
same individual, the same substance, can be the place of multiple processes of 
subjectification. So, as Agamben recapitulates, “the boundless growth of apparatuses in 
our time corresponds to the equally extreme proliferation in processes of 
subjectification” (Agamben, 2009, p. 15).  
In brief, apparatus is mentioned when different ways of play of power are behind 
the scene to administer, manage, control and finally subjectify individuals. Addressing 
Agamben’s conception of apparatus, the theories of wilāya, as will be observed, have 
been generated over the centuries to control and supervise minds, bodies, actions and 
practices of individuals, and from this perspective, wilāya has been turned into a 
machine that demands obedience and forces individuals into becoming believers. 
Individuals, then, are both the agents of wilāya and at the same time; the subject of this 
all-masculine apparatus that not only has an ontological nexus to Divinity; but also 
executes power on behalf of Divinity, therefore, any disobedience targets His dignity 
and grandeur.  
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The Introduction should be treated as the foundational chapter for further 
discussion on wilāya throughout this thesis. As observed, it sought to discuss wilāya 
and its roots in Islamic sacred sources, including the Qurʾān, ḥadīth and statements of 
the Imāms. Research on this term had an etymological aspect too, which was studied in 
the origin and historical development of wilāya as they were cited in the early Shīʿa 
ḥadīth compilations. With regard to its status in the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, it can be 
concluded that the pair wilāya /walāya is a well-versed term with a solid foundation in 
the early Islamic and Shīʿa tradition. It was observed that it is around the wilāya of 
Imāms, as the only legitimate heirs of the Prophet that, the Shīʿa discourse of leadership 
and authority has been formed. Pertinent to this, is the early Shīʿa conceptualization of 
wilāya through which the Shīʿa Community has come to identify itself, and through 
which, historically, it drew its boundaries. In the next chapter, the mystical 
conceptualization of wilāya in the School of ibn ʿ Arabī will be studied. It will be observed 
how this term, by being located at the centre of the Akbarīan apparatus, finds new 
dimensions and significantly changes forever the course of theorizing and 
conceptualizing this term.  
1 - For all Qurʾānīc translations throughout this thesis I use, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Others (eds), the 
Study Quran, a New Translation and Commentary, 2015 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers). 
2 - This verse is famous as the ‘wilāya verse’ and refers to Ali who endowed his ring to a beggar when he 
was praying. In this verse, the wilāya of the Prophet and of Imāms are not mentioned explicitly, though 
Shīʿa scholars have interpreted the term ‘ṣādiqīn’ (the Truthful) as them.  
< http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa1817# > last accessed January 6, 2017. 
3 - The abovementioned ḥadīth is not mentioned in Shīʿa sources, and it is only Sunni mystical sources 
that have cited it.  
4 - Or ordinary believers who have reached the status of self-annihilation (fanā) and gained divine 
attributes (akhlāq a-llāh).  
5 - Along with the importance of sirr in understanding the office of wilāya, Sufis have enumerated two 
other reasons for the secrecy of awlīyā under the divine ḥijāb. The first one is awlīyā’s desire for 
obscurity (khamūl) and their dislike of being known or recognized by people. It is their insistence in 
keeping themselves hidden from people and choosing an obscure life that preserve them from being 
known and killed by them (Himmatī, 1391, pp. 9-15). The third reason is that since the interest of the 
world and its survival depends on the existence of awlīyā, they must be unknown. The absence of 
awlīyā is equal to the destruction of the world (Himmatī, pp. 15-17). 
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6 - The text is discussed by Robert Gleave in an article entitled: Early Shiite hermeneutics and the dating 
of Kitāb Sulaym ibn Qays, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Volume 78, Issue 01, 
February 2015, pp. 83-103.  
7 - These sources include:  
Al-Rajāl and al-Maḥāsin, both by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ʿAbd ul-Raḥmān Barqī (d. 274-280 H/887-
893), A-Nawādir by Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿῙsā ʿAshʿarī (d. 3rd H/9th), Al-Ghārāt by Ibrāhīm ibn 
Muḥammad al-Thaqafī al-Kūfī (d. 283 H/896), Tafsīr ul-Ḥibarī by Abū ʿAbdullāh Hossein ibn Ḥikam al-
Ḥibarī al-Kūfī (d. 3rd H/9th), Tafsīr-i Furāt al-Kūfī by Furāt ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Furāt al-Kūfī (d. 4th H/10th), 
Musnad al-Imām Mūsa ibn Jaʿfar by Abī ʿImrān Mūsa ibn Ibrāhīm al-Marwzī (d. 2nd century H/8th), Qurb 
ul-Isnād by ʿAbdullāh ibn Jaʿfar Ḥimyarī (d. 2nd H/8th), A-Tafsīr (also known as Tafsīr-i Qumī) by ʿAlī ibn 
Ibrāhīm Qumī (d. 307 H/919), Tarīkh-i Ahl ul-Bayt by Ibn Abī Thalj al-Baghdādī (d. 310 H/922), and Al-
Imāma and Wa Tabṣira Min al-Ḥeyra both by ʿAlī ibn Hossein Bābawayh al-Qūmī (d. 329 H/940). All of 
these ḥadīth compilations are written before the composition of al-Kafī.  
8 - The significance of the doctrine of wilāya - as love-loyalty-submission - (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 453) 
caused almost all the early compilers of the Shīʿa ḥadīth not only to discredit “the so-called Uthmanian 
Qurʾānīc vulgate” (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 231) as something falsified and censured, but also to set forth 
the idea that the much more voluminous and credited version of the Qurʾān, known as ‘the Qurʾān of the 
imāms’ (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 236), having been disclosed to the Prophet; concerning the walāya of 
the imāms is the truthful Book and provides “a literal Qurʾānīc basis for the political and theological 
doctrines of the imamate” (Amir-Moezzi, 2011, p. 237). 
9 - Hassan Ansari has shown that how the idea of the necessity of ḥujja has been important in Twelver 
Imamite, and from the first half of the third century of Hegira, Imamite theologians such as Faḍl ibn 
Shādhān came to conceptualize the concept of imām and ḥujja. See: 
Hassan Ansari, Imamate, in online Dāʾyratu-l-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, Vol 10, 1392 (Tehran: 
Intishārāt-i Dāʾyratu-l-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī), pp. 137-141 < 
http://www.cgie.org.ir/fa/publication/entryview/4686 >, last accessed 5/1/17.  
10 - They were active during Imām al-Baqir (114 H/732) and were hidden among his companions.  
11 - A sect within the Ghullāt that “abrogated the sharīʿa and did not consider themselves bound by 
religious obligations, including prayer” (Modarressi, 1993, p. 35). 
12 - According to Skinner, the social context of a given text cannot independently lead a historian of 
ideas to the recovery of the intentions of author, but only to discovery of the author’s past motivations; 
which is the linguistic context of a certain period of time, when a given text was composed.  
13 - Matthew Melvin Koushki, The Quest for a Universal Science: The Occult Philosophy of Ṣāʾin al-Dīn 
Turka Ῑṣfahānī (1369-1432) and Intellectual Millenarianism in Early Timurid Iran, Ph.D. dissertation, 
Yale University, May 2012. 
14 - Apparatus or “dispositif”, in French was a vague concept in Foucault's later thought. He used it quite 
often, especially from the mid-1970s, when he begins to concern himself with what he call 
“governmentality” or the “government of men”. Both Giorgio Agamben and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), 
used it and illuminated it in their writings. In his essay called “What is an Apparatus?” (2009), Agamben 
tried to decode what Foucault meant by this technical term. See: Giorgio Agamben, What is an 
Apparatus? Translated into English by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, 2009 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press). 
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Chapter One: Ibn ʿArabī and Wilāya 
The subject matter of this chapter is the study and critical analysis of the conceptions 
of wilāya, the seal of wilāya (khatm al-wilāya, also known as the seal of the sainthood), 
nubuwwa (prophethood), khilāfa (vicegerency), and al-insān al-kāmil (the Perfect Man), in 
the writings of ibn ʿ Arabī (d. 637 H/1240). The focus is on a number of his texts and treatises, 
such as Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Bezels of Wisdom) ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib (the Fabulous Gryphon) Risālat 
al-Anwār (Treatise of the Lights) published in Majmūʿa Rasāʾil (Collected Treatises) and 
Tajalīyāt ul-Ilāhīya (Divine Theophanies). To this end, the present chapter starts with the 
biography, studies, journeys and bibliography of ibn ʿArabī, followed by his conceptions of 
the abovementioned terms. The purpose is to show how he was inspired by previous mystics 
and mystical traditions which would have been available in his time, what he added to the 
existing traditions, and what he left as his legacy for future generations.  
All this is highly relevant to the overall content of this study, because it enables 
researchers to keep track of the conceptualization of the abovementioned terms, and 
particularly the doctrines of wilāya and khatm al-wilāya, from the earliest mystics such as 
al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in the third century up to the seventh century, when the Andalusian 
mystic makes them the central concepts of his mysticism. By doing so, it places the 
researcher in a better position to answer the second question of this study: “whether the 
conceptualizations of wilāya have remained stagnant and unchanged throughout history”. 
Addressing the doctrine of al-insān al-kāmil, whose conceptualization pre-dates ibn ʿArabī, 
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the intention is to study its conceptual development from ibn ʿArabī onward, and to delve 
into this question that how later scholars, here Shīʿa mystics and philosophers, understood 
it, interpreted it and adjusted it into their doctrinal platform. These two questions are 
prologues to the major question which are “whether Akbarīan mysticism was inexorable for 
later scholars, and if not, why the majority of them wanted to interpret him from a Shīʿa 
perspective”?  
As it is already mentioned, for example, on the conceptions of khatm al-wilāya, al-
Shaykh al-Akbar (the Greatest Master) was inspired by al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 295 H/910) 
and his theory of khatm al-wilāya, though ibn ʿArabī’s contribution on both the concept and 
the referents of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah and wilāyat al-khāṣṣah are more impressive on later Sufis. 
In certain areas, such as the theory of the Perfect Man, ibn ʿArabī retains supremacy over his 
predecessors and successors.1 Al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s legacy, however, is significant and 
critical to such an extent that subsequent mystics, whether in agreement with him or not, 
were in different ways influenced by him. Pertinent to this, is his impact on Shīʿa scholars 
and on the growth and development of Shīʿa mysticism in later centuries, in the sense that 
ibn ʿArabī’s intellectual legacy came to be read and interpreted with Shīʿa concerns and 
interests.  
1.1. Bibliography, Travels and Works 
Abū ʿAbdullāh Muḥy al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿArabī al-Ḥātamī 
(d. 638 H/1240), later known as al-Shaykh al-Akbar, was born in Murcia in Andalusia (Arabic 
al-Andalus) in today’s Spain. When he was eight years-old, his family moved to Seville 
(Arabic Ishbiliyyah), and his father started an official career there. It was in Seville that ibn 
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ʿArabī began his primary education with famous teachers on the Qurʾān, ḥadīth, literature 
and the other related subjects, and received ījāza (authorization) of teaching, as well as 
khirqa (lit. cloak). It was also at this time, the period of jāhilīyya (lit. ignorance) that he, as a 
teenager “felt drawn in a different direction. He had a presentiment of certain spiritual need” 
(Addas, 1993, p. 31). So, the young ibn ʿArabī was “divided between his desire to enjoy the 
good things of this low world and his desire for God; the period when he had a vague 
apprehension of the Truth but did not yet know it in its fullness” (Addas, 1993, p. 31).  
Ibn ʿArabī is characterized by his several adventurous journeys to different parts of 
the Muslim world, as well as having dreams and visions. His journeys were both geographical 
and spiritual, shaping his personality as the most celebrated ʿārif (mystic) of the Muslim 
world. There are two viewpoints regarding ibn ʿArabī’s methods of learning: first, from an 
early age he became acquainted with numerous shaykhs and benefited from a number of 
masters, both in Seville and various other Muslim cities; from Islamic Spain to Baghdad and 
to Konya. These figures, who were mostly ʿ ārifs as well as a handful of theologians and jurists, 
impressed and shaped his ideas on ʿirfān (mysticism), fiqh (jurisprudence) and kalām 
(theology). Among those who impressed him greatly were the Malāmatīyya (also Malāmatīs, 
from the Arabic word malāmah or blame), who were praised by ibn ʿArabī as the owners of 
the most exalted status of wilāya and whose ranks were only comparable to prophethood 
(Khurāsānī, in http://lib.eshia.ir/23022/4/1507, p. 5). 
On the other hand, there are scholars, such as Gerald Elmore who argues that he was 
not unduly influenced by any personal teacher and therefore can be regarded as “a perfect 
example of the theodidactic, Uwaysī mystic – a Sufi with no (visible) master among men” 
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(Elmore, 1999, pp. 103-108).2 However, there is no room for doubt about his masters 
initiated him with regular Islamic ʿilm, and as Claude Addas has argued, he “undertook to 
deepen his knowledge of the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth” (Addas, 1993, p. 44). Addas provides us 
with the names of his teachers, as well as the legal and spiritual schools that influenced the 
young ibn ʿArabī (Addas, 1993, pp. 44 ff). Therefore, his journey bears the imprint of both 
the regular Islamic training he gained from his masters, as well as the illumination (fatḥ) 
which he obtained during a retreat (khalwa), as the fruit of a long period of initiatic discipline 
(rīyāḍa) (Addas, 1993, p. 35).3 As mentioned earlier, one of the characteristics of ibn ʿArabī 
were his dreams and visions of figures such as the Prophet, and Sufis - among them women 
- all of whom came to inspire him with their words and enunciations. Along with dreams and 
visions, he received a number of “transcendent inspirations” (Nettler, 2003, p. 5), through 
which (by his claim) most of his works were revealed to him by God. For example, Fuṣūṣ al-
Ḥikam4, as well as his magnum opus in thirty-seven volumes, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah 
(Meccan Revelations) and Mawāqiʿ al-Nujūm (the Stations of Stars) which were later written 
by him in a short period of time, are among those divine gifts (Khurāsānī, p. 5). 
Ibn ʿArabī’s long period of physical, intellectual and religious travel helped him both 
to teach and learn from others. Through this exchange, he not only achieved “an impressive 
literary productivity closely linked with his physical movements” (Nettler, 2003, p. 1), but 
also gained “an original perspective that [as will be shown in this chapter] in later Islam 
served to re-orientate religious thought, whether Sufi or other, in a most profound way” 
(Nettler, 2003, p. 2). Settling in Damascus proved to be most beneficial for ibn ʿArabī in 
several ways. He completed the first draft of al-Futūḥāt (Addas, 1993, p. 285),5 as well as 
Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Khurāsānī, p. 7). His intellectual and spiritual experiences blossomed as 
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well. In addition, he gained “the good will, friendship, and protection offered him by the 
powerful family of the Banū Zakī … [a factor that] enabled him to pursue his teaching in 
complete tranquility” (Addas, 1993, p. 254). He died in twenty-eight of Rabīʿ al-Thānī 638 
/16 November 1240, at the age of seventy-eight, and was buried in the family cemetery of 
qāḍī (also qāzī, lit. the judge) Muḥy al-Dīn ibn Zakī (Khurāsānī, p. 7). 
 For the purpose of my research, which is the reading and analysis of the concept of 
wilāya and other related terms in the writings of ibn ʿArabī, I have chosen a few of his key 
texts, such as Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, with the glosses of Abu al-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī,6 ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib and 
Risālat al-Anwār (Apostleship of Lights). There are two difficulties with reading and 
understanding ibn ʿ Arabī’s texts: the intricacies of his texts and the complexities of the Arabic 
language he uses. Addressing ibn ʿArabī’s thought and language, Nettler rightly argues that 
both his Sufi thought and language are highly complex, in some cases overlapped and 
ambiguous, and as such, “resist any simple and straightforward understanding” (Nettler, 
2003, p. 2).  
1.2. The Perfect Man 
The intent of the Perfect Man, which constitutes the mystical anthropology of all the 
ʿirfānī trends in the Muslim world, is very much indebted to ibn ʿArabī and his School. It is 
well known that it was al-Shaykh al-Akbar, who, for the first time in the history of Islamic 
mysticism, turned the Perfect Man; the archetype, ideal exemplar, the Minor Cosmos 
(microcosm), and the medium by which Deity looks at His creatures; into a cornerstone of 
his theoretical mysticism (ʿirfān-i naẓarī). The notion, however, as a number of scholars 
including Nicholson, Abu al-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī and Takeshita have argued, is almost as old as Sufism 
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itself (Nicholson, 1998, p. 77, ʿAfīfī, 1423 H/2002, pp. 35-397 & Takeshita, 1986, pp. 15ff8), 
though, in subsequent developments, ibn ʿArabī’s conceptions of the Perfect Man became a 
model for further theorization by Sufis.  
Masataka Takeshita offers an elaborated elucidation of this notion in the thoughts of 
ibn ʿArabī in his doctoral thesis, “ibn ʿArabī’s Theory of the Perfect Man and its Place in the 
History of the Islamic Thought”. Along with its historical genealogy, from pre-Islamic 
traditions up to ibn ʿArabī, Takeshita explains anthropocentrism as the predominant feature 
of ibn ʿArabī’s anthropology, and shows how he used the themes and motives familiar to 
early Sufism (Takeshita, 1986, p. 8). Although his anthropology manifests obvious 
similarities to that of the early Christian fathers, “the notion of theology” of the image on the 
basis of the famous hadith that “God created Adam in His image”, was changed dramatically 
by Muslim Sufis. Their belief was that, Adam, as the stereotype, was created according to 
God’s names and attributes, and not according to His essence as opposed to the Christian 
doctrine. Due to the significance of tawḥīd in Islam, Muslim theologians distinguished 
between the essence and the names and attributes, and in this way, endowed the latter with 
an intermediary position between the absolute Godhead and the creature (Takeshita, 1986, 
pp. 15-17). 
Without digging into historical debates on the theory of the Perfect Man prior to ibn 
ʿArabī, what is important for discussion here is that it was ibn ʿArabī who used the phrase 
“the Perfect Man” for the first time, and mostly used it to describe Adam, who was created in 
God’s image as His vicegerent on earth. Adam is the khalīfa in terms of the totality (or 
synthesis) of his status – maqām al-jāmiʿ or kawn al-jāmiʿ (synthetical being) –, in the sense 
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that “he is the synthesis of the image of God and the image of the universe” (Takeshita, 1986, 
p. 50). As Takeshita argues, in order to understand the abovementioned theory, one needs 
to pay attention to both the Judeo-Christian tradition of the theory of the double nature of 
man on one hand, and the epistemological and ontological functions of reality in ibn ʿArabī 
on the other (Takeshita, 1986, pp. 51ff).  
As mentioned above, it is with Faṣṣ on Adam that the Akbarīan discussion of the 
Perfect Man starts. In this first Faṣṣ,9 ibn ʿArabī talks about the station of man (insān), or the 
station of the khalīfa of God on the earth, who is the eye of God by which the Deity looks upon 
His creatures and shows mercy toward them. Therefore, insān is pre-eternal and perennial, 
he is the Logos (kalima), encompassing His names, attributes and the secrets of creation. The 
cosmos is created by insān, and its durability and persistency is indebted to him. Moreover, 
insān is called the Seal (which means the one who brought the wilāya to its highest level), 
because He seals His treasuries and preserves them by insān (ʿAfīfī, 1423 H/2002, vol. 1, p. 
50). Insān is different from the angels in that he not only embodies all the names and 
attributes, but, because he is cognizant of the names and can teach them to angels, he is the 
more excellent. He also embodies completeness, as he manifests the images of Reality (ḥaqq) 
and of the cosmos both (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 55). 
 The Reality10 is reflected and present in every creature, but it is only the Perfect Man 
or the Great Man (al-insān al-kabīr) which is regarded as the spirit (rūḥ) and the heart which 
animate the cosmos, the cosmos being his outward manifestation (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 111). The 
doctrine of the Perfect Man has drawn the attention of the Shīʿa ḥakīms of the post-Safawid 
era, and as it will be observed in chapter three, both the scholars of the Schools of Tehran 
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and Qum, adjusted it into their doctrinal creed, here Shīʿīsm. Imāms are the Perfect Man, the 
ḥaqq (which is a Qurʾānīc term, means reality/truth), and ḥaqīqa (lit. rightness, 
appropriateness). The latter is not a Qurʾānīc term, but is used extensively in the ḥadīth 
literature about Imāms and their status. Ḥaqq (lit. truth, reality, rightness) have always had 
a fundamental role in “the quest for wisdom and the happiness of the soul” in Islamic 
philosophy (Chittick, 2014, p. 4). In the same way, Imāms represent ḥaqq and ḥaqīqa and are 
regarded as ‘the light of guidance’ and ‘the ship of salvation and happiness (miṣbāḥ ul-hudā 
wa safīnat ul-najāt) for their believers.  
In the twelfth faṣṣ of the book of Fuṣūṣ, which is dedicated to the Wisdom of the Heart, 
ibn ʿArabī discusses the issue of the heart in general, the heart of the Gnostic (ʿārif) in 
particular, which originates from the mercy of God. The heart not only originates from the 
mercy He has for His creatures, but also the heart of the ʿārif is more immense and extensive 
than His mercy. When God wishes to widen the heart of a chosen ʿārif, His purpose is that the 
ʿārif’s heart contains nothing but the remembrance of God, as He is envious (ghayūr) toward 
His subjects; there is no room in the heart of the chosen ʿārif’s to love any other above God. 
So, as He manifests Himself in different ways (in different names and attributes), the heart 
widens and constricts in order to be capable of reflecting different manifestations, and as 
such, there is no more room for anything but Him (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 120). 
The heart of the ʿārif, ibn ʿArabī argues, is an allegory of the heart of the Perfect Man, 
and is the place of the bezel (faṣṣ) of the seal of the prophets. By adopting such an argument, 
ibn ʿArabī takes an opposite stance, opposite to what the Folk believe as the status of the 
heart in receiving God’s manifestation. Remembering Bevir’s conception of the term “webs 
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of beliefs” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 190 ff), and its reciprocal relationship with ‘inherited tradition’ 
(Bevir, 2004, p. 195), ibn ʿArabī’s conception of istiʿdād (a web of beliefs) as it stands against 
the common heritage of his time (or, Folk’s common belief in the status of the heart of ʿārif 
in accepting tajallī), is an example of the priority of agency over structure, here a common 
tradition. The priority of agency over structure and people’s capability of altering the 
traditions they inherit by changing the totality of the beliefs they hold (Bevir, 2004, pp. 196-
197) is also emphasized by Skinner (Skinner, 2002, p. 7). 
The popular belief among the mystics is that God is manifested in conformity with the 
preparedness of the servant, but this is not true; as according to ibn ʿ Arabī, this preparedness 
of the servant, istiʿdād, “is rather the servant’s preparedness to conform to a particular form 
of God’s phenomenal appearance. Indeed, this istiʿdād is given by God to His servant”11 
(Nettler, 2003, pp. 124-125). Thus, when this preparedness comes to the heart, the heart 
sees Him in the form in which He is revealed to it. Therefore, the heart of the ʿārif is the only 
thing that sees God in everything and worships him in the infinite shapes of His 
manifestations (Takeshita, 1986, pp. 117-118). 
As already noted, ibn ʿArabī facilitates the idea that the ʿārif is able to enlarge himself 
in equal degree to the image upon which God manifests Himself (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 120). By such 
an argument, the role of the polished heart of the ʿārif in receiving divine manifestations, and 
his preparedness to conform with the image of God, are more crucial than divine 
manifestation per se, though, as stated earlier, the preparedness of the heart is given by God 
to His servant. Ibn ʿArabī explains the difference between these two ideas by distinguishing 
between two kinds of theophanies (tajallī); the first one is called tajallī al-ghayb (the 
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Theophany of the Unseen/invisible), and the second, tajallī al-Shahāda (the Theophany of 
the Visible).  
According to the first type of theophany, the capacity [to receive His manifestations] 
is endowed to everyone who has a heart, and thereby the hidden and invisible Reality - which 
is called huwa, (lit. he, masculine subject pronoun) and refers to His essence – is displayed 
in the heart of the ʿārif. Following this, the second theophany happens. To be more precise, 
when the capacity to receive His essence is achieved by the heart, at a higher level, the second 
theophany appears - by which ʿārif sees God as He appears to Himself in a form given by the 
place in which He is seen (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, pp. 120-121).12 Instead of the term “capacity” in 
receiving tajallīs, ibn ʿArabī prefers “the allegory of the mirror”, as the issue of manifestation 
is more of a polished mirror reflecting upon itself His names and attributes. The heart of the 
ʿārif is ordained to accept the images of the names or permanent archetypes (aʿyān-i thābita), 
and the role and importance of the capacity of the heart of the ʿārif has little place in ibn 
ʿArabī’s mysticism (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 146). Insān, ibn ʿ Arabī argues, is a comprehensive example 
of the Deity and encompasses His names, attributes and deeds. Insān is the microcosm and 
the spirit which animates the macrocosm, and as such has the authority to act upon the 
cosmos. Everything in the cosmos praises him, because he is endowed with the reality of the 
image of God (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p 199). This doctrine has a reverse as Fazlur Rahman maintains, 
which is the doctrine of “the universe as the ‘macro-anthropos (al-insān al-akbar)’ or ‘macro-
persona (al-shakhs al-akbar)’”, and Man as ‘micro-anthropos (al-insān al-ṣaghīr)’; while the 
former “patterns man on the Universe”, the latter patterns the Universe on man (Rahman, 
1968, p. 149). 
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Al-insān al-kāmil, is here personified in Ibrahim; the second father of all Muslims, and 
the mystery of the reality of the Perfect Man (al-Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, pp. 30-32), is the 
gnostic as opposed to ordinary believers (muʾminūn), and has the gnosis (maʿrifa) of the 
truth of the Book, which contradicts the literal meaning of it. On the basis of the ẓāhirī 
(exoteric) and straightforward text-reading meaning of the Qurʾān, God is the absolute 
omnipotent, though in terms of the bāṭinī (esoteric) reading, His omnipotence is “qualified 
by the very nature of the world He has created” (Nettler, 2003, p. 91), among them the aʿyān-
i thābita are important. As Nettler maintains, “the fixed essences [aʿyān-i thābita], which are 
one stage in an ‘emanating process’ of divine self-expression, determine God’s choices, 
wishes and abilities” (Nettler, 2003, p. 91), and the gnostic is aware of this truth.  
The conception of God and His being determined by His rules, should be understood 
in terms of the word ‘reciprocity’. Nettler rightly mentions that “God feeds you with your 
very being, while you feed Him with the order and structure … which determines the manner 
and specific content of this ‘feeding’” (Nettler, 2003, p. 95). Therefore, the term mukallaf, is 
understood differently from its standard meaning in the Islamic technical, legal and 
theological usage. In this usage, the human being is “the object of God’s revelatory commands 
of belief and action (the taklīf)” (Nettler, 2003, pp. 95-96). For ibn ʿArabī, however, mukallaf 
means convention or reciprocity, or “the matter is from Him to you and from you to Him” 
(Nettler, 2003, p. 96). So, “there is a full reciprocity and ontological intertwining between 
God and man” (Nettler, 2003, p. 96).  
This divine-human mutuality and intertwining of relationship, or the absorption of 
Him in His creation, is designated as “the divine stations which are His names. His being in 
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the world is His self-expression through the names which are the world and which possess 
His essence” (Nettler, 2003, p. 100). Profoundly different from traditional Islamic 
understanding of the concept of God and His relationship with the creation, the Akbarīan 
doctrine is seemingly the “total identification of God and man through the mutual 
assimilation of each other’s personal attributes” (Nettler, 2003, pp. 100-101), and is 
regarded as the foundation of his theory of unity and diversity, or the One and the Many.  
Returning to the ʿārif’s (the Perfect Man) attributes, ibn ʿArabī believes that the ʿārif, 
due to divine injunction and not by his choice, can act effectively in the world through himma 
(endeavour or determination) (Nettler, 2003, pp. 210-211). Here, ibn ʿArabī emphasizes on 
the significance of the faculty of imagination (khīyāl), not only in creating God’s image (every 
ʿārif creates his own God), but also in creating or making things appear in the corporal visible 
world (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 81 & pp. 148-158). Himma is pivotal not only because it touches upon 
the role of the creative faculty of the Perfect Man in actualizing things in the material world,13 
but also because of the stress ibn ʿArabī places on the realm in-between, which is called 
barzakh or the mundus imaginalis, to be Corbinian. As William Chittick has rightly pointed 
out, along with the conventional reading of Islam “which conceives of the cosmos as a 
hierarchy of worlds” inspired by the Qurʾān, ibn ʿArabī adds a new world in-between these 
two. Chittick evaluates his role in bringing out “the full implications of the in-between realm” 
as very important, because it was “one of several factors that prevented Islamic philosophy 
from falling into the trap of a mind/body dichotomy or a dualistic worldview” (Chittick, 
2014, p. 11).  
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This realm is “both unseen, spiritual, and intelligible, and in another respect visible, 
corporeal, and sensible”, and it is a locus where spiritual beings are corporealized and where 
corporeal beings are spiritualized. To be more precise, the mundus imaginalis, according to 
Chittick, “is a real, external realm in the Cosmic Book, more real than the visible, sensible, 
physical realm, but less real than the invisible, intelligible, spiritual realm” (Chittick, 2014, p. 
11). When ibn ʿArabī states that the People of the Perfection (ahl al-kamāl) by the help of 
himma, can actualize things in the material world, he refers to potentialities of the mundus 
imaginalis, where the spiritual copy of corporal things exists and the Perfect Man actualizes 
them.  
Ibn ʿ Arabī divides insān into three groups: the first and the most honorable one is “the 
People of the Hearts” or “the Most Perfect ʿĀrifs”, who are capable of knowing God by 
intuition and perceptivity (dhawq). The second group contains “the People of the Intellects”, 
theologians or philosophers who are also called “the People of distinguished 
ideas/thoughts”, who know God by limiting Him in certain images. The third group is the 
imitators, who follow and trust the prophets and messengers’ teachings of God (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, 
p. 149). The first group is the referent of the Perfect Man who is the permanent and the most 
perfect manifestation of God, and from this perspective, there is no difference between 
divinity and humanity (ibid, p. 190). The Perfect Man, ibn ʿArabī states, is the secret of being 
and its cause, and it is for the sake of him that His mercy emanates to people (ʿAfīfī, p. 191).  
By dividing ijtihād into two categories, ibn ʿ Arabī discusses that the Most Perfect ʿ Ārifs 
enjoy a kind of ijtihād which consists both of religious laws and inspiration from God, while 
the other kind is achieved by human efforts and endeavours (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, pp. 216-217). They 
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are endowed with divine knowledge because they are considered “divine words”, and as 
such have the gnosis of the realities of things as well as the authority to act upon the cosmos 
(ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 221, 260, 271, 279). In explaining ibn ʿ Arabī’s conception of ijtihād, Nicholson 
states that although he “admits the immutability of the Koranic revelation, he claims for 
Moslem saints the right to modify by abrogation or addition the religious code that is based 
on ijtihād, i.e. on non-Prophetic authority, and to put aside any ḥadīth in which their inner 
light detects a flaw” (Nicholson, 1998, p. 159). ʿĀrifs are the Servants of the Time (ʿUbbād al-
Dahr), because every moment He shows Himself to them in a new form and, because the 
emanation is renewed every moment, ʿārifs, due to their unity with the Reality, are renewed 
and reborn as well. Not only ʿārif but also the whole existence is renewed by new emanation 
which happens every moment (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 290).14  
1.3. Wilāya, Khilāfa, Nubuwwa and Risāla 
 Along with the Perfect Man, Fuṣūṣ also contains ibn ʿArabī’s conceptions of wilāya, 
khilāfa (vicegerency), nubuwwa (prophethood) and risāla (messengership/apostleship), 
though before examining them, it is relevant to briefly point to al-Tirmidhī15 as the preceding 
figure whose formulations of wilāya and khatm al-wilāya inspired ibn ʿArabī in his 
elaborations on them. The ʿārif and ḥakīm of the third century, Abū ʿAbdullāh Muḥammad 
ibn Ḥassan ibn Bishr ibn Hārūn Tirmidhī, offered a systematic discussion on the concepts of 
khatm al-wilāya and khatm al-nubuwwa. According to Tirmidhī, nubuwwa and wilāya have 
elements including revelation, words, and spirit (waḥy, kalām, rūḥ), along with the hidden 
knowledge of God, reality, and tranquility (ḥadīth, ḥaqq and sakīna) which form the 
components of them, respectively (Radtke & O’kane, 1996, 112-117).16 
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 Awlīyā are selected by God to this office17 and their endeavours in attaining wilāya 
are not as effective as God’s will in choosing them and bestowing on them cleanliness of 
heart, knowledge of God’s Oneness (ʿilm al-tawḥīd), and knowledge of His favors (maʿrifat 
al-ālāʾ) (Radtke & O’kane, p. 153). Since the friends of God are gifted with His benefaction 
(karam), their miracles are generated from His benefaction and they have unconditional 
faith in Him (Radtke & O’kane, pp. 163-164).18 Among these friends there is one (khatm al-
awlīyā), who, due to his close proximity to God, is the most honorable. His sealing is a safe 
conduit for other awlīyā whose honesty and loyalty to God is imperfect. The seal is the 
greatest saint and has the highest position among people after the Prophet. Khātam, on the 
basis of his distinguished essence19, is different from others and is called the Mahdi, who will 
appear in End Times and will be the proof of God on other awlīyā (Radtke & O’kane, pp. 197-
205).20 
 Wilāya, according to ibn ʿArabī, is a pre-existent and perennial office21, because walī 
has two characteristics; he is cognizant of the divine names and attributes, and he is the one 
who has completed the status of totality (jāmiʿīyah). The status of walī is one of totality and 
unity, as he has accessibility to divine knowledge. Walī is higher than the 
apostles/messengers (rasūls) and the nabīs (prophet), since nubuwwa (prophethood) and 
apostleship (risāla) are interrupted, but wilāya is everlasting and uninterrupted and, from 
this perspective, wilāya is a comprehensive status more universal than nubuwwa and risāla 
(ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 64 & pp. 134-135). Despite differences and contradictions, the offices of 
wilāya and nubuwwa have similarities as well. In Risālat al-Anwār, ibn ʿArabī states that 
wilāya and nubuwwa have three things in common: attainment of knowledge from its divine 
source, performance of extraordinary deeds, such as miracles (karāmats or charismatic 
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power), and having the ability or himma to create things in the physical world (ibn ʿArabī, 
al- Rasāʾil, n.d., p. 84).  
 Muḥammad ʿAlī Muwaḥid in his glosses on Fuṣūṣ, points out that wilāya, risāla, and 
nubuwwa are of the same nature. Risāla or apostleship, is an intermediate station between 
God and people and therefore He appoints rusul to transmit His message to them. So, risāla 
is an isthmus between Deity and people and should be regarded as a divine gift. On the other 
hand, nubuwwa is an isthmus between wilāya and risāla, as God reveals to nabī a sharīʿa 
which could only be for nabī himself; if nabī has to convey the message to others he is called 
rasūl, otherwise he is only nabī, which means that his message should be kept hidden. Rusul 
are also divided into two groups: the first group is to convey the message to people, and is 
indifferent about whether people accept it or not; while the second group includes those who 
use force to persuade people to accept the message of the nabī. In other words, their message 
should be spread by sword until people obey and subordinate to them (Muwaḥid, 1386 
shamsī, p. 78). The second group of rusul needs a khalīfa or a successor, who is the owner of 
sword, appointment, dismissal and wilāya (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 207). 
Therefore, the second usage of the term wilāya is the succession of the prophets, and 
from this perspective, the office of wilāya reminds us that His mercy to people and the 
emanation are not interrupted. Wilāya is both a general term for every personification of the 
Perfect Man, including prophets and nabī, as well as khalīfas of the prophets, including the 
Prophet of Islam. From this viewpoint, each prophet has a walī who inherits his sharīʿa and 
seals his religion. He is subordinate to it and executes it. In terms of his succession, walī is 
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the servant of the cause of God and should render his service to His will (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, pp. 97-
98 & pp. 162-163).  
Nabī and walī both have the right to dispose, as well as the authority to act upon the 
cosmos, though there is a slight difference between these two types of taṣarruf: walī, or the 
most perfect ʿārif has no authority in accepting the right of taṣarruf,22 but nabī asks for such 
a right before accepting nubuwwa, because without having such an authority his mission is 
incomplete (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 129). Apart from the right of taṣarruf, there are other differences 
between nabī and walī: awlīyā are the People of Unveiling (ahl al-kashf), while anbīyā are 
the People of Informing and Warning (ahl al-indhār awi-l-ikhbār) (Muwaḥid, 1386 shamsī, 
p. 78). Walī is the everlasting and remaining name of God and is more exalted than nabī and 
rasūl. In terms of the succession of Prophets, the office of wilāya is that of the General 
Nubuwwa (nubuwwat al-ʿāmm or al-ʿāmmah), and awlīyā (or anbīyāʾ al-awlīyā, lit. walīs 
who are general prophets), regarded as signs of His mercy to people and are sent to people 
when a prophet dies (ʿAfīfī, vol. 1, p. 135).  
Addressing the relationship of nabī and walī, Addas explains that the Akbarīan 
doctrine of wilāya should be understood with regard to both the esoteric interpretation of 
the Qurʾānīc verses “referring to the individuals in question” (Addas, 1993, p. 277), and the 
office of nubuwwa. All the awlīyā are heirs to the prophets, but “each of them incarnates one 
particular form of sainthood, the model and source of which are represented by one of the 
‘major prophets’” (Addas, 1993, p. 277). Therefore, a walī can be mūsawī, ibrāhīmī, ʿīsawī, 
hūdī, Muḥammadī and so on, and every walī is superior to another only with regard to the 
function he performs (Addas, 1993, p. 126). On the other hand, it will be helpful to recall that 
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for ibn ʿArabī, sharīʿa (Islamic law) and ḥaqīqa (reality) are identical, as the way of spiritual 
realization is attained through “strict observance of the Law and scrupulous imitation of the 
Prophet’s Sunna” (Addas, 1993, p. 271). 
Ibn ʿArabī’s conceptions of wilāya include his theory on the sealing/seal of the wilāya. 
Along with al-Futūḥāt and Fuṣūṣ, in ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib, as well as in his treatises (al-Rasāʾil) ibn 
ʿArabī develops arguments for the theories of khatm al-wilāya and khatm al-nubuwwa;23 
(their divisions and components), for Mahdi and his appearance, and for the referent of the 
concepts of khatm al-wilāya. Since the extent of wilāya is wider than that of nubuwwa and 
risāla, and wilāya refers to a perpetual station which lasts forever, in the same way, khatm 
al-wilāya indicates His mercy and implies that if His creatures are not to be deprived of His 
raḥma and blessing, the unmerited favor of His emanation should be descended to them.  
Wilāya symbolizes the uninterrupted flow of divine emanation, but since the death of 
the Prophet, the gate of the prophethood of legislation (nubuwwat a-tashrīʿ) has come to an 
end, only wilāya (another kind of prophethood) remains, and it is through the awlīyā (who 
realize the office of wilāya) that the spirit of Muḥammad24 (al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyah) 
“will continue on its course until the end of time” (Addas, 1993, p. 77). Originally a Gnostic-
Manichaean idea which has intruded into Sufism, al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadiyah - as the 
highest essence which embodies the attributes and names of God - through Akbarīan 
mysticism, which made of this light God himself, has become an ‘orthodox’ doctrine at the 
centre of Sufism. Over time, orthodoxy accepted that the Prophet is the Primal Light in which 
all the Prophets were foreshadowed, an idea which gave incomparable status to the Prophet 
of Islam vis-a-vis other prophets (Rahman, 1968, p. 171 & 175). Therefore, according to the 
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mysticism of ibn ʿArabī, the Muḥammedan Seal is “the comprehensive and integral 
manifestation” (Addas, 1993, p. 79) of the Muḥammedan sainthood, itself a supreme source 
of every other form of wilāya (Addas, 1993, p. 80).  
Ibn ʿArabī employs the allegory of the silver and golden brick to allude to khatm al-
nubuwwa and wilāya, respectively. In this regard, he narrates one dream twice, once in 
chapter sixty-five of al-Futūḥāt, and for a second time in the faṣṣ of the prophet Seth of Fuṣūṣ. 
In this dream, which transpired in Mecca, the Kaʿba plays the central role. Ibn ʿ Arabī observes 
that the Kaʿba was built of bricks that were alternately made of silver and gold. The 
construction seemed to be complete, but when he turns his face towards the side between 
the Yemenite and the Syrian corners, he notices that two bricks have fallen - one gold and 
the other silver, one above the other - from the wall of the Kaʿba, making the wall incomplete. 
In this dream, he saw himself placing the bricks back into the wall, thus completing it.25 The 
dreams traced back to a ḥadīth related from the Prophet in which he allegorized the 
prophethood as a wall and he himself as a brick by which the wall of the prophethood came 
to be completed and perfected. On the basis of this dream, ibn ʿArabī interpreted that he was 
the seal of the wilāya and was to complete the wall of the Kaʿba. In fact, ibn ʿArabī observed 
himself in his dream as both the golden and silver bricks, which meant that he was to fill the 
missing sections on the wall as the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya (Muwahid, 1386 shamsī, 
pp. 79-80).  
Since he saw himself in the place of the two bricks and had no doubt that both were 
his very essence (dhāt), when he woke up he thanked God for showing him his true place - 
or his type (ṣinf) - among his followers, which is both the Apostle of God among the prophets 
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and the seal of the wilāya among awlīyā. In his explanation of the dream, Gerald Elmore 
points to the fact that the silver brick “is to be understood as representing the Seal’s external 
dependence on the Prophet's law, whereas his independent access to the very source of the 
law26 is symbolized by the more excellent, golden brick” (Elmore, 1999, p. 149). 
Wilāya is the central theme of the ʿAnqāʾ Mughrib.27 In this book, ibn ʿArabī develops 
his theory of wilāya as “bodied-forth in its supremely final authority” (ibn ʿArabī, n.d., p. 80) 
or the seal of wilāya, and divides it into two types of the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya 
(wilāyat al-khāṣṣat al-Muḥammadīya), and the seal of the general wilāya (wilāyat al-ʿāmm 
or ʿāmmah). Jesus is the Word of God (Kalimat al-Allah), the logos and the seal of the wilāya, 
though in his second appearance on the earth, he will submit to the Prophet’s sharīʿa as an 
all-encompassing law. In other words, because the sharīʿa of the Prophet of Islam is the most 
perfect one and has the station of completeness, it contains all the previous sharīʿa and by 
following the sharīʿa of the Prophet, Jesus in fact obeys the general rules and principles of all 
the precedent prophets (ibn ʿArabī, n.d., p. 4). 
Ibn ʿArabī’s theories of the seal of the general wilāya and the seal of the particular 
wilāya are coherent and clear. Jesus is the referent of the former and is promoted to a high 
office in the spiritual hierarchy, which is unique among the major Sufi theorists (Elmore, 
1999, p. 144). In explaining the nature of that particular relationship between ibn ʿArabī and 
Jesus, Addas maintains that “if Jesus is the Seal of Universal Sainthood, ibn ʿArabī himself laid 
claim to the role Muḥammadan Seal [and] only a partial and extremely biased examination 
of his writings could possibly have incited certain authors to maintain that no formal 
declaration to this effect is to be found in his writings” (Addas, 1993, p. 79). Addas uses an 
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example from al-Futūḥāt in which he claims that “I am - without any doubt - the Seal of the 
Sainthood, in my capacity as heir to the Hashimite and the Messiah” (ibn ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt, 
vol, 1, p. 244, in Addas, 1993, p. 79). In his Dīwān, according to Addas, ibn ʿArabī repeats his 
claim of the sainthood again (Addas, p. 79).28 
On the other hand, in different places in the ʿAnqāʾ, he “routinely downplays” or even 
“explains away” (Elmore, 1999, p. 180) the traditional criterion of physical relation to the 
Prophet, and takes a typical Sufi position in which the seal should be even closer to the 
Prophet than the Quraysh, as it is more a matter of spiritual imamate and wilāya than the 
physical one. Salman the Persian (d. 35 H/656), who was adopted spiritually by the Prophet 
due to his devotion and religious commitment, bears witness to this fact. Elmore believes 
that Salman holds the office of ṣiddīqīyah (derived from Abū Bakr Ṣiddīq, meaning truthful), 
which is apostleship with nubuwwa and wilāya (Elmore, ibid, p. 154). This controversial 
topic and the two contrasting readings of it will be discussed in the following sections.  
The terms imām and the office of imamate are used for judgeship and khilāfa, 
interchangeably. In the first usage, ibn ʿArabī states that everyone is an imām for 
him/herself, as s/he is the only one responsible for personal decisions. In such a usage, imām 
means judge, or inner voice and conscious, and with regard to its personal usage, it means 
leader of a family and household. However, if imām is used as the leader of a community 
(ummah), the scope of the authority and responsibility of imām widens and encompasses 
everyone in the community under the guardianship, and as such, his order must be obeyed 
and his voice must be listened by all (ibn ʿArabī, ʿAnqāʾ, n.d., p. 78).  
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In addition, there is another usage of the terms imām/imamate, which is imām al-
qudsī or the holy imām. The holy imamate is a spiritual status, and is described as “the 
shining and luminous light” and “a heart which is preferred to the world of ghayb va 
Shahāda”, and as such receives His manifestations in his heart. Hence, when God states that 
“My heavens and My earth do not encompass Me and place Me in themselves, but the heart 
of My faithful servant does”, He refers to such a sublime status (ibn ʿ Arabī, ʿAnqāʾ, n.d., p. 79). 
The heart of the holy imām, ibn ʿArabī states, is “the House of Reality, Bayt al-Ḥaqq” and “the 
Seat of Honor, Maqʿad a-Ṣidq”, and people come to pledge allegiance to Him (ibn ʿArabī, 
ʿAnqāʾ, p. 79).  
For Ibn ʿArabī, the office of imamate is multi-dimensional and contains both spiritual 
and political authority and responsibilities, and people come to pledge allegiance to him, as 
by such an allegiance they in fact pay homage to God; it is He who is conceived as the 
“supreme imām” and “the first followed”. The imām, who should be from the household of 
the Prophet, is His representative and has this honour after the Prophet. Interpreting verse 
ten of the sūrat al-Fatḥ (Victory) “Truly those who pledge allegiance unto thee pledge 
allegiance only unto God. The Hand of God is over their hands” (Nasr, 2015, p. 1250), ibn 
ʿArabī assures us that “this most serious status (maqām al-ajsam), will not be effective until 
khatm al-awlīyā from the household of the Prophet and the lineage of Ali takes responsibility 
of it (ibn ʿArabī, ʿAnqāʾ, n.d., pp. 80 ff).  
Addressing ibn ʿ Arabī’s theories of wilāya, nubuwwa, the Sealing, and the Perfect Man, 
the goal was to lay stress on those aspects of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism which are relevant to the 
discussion of wilāya by later scholars who discuss it from a Shīʿa perspective. Any study on 
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this, however, would be incomplete if it did not pay enough attention to the political 
dimensions of his mysticism, and to the messianic ambitions and claims being latent in them. 
The Akbarīan conceptualization of wilāya has considerable potential for change in the socio-
political sphere. The study of practical consequences of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism is beyond the 
scope of this research, though in chapter four it will be observed how the theories of wilāya 
and al-insān al-kāmil facilitated Ayatollah Khomeini’s understanding of the role of walī 
(wrapped in a juridical aura, of course), to claim leadership and authority.  
1.4. Ibn ʿArabī in the Shīʿa World 
As it is mentioned earlier in this chapter, ibn ʿArabī had a profound impact on Shīʿa 
mysticism, although the reason(s) why he was so important and Shīʿa mystics wanted to 
interpret him and his thought from a Shīʿa perspective has yet to be studied. It should be 
added that his relationship with his Shīʿa exponents was ‘deeper’ than mere interpretation 
and in fact contains ‘adjustment’ and ‘dissemination’. It is important to note that Akbarīan 
mysticism in the hands of the Shīʿa mystics, surpassed its original form and transformed into 
a new apparatus that, while maintaining similarities with and influenced from it, should be 
treated as an independent philosophical system. To mention briefly, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī 
(also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1336), Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. 787 H/1385), ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah 
Simnānī29 of the late seventh and the early eighth century, and the Azerbāijānī ʿārif and poet, 
Shaykh Maḥmūd Shabistarī30 of the seventh and eighth century, as well as their students, are 
notable examples in this regard.  
ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, whether in his exegesis on the Qurʾān, or in his commentary 
on Fuṣūṣ, or in his Futuwwat Nāmih (the Book of Chivalry) has incorporated ibn ʿArabī’s 
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ideas into a Shīʿa framework and argued that, regarding the Muḥammedan seal of the wilāya, 
ibn ʿArabī indicated the Mahdi from the household of the Prophet. In Futuwwat Nāmih, 
Kāshānī argues that all the prophets “take their status and honor from the seal of the 
prophets, and the seal of the prophets achieves his dignity from the seal of the wilāya which 
is his inward” (Kāshānī, n.d., p. 34). Wilāya is the inside of nubuwwa and risāla and is pre-
eternal and ever-lasting. The seal of the wilāya resembles a lamp which emanates a 
streaming light (Kāshānī, n.d., p. 34). In his argument on the status of nubuwwa, Kāshānī 
argues that nabī holds a two-faceted office, which conveys the message of God to people and 
establishes a sharīʿa, as well as informs people of the Unseen (ghayb) and his gnosis of divine 
names and attributes. On the basis of the former, he is called nabī and prophet, and on the 
basis of the latter, he is known as walī. As a Shīʿī mystic, Kāshānī believes in the sealing of the 
Mahdi (the twelfth Imām from the household of the Prophet), and discusses that at the time 
of his return, he will submit to the sharīʿa of the Prophet, though all the previous prophets 
will be subordinate to his knowledge and his reality. His inward is the Prophet’s inward; he 
informs people of the Prophet’s sayings and tradition. The Mahdi is the source of the 
knowledge of all the previous prophets and awlīyās and knows their sharīʿa (Kāshānī, n.d., 
pp. 34-35). 
Another figure is Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī who is inspired by Kāshānī, though developed 
the latter’s ideas into an elaborated theory on wilāya and its nexus with tawḥīd. On the office 
of wilāya, Āmulī brings forth a typical argument which comes to be repeated by later Shīʿa 
mystics: wilāya (obviously wilāya of Ali and his sons), is one of the fundamental principles 
of the Faith of Shīʿīsm. Āmulī not only questioned ibn ʿ Arabī’s conceptions of khatm al-wilāya, 
but also synthesized Sufism and Shīʿīsm and integrated them into one concept (Tanhāyī, 
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1379, p. 60). One can add to this list the abovementioned Simnānī, whose critiques on ibn 
ʿArabī’s waḥdat-i wujūd bore fruit in the formation of an independent ʿirfānī school known 
as the Unity of Consciousness (waḥdat-i shuhūd).31 Although it was left to Aḥmad Sirhindī 
(d. 1033/1624) to describe Simnānī’s philosophical critiques over the ontological 
relationship of God to the world and elaborate on it, and Naqshbandī Sufi order to adopt it, 
but it was Simnānī who took initiative in exposing a new doctrine to Islamic mysticism (Elias, 
1995, p. 162).  
Apart from these figures who were influential in introducing ibn ʿArabī into the Shīʿa 
world, the Niʿmatullāhī silsila (lit. chain) as one of the most well-established Shīʿa mystical 
schools, is another example whose scholars tried to integrate ibn ʿArabī’s ideas into their 
ʿirfānī/bāṭinī system. Another Shīʿa mystical tendency, Dhahabī (also Dhahabīyah), has been 
greatly influenced by ibn ʿArabī and his thoughts have been incorporated into the Dhahabī 
doctrine. Apart from his influence on the intellectual development of later Sufis, ibn ʿArabī’s 
ideas, to a large degree, helped facilitate the formation and emergence of a number of Shīʿa 
messianic movements that appeared in the Muslim world. These movements, which 
emerged in the Islamic medieval ages - in the interim between the collapse of the Abbasid 
dynasty in 655 H/1258 and the establishment of the Safawid kingdom in Persia in 907 
H/1501 - marked a long period of time in which Sufism (and particularly the Akbrīan brand 
of it) and Shīʿīsm linked together, fueling one another. The socio-political developments of 
this time, which are well studied by figures such as Kāmil Muṣṭafā al-Shaybī32 are more in 
depth than the goals of this research, though the main question which was raised earlier 
remains valid and needs to be studied.  
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In chapter three of the present research, it will be observed that how Mullā Ṣadrā 
formed a synthesis of the three intellectual tendencies of his time including Akbrīan 
mysticism, Shīʿa theology and Islamic philosophy. The ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and 
Qum who added considerably to Ṣadrā’s philosophical system, should be regarded as the 
culmination of Shīʿa understanding of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism. The prominent ḥakīm of the 
School of Tehran, Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī (d. 1306 H/1888) is particularly notable, 
as he had an undeniable impact on Ayatollah Rūḥullāh Khomeini (d. 1368 H/1989), whose 
ideas and conception of wilāya will be discussed adequately in chapters four and five of this 
research.  
1.5. Ibn ʿArabī’s Legacy 
As the greatest mystic of the Muslim world whose ideas have attracted philosophers, 
mystics and theologians from his time up to the present, the questions which arise are “what 
was it about his ideas that was controversial and made them attractive” and “what made him 
different from others”. Delving into these questions will help to evaluate his impression on 
Muslim mystics in later centuries. In a very general classification, one can safely say that ibn 
ʿArabī’s ideas are divided into two categories: they are either elaborations on existing ideas 
that would have been available at his time – ideas like wilāya, khatm, and al-insān al-kāmil – 
and which he blended with his own and developed them into coherent theories/doctrines; 
or newly created ideas. The theory of waḥdat-i wujūd (though he never uses this term) 
(ʿAfīfī, 1423 H/2002, p. 25), and the relationship between Essence (dhāt) and names and 
attributes (asmāʾ wa ṣifāṭ) are examples of the second.  
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Perhaps the most important thing about him and his theoretical mysticism (or 
speculative Sufism in Rahman’s words) (Rahman, 1968, p. 238), is the nexus between 
philosophy and mysticism. Ibn ʿArabī, like many other eminent orthodox scholars in the 
Muslim world, perceived mysticism as an area that can - and perhaps needs to - be 
philosophized or theorized. Therefore, mysticism, in his hands as well as other “speculative 
Sufis, is a mode of philosophic thought, except that it seeks to back itself up by a theory of 
kashf, implying a some kind of infallibility” (Rahman, p. 238), and is regarded as the product 
of a kind of synthesis of the “traditional orthodox kalām-theology based on the Qurʾān and 
Islamic doctrine with the purely speculative theology of the Sufi theosophy” (Rahman, p. 
238). At the centre of this system, as has been observed, stands the conception of wilāya, 
“without which the doctrine of kashf would have collapsed” (Rahman, p. 239).  
His students and particularly his disciple and step-son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (d. 673 
H/1274), however, were more influential in elaborating on this brand of mysticism than he 
was himself. Also, later mystics and ḥakīms, like those of the Schools of Isfahan, Tehran and 
Qum expressed interest and advocacy in adding to this tradition - but it was our scholar 
whose ideas laid the foundation for theoretical mysticism to be generated. As Melvin Koushki 
has shown, its footprint can even be found among lettrists such as Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Turkah 
Ῑṣfahānī (d. 835 H/1432) (Koushki, 2012, p. 30). Located in an orderly apparatus, the 
abovementioned terms and ideas helped following generations, right up to the present, to 
have a new understanding of the relationship between Deity and the cosmos – including Man 
– on one hand, and the cosmos as divine manifestation on the other.  
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As Abrahamov has rightly pointed out, dhāt and asmāʾ wa ṣifāṭ are two components 
of one single problematic which is the question of existence (Abrahamov, 2015, p. 6), and in 
the Akbarīan School there is a separation between Deity’s dhāt - which is unknowable and 
inaccessible by Man - , and His names and attributes which are attainable by Man’s cognition. 
Deity is absolute and indivisible, and this division is only employed for methodological 
purposes. Deity manifests Himself to the Universe/cosmos, and therefore we are able to 
know Him through His manifestations. The question of the manifestation of Deity is the 
cornerstone of the theory of waḥdat-i wujūd (the unity of being), and as ʿAfīfī maintains, is 
to explain the relationship between al-Ḥaqq wa al-khalq. Waḥdat-i wujūd indicates that 
Reality is one in His Essence, which is called al-Ḥaqq, but it is many in His names and 
attributes and is called al-khalq. Allah encompasses everything in His Essence (jāmiʿ li kull-i 
shayiʾ fī nafsihī): everything has His ingredients, and He manifests Himself in the image of 
every being, and from this viewpoint, the cosmos by its essence, is nothing but a dream (ʿAfīfī, 
1423 H/2002, pp. 24-27).  
In terms of the relationship between these two, Abrahamov is certain that “God’s 
Unity is absolute from the standpoint of His Essence, but many from the perspective of the 
cosmos” (Abrahamov, 2015, p. 7). One can say that with regard to the status of Man (or better 
to say the Perfect Man), and its relationship with the cosmos and Deity, there exists a 
triangle: Deity manifests Himself through names and attributes both in the cosmos and in 
the Perfect Man (Prophets and awlīyā have His ingredients in themselves), and as a 
microcosm, the Perfect Man shares all the characteristics of the cosmos. Despite their 
similarities, there is a difference between micro and macrocosm which is the capacity of Man 
to have spiritual journeys, known as the Fourth Journeys (asfār al-arbaʿi).33  
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Ibn ʿArabī mentioned these journeys in the first two volumes of al-Futūḥāt al- 
Makkīyah, though in two different conceptions, and both are different from the reading of 
Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045 H/1635-36) which was set forth four centuries later in a book with the 
same title (Ḥassan Zādih, 1390, pp. 11-13). The theory of Ṣadrā which is the dominant 
reading of an old idea in Islamic mysticism, has in fact been represented by later 
commentators of ibn ʿArabī, including ʿAfīf a-Dīn al-Ṭilmisānī (d. 690 H/1291), ʿAbd al-
Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335), and Sharafadīn Dāwūd Qayṣarī (d. 751 
H/1350). As Dāwūd Ḥassan Zādih has pointed out, the first two journeys of ‘ila llāh’ and ‘fi 
llāh’ have been present in Islamic mysticism since its formative years, but it was ibn ʿArabī 
who elaborated on them and added one more journey of ‘baqā baʿd az fanā’ (subsistence 
after annihilation) to them. The journey itself, years later, was divided into two separate 
journeys of min al-Ḥaqq ila al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq and fi al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq by ibn ʿArabī’s 
commentators, and finally became perpetuated by Mullā Ṣadrā (Ḥassan Zādih, 1390, p. 9ff) 
in al-Asfār al-Arbaʿi.  
Regarding its conceptual development over time, one can safely say that the 
conception of asfār al-arbaʿi, more as a product of the School of ibn ʿArabī than of himself, is 
divided into pre- and post-Akbarīan time, and has been a source of inspiration for later 
generations of theologians, mystics and philosophers. Here again, we have ‘webs of beliefs’ 
– as “boundless, spherical networks, not hierarchical pyramids” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191) – and 
inherited traditions, as well as the capability of scholar/philosopher in adopting webs of 
beliefs against common tradition and in changing the tradition they have inherited (Bevir, 
2004, pp. 196-199).  
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Asfār al-arbaʿi, a symbolic sketch of the spiritual journey of Man to his completion 
(kamāl), has a strong juncture to the stations of wilāya and khilāfa. Regarding these two 
stations, Dāwūd Qayṣarī distinguishes between the station of quṭbīyat (polarity) and that of 
the perfect seekers (sālikān-i kāmil). The station of quṭbīyat (or that of the perfected seekers, 
sālikān-i mukammil) is the last station and is attained at the end of the fourth journey, but 
the highest station that a perfect seeker can reach, is the third journey or the station of unity 
and totality (waḥda wa al-jamʿ). Quṭb, a station from where He looks at the cosmos (al-
Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, p. 517 & 915), has a number of characteristics, but perhaps the most 
important of all are khilāfa, wilāya and the station of quṭb al-aqṭāb which is designated 
exclusively to al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah. The spirit of Muhammad is inherited by his 
successors (not necessarily blood progeny), in the sense that the Prophet’s successors enjoy 
his wilāya and khilāfa as well. To conclude, according to Qayṣarī, the status of wilāya is 
achieved at the end of the first journey, the status of khilāfa is gained at the end of the third 
journey, and quṭbīyat is the highest attained when the fourth journey is completed (Ḥassan 
Zādih, 1390, pp. 15-23).  
1.6. Conclusion 
There result several lessons from the formulations of wilāya in the mysticism of ibn 
ʿArabī. Although a well-established concept in the deepest soil of Islamic mysticism (al-
Ḥakīm, 1401 H/1981, p. 1233), it was ibn ʿArabī who promoted it to a creative construction 
at the heart of his theory on waḥdat-i wujūd. Wilāya, along with nubuwwa and risāla, shapes 
a “concentric sphere of activity” (Elmore, 1999, p. 152), and claims to not only cover the 
sphere of human beings, but also two more modes - the generic and universal. In comparison, 
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wilāya is the most comprehensive office and has superiority over the others. After that comes 
nubuwwa and risāla, which reveal that this classification is on the basis of the priority of the 
inward over the outward, as wilāya is the esoteric dimension of nubuwwa and risāla, and 
every nabī and rasūl is a walī, but not vice versa.  
In addition to wilāya, another prominent dimension of Akbarīan mysticism is the 
conception of the Perfect Man as the ideal type, or microcosm, a spirit that animates the 
cosmos and manifests the wisdom of the all-comprehensive name, and finally a medium – 
eye, ear, hand – through which Deity shows Himself to His creatures. Although an old concept 
rooted in the Abrahamic tradition, the Perfect Man found its most elaborated presence in the 
writings of ibn ʿArabī. Al-insān al-kāmil, best understood in Western terms as the Divine 
Logos through which all things are created, stands at the center of ibn ʿArabī’s worldview 
and integrates all its disparate dimensions (Chittick, 2014, p. 16). It is a locus in which the 
Real (ḥaqīqa) has been realized to the extent of the human capacity.  
‘Divine Logos’ is an important term in the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī’ and needs 
attention. We know that the Fuṣūṣ is divided into twenty-seven chapters, each of which is 
dedicated to a prophet or sage, and each of these figures presented as a logos (kalima) 
embodying the wisdom (ḥikma) of a specific divine name. So, each prophet/sage represents 
Divine Logos relevant to his mission and to his existential capacity, though all share ‘the 
Station of No Station’ (maqām lā maqām), also called ‘the Muḥammedan Station’ which “is 
full realization of the Reality of Realities; [and] it embraces all stations and standpoints 
without being determined and defined by any of them” (Chittick, 2014, p. 22). As Chittick is 
certain, the Perfect Man, which stands “in the Station of No Station, is in effect the human 
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analogue of Nondelimited Being (Wujūd Muṭlaq, also Dhāt Ghayr ul-Maḥdūd), which 
assumes every delimitation without itself becoming limited (Chittick, 2014, p. 22).  
Addressing his legacy, Alexander Knysh is right that the Greatest Master and his 
mysticism are treated by a wide variety of scholars and in different genres of literature, from 
early biographies to later refutations and apologies, to Sufi writings, to metaphysical and 
theological debates, and to less theoretical and more empirical works such as Muqaddima of 
the Tunisian thinker ibn Khaldūn (d. 808 H/1406).34 Knysh also shows how he was 
considered differently in the two parts of the Muslim world. In the Muslim West, “his legacy 
was not considered unique or exceptional” (Knysh, 1999, p. 197), while in the East, his 
teachings made a great impression on ʿulemā, “who treated him as the foremost exponent, if 
not the founder, of monistic philosophy (Knysh, 1999, p. 197).   
In the East, where Shīʿīsm has traditionally been more pervasive than the West, his 
legacy not only inspired many subsequent thinkers, but also caused uproar and outrage due 
to the doctrine of the khatm. The Eastern ʿulemā, as is the case in the Shīʿa world, have not 
been simple interpreters and commentators of him, but rather accepted his legacy after 
examination and question. As Matthew Melvin Koushki has mentioned, the “interpenetration 
of Sufism and Shīʿīsm was to strike a particularly deep root in Shīʿa scholarly circles” 
(Koushki, 2012, p. 72), and it was the rationalist School of Bahrain (7th/13th) that for the first 
time achieved “a synthesis of Imāmī theology with ibn ʿArabīyan mystic-political thought” 
(Koushki, p. 72).  
In the case of Akbarīan doctrine of khatm al-wilāya, the intellectual and spiritual 
exchange of ideas occurred when they were adjusted to a Shīʿa context. In this camp, as it is 
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mentioned earlier in this chapter, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335) and 
Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī (d. 787 H/1385) are the most prominent. Ibn ʿArabī’s influence not 
only swept borders of mysticism and philosophy, but also found its most overt 
manifestations in the appearance of a number of messianic and apocalyptic uprisings in the 
middle ages. Movements, such as Ḥurūfīyya (also Ḥurūfīsm), Nuqṭawīya, Niʿmatullāhīya, 
Nūrbakhshīya and Mushaʿshaʿīya, are cases in point. These movements were centered on the 
idea of wilāya and the role of walī in fighting injustice, overthrowing temporal rules and 
establishing the government of Mahdi on the earth.  
The idea of wilāya is the pivotal idea of the School of Shaykhīsm as well, which, as will 
be observed in the next chapter, came to emerge as an alternative to the mainstream Shīʿīsm, 
with kashf and wilāya at the centre, though devoid of any liaison between theology and 
speculative mysticism. Ibn ʿArabī is sporadically mentioned and criticized by the first 
Shaykhī leader, but Shaykhīsm is far from being a serious reaction or response to the 
speculative mysticism of al-Shaykh al-Akbar, and rather, should be treated as an esoteric-
kalāmī trend which remains constrained to its Shīʿa coffin. The critiques of Shaykh Aḥmad 
al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1823) on ibn ʿArabī are clear examples of interdiscursive critiques and 
have had numerous equals in the Muslim world. The study and critical analysis of the Shaykhī 
key texts in order to delve into the conceptions of wilāya, imamate and nubuwwa are the 
main focus of chapter two, and it will be shown how this school contributes to the existing 
tradition on wilāya, and related concepts.  
1 - Reynold Nicholson discusses the impression of ibn ʿArabī on the next generations and particularly shows 
how ʿAbdul al-Karīm Jīlī was indebted to his theory of the Perfect Man. Nicholson adds that both Jīlī and ibn 
ʿArabī “are inspired by the same mystical philosophy … [and use] similar methods in order to develop their 
ideas”. See: 
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Reynold A. Nicholson, Studies in Islamic Mysticism, Appendix II, Some Notes on the Fuṣūṣ ‘l-Hikam, 1921 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 149.  
2 - Elmore’s opinion seems to me surprising; since the names as well as the spiritual and legal affiliations of 
ibn ʿArabī’s masters are well documented. Some of them were a famous Sufi and mutakallim (theologian), a 
few were illiterate, and some others were at the same time his masters and disciples both. Addas not only 
enumerates them, but also lists the names of the ʿirfānī and philosophical schools of his time (Addas, 1993, 
pp. 44 ff).  
3 - Alexander Knysh also believes that he not only was not Uwaysī, but also the reason behind his extensive 
journeys was to study under “the most prominent religious teachers of his time” (Knysh, 1999, p. 7). 
4 - Nettler has given a full account of this. See:  
Ronald L. Nettler, Sufi Metaphysics and Qur’anic Prophets: ibn ʿArabī’s Thought and Method in the Fuṣūṣ al-
Ḥikam, 2003 (Cambridge: the Islamic Texts Society), pp. 5-6.  
5 - Khurāsānī claims that ibn ʿArabī wrote the second copy of the book in Damascus, and the first one having 
been written in Mecca in 599. Khurāsānī, p. 7.  
6 - I will refer to the text throughout this chapter as ʿAfīfī.  
7 - ʿAfīfī believes that it was Manṣūr Ḥallāj who, for the first time, drew our attention to “this Jewish maxim” 
that God has created Man on a divine image (ṣūrat ul-ilāhīya), and therefore, Sufis err in attributing it to the 
Prophet of Islam (ʿAfīfī, 1423 H/2002, p. 35). 
8 - Masataka Takeshita, Ibn Arabi’s Theory of the Perfect Man and Its Place in the History of Islamic Thought, 
University of Chicago, Ph.D. dissertation, 1986. 
9 - Faṣṣ or bezel of [divine] wisdom, in the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī is an allegory for ḥikmat or the esoteric 
heritage which is inherited to all the prophets and the awalīyā from the spirit of Muḥammad (al-ḥaqīqat al-
muḥammadīyah). Al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah is the logos carrying ḥikmat from Deity to the prophets and 
to the awalīyā (ʿAfīfī, vol. 2, p. 3). The Fuṣūṣ is mostly “on the nature of God as manifested through prophecy, 
each of its twenty-seven chapters being attached to the logos (kalima) of a prophet typifying a particular 
Divine attribute. Since God does not reveal Himself completely except in Man, the first chapter treats of Adam 
as the microcosm, the Perfect Man, the absolute mirror of Divinity” (Nicholson, 1921, p. 149). Nicholson in 
this chapter, entitled “Some Notes on the Fūṣūṣ ‘L-Ḥīkam” points to the difficulties he had in reading, 
understanding and translating ibn ʿArabī’s complicated text and states that “the theories set forth in the Fuṣūṣ 
are difficult to understand and even more difficult to explain, … [as] the author’s language is so technical, 
figurative and involved that a literal reproduction would convey very little. On the other hand, [Nicholson 
states] if we reject his terminology, we shall find it impossible to form any precise notion of his ideas” 
(Nicholson, 1921, p. 149). Other non-Arab scholars, such as Sharaf al-Dīn Khurāsānī and William Chittick, 
both of whom have written entries on “ibn ʿArabī” refer to this point.  
10 - For different meanings and usages of the term ḥaqq in the terminology of ibn ʿArabī, see:  
Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, al-Muʿjam al-Ṣufi: al-Ḥikma fī Ḥudūd al-Kalima, 1401 H/1981 (Beirut: Dendera), p. 337.  
11 - The italic is in the text.  
12 - ʿAfīfī explains these two as such: the Reality has two theophanies: the Theophany of the Invisible and the 
Theophany of the Evidence. In the first theophany, He manifests for His essence in His essence upon His 
names and attributes and is called the emanation of the more sacred (fayḍ al-aqdas) (ʿAfīfī, ibid, vol. 2, p. 
145). The reason for this theophany is the love of the Deity for His essence which motivates Him to be 
manifested in divine names and attributes. As the result, permanent archetypes (aʿyān-i thābita) are 
appeared. In the second theophany, He appears “in the images of the extraneous archetypes” (aʿyān-i khārijī), 
and is called the emanation of the sacred or fayḍ-i muqaddas (ibid, p. 145) and as the result the concomitants 
(lawāzim) of permanent archetypes in the world are appeared. These two realms are contrasted, as the 
former represents unity and inward, while the latter displays outward and multiplicity (ibid, p. 145). Aʿyān-i 
thābita have two modulations: the first one is the images of the names and attributes, while the second 
modulation is designated to the realities of the extraneous archetypes. The emanation happens in both levels. 
13 - Though again I should emphasize that the himma of the ʿārif does not stem from his free will or personal 
choice, but divine injunction; although, even it does, the concept of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ itself, both God’s 
and man’s, are “compelled and ordained in the very order of things” (Nettler, 2003, p. 215). Nettler reads: 
“the divine and human ‘free’ choices and their results are subsumed within the larger universe of 
metaphysical order and determination – and the choices are then fixed in their own domain” (Nettler, 2003, 
p. 215).  
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14 - Ibn ʿArabī in al-Rasāʾil briefly points to the theory of the Perfect Man and the status of insān in the world 
as the microcosm and the Comprehensive Book (Kitāb al-Jāmiʿ). For example, in the introduction of al-Rasāʾil 
(n.d., pp. 4-12), in an independent risāla on the sealing of the wilāya (pages 41-44), and in another risāla of 
the same collection (pages 60-63). These two are a part of an independent book entitled Shaq al-Jayb fī ʿIlm 
al-Ghayb (Ripping the Collar in the Knowledge from the Unseen) which is published in this collection. There 
is also another treatise entitled Risālat al-Anwār fī mā Yamnah ul Sāhib al-Khalwāt-i Min al-Asrār (the 
Treaties on the Lights in what is Granted to the Owner of Solitude) (pp. 74-87) which contains ibn ʿArabī’s 
theory of the Perfect Man. 
15 - Muḥammad Sūrī in his article Ḥakīm Tirmidhī va Naẓarīyayi Wilāya, explains why Tirmidhī and some of 
his other contemporary ʿārifs were not called Sufi, but ḥakīm or faqīr (poor), and why they did not reveal any 
affiliation to official Sufi ṭarīqas (lit. path). Sūrī maintains that in the third century, terms such as Sufi and 
taṣawwuf were solely referred to the ʿārifs of the School of Baghdad, and therefore, in order to refer to the 
masters of other schools/ṭarīqas, and especially those of Transoxiana, either ʿārif or ḥakīm has been used. 
People of the Levant used to call their ʿārifs as faqīr and not Sufi. See: 
Muḥammad Sūrī, Hakīm Tirmidhī wa Naẓarīyayi Wilāya, the Journal of Falsafeh va Kalām, vol 4, Winter 1385, 
p. 91.  
16 - Tirmidhī himself was accused of having prophetic ambitions, while he had chosen an obscure life. He 
believed that there is no difference between nabī and rasūl, except the fact that the latter has a sharīʿa that 
should be proselytized to his people, while nabī submits to the existing sharīʿa of his time and does not bring 
a new law. Aside from their differences, these two have a similarity, in the sense that both benefit from 
revelation and hence it is obligatory for people to accept them. The office of wilāya, in turn, is devoid of such 
features; unless when walī reaches the status of muḥaddath which is equal to risāla and nubuwwa. 
Muḥaddath is the one who receives His revelation by inspiration and talks to God through ilhām. Only in this 
case, walī - like nabī and rasūl - is immune from sin. Tirmidhī, despite having anti-Shīʿa beliefs, believes that 
twelve Shīʿa imāms are walī and immune from sin. See: ibid, pp. 94-99.  
17 - For typology of awlīyā, see: 
Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, al-Muʿjam ul-Ṣūfī: al-Ḥikma fī Ḥudūd al-Kalima, 1401 H/1981 (Beirut: Dendera), pp. 518-519.  
18 - The idea of awlīyā being selected by God’s will to the office of wilāya and having no right or authority in 
choosing the course of their life, is very dominant in the Shaykhī School. Imāms, from a Shaykhī viewpoint, 
are totally devoid of any power to make any decision, and even their daily actions are determined by Him. 
They are immune from sin, not because they voluntarily decide not to commit sin, but because they are not 
able to do sin. From this perspective, their status is very close to that of the angels who worship God 
involuntarily and not out of their decision. This is discussed further in chapter two.  
19 - Tirmidhī emphasizes that by “essence” he means walī’s absolute and unconditional faith and trust to God, 
and therefore, walī’s deeds are not as determinative as his faith and submission. Perhaps, the idea that 
“believer should be like a dead corpse in the hands of His God” generated from this idea which teaches 
absolute submission and subordination. 
20 - The impact of Tirmidhī on ibn ʿArabī has been discussed in a number of sources. For a useful study of the 
impact of Tirmidhī on ibn ʿArabī, see: Takeshita, Op.cit, 1986, pp. 128ff.  
21 - Along with wilāyat al-takwīnīya (Introduction, a., p. 11), the idea of the eternity (azalīyya) of wilāya is also 
new and belongs to the later generations of scholars. The author’s understanding is that later 
conceptualizations on wilāya and related terms are intoxicated by Shīʿa extremist movements and ghālī 
scholars whose contributions to these ideas, as well as further developments of wilāya have not been studied 
appropriately yet. In the early ages, as we observed in Tirmidhī, wilāya was not understood and 
conceptualized by wilāyat al-takwīnīya, or the idea of eternity. 
22 - Walī/perfect ʿārif’s close friendship with God results in his powerlessness and absolute submission to His 
will, a virtue which is absent in the office of nubuwwa. This idea, which is basic and predominant in 
mysticism, finds its maximal understanding in Shaykhīsm, and is prevalent in the conceptualizations of wilāya 
in the Schools of Tehran and Qum, too. They are discussed in chapters two and three of this research. 
23 - The Seal of the wilāya “is simply the nāʾib or substitute for the Seal of the Prophets within the ranks of 
sainthood. In the case of the person of the Prophet, sainthood (walāya) is ‘veiled’ by prophecy (nubuwwa); in 
the case of the Seal of the Saints it is openly displayed” (Addas, 1993, p. 200). 
24 - I borrow the term from Binyamin Abrahamov, as I believe it is closer to the meaning and connotations of 
al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah, than the established term “Muḥhammedan Reality”. The latter seems to be 
superfluous.  
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Binyamin Abrahamov, Ibn al-ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, An annotated translation of ‘The Bezels of Wisdom’, 
2015 (London and New York: Routledge), p. 7. The spirit of Muḥammad in the terminology of ibn ʿArabī is 
called ‘the First Father in Spirituality’ (abul awwal fi al-rawḥānīyāt), or ‘the origin of the cosmos’, as opposed 
to Adam, the first prophet, who is called abul ajsām al-insānīya (the Father of Human Bodies) (al-Ḥakīm, 
1401 H/1981, pp. 46-47). 
25 - Claude Addas in her Quest for the Red Sulphur has explained the dream in details. See:  
Quest for the Red Sulphur; the Life of Ibn ʿArabī, Translated from French into English by Peter Kingsley, 1993 
(Cambridge: the Islamic Text Society), p. 213.  
26 - Italic is in the text. 
27 - As Gerald T. Elmore has shown in his survey on ʿAnqāʾ, the book is written “long before the production of 
his great masterpieces, al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah and Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, by and in which the Akbarīan teachings 
would attain final definition”. Elmore also maintains that the book “should be understood as a personal 
treatment and an existential expression of man’s presentation of himself to the world”. Gerald T. Elmore, 
Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time: Ibn ʿArabī's Book of the Fabulous Gryphon, 1999 (Brill Academic 
Pub), pp. 12-13 & pp. 76-108.  Elmore observes ʿAnqāʾ as the very personal narrative of the author’s desire 
for rising up out of his obscurity and making himself known to others. p. 48. And for the appellation of ʿAnqāʾ, 
see Elmore, 1999, pp. 184-195.  
28 - Focusing on the trio of ‘visions, retreats and revelations’, Addas maintains that it was at the end of a nine-
month retreat in the year 586 H/1190 in Seville that ibn ʿArabī was told he was the Muḥammedan Seal, the 
supreme Heir (Addas, 1993, p. 92). This incident, having been elected as the Seal, is going to be repeated 
many times later. In the same year (in 586 H) in Cordoba, ibn ʿArabī had a dream in which he is announced 
“that he has been designated the Muḥammadan Seal; the incident that occurred a few years later at Fez …” 
(Addas, 1993, p. 200). In Mecca, he experienced the vision again, and as Addas rightly mentions, what 
happened in this holy city “marked the definitive and solemn fulfilment of the divine promise, and the 
recognition by the Messengers of God, … of the universality of office conferred on the al-Shaykh al-Akbar: a 
kind of pact of allegiance in the tabernacle of Sainthood” (Addas, 1993, p. 200). 
29 - Shaykh Abu al-Makārim Rukn al-Dīn ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah Simnānī, the “respected theologian, jurist and poet” 
(Elias, 1995, p. 1), was born and grew up in a turbulent age (Elias, 1995, passim), and was deeply influenced 
by the visionary experiences and mediational practices of Najm al-dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221) and other 
visionary mystics associated with Kubrā. Although Simnānī later “systematized their ideas and his own in a 
complex colour symbolism of subtle substances (laṭāʾif)” (Elias, 1995, p. 1), and despite his importance to the 
Kubrawiyyah silsila, “no surviving Sufi order lists him as its eponymous founder” (Elias, 1995, p. 55).  
30 - Shabistarī’s brightness of mind is revealed by means of his comprehension regarding the complexities of 
waḥdat-i wujūd and his skills in adding to ibn ʿArabī’s intellectual system. He could be regarded as the 
representative of a brand of mysticism whose main characteristic was pouring of ʿirfān into Persian literature 
as means of expounding and illuminating it. For Shabistarī, the rich tradition of Persian literature was a 
framework through which the intricacies of the Akbarīan mysticism were expressed more fully. In his 
magnum opus Gulshan-i Rāz, which is written in the form of ode (mathnawī), Shabistarī discusses the main 
ʿirfānī/kalāmī ideas of the First Emanated, the state of completeness or totality (maqām-i jāmiʿ), as well as the 
theory of the Perfect Man and wilāya and nubuwwa (Shabistarī, n.d., p. 16).  
31 - By waḥdat-i shuhūd, Simnānī means a mystical state, “being a witness to God’s essence, attributes, acts 
and efforts” (Elias, 1995, p. 162) rather than simply a comprising of divine unity and transcendence. Although 
Simnānī never accused ibn ʿArabī of heresy of antinomianism and even referred to him with respect, he was 
opposed to his ontology in which divine unity and transcendence were compromised (Elias, 1995, p. 97). For 
Simnānī, there is no possibility of union with the divine, and individuals such as ibn ʿArabī, who appeared to 
“have reached the second to last stage of the mystical path, … have stumbled at that point and fallen into the 
trap of self-delusion” (Elias, 1995, p. 98). Simnānī can be regarded as a mujaddid (religious reformer) as well. 
As Elias rightly maintains, “given the political and religious situation of his time, Simnānī believed that Islamic 
belief and polity were threatened. This is evident both in the philosophy he espoused and in the sense of 
urgency which pervades his writings” (Elias, 1995, pp. 162-163). He not only had a great deal of impact on 
Sufi theories of social and political action, but deeply involved in the political movement of his day, and from 
this perspective, is very much similar to Najm al-dīn Kubrā (Elias, 1995, p. 160). 
32 - Kāmil Muṣṭafā Al-Shaybī, Al-Ṣala Bayn al-Taṣawūf wa Tashayūʿ (The Correlation Betwixt Sufism and 
Shīʿīsm), 2 volumes, 3rd edition, 1382 (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus). 
 
 
74 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
33 - These journeys are as such: min al khalq-i ila al-Ḥaqq (the journey of creation/the creature to the Truth), 
bil Ḥaqq-i fi al-Ḥaqq (in the Truth with the Truth), min al-Ḥaqq ila al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq (from the Truth to 
creation with the Truth), and fi al-khalq-i bil Ḥaqq (with the Truth in creation). 
< http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H027.htm >, last accessed December 27, 2016.  
34 - James W. Morris in his article entitled An Arab “Machiavelli”? Rhetoric, Philosophy and Politics in Ibn 
Khaldun’s Critique of “Sufism”, has discussed Ibn Khaldun’s criticisms of contemporary “Sufism”. The article is 
accessible here < http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlespdf/hi_critics.pdf >, last accessed 02/07/2017. 
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Chapter Two: The Shaykhī School and Wilāya 
 
The conception of wilāya, nubuwwa, imamate, the stations of gnosis, and the 
sealing, was not confined to ibn ʿArabī and his style of mysticism. Almost all of the Shīʿa 
schools, whether ʿirfānī (like the mystical orders mentioned in the previous chapter) or 
kalāmī (as in Shaykhīsm which is the interest here), are centred on wilāya and the 
question of authority as their principal question. From this perspective, Akbarīan 
mysticism and Shaykhīsm have similarities to each other, and a plethora of literature 
produced by the Shaykhī ʿulemā over a period of one hundred and twenty years, 
testifies to the fact that the problematic of wilāya was one of their main questions. 
Depending on the inclination of the school, however, the conception of wilāya differed. 
In terms of the research questions asked in the Introduction (B. p. 14), the author seeks 
to examine if the conceptualizations of wilāya in Shaykhīsm underwent any changes, or 
remained stagnant, and if its similarities with the doctrine of wilāya in the Akbarīan 
mysticism should be considered as stagnation.  
Similar to the formation of the office of wilāya which has been crystalized in the 
Akbarīan mysticism, in the Shaykhī School wilāya is the core and the inward essence of 
nubuwwa and awlīyā possess the four stations of bayān, maʿānī, abwāb and imamate 
(presentation, significatum, gates and imamate). Therefore, imamate and nubuwwa 
make a double-faceted station: one side facing God and the other side facing people. 
Pertinent to this, is the station of multiplicity, vis-à-vis that of totality which is 
exemplified in wilāya and nubuwwa respectively; though each of them represents one 
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dimension of the reality of tawḥīd. In the station of wilāya, walī expands and manifests 
the message of nubuwwa. Wilāya also is an ontological as well as a cosmological status, 
therefore, it is not only one of the fundamentals of Shīʿīsm, but is also connected to the 
celestial role and power of the Imāms. In the Shaykhī School, the Prophet and the Imāms 
are the effective cause (ʿillat-i fāʿilī) of creation; and in the absence of their effectiveness, 
God’s act of creation will not be finalized. From this perspective, wilāya is the mode 
through which God manifests Himself in the cosmos in a modulated manner. In an 
obvious similarity with the ʿirfānī understanding of the term, it is wilāya, insofar as it is 
nubuwwat al-khāṣṣah, followed by wilāya to the extent that it is nubuwwat al-ʿāmmah.  
The Shaykhī ʿulemā have also written copiously about the notion of the return 
of the Hidden Imām. Leaving aside the messianic implications of notions such as 
expectation (intiẓār), appearance (ẓuhūr), and gate (bāb/the intermediacy of the 
Hidden Imām), what is important for discussion in this chapter is that the abwāb are 
the representatives of the continuation of the “polar motif”, which is both a 
characteristic of Shīʿa thought, and vital in the formation of Shaykhīsm. The role of the 
Shaykhī ʿ ulemā as the guides and the preservers of the community of believers is merely 
to be the bearer of the Imām’s charisma.  
 Previous scholars, such as Henry Corbin, have delved into the Shaykhī 
epistemology and Imamology, and more recently other scholars including Denis 
MacEion, Idris Samawi and Denis Hermann have contributed extensively to the existing 
tradition on Shaykhīsm. This chapter builds on their work in an original way and, 
through study and critical analysis of key Shaykhī texts will show the impact of the 
Skaykhī ʿulemā on our understanding of the challenging concept of ‘leadership’ in 
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Shīʿīsm, and how their alternative has influenced, both practically and theoretically, 
further developments in the Shīʿa world. It will also be observed that there are 
implications regarding Aḥsāʾī’s intention in bringing an alternative to the mainstream 
(Uṣūlīsm), proven by a number of facts, including his efforts to redefine ijtihād, as well 
as the emphasis on his recurring dreams of the Imāms. And last but not least, although 
Shaykhīsm is an autonomous school of thought and should not be evaluated by later 
events, it was the Shaykhī conception of notions such as leadership, occultation, 
eschatology, the future return, and the occult sciences that rendered the formation of 
the subsequent movements of Bābīsm and Bahāʾīsm.   
2.1. The Shaykhī1 ʿUlemā  
Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm al-Aḥsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1823)2 was 
born in al-Ahsa, in the northeast of the Arabian peninsula to a Shīʿa family of Sunni 
origin in the year 1166 A.H. (1753 C.E.) (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, p. 15).3 His biography 
appeared in a number of Bābī and Bahāʾī texts,4 one of the treatises of his successor 
Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (d. 1259 H/1843), entitled Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn (Proof of the 
Astonished), some encyclopedia entries,5 secondary sources,6 a biography by Abul 
Qāsim Khān Ibrāhīmī (1388 H/1969) which is written in his two-volume book entitled 
Fihrist-i Kutub-i Mashāyikh-i ʿIẓām7 (the Publications of Dignified Maters) and in a 
standard autobiography which is cited in many of his writings, including the 
voluminous Sharḥ Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīra8 (Commentary on the Grand 
Comprehensive Visitation). Here, the author is not going to reiterate details of his life, 
but instead, try to touch upon those aspects which will be of relevance to the debate of 
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the Shaykhī School in this chapter. In his biographical sketch, there exist three notable 
points: 
He gives an extensive narration of his dreams of the Imāms including the twelfth 
Imām,9 in which he benefited directly and immediately from their divine knowledge 
and divine emanation (fayḍ). In addition, he mentions a number of inspirations in 
which hidden matters are revealed to him - if only briefly (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, pp. 10-
14). Dream is an important theme, both in the formation of the Shaykhī doctrine and in 
the shaping of the alternative model of leadership, and hence needs closer attention. As 
Louise Marlow has rightly pointed out, unlike modern societies in which dreams are 
marginalized, in pre-modern cultures dreams were prevalent and effective. Not only 
did dreams have “the primary connotation of unreality” (Marlow, 2008, p. 1), they were 
regarded as “the private experience of the individual dreamer, but also as public events 
of significance for the larger community in which the dreamer participated” (Marlow, 
2008, p. 1).  
Regarding the significance of dreams in the Islamic culture in general and in the 
Shaykhī School in particular, one can ask about the kind of truths a dream conveys, and 
what the epistemological status of dream is for certain Islamic thinkers. Eric Ormsby is 
certain when argues that dreams carry “a special imprint of authority, they seem to 
represent a way of knowledge, and yet, at the same time, they involve neither the 
communications of the senses nor the inborn certainty of a priori knowledge” (Ormsby, 
2008, p. 142), and therefore it was “a form, albeit a shadowy form, of prophecy itself” 
(Ormsby, 2008, p. 142).  
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The second point is that, despite Aḥsāʾī’s dreams of the Imāms and the Prophet, 
which could be interpreted as “spiritual ījāza” from them (MacEion, 2009, p. 79), he has 
been honoured by many authentic ījāzas from his masters to teach and declare fatwā. 
Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (d. 1259 H/1843), in Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, Ibrāhīmī in his 
encyclopedia entry, Mudarris Tabrīzī in Rayḥānat al-Adab (Biographical Evaluation of 
the People of Epithet and Title), Vahid Rafati in his doctoral thesis, and MacEion have 
mentioned these ījāzas, as well as the names and the titles of those who granted Aḥsāʾī 
their permissions (Rashtī, n.d., pp. 51-56, Ibrāhīmī, 1373, p. 663, Mudarris Tabrīzī, 
1369, pp. 79-80, Rafati, 1979, p. 41,10 & MacEion, 2009, pp. 75-80).11 His effort to seek 
for permission is an indication of his distaste for being regarded as a scholar devoid of 
any association with the mainstream tendency. He needed these ījāzas to be able to live 
a “normal” intellectual life, as did his peers. Corbin, unlike MacEion, however, believes 
that Aḥsāʾī has never had a teacher, and should be regarded as one of those “perfect 
believers” who received their knowledge in dreams and visions through the “Invisible 
Man” (shaykh-i min al-ghayb or rijāl al-ghayb).12 Corbin cites Aḥsāʾī ‘Uwaysī’, attributed 
to Uways al-Qaranī (d. 657 H/1258), who did not find an opportunity to visit the 
Prophet, but submitted to Islam. According to Corbin, Uwaysīs are more familiar with 
the reality of Islam and Shīʿīsm than those who have learned it from a teacher (Corbin, 
1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 25-26), though as already observed, this opinion, with regard 
to Aḥsāʾī’s numerous ījāzas seems to be futile.  MacEion mentions other cases such as 
his “contempt for Sufism and certain forms of mystical philosophy, in particular the 
thought of ibn ʿArabī and Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1090 H/1680),13 his refusal to 
collaborate closely with the state, and his rejection of the validity of takfīr”, as evidence 
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that Aḥsāʾī “did not seek to dissociate himself from the Uṣūlī tradition, even if his 
relationship with it was not, perhaps, one of total identification” (MacEion, 2009, p. 78). 
The third point is that, it is quite well-known that Aḥsāʾī had a “strong interest in 
natural philosophy” (Samawi, 1998, p. 42)14, including chemistry, alchemy and 
astronomy in general, and the occult sciences in particular.15 These sciences had 
confirmation from the Imāms, especially the first and the sixth Imāms (Samawi, 1998, 
pp. 32, 42). Aḥsāʾī, as well as his successors and mainly Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, regarded 
these sciences as the second source of their esoteric knowledge, which was surely an 
extension of their direct initiation into knowledge by imāms. As Idris Samawi has 
pointed out, Aḥsāʾī was not only familiar with relevant sources and materials made 
known at his time, but also in a number of writings he admitted that he practised Occult 
sciences frequently (Samawi, 1998, pp. 42-43).16 
Seyyed Kāẓim ibn Qāsim al-Ḥusseynī al-Rashtī (d. 1258 H/1843), mostly known as 
Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, was the son of a Seyyed from Rasht, in northern Iran. Information 
on the life of Rashtī is not as detailed as Aḥsāʾī’s, although MacEion gives a lengthy 
account in his biography (MacEion, 2009, 107-137). He was appointed as head of the 
Community by Aḥsāʾī before his death in 1241/1828 (MacEion, 2009, pp. 116-117), and 
from that time onward he was actively engaged in the affairs of the School. Unlike the 
aloof lifestyle of his master, Rashtī was politically involved with the Ottoman, as well as 
with the Iranian officials in Iran and in the Shīʿa cities of Karbala and Najaf (MacEion, 
2009, pp. 127-134 & Cole and Momen, 1986, passim). Rashtī was a prolific writer and 
wrote extensively on the fundamentals of the Shaykhī doctrine. In addition to Sharḥ 
Khuṭbat al-Tuṭunjīya17 (Commentary on the Sermon of the Gulf), he wrote a number of 
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treatises, such as Asrār al-Shahāda (the Mysteries of Testimony), Rasāʾil dar Jawāb-i 
Suleymān Khān Afshār (A Response to Suleymān Khān Afshār), Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, 
Risālat al-Ḥujjat al-Bālighah (the Treatise of Certain Proof), Maqāmāt al-ʿĀrifīn (the 
Stations of the Gnostics), and Wasāʾiṭ-i Āqa Muḥammad Sharīf Kermānī (the Wills of 
Āghā Muḥammad Sharīf Kermānī). 
Compared to Aḥsāʾī, he laid more stress on the occult sciences and especially jafr, as 
a methodology for explaining themes such as imamate and wilāya from a Shaykhī 
perspective. As mentioned before, Sharḥ Khuṭbat al-Tuṭunjīya is written by a scholar 
who tries to illustrate the office of wilāya as celestial and as a manifestation of divinity. 
From this perspective, walī, either the Prophet or imām (and especially Imām Ali), is 
the bearer of the station of Deity (divinity) as is manifested in His names and attributes. 
Since Divine Essence is not comprehensible by human gnosis, the Deity manifests 
Himself in His names (asmāʾ), and attributes (ṣifāt), and awlīyā are the bearers of all 
these manifestations (ḥāmil-i ẓuhūrāt-i rubūbīya) (Rashtī, n.d., vol. 2, p. 13). Rashtī 
acknowledges three stations of Divine Essence (rubūbīya), nubuwwa (which is the 
station of totality (maqām al-jāmiʿ), and imamate (which is the station of multiplicity 
(maqām al-tafṣīl) (Rashtī, n.d., vol. 2, p. 13). In the following, Rashtī’s contributions to 
the Shaykhī doctrine will be discussed further.  
Another Shaykhī leader is Mullā Mīrzā Ḥassan Gawhar (d. 1266 H/1850), a native 
of Arasbaran in Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran. He moved to Ottoman Iraq to pursue 
religious studies. After living in Najaf, he left for Karbala to attend Aḥsāʾī’s classes and, 
after his death, he became one of the most prominent students of Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī 
(Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, pp. 3-4 & Gawhar, n.d., pp. 3-4). He had ījāza from Aḥsāʾī 
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(Gawhar, n.d., pp. 144-145), and ran his own circle of teaching and training in Karbala, 
claiming that a number of the later famous ʿulemā had been his students. Gawhar wrote 
numerous books, including short treatises, and commentaries on theological and 
juridical topics, such as imamate, nubuwwa, wilāya, and fundamentals of Shīʿa/Shaykhī 
doctrine. He also wrote refutations on his two rivals: on Karīm Khān Kermānī, entitled 
Risāla fī Radd-i ʿalā Ḥājj Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (Refutation on Ḥājj 
Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī) and on Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī, entitled 
Risāla fī Jawāb-i Iʿtirāḍ-i Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī (Treatise to Mullā 
Muḥammad Jaʿfar Astarābādī’s Objection) (Gawhar, n.d., pp. 5-7).  
Gawhar and Kermānī were rivals on the issue of the leadership of the Shaykhī 
School. Kermānī, due to his affinity with the Qajar court, and the reputation, wealth and 
power which resulted from that position, won the claim.18 Fortunately we possess 
detailed accounts of Kermānī’s life. Muḥammad Karīm [Khān] was the son of Ibrāhīm 
Khān Ẓahīr al-Dawla, the cousin and son-in-law of Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah Qajar. He was born in 
Kermān in 1227 H/1812 when his father, one of Aḥsāʾī’s advocates, was the governor 
of Kermān. Yaḥyā Aḥmadī Kermānī maintains that Ibrāhīm Khān ibn Mahdī Qulī Khān 
ibn Muḥammad Ḥassan Qajar was appointed as the governor of Kerman in 1218 
H/1803 in order to restore prosperity to the city after its destruction by the assault of 
Āghā Muḥammad Khān Qajar (d. 1211 H/1797) (Aḥmadī Kermānī, 1371, p. 140). After 
the death of his father, Karīm Khān moved to Karbala to study under Rashtī. He had a 
number of ījāzas from his master, as well as other prominent ʿulemā, and wrote two 
hundred and sixty books on a variety of topics such as tawḥīd, nubuwwa, imamate, 
wilāya and resurrection. He died in Negar, a small village in Kerman in 1288 H/1871, 
and was buried in Karbala (http://www.alabrar.info/).  
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Kermānī’s contribution to the School can be divided into two interrelated 
categories. First, he wrote extensively on the concept of the Fourth Pillar (rukn-i 
rābiʿ),19 and tried to theorize it. Kermānī elaborated more on this concept than Aḥsāʾī, 
Rashtī, and his rival, Gawhar. Second, he Persianized the Shaykhī creed, in the sense 
that until his time, Shaykhīsm, both geographically and theoretically, was regarded as 
more of an Arabic school of thought. His opus in four volumes, Irshād al-ʿAwām (the 
Guidance of the People) is written in Persian and except for a few writings, the rest of 
his works are written in this language. He composed two of his refutations on the cause 
of Bābīsm in Arabic,20 but later translated one of them into Persian.   
Over the course of one hundred and twenty years, the abovementioned scholars 
have added to the existing literature on authority and succession of the imāms. 
Furthermore, through their writings, several perspectives of Islam and Islamic 
intellectual traditions unite. This tree, as was common in other Islamic schools, has its 
roots in mysticism, theology, jurisprudence, and the bāṭinī dimension of Islam. 
Fortunately, much has been written by them, so on the basis of their literature we can 
estimate their impact on intellectual developments and on subsequent actual events. In 
the following section, the historical and intellectual contexts of Shaykhīsm which had 
their imprints on the formation and later developments of the School will be 
documented. Then attention will focus on the Shaykhī conceptualizations of imamate, 
nubuwwa and wilāya, with discussion on how each of Aḥsāʾī’s successors, by focusing 
on different sections of their master’s heritage, have actually affected the course of 
events. 
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2.2. Historical Context and Intellectual Developments  
The collapse of the Safawids at the hand of “a rag-tag bunch of tribesmen” 
(Matthee, 2012, p. 245) resulted in the disintegration of their empire, and the 
emergence of a number of local governors; though none of them was capable of offering 
any alternative centre of political power and economic activity. There was a brief 
Afghān assault, and “Maḥmūd’s death in [1137 H/]1725 was followed by large-scale, 
long-term chaos that was exacerbated by the rapacious policies of Nādir Shah in the 
1730s” (Matthee, 2012, p. 255). It took a full century for Iran to regain a measure of 
stability, and afterward three dynasties claimed legitimacy in the Safawid’s name, but 
all of them lacked its mystique and mobilizing power. After a short period of the Afshārs 
(also Afshārīd, 1736-1796/1148 H-1210) which was followed by the Zand dynasty 
(also Zandīya, 1750-1794/1163 H-1208), the Qajars appeared on the scene. For the 
first time in a hundred years they were able to recapture Persia’s integration and 
relative stability. In contrast to the Safawids, the Qajars failed “to construct a statewide 
bureaucracy” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 38).  They were unable  to crush the authority of 
local communities and their self-administration in favour of a more centralized 
apparatus; to operate effective economic and financial plans; to build a “viable standing 
army” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 39); and finally “to recapture the full grandeur of the 
ancient shah-in-shahs” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 40). Their system, from time to time, was 
threatened by stiff oppositions which arose from external dangers, local tribesmen, 
clergymen, communal rivalries, and, from Muḥammad Shah and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah 
onward, social uprisings and movements. Their epoch featured serious discontentment 
such as Ismāʿīlī revivalism in the form of Āqā Khān Maḥallātī’s (d. 1298 H/1881) 
revolt;21 the Bābī uprisings announcing jihād against the establishment; and the Reuter 
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Concession22 which was immediately denounced in widespread resistance by all ranks 
of businessmen, clergy, and nationalists against it. There was also the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1907.  
These incidents highlight a distinctive feature of the Qajar period: the inability 
of the establishment to exercise authority and power over society. The court was 
obviously too ineffective and weak to execute power. Its various drives for 
modernization and reform23, on the contrary, propelled social classes and strata, such 
as the traditional middle class (bāzārīz), intelligentsia, and a notable group of 
clergymen, towards the new route of Western links. This contact with the West 
generated class consciousness, fuelled discontent, and transformed these classes into a 
“propertied middle class,”24 who pressured the establishment to share with them the 
power and resources of wealth (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 58-69 & 2008, Chapter One, pp. 
8-33).  
Qajar’s economic and monetary situation also merit consideration. There is a 
tendency among historians of Iranian Studies to depict the social situation of Persia in 
the Qajar era under the titles of “social disorder”, “social disaster’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘the age 
of crises’ and ‘the age of decline.25 There are two reasons for this; observers are either 
eclipsed by the glory of the Safawid era, when Persia politically and economically was 
honored as a superpower (though as Rudi Matthee has rightly discussed, this image 
does not reflect the truth)26, or they are tempted to draw such a picture in order to 
explain the catastrophe and disaster as “signs of moral weakness and the prelude to 
impending doom” (Amanat, 1989, p. 29), as well as evidence for the coming of 
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Armageddon (fitna/malāḥim); all of these as prerequisites for the return of the Mahdi, 
the saviour.27  
Peter Avery argues that the economic and social situation in these years, in 
contrast to what is portrayed by Amanat and others, was not that catastrophic. In fact, 
the country was marked by urbanization and the growth and wealth of the middle class. 
Avery maintains that the spring of the Bābī movement from among the middle class 
(and particularly mercantile classes), should be treated not as a symptom of an ill 
economy, but rather “the fostering by the early Qajar kings of the merchants” (Avery, 
1965, p. 76) that brought religious tensions to the fore (Avery, 1965, pp. 76-77). It was 
also at this time that, under the shadow of “the prospering merchant class” (Avery, p. 
77), the first foreign contacts after the rise of the Qajars were made. Avery concludes 
that the urban class, including merchants (and also ʿ ulemā), continued to prosper under 
the early Qajars (Avery, 1965, pp. 77-94). 
Along with economic and political contexts, Iran’s religio-intellectual landscape 
under the Qajars needs to be discussed adequately. Three major discourses marked the 
intellectual horizon of Persia at this time and their influence continued into the 
following century: first, the appearance of new trends in Shīʿa jurisprudence, including 
the treatises on jihād (known as jihādīya) and the birth of fiqh-i mashrūṭah (a type of 
jurisprudence which deals with Constitutionalism); second, the vitality and popularity 
of different brands of esotericism, including the Ismāʿīlī movement, the Shaykhī School, 
and in later years, the two messianic eruptions of Bābīsm and Bahāʾīsm. The third 
discourse was the crystallization of the legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā in the School of Tehran. 
There have been other trends which lie outside the scope of this research, including 
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different currents of Shīʿa mysticism and western philosophy which left their mark on 
the intellectual developments of this era.  
Locating Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī’s philosophical activities in the intellectual 
context of nineteenth century Persia, one comes up with a number of currents which 
shaped his wide range of ideas and theories. To generalize, his philosophical activities 
had three sources which have been dominant in the seminaries and madrasas of Persia 
for centuries: esotericism; developments in Shīʿa jurisprudence and their 
crystallization in the two schools of Akhbārī and Uṣūlī; and philosophical developments 
after Mullā Ṣadrā. With regard to esotericism, in late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century Persia the bāṭinī ideas, and particularly pre-messianic speculations and 
longings, were intense and in circulation (Amanat, 1989, pp. 93-94), depending on the 
time and the situation they became activated. By bāṭinī ideas, I refer to ideas such as 
expectation (intiẓār), appearance (ẓuhūr), and future return (rajʿa) which were 
signified, and could have found new signifiers in different socio-political contexts and 
in different times. Other ideas can be added to these, such as kashf (revelation), whose 
importance in the Shaykhī School is already mentioned; esoteric interpretation of the 
Qurʾān; dreams of the Imāms; and a hierarchical, hidden, chain of leadership and 
authority. All of them shaped the components of Shaykhīsm as an esoteric school.  
Recalling the methodology here, esotericism of the Qajar era manifests a good 
example of the existence of a web of beliefs that constitutes a network of interconnected 
concepts which stand against inherited traditions and alter them (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 
ff). Webs of beliefs, according to Bevir, have features such as their boundless, spherical, 
and anti-hierarchical structure, as well as the freedom of the author to choose their 
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starting point (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff). In terms of the relationship between webs of 
beliefs and the inherited intellectual traditions of every epoch, traditions do not come 
into being before an individual holds beliefs, but individuals are not tradition-bound 
and can alter them or migrate from this tradition to that (Bevir, 2004, pp. 193 ff). The 
Shaykhī School not only pushed the existing, inherited bāṭinī tradition of its time to its 
limit, but stepped beyond it and created a new tradition which has not yet been 
challenged or discredited by an analogous discourse. In studying the Shaykhī webs of 
beliefs on messianism and mahdism, on intiẓār and zuhūr, and on utopia, one needs to 
pay attention to the fact that this web was held against the background of the traditions 
of their time, where these traditions themselves “derived from people holding webs of 
beliefs against the background of earlier traditions, and so on” (Bevir, 2004, p. 195).  
In terms of development in Shīʿa jurisprudence, and particularly the rivalry 
between the two schools of Akhbārī and Uṣūlī, as the second source of Aḥsāʾī’s 
philosophical activities, he was most likely influenced by this rivalry. He, and following 
him the whole Shaykhī apparatus, took a pro-Akhbārī position with regard to ideas such 
as ijtihād (the offering of independent effort in the interpretation of the sharīʿa law) 
and taqlīd (emulation or imitation in sharīʿa-related questions), as well as the role of 
mujtahids in the Community. A dispute started in the mid-seventeenth century when 
the influential figure of the Akhbārī movement, Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 
1036 H/1627) challenged Uṣūlīsm on its reliance of ijtihād. He mainly criticized the 
Uṣūlī’s use of ʿaql (reason) and ijmāʿ (consensus) as “legal principles” (uṣūl-i fiqh) to 
conduct ijtihād and therefore recognized the Qurʾān and hadīth as the only legitimate 
means to reveal the opinion of the Imāms.28  
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As Denis Hermann has analyzed, for Astarābādī, “these doctrinal developments” 
have been “influenced by Sunnism and, in particular, by Shāfiʿīsm” (Hermann, 2015, p. 
7), and therefore, must be rejected. Hermann is right when he maintains that all “the 
main currents of Imāmī Shīʿīsm” from Sufism to Uṣūlīsm, to Akhbārīsm, and later to 
Shaykhīsm, should be regarded as responses to the painful absence of the Imām after 
the Major Occultation (ghaybat-i kubrā) (Hermann, p. 7). In terms of their opposition 
to the mainstream (Uṣūlīsm) on ijtihād and, as it will be observed in the following, on 
the doctrine of the Fourth Pillar (rukn-i rābiʿ), one can safely conclude that, while they 
tried to maintain their independence from both, the Shaykhī ʿ ulemā appeared “to be the 
heir of” the Akhbārī movement at a time when it was “in decline following the success 
it had during the twelfth/eighteenth century” (Hermann, p. 19).29  
The third source of Aḥsāʾī’s thought was philosophical development after Mullā 
Ṣadrā. In general, the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā can be classified as process 
metaphysics as opposed to substance metaphysics. According to the process approach 
to metaphysics, features such as ‘becoming’ and ‘novelty’ are regarded as the essential 
description of a metaphysical endeavour. In substance metaphysics, “the fundamental 
realities of the world are entities (called ‘substances’) with essences which are fixed 
and unchanging” (Samawi, 1998, p. 10). Plato and Aristotle’s philosophy can be 
categorized as substance philosophy because it is believed that Platonic ‘Ideas’ and 
Aristotelian ‘physical and material realms’, as something immaterial and atemporal, are 
the loci of these entities (Samawi, 1998, pp. 10-11). 
In opposition to this is process metaphysics which is based on process and “is 
characterized by continuous novelty, becoming, dynamism, flux or essential (as 
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opposed to accidental) motion. It’s being is identical to its becoming” (Samawi, 1998, p. 
11). Process philosophy/metaphysics, therefore, recognizes both the reality and 
fundamentality of process (Samawi, 1998, p. 12). Without digging into the details of this 
classification and its development through history, what is important for this research 
is to relate Aḥsāʾī’s philosophical activities with one of these traditions and to find his 
intellectual context in the post-Ṣadrīan era. As Idris Samawi maintains, despite the 
dominance of substance metaphysics in the post-Avicennan time, the process 
metaphysics found its true revival in the hands of Mullā Ṣadrā; a development which 
happened “from within the tradition of the falāsafah” (Samawi, 1998, p. 21). His ḥikmat 
al-mutaʿālīya was a synthesis of three currents, a synthesis ‘within’ Peripatetic 
metaphysics of ibn Sīnā, the illuminationism of al-Suhrewardī, and the philosophical 
mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. In addition, “Mullā Ṣadrā claimed to have proved the existence 
of motion in the category of substance, a move that marks the dawn of process 
philosophy in the tradition of falsafah” (Samawi, 1998, p. 22).  
The metaphysical school of Mullā Ṣadrā was the predominant school of falsafah 
in the post-Safawid era and it remained so until the time of Aḥsāʾī. Therefore, despite 
Aḥsāʾī’s critical commentaries on two of Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings, and his critiques on 
“what he saw as certain leanings towards pantheism in Ṣadrā’s works” (Samawi, 1998, 
p. 22), Mullā Ṣadrā was the major point of departure for him. In addition to Aḥsāʾī’s 
inspiration from the process metaphysics, as a Shīʿī mutakallim (theologian), his early 
sources of thinking were revelation and Shīʿa tradition which are both “very process-
oriented in nature” (Samawi, 1998, p. 25). Therefore, in the post-Ṣadrīan era, it was 
almost impossible to find a philosopher who was not a theologian and as such did not 
need to reconcile faith and philosophy. Pertinent to this, is the prevalence of the 
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mysticism of ibn ʿArabī and its impact on the minds and writings of 
philosophers/theologians of this time. In case of our scholar, he combined both Shīʿa 
kalām and Mullā Ṣadrā’s process philosophy - despite critical commentaries of him - 
and had a love-hate relationship with the mysticism of ibn ʿArabī. Samawi goes further 
and believes that “delving deeper into the teachings of the earlier Shia Imams/Sages 
inspired Shaykh Aḥmad to radically transform the metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā into a 
system that is even more dominated by process theme” (Samawi, 1998, p. 25 & 
unpublished article, pp. 20-23).  
After locating Aḥsāʾī’s philosophical activities in the post-Ṣadrīan era and 
indicating the sources of his thought as it developed over time, attention will turn to the 
conceptualizations of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in the key Shaykhī texts, followed 
by a discussion of the doctrine of wilāyat al-takwīnīya and the idea of ‘imām as the four 
causes’, and thirdly a study of the Shaykhī eschatology and its nexus to the office of 
wilāya.  
2.3. Imamate, Nubuwwa and Wilāya 
Henri Corbin uses the term integrity (entirety/totality) to explain the reality of this 
“divine school of thought.” Shaykhīsm, Corbin writes, is a consistent composition of 
sharīʿa and spirituality, supporting “a pure and perfect imamology”30 which is called 
Shīʿīsm. At the centre of this imamology lies the gnosis of imām which is inseparable 
from the esoteric meaning of the Qurʾān and of the revelation on one hand, and the 
inward of the previous revelations on the other. Henceforth, the gnosis of imām 
connects to, and also reveals the reality of divine revelations. The totality of this 
imamology has three components: the transmitted sources (naql) vs. the intellectual 
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sources (ʿaql); esoteric interpretation (bāṭinī taʾwīl);31 and a series of sciences such as 
chemistry, alchemy, and the Science of the Letters (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 2-
8). Wilāya and nubuwwa are closely linked, because wilāya is the fruit and reality of 
nubuwwa. Nubuwwa and wilāya are the stations of the outward and the inward of the 
Prophetic, as well as of the Qurʾānīc revelations, respectively; and wherever the cycle 
of nubuwwa comes to an end, the cycle of wilāya begins (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, 
pp. 78-79).  
 Wilāya is the heart, the dominant theme of this imamology and has three 
fundamental motifs: a: the theme of the cycles of Prophecy [nubuwwa], b: the cycles of 
Revelation, and c: spiritual sciences of nature. With regard to the first theme, Corbin 
argues that “Shīʿa gnosis, as an initiatic religion, is an initiation into a doctrine 
[therefore], walāyat, as an initiation and as an initiatic function is the spiritual ministry 
of the imām, whose charisma initiates his faithful in the esoteric meaning of the 
prophetic revelations” (Corbin, 1994, p. 134). Thus, imām is walī, and as such, is the 
grand master, the master of initiation. There is also a theophanic feeling common to 
Shīʿīsm and to Sufism revolving around the office of imamate. The Person of the imām, 
Corbin writes, is the pre-eminent theophanic form (maẓhar). He is the person of the 
Shāhid, the beautiful being chosen as the witness of contemplation (Corbin, 1994, pp. 
133-139). 
The Shaykhī belief in the twelfth Imām requires having spiritual faith in him 
which is a unique experience, bestowing upon the believer a divine blessing and gift. 
Imām, in terms of a believer’s capability, shows him his own polar orientation which is 
every single believer’s direction and path of faith (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 78-
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79). The imāms, “in their theophanic persons, together with the Prophet and the 
resplendent Fatima, form the pleroma of the "Fourteen Very-Pure" (Corbin, 1977, p. 
59); among them Fatima has the predominant position and role. The eternal figure of 
Fatima-Sophia is the source of “a cosmic Sophianity,”32 which has a “threefold dignity 
and function”. This includes that she is “the manifested form”, she is all thinkable reality, 
the pleroma of meanings of all the universes, and she, as “the secret of the world of the 
Soul, is also its manifestation (bayān), without which the creative Principle of the world 
would remain unknown and unknowable, forever hidden” (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, 
pp. 64-65). 
 Given this brief introduction, this section starts with the theological conceptions 
of the notions of imamate, nubuwwa and wilāya in the writings of the Shaykhī ʿulemā. 
It will start with Shaykh Aḥmad’s oeuvre Sharḥ al-Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīra; a great 
composition of the divine ḥikma indeed (Corbin, 1346 shamsī/1967, pp. 78-79), and 
then will study major texts written by Rashtī, Gawhar and Kermānī. The aim is to show 
how these notions are linked to one another on one hand, and to the Shaykhī 
epistemology on the other.  
In his voluminous Sharḥ al-Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿat al-Kabīra attributed to the tenth 
Imām, Ali al-Naqi (d. 254 H/868),33 Aḥsāʾī, from an esoteric perspective, presents an 
imamology which is not only tied to the fundamentals of Shīʿīsm, but also is connected 
to celestial issues. Awlīyā have four stations. The first is al-sirr al-muqannā bil sirr (the 
secret veiled by the secret), which is also called the station of tawḥīd or bayān. In this 
station, awlīyā are regarded as the manifestations of His names and attributes, as divine 
essence is not comprehensible by a human being. According to a ḥadīth transmitted 
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from Imām Ali, maqām al-bayān means to know Him as He is in His reality, and know 
that nothing is similar to Him. This station indicates absolute tawḥīd, and is what the 
imāms explain in their esoteric teaching of divine essence. The second station is maqām 
al-maʿānī (the station of significatum), which is termed as sirr u-sirr (the secret of the 
secret, or the hidden of the hidden, bāṭin al-bāṭin). The second station “is the reality of 
the imāms insofar as they represent and manifest God in the totality of his essence and 
his names.” The third station is abwāb (gates), the sirr or intermediacy (al-wisāṭa wa 
al-tarjuma). They are gates to God, as they facilitate His emanation to people. The fourth 
station is that of imamate, which is ẓāhir (apparent) or ḥaqq (reality), while the first 
station is called ḥaqq al-ḥaqq (the reality of the reality) (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, 
pp. 42-50).34 
Relevant to this, is Aḥsāʾī’s discussion of seven stations of gnosis, namely, a: 
maʿrifat al-ithbāt al-tawḥīd (the gnosis of monotheism), b: maʿrifat al-maʿānī (the 
gnosis of significatum), c: maʿrifat al-abwāb (the gnosis of gates) d: maʿrifat al-imām 
(the gnosis of imām) e: maʿrifat al-arkān (the gnosis of Pillars), f: maʿrifat al-nuqabā 
(the gnosis of leaders, directors) and lastly, maʿrifat al-nujabā (the gnosis of nobles) 
(Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 43). It is noteworthy that in the first volume of the 
abovementioned Khuṭba, Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī transmits the same ḥadīth and quotes 
the same verse (āyah) of the Qurʾān to prove the stations of gnosis, as well as the 
stations of awlīyā (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, pp. 448-450). Gawhar also develops the 
same argument to describe the stations of the Prophet and of the imāms (Gawhar, 1423 
H/2002, pp. 470-474). It would seem that Kermānī is more creative in his debate on the 
four stations of awlīyā and the sevenfold stations of gnosis connected to it. He not only 
uses the same ḥadīth and verse of the Qurʾān to develop his argument for the theory of 
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maqāmāt (stations) and maʿārif (levels of gnosis), but also goes further and backs it 
with rational reasons as well. In Irshād al-ʿAwām, he looks to be more of a ḥakīm than 
a Shaykhī mutakallim (theologian), who amply elaborates on the Shaykhī 
fundamentals. He ties nubuwwa with concepts such as ḥikma and justice, maintaining 
that the prophet’s philosophy of being is to fulfill His justice for people and to reveal 
divine wisdom (ḥikmat al-ilāhīya) for them. Awlīyā manifest His names and attributes, 
and are the intermediacies of emanation, but they have come to preserve social order 
and civilization as well. Prophets are perceived to be kings of the world, chosen by the 
Wise Creator (his terminology is reminiscent of a peripatetic ḥakīm), in order to guide 
people in the righteous way (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 12ff).  
The awlīyā are also identified with aʿrāf (lit. the people of the heights) which is 
mentioned in the Qurʾān, 7: 46-48. On the basis of a number of narratives, the Imāms 
and the Prophet are aʿrāf. Aḥsāʾī transmits a ḥadīth from Imām Ali (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 
H/1999, vol. 1, p. 44), in which he introduces himself and other Imāms as aʿrāf, who 
have a number of functions both in this world and in the hereafter. The office of aʿrāf is 
to identify the people of Heaven (ahl al-janna) and to separate them from the people of 
Hell (ahl al-nār), in the sense that those who accept their wilāya are allowed to enter 
Heaven, and those who deny it will exist in Hell forever. In addition, aʿrāf help God in 
facilitating emanation and assist Him in creating the world. They are also His light and 
His words (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 48). Kermānī uses the Arabic term ‘tuṭunj’ 
(lit. gulf), to describe the status of Imām Ali and one of the proofs of aʿrāf; the one who 
stands at the origin of mercy and/or agony (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 184-186, 
117-125). 
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In the Shaykhī doctrine, imamate and nubuwwa are closely linked. Imamate is 
the bāṭin, or inward of nubuwwa. Tuned to the idea of the sealing, Shaykhīsm maintains 
the necessity of imamate as a complementary station to nubuwwa, and the revealer for 
the Prophet’s message. Imām is a teacher who instructs believers in the concealed 
dimension of the message of Islam (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 84). Wilāya is also 
the station of multiplicity (maqām al-tafṣīl), vis-à-vis nubuwwa which is the station of 
totality (maqām al-ijmāl) (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, p. 466). In this station, each of them 
represents one dimension of the reality of tawḥīd (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, p. 475). Walī 
is to expand and manifest the hidden message of nubuwwa. Communicating a ḥadīth 
from Imām Ali, in which he calls himself the point under the Arabic letter of “b” (bā), 
Rashtī names the station of wilāya as rubūbīyat al-thālithah (lit. the third divinity) 
which is the expansion and manifestation of rubūbīyat al-thānīyah (lit. the second 
divinity),35 or the station of nubuwwa. “A” (alif), the first letter of the Arabic alphabet, 
stands for this station (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 2, pp. 12-13 & Rashtī, n.d., pp. 9ff).  
Despite Aḥsāʾī’s commentaries on Fayḍ Kāshānī and on the entire Ṣadrīan 
tradition, as well as his distaste of mysticism, in the Sharḥ he agrees with the author of 
Kalimāt and the mystics. Imamate and nubuwwa are always regarded as being a 
double-faceted station. ʿAzīz Al-dīn [Azīzuddīn] Nasafī in his classic, al-Insān al-Kāmil 
(the Perfect Man), maintains that nubuwwa has two faces: a face toward God and a face 
toward people, while walī only looks at God, and whenever he turns his face to people, 
he becomes a prophet (Nasafī, 1379, p. 316). Thus, wilāya is treated as the core of 
nubuwwa, the esoteric aspect of it, and a God-oriented status. By looking at the face of 
God, the walī becomes even more remote and inaccessible to people, and it is the office 
of imamate which becomes more attainable by believers. Imām has two dimensions: 
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one toward God and another toward people; though the source of his legitimacy and 
even popularity, is exclusively divine. Whatever is revealed to the Prophet is revealed 
to them, and is preserved by them from misinterpretation and misunderstanding 
(Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 51-52). In the general interpretation of the status of 
nubuwwa, Aḥsāʾī argued that God has chosen the imāms to be guardians and custodians 
of people in all four positions and to be intermediaries between Him and the people. On 
the basis of the last position, He has excluded the fourteen immune figures to be His 
attributes, His names, His blessings, His extensive mercy and also His maʿānī 
(significatum) (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 52). 
In Kalimāt, wilāya is embedded in the doctrine of the Perfect Man (also the 
Universal Man) (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 188-195), and both wilāya and imamate have 
two attributes: being absolute and being delimited (muṭlaq and muqayyad), 
respectively. Hence, there are the absolute nubuwwa and the absolute wilāya, in 
addition to the delimited wilāya and nubuwwa (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 188-190). Fayḍ 
maintains that the origin of all creatures is Ḥaqīqat al-Muḥammadīya36, which 
encompasses all celestial and terrestrial perfections.37 The Universe and human beings 
are components of it, and have been created to serve it in order to be completed. 
Moreover, there is no veil between this Reality and God (Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 190-
191). 
Aḥsāʾī’s contention on wilāya and imamate as being reflected in the Sharḥ has 
the typical resonance with the one which is presented by Fayḍ Kāshānī when he is 
narrating a number of ḥadīth from different imāms, attempting to make it clear that 
imamate is not distinguished from nubuwwa, and that the core of both is wilāya. Awlīyā 
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are eligible to receive revelation in all its forms, such as inspirations, visions and 
dreams. They even receive “the specific revelation”, which so far had been supposed to 
be an exclusively prophetic attribution. When arguing that truthful and reliable 
knowledge is the divine knowledge, Aḥsāʾī’s words remind us of Fayḍ’s, when he 
clarifies that we are eligible to reach divine knowledge by reciting dhikrs 
(remembrance, repeating divine names), mediation, and purifying our hearts from vice 
(Fayḍ Kāshānī, 1390, pp. 240-241). Wilāya is also an office of authority. Aḥsāʾī 
acknowledges the complete authority of the Prophet and the Imāms over the life of 
believers. The walī is one who is more eligible than believers to have authority over 
their lives, their deaths and their wealth (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 72). Walī gains 
his power from closeness to, and friendship with God, and that is why the pair 
wilāya/walāya designates two facets of one reality.38 Imāms are regarded as the donors 
of all benefits as well as the swords of revenge (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 58). They 
are also shāhid (witness of contemplation) from God upon people, and are His luminous 
lights; since they eliminate the deepest and the most profound dark. They are the 
holders of the column of light (ʿamūd min a-nūr/noor), through which they are able to 
watch people and see their actions (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 58-60).  
As Corbin explains, in a mystical experience the word “witness” and the figure of 
the “Heavenly Witness” are designated to the suprasensory personal guide/master, 
who guarantees “with such certainty a theophany perceived by love alone.” This guide 
of light is called by a number of names, such as “the Sun of heart, the Sun of certainty, 
the Sun of faith, the Sun of knowledge, the spiritual sun of the Spirit”. It is he who 
“carries the mystic up toward the Heavens.” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 84-85, 91-92, 119-120). 
In the first volume of the Sharḥ, Aḥsāʾī’ extensively talks about shuhadā and their role: 
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they are the imāms, the witnesses or ḥujja (proof) of God to people and His signs among 
them. Ḥujja, therefore, is the very secret of shāhid, as without it God and His presence 
would remain in a state of disappearance and abstraction. Thus, shāhid could also be 
regarded as a mirror through which He looks at His people and watches them. 
Therefore, the imāms are His theophanies (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 365-372 & 
vol. 2, pp. 169-173). 
2.4. Imāms as the Four Causes  
Shaykh Aḥmad’s imamology goes beyond the conventional Shīʿa understanding 
of the cosmic role of the Imāms.39 Awlīyā “are the storage (maʿdan) of divine wisdom 
(ḥikmat al-llāh, or the eternal wisdom, lit. ḥikmat al-azalīyya), from which has emerged 
ḥikmat al-ḥaqīqīya or the sacred substances of awlīyā (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 
170). Ḥikma is a modulated station and has three levels including: ḥikmat al-ḥaqqīya 
(also called ḥikmat al-llāh), which is the highest level of ḥikma; ḥikmat al-ḥaqīqīya or 
awlīyā’s substances which is a sign of God; and finally, their wilāya which has originated 
from His authority and dominion (Aḥsāʾī , 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 170). Ḥikma or Sophia 
in the Hellenic literature, as both the method and the final goal, is the gnosis of God, and 
the imāms are to be “understood as Logos, or Word, through which gnosis of God is 
obtained” (Samawi, 1998, p. 87).  
According to Aḥsāʾī, the Prophet and the imāms are the Effective Cause of 
creation; (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 190-194), and in the absence of their 
effectiveness His act of creation won’t be finalized (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 361-
362). Aḥsāʾī’s notion of the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, or “the existential and absolute 
cosmic authority of the imāms”, is not an innovation, but actually a heritage of the 
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Sadrīan ḥikma, and the term specifically used by Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1045 H/1635 H) for 
any “cosmic role for the imāms”40 (Rizvi, 2013, p. 2). Imāms are the trustees of His 
secret, and the last letter by which His greatest name is completed (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 
H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 194-195). Baqīyatallāh (the Remnant of God), which is both a 
common title for all the Imāms and a specific title used exclusively for the last Imām, 
carries all the attributes and meanings being implicated by wilāyat al-takwīnīya. 
Believers not only come to know God by their imāms, but also worship God and praise 
Him through them. It is through the Imāms that people are provided with subsistence 
(rizq) and receive death (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 249-250). Aḥsāʾī re-defines 
the term ‘believer’ (muʾmin) as a person who is examined by belief in awlīyā, and argues 
that submission to awlīyā is more obligatory for believers than doing daily prayer 
(ṣalāt). (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, pp. 54-55, 58-155). Therefore, in the Shaykhī 
terminology, blasphemy and faith mean enmity/disobedience to awlīyā and obedience 
to them, respectively (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 228).41  
In relation to wilāyat al-takwīnīya, Kermānī argues that the Prophet and the 
Imāms have two statuses: the apparent authority (quṭbīyyat-i ẓāhirī) and the hidden 
guardianship which is wilāyat al-takwīnīya. Regarding the latter, they enjoy a position 
by which nothing would be hidden from them and their knowledge is to embrace 
everything in the Universe. In addition, they are granted absolute authority over the life 
of believers (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 120, pp. 125 - 128). By focusing on the 
divine weight of imamate, the Shaykhī ʿulemā move the Imāms away from the 
accessibility of believers even further, to the realm of hūrqalyā, and henceforth they 
need to create another level of being which is qurāʾi ẓāhirah (visible towns). For 
example, in a statement addressing imāms’ different performances, Aḥsāʾī totally 
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discharges them from any subjectivity in talking or in keeping silent, in doing jihād or 
restraining from it, and even from killing or being killed (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 
235).42 In relation to this, both Rashtī and Kermānī also argue that due to the distance 
of the Hidden Imām from ordinary people (ʿawām), they need visible leaders to act as 
an intermediary between him and his followers (Rashtī, Ḥujjat al-Bālighah, n.d., pp. 91ff 
& Risāla Dar Jawāb-i Suleymān Khān Afshār, n.d., pp. 28ff, & Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 
4, p. 50). 
On the basis of the verse eighteen of the sūrah of Sabaʾ (Sheba), stating that “And 
We set between them and the towns that We had blessed towns easily seen” (Nasr, 
2015, p. 1047), and also Imām al-Baqir’s interpretation of the word ‘towns’ (qurāʾ),43 
Aḥsāʾī argues that the rest of the verse is assigned to jurists (fuqahā) “and We measured 
the distance between them: ‘Journey between them in security by night and by day” 
(Nasr, p. 1047). Henceforth, according to this taʾwīl, the visible towns are jurists; “who 
are perceived as being the Imāms’ messengers (rusul) and transmitters (naqalah) to 
their Shīʿas” (Aḥsāʾī , 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 353, 378-380). Jurists are adherents of the 
faith, as they spread the message of the Imāms and their ḥadīth by teaching (Aḥsāʾī, 
1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 353). Moreover, they are eligible to receive absolute obedience, 
because they have been raised to eminency by their closeness to the Imāms (Aḥsāʾī, 
1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 285). 
Aḥsāʾī is not clear on what he means by the word qurāʾ,44 and it is his successors, 
especially Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī who shed more light on it. In his Irshād al-
ʿAwām, which contains the creeds of the Kermānī Shaykhī School, Kermānī explains 
how believers should understand ‘towns’ (qurāʾ). According to him, there exist eight 
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towns; precisely eight stations of knowledge between the Hidden Imām and people. 
Although a reminder of the seven mystical valleys, “the eight towns” are used 
allegorically to point to the numerous stations a believer should take in gaining 
knowledge of the Imāms. In the middle of their path, believers should stop at the eighth 
station which is the station of the Shaykhī ʿulemā. A group of people, Kermānī states, 
are at the first station, the gnosis of Islam, which has three dimensions: sharīʿa or law, 
ṭarīqa or path, and ḥaqīqa or truth. Then come the stations of nujabā and nuqabā, and 
finally, there is the station of the Fourth Pillar. It is only through the gnosis of the Fourth 
Pillar that a believer is able to know his imām (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 127-
128). The Fourth Pillar came to be assigned as the fourth fundamental of Shaykhīsm 
after unity, nubuwwa, and imamate (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 57-61). Kermānī 
argues that the Fourth Pillar is an indication of the maturation of Shīʿa thought, and 
since that time has not yet come, it stands at the end - after unity, nubuwwa, and 
imamate. For him, the Fourth Pillar is eternal, though it has been hidden hitherto and is 
revealed now45 (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 13 & vol. 3, pp. 33-34 & vol. 4, pp. 67-
69, 128-129).  
According to Kermānī, the holders of the office of the Fourth Pillar are the 
Imām’s name, attribute, and remembrance,46 and therefore, their identity and existence 
are not intrinsic (dhātī), but accidental (ʿaraḍī); they are to reveal the Imām’s light and 
dignity (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 127-128). The gnosis of the Fourth Pillar, 
like the gnosis of imamate, is innate, having been gifted to us in the world of the al-
dharr47 (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 14, 171-178 & vol. 4, pp. 66-67), and only the 
people of the heart (ahl al-fuʾād) were eligible to submit to it. The office of the Fourth 
Pillar is given to those who are called aṣḥāb al-yamīn (people of righteousness), 
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sābiqūn (forerunners), and muqarrabūn (intimates), (figures such as Salman the 
Persian, Abū dhar, and the two last vicegerents of the Hidden Imām), who are 
commanded to be unseen and veiled. The Perfect Man (or the Perfect Shīʿa/nāṭiq-i 
wāḥid) is the only eligible figure to hold the office of the Fourth Pillar.48  
The Shaykhī interpretation of the office of imamate and its nexus with the Four 
Causes and wilāyat al-takwīnīya has another component, which is infallibility (ʿiṣma) 
of the imāms. Aḥsāʾī’s opinions on ʿiṣma are reflected in an independent treatise called 
Risālat al-ʿIṣma wa Rajʿa. Infallibility is a divine attribute; or emanation, which 
originates from His absolute justice (ʿadl al-muṭlaq), and prohibits its holder to sin. 
Those who are adorned by it are safeguarded and preserved by His protection. Aḥsāʾī 
emphasizes that divine grace prevents imāms from relinquishing good and doing bad, 
in the sense that ʿiṣma necessarily dispossess them from any ability, desire and/or will 
to sin.49 Rather, the imāms are obligated to observe precepts and to abandon sin (Aḥsāʾī, 
1430 H, pp. 3-5). Quoting Imām Ali, he maintains that by infallibility, the imāms are His 
tongue and His deed by which He speaks and acts (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 6). From this 
perspective, Aḥsāʾī ties infallibility with the status of absolute guardianship, which is 
higher than nubuwwa and entails the station of intermediacy and representation. The 
holders of the absolute guardianship are granted absolute justice or infallibility; by 
which they come to be the close companions of God (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, pp. 11 -13).  
Infallibility is an inseparable element of representation and designation. God, in 
the world of the al-dharr, has armed His walīs with infallibility in order to protect them 
from fault and sin (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 20) and, at the same time, he has prevented 
oppressors (ẓālimīn) from achieving the covenant of wilāya and imamate (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 
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H, p. 22). Moreover, for Aḥsāʾī, infallibility came to be a specifically Imāmī attribute;50 
since Twelver Shīʿas believe that all prophets are free from (munazzah) committing sin, 
which is distasteful to Him (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 26). Equating infallibility with 
designation, Corbin argues that these two attributes grant imāms both a divine position 
and a non-temporal ancestry, and that is why the Shīʿa meaning of imamate differs from 
the Sunni understanding of it (Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, p. 402). 
In Risālat al-ʿIṣma wa Rajʿa, Aḥsāʾī develops an argument for the idea of 
infallibility of the ʿulemā. They are ghawth51 (lit. help or aid), and it is impossible for 
any age to be deprived of them.52 It is also through them that God looks at His creatures, 
and it is by them that He helps those who are seeking aid (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, pp. 79-81). 
Aḥsāʾī coins another concept; khawāṣ al-khawāṣ (the most distinguished people), 
which is designated to the specific vicegerents of the Hidden Imām, or Shaykhī leaders. 
This concept describes those highly distinguished figures who are very close to God due 
to their avoidance of sin (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 129-130), while Kermānī 
applies the term to both the specific vicegerents, and the whole Shaykhī community 
(Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 3, p. 32, 54, 80).53 It is on the basis of this hierarchical 
concept that gnosis is classified into four groupings. The first three, which are the gnosis 
of Deity, of the manifestations, and of the gates, are attainable by khawāṣ al-khawāṣ or 
the Shaykhī leaders, but the last one, the gnosis of the nuwwāb (the gnosis of the 
Shaykhī ʿulemā) could be accessible by ordinary people (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, 
pp. 88-140). 
The Shaykhī ʿulemā or the gates of the gates of God, who are gifted with the 
attribute of infallibility, are regarded as the true bearers of the charisma of imāms. At 
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the beginning of this chapter, Aḥsāʾī’s visions and dreams of the Imāms, with whom he 
claims to be in contact, were discussed.54 Having channels of direct contact with Ṣāḥib 
al-Zamān (the Lord of the Age) is important, not only because he receives guidance 
from the Imām, but also because it is a source of legitimacy due to its value and credit. 
Thus, as the “de facto leader and defender of the faith,” he, as well as the rest of the 
Shaykhī leaders, would be able to “exercise a large amount of charismatic authority” 
(MacEion, 2009, p. 18 & 23). 
2.5. The Shaykhī Eschatology and the Idea of the Future Return  
The Shaykhī ʿulemā have significantly contributed to the doctrine of the future 
return of the Hidden Imām. In Shaykhīsm, notions such as expectation, appearance, and 
gate (bāb/the intermediacy of the Hidden Imām), have messianic implications. Abbas 
Amanat has shown that messianic fervour not only preoccupied the Shaykhī literature 
and practice, but more than that, around the 1830s and 1840s, “premessianic 
speculations [were] particularly intense … especially among individual seekers of 
ẓuhūr who were later converts to the Bāb”. Based on the writings of “the early Bābīs, as 
well as those of the Bāb himself,” Amanat concludes that messianism was both “in 
circulation” and “also influential in conversions” (Amanat, 1989, pp. 93-94). In fact, out 
of the Shaykhī/Bābī circle, the prophecies and signs toward the advent of the Mahdi 
were in the same way present and outstanding. “Niʿmatullāhī emissaries” and “Persian 
Ismāʿīlīsm” that had experienced a revival in the nineteenth century shared the same 
speculations (Amanat, 1989, pp. 70-105).  
The Shaykhī sources promised the immanency of the future return of the 
Twelfth Imām as an event more likely to occur in the near future. Aḥsāʾī, in Risālat al-
 
 
106 
Ḥayāt ul-Nafs (Treatise on the Life of Self) which is a treatise on the return of the 
Prophet, of the Imāms, and of a number of notable Muslim figures, describes their 
return to this world as the actualization of God’s promise of the establishment of 
Mahdi’s just government. He uses the idea of the future return to impart the faith of 
Shīʿīsm as the only true sect in Islam. His narratives should not be treated as a standard 
eschatology, such as Zoroastrian eschatology, or even a Bayānī (Bābī) one; both of 
which are much more elaborate and rich, but rather as a story in accordance with his 
Imamology. The question of the establishment of Mahdi’s just government, and its close 
connection to categories such as resurrection, the hereafter and the judgment, is 
replaced by a vindictive sectarian battle within Islam. As will be argued, from this 
perspective, the Shaykhī eschatology should be treated as an eschatology of revenge, 
being less concerned with the establishment of justice at the end of the world - as the 
main purpose of any narrative of eschatology - and more concerned with taking revenge 
on ʿĀshūrā tragedy (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 15-55).  
In addition to Risālat al-Ḥayāt ul-Nafs, Aḥsāʾī elaborated on the future return of 
the Imāms and the Prophet in the third volume of the Sharḥ, whilst focusing on ʿĀshūrā 
and arguing that the advent of al-Qāʾim is a preliminary event for the return of al-
Hossein. Here again, the third Imām and taking revenge from the Umayyads are the 
central themes (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 3, pp. 48-100). Rashtī also addresses ʿĀshūrā 
and maintains that al-Hossein’s unjust martyrdom is important both in the life of the 
faith of Shīʿīsm, and in the whole history of the preceding prophets and their missions. 
In a treatise entitled Asrār al-Shahāda, he discusses the Shaykhī eschatology with a 
particular focus on the city of Karbala, on ʿĀshūrā and its martyrs, and their relations to 
the previous prophets. According to Rashtī, all the prophets have come to bear 
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testimony to the imamate and wilāya of the Prophet and his household, especially his 
grandson al-Hossein (Rashtī, n.d., pp. 2ff). Rashtī ties ʿĀshūrā to the lives of previous 
prophets to present it as an eternal accident which is rooted in the depth of history, and 
as such representing good in an eternal battle between good and evil.  
In Sharḥ Ḥayāt al-Arwāḥ, Gawhar discusses the topic in detail. By distinguishing 
between ẓuhūr and rajʿa, he argues that the appearance of the Hidden Imām at a time 
unknown is called ẓuhūr, while the future return of the Imāms is called rajʿa. His 
narrative contains the typical path of events of the Shaykhī eschatology in which not 
only the Prophet and his household will have a future return, but also a number of 
previous prophets along with their successors (awṣīyā), will return to help the son of 
Fatima in his fateful war with the descendants of Yazīd (Gawhar, 1423 H/2002, pp. 598-
675). For Kermānī, Karbala is the spirit of the body (the earth), and it is the first city to 
have been created twenty-two thousand years before the creation of other cities, and is 
exalted to be the father of all of them. It is also the Intellect (ʿaql), the heaven of the 
earth and the pedestal (kursī) of nubuwwa, compared with Kufa which is the pedestal 
of wilāya (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 96-106, & vol. 3, 1267 H/1850, pp. 153-
160, 171-203). 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr sheds light on the existing harmony between scientific 
geography and sacred geography. He maintains that since Muslim geographers believed 
that there was “no sharp distinction between scientific geography - as it is understood 
in the modern sense -, and sacred geography - in which directions, mountains, rivers, 
islands, etc., become symbols of the celestial world”, - every clime (iqlīm, or sacred city) 
had a correspondence in the celestial order and “had connected to a planet and a zodiac 
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sign” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99). “In Islamic geographical texts”, Nasr explains, “it is believed 
that there are seven heavens which are not only connected to seven climates, but are 
also their counterparts. Nasr calls it the combination of “descriptive and symbolic 
geography”, which had been obtained from ancient civilizations: “the climates, which 
are the counterparts of the seven heavens, were known to the Babylonians and the 
Greeks, as well as to the ancient Iranians, who had a concentric rather than longitudinal 
conception of it” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99). Not only locations “are the terrestrial image[s] of 
the celestial order” (Nasr, 1992, p. 99), but also events, such as famine and rain, and 
figures, have metaphysical counterparts.  
The Shaykhī eschatology starts with a cosmic chaos which continues with the 
appearance of Dajjāl (the Islamic anti-Christ), and later al-Sufyānī which has an 
Umayyad root. In the meantime, some Shīʿa figures return to the scene and are 
immediately killed by the army of evil.55 In a complementary explanation to Aḥsāʾī’s, 
Kermānī suggests an argument for the future return of the Prophet as the last return of 
all. He puts forward four reasons for this. First of all, since the Prophet is the most 
distinguished and celebrated (ashraf) of all people, his return would be a sealing 
(khatm) to any return. Second, as preceding prophets have been only his forerunners, 
previous returns are regarded as a prelude to his return. Thirdly, he is the universal 
spirit (rūḥ-i kullī) and the absolute wisdom (aql-i kullī) of the world, and his return 
would be the last step in the completion of the body. And finally, by his return, the 
outward and the inward dimensions - bāṭin and ẓāhir - of his mission will correspond 
with each other (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 84-85). 
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The appearance of the Twelfth Imām - which coincides with a number of climatic 
changes,56 such as a famine, followed by a heavy rain, in Jumād al-Awwal is an advent 
from the Unseen which is always referred to in the Shaykhī texts as mundus imaginalus 
(Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, p. 264) or hūrqalyā: “our walī is in hūrqalyā and will manifest and 
return to this world from ʿālam al-mithāl” (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 8, p. 421).57 ʿĀlam al-
mithāl is the world that the “spiritual body” of muʾmin (believer, here imām) or the 
“Anima substantive of the adept” becomes the Earth of his Paradise and also the Earth 
of his Resurrection (Corbin, 1977, p. 72, 84). From this perspective, the manifestation 
of the awaited Imām “is not an external event destined suddenly to appear on the 
calendar of physical time”, it is an event that gradually takes place as “the pilgrim of the 
spirit, rising toward the world of hūrqalyā, brings about the advent of the awaited imām 
in himself” (Corbin, 1977, pp. 72-73). 
Hūrqalyā (originally Havarqalyā)58 is a key concept in Shaykhī epistemology and 
anthropology and deserves closer attention. The quest of every seeker is the Orient, 
thereby orienting himself as “a primary phenomenon of ... [his] presence in the world.” 
This Orient, however, is not situated on geographical maps, since it belongs to the 
eighth territory59 which is not “comprised in any of the seven climes”,60 and “is in the 
direction of the north, beyond the north. Only an ascensional progress can lead toward 
this cosmic north chosen as a point of orientation” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 1ff). The north, 
first and foremost, is of significance “by a mode of perception,” by “primordial Images, 
preceding and regulating every sensory perception, and not with images constructed a 
posteriori on an empirical basis.” The world of archetype-images which precede all 
empirical data is “the autonomous world of visionary Figures and Forms,” where beings 
and things are seen, and are given their meaning by the active Imagination. “The Angel 
 
 
110 
Gabriel of the Qurʾānīc evelation, who is identified with the active Intelligence of the 
Avicennan philosophers, is the mediator through which imaginations are engaged. This 
autonomous world of visions is called the Earth of Hūrqalyā” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 4-16).  
In the work of Aḥsāʾī, as Rafati maintains, havarqalyā (the realm of the subtle) 
has several connotations and is often used synonymously with “the realm of 
similitudes” (Rafati, 1979, pp. 107-108) or ʿālam al-mithāl (also ithmus/barzakh). It is 
in this territory that the Twelfth Imām along with his fathers, lives and it is also from 
this world that he makes direct contact with his believers (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 8, pp. 
421-22). As his visit is not experimental, his return also takes place in the supersensory 
world.61 That being acknowledged, the events of this history are seen to be much more 
than what we ourselves call facts: they are visions. On the other hand, everything that 
we call history and value as historical is not seen in hūrqalyā, and is not an event in the 
earth of hūrqalyā, therefore is devoid of religious interest and spiritual meaning. The 
orientation of the terrestrial earth toward the earth of hūrqalyā, toward the celestial 
pole, confers a polar dimension on terrestrial existence and gives it a direction not 
evolutionary but vertical, ascensional. The past is not behind us, but under our feet 
(Corbin, 1977, pp. 89-90).  
 By the argument that the Imāms’ bodies belong to this world and are deprived 
of any temporal impurity, Aḥsāʾī maintains that forms, figures and bodies of the world 
of hūrqalyā have maximal transparency and purity (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 3, p. 107). 
Aḥsāʾī makes a strict distinction between the “organic, animated body (jasad) … and … 
corporeal mass or volume jism)” and by doing so recognizes four bodies for humans: 
two jasads (A & B) and two jisms (A & B), which “represent a twofold accidental body 
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and a twofold essential body” (Corbin, 1977, p. 91). Jasad A belongs to the material 
perishable world, and jism A is not everlasting and does not belong to the elemental 
world or to “the Terrestrial Elements.” The second jasad, though hidden in the first 
jasad (jasad A), is not perishable: it is rather composed of “archetypal elements, the 
subtle elements of the "earth of hūrqalyā.” The second jism “is the essential subtle body, 
archetypal, eternal and imperishable” (Corbin, 1977, pp. 91-92), and is called jism al-
ḥaqīqī or jism al-laṭīf.62  
This body, which is composed of jasad B and jism B, is “seventy times nobler and 
more subtle than those of the body of elemental flesh in which it is hidden and invisible. 
It has shape, extent, and dimension, and is nevertheless imperishable” (Corbin, 1977, p. 
96). The jasad-i hūrqalyāyī survives in the grave, but the grave is not the “graveyard”; 
it is “exactly the mystical earth of hūrqalyā to which it belongs, being constituted of its 
subtle elements; it survives there, invisible to the senses, visible only to the visionary 
Imagination” (Corbin, 1977, p. 96 & Rafati, 1979, pp. 108-115).63 
The idea of the future return is vital in the formation of the Shaykhī School, in 
the sense that faith (īmān) is conditioned by belief in the future return. Faith would not 
be complete until believers have true belief in the future return, because belief is a gate 
leading followers to certainty and assurance. Therefore, by elaborating on the two 
categories of khiṣṣīṣīn (the most distinguished ones) versus khāṣṣīn (the specific ones), 
the Shaykhī ʿulemā argued that those who believe in the future return in general and in 
the return of the Twelfth Imām in particular, are khiṣṣīṣīn and enjoy a higher position 
than khāṣṣīn: “belief in the future return is the reality of submission, [which is] Islam, 
and one of the signs of the perfect faith” (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 3, p. 100).64 The idea 
 
 
112 
and the structure of this anthropological hierarchy, as Corbin mentions, “correspond to 
the idea and structure of an esoteric astronomy; the one and the other exemplify the 
same archetypal Image of the world” (Corbin, 1994, pp. 62-63).  
2.6. The Occult Sciences  
The occult sciences (ʿulūm-i khafīya or gharība) are methodologies used to study 
and describe the phenomena of the physical world. This kind of science has a long 
history in the Muslim world and a number of Muslim philosophers, such as Avicenna, 
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672 H/1274), and Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-ʿĀmilī (known as Shaykh 
Bahāʾī, d. 1030 H/1621), have famously written about it. In this regard, Avicenna’s 
treatise called Risāla-yi Shāqūl (the Treatise of Plumb Line) or Shaykh Bahāʾī’s 
Kashkūl65 (Analects) are evident examples (Nasr, 1992, pp. 153-157). Matthew Melvin 
Koushki has researched extensively on the occult sciences (particularly lettrism and 
jafr), and their history in the Tīmūrīd period. Focusing his inquiry on Ṣāʾin al-Dīn Turka 
Iṣfahānī (d. 836 H/1432), Koushki shows how, in pursuing his neoplatonic-
neopythagorean quest, Turkah deployed “all available means, whether rational or 
mystical, scientific or magical” to comprehend the twin Books, the Qurʾān and the 
Cosmos (Koushki, 2012, p. I & pp. 33ff). Koushki argues that Turkah’s lettrism was part 
of a larger intellectual project in western Iran (mainly Isfahan) and it had three strands: 
gnostic-messianic, Sufi and intellectual (Koushki, 2012, p. 29).  
Seyyed Hossein Nasr observes the usage of these sciences from a mystical 
perspective and believes that due to the centrality of Unity in Islam, by numbers, letters 
and figures (all components of the occult sciences), Muslim thinkers wanted to express 
‘unity in multiplicity’ (Nasr, 1992, p. 146, pp. 295-296). Here, I will not delve into the 
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Shaykhī philosophy of the occult sciences and only highlight those parts which connect 
the occult sciences to the Shaykhī conception of wilāya and nubuwwa. Fortunately, the 
Shaykhī ʿulemā have left us with a rich literature, and Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī, Seyyed 
Kāẓim Rashtī66 and Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī67 wrote several texts on the 
occult sciences. For them, in addition to its function as a means to decipher the cosmos, 
the occult sciences have also been regarded as a medium to the gnosis of metaphysical 
forces, such as stars, jinn, and ghosts.  
In Risāla-yi Rashtīya (Treatise on Rashtī), Aḥsāʾī raises the issue of the occult 
sciences (in Aḥsāʾī’s words khamsa-yi muḥtajaba), including Kīmīyā, Līmīyā, Hīmīyā, 
Sīmīyā and Rīmīyā.68 In addition, he offers another argument for the idea of jafr, which 
helps him render his conceptualization on the philosophy of creation, or bidʿ. Bidʿ is His 
will (mashīyya) and is the first creature of Him. In Islamic philosophy, His mashīyya is 
termed as ṣādir-i awwal or the first emanated. Then the letters were created which are 
called the second man (ādam-i thānī or bidʿ-i thānī), vis-a-vis ādam-i awwal which is 
His mashīyya. The letter of “a” (Alif), which is the first letter of the Arabic alphabet, is 
the most prominent of all and is called the first invention (ikhtirāʿi awwal) or His act. 
Other letters are stemmed from Alif. Alif also stands for the Prophet Muhammad, the 
owner of the station of brevity (ijmāl), while “b” (bā), the second letter signifies Ali. “Ba” 
is the softer form of Alif and also its description. Henceforth, the office of wilāya is not 
only regarded as the continuity of nubuwwa, but also it is to disperse and distribute 
what the Prophet says (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 8, 353-354).  
Aḥsāʾī states that every letter contains distinctive properties (khāṣīyat) which 
are speculative (fikrīya), verbal (lafẓīya), numeral (raqamīya) and figural (ʿadadīya). 
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On this basis, there have been founded the collective nouns of subḥānallāh, al-
ḥamdulillāh, lā ilāha ila llāh, and Allah Akbar. They constitute the four pillars (arkān) of 
Islam, each of them representing one dimension of the message of Islam, including 
tawḥīd, nubuwwa, imamate and Shīʿa. These pillars are the causes of liveliness and 
death (ḥayāt wa mamāt), maintenance (rizq), intellect (ʿaql), soul (nafs), as well as 
nature and substance (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 355-356). As Juan Cole maintains, Aḥsāʾī 
emphasizes that the twenty-eight basic letters of the Arabic language have not only 
been backed by cosmic forces, but the cosmos itself is perceived to be a “divine text” 
(Cole, 1994, p. 1).  
This text is composed of single letters, each of which is a symbol pointing to a 
feature. Cole tries to makes this “linguistic cosmology” understandable and even logical 
by saying that Aḥsāʾī’s contribution has two contrasting poles, simplicity and 
complexity, and immateriality versus materiality, which is being successfully 
reconciled in a unified and meaningful system. He argues that for Aḥsāʾī “the letters are 
elements, so that letter mysticism in this Greco-Arabic tradition is not only cosmological 
linguistics but also atomistic physics and a natural, “cosmic” dimension to the alphabet 
as symbol can therefore also be discerned” (Cole, 1994, pp. 10-11). Moreover, Cole 
maintains that “revisionism and … dynamism” (Cole, 1994, p. 15) embedded in this 
system are claimed to not only explain the philosophy of creation, “but it is they that 
underlie the mystery of Resurrection. It is here that we begin to see the radical 
possibilities in Aḥsāʾī’s thought for the ability of the letters to be recombined, 
suggesting that the world need not always be as it is, that it can in effect be spelled out 
differently, especially by a messianic figure” (Cole, 1994, p. 10).  
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Rashtī in Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, in addition to jafr mentions two more occult 
sciences; the science of elixir and the science of numbers which contain the 
methodology of gaining knowledge and decoding the secrets of the material world. By 
transmitting a ḥadīth from Imām Ali stating that “people know the apparent dimension 
of these sciences, but I know both dimensions: outward and inward. The outward only 
contains the Classical Elements such as fire, earth, water and air, while the inward is so 
strange in a sense that it only brings confusion”. Rashtī argues that these sciences were 
handed down among the Imāms to the Hidden Imām and his vicegerents during his 
occultation (Rashtī, n.d. p. 10).  
Rashtī’s Khuṭbah is also written from the jafr perspective. Here jafr is a 
methodology by which believers come to understand the position of the Prophet and 
his household. In the first volume of the Khuṭbah he tries to give an esoteric 
interpretation of the first sūrah of the Qurʾān. Ḥamd, meaning praise be to God, is a 
mirror reflecting divine essence and has two faces: one facet refers to absolute 
monotheism (tawḥīd) and the second one is a status in which all divine names, 
attributes and fiʿl (act) are manifested (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 51). Ḥamd also stands 
for multiplicity in which, form (ṣūrat) and substance (māddih) gather. This indicates 
the most perfected manifestation which is the manifestation of the throne (ʿarsh) in the 
pedestal (kursī). Rashtī states that this is the position of the twelve astrological signs 
which stand for the twelve Imāms. Not only the Sun (shams) rotates on its orbit in the 
throne, but every world has a number of minor and major suns. Shams al-jismīyah (the 
Material Sun), the last of the suns and probably the most perfected one, belongs to the 
last world which is our world, or the material world (ʿālam-i jismānī). Shams al-
jismīyah is called the Sun of Nubuwwa (al-shams al-nubuwwa), and it symbolizes a light 
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that not only enlightens the material world, but also affects everything in it. Here, al-
shams al-nubuwwa is in its entirety and multiplicity. The moon also stands for wilāya 
(al-qamar al-wilāya). Ḥamd, in its multiplicity, symbolizes the absolute wilāya which is 
a foliage tree with a body and branches (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 52).  
Rashtī transmits a ḥadīth from the Prophet saying that, “Ali and I are from the 
same tree, while Fatima is its offshoot, the Imāms are the branches, and our knowledge 
is the fruit of it” (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 53). By knowledge, Rashtī means “the wisdom 
of the saints” (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, p. 53), or gnosis. It is in gnosis that “knowledge and 
being coincide; it is there that science and faith find their harmony” (Nasr, 1992, p. 
337); as gnosis is the highest form of knowledge in Islam. The Gnostic not only has 
definite conceptions of the universe, but also “sees all things as manifestations of the 
Supreme Divine Principle, which transcends all determinations” (Nasr, 1992, p. 337).  
The absolute wilāya (wilāyat al-muṭlaqah) is the manifestation of the outward 
face of ḥamd, while the inward stands for divine essence which is incomprehensible to 
and unreachable by man. Therefore, ḥamd, as the name and attribute of God, is 
designated to the position of absolute wilāya which belongs to Ali and his sons (Rashtī, 
1421 H/2001, p. 57 & pp. 121-2). In relevance to his discussion on wilāya and its 
relation to ḥamd, Rashtī develops an argument for the understanding of the conception 
of the Muḥammedan Light (al-noor al-Muḥammadīya) which is also known as the 
Muḥammedan Reality, the First Intellect, and the First Pen (al-qalam al-awwal). This 
nūr/noor, when called al-aql al-awwal is a medium through which God speaks to His 
creatures, and when named as al-qalam al-awwal is a tool by which He has created the 
whole creation. From the Neoplatonian axiom that “from the One (al-wāḥid) emanates 
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only one (wāḥid) (lā yaṣduru min al-wāḥid illa l-wāḥid), Rashtī argues that al-noor al-
Muḥammadīya is the first emanation or ṣādir-i awwal (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, pp. 
101-105 & pp. 548-549). From al-noor al-Muḥammadīya has been generated twenty 
oceans of light, including divine knowledge; knowledge that no one except for God 
possesses (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 276-277 & 476-477).  
Gawhar in Rasāʾil al-Muhimma fī Tawḥid wa al-Ḥīkma (Important Treatises in 
Monotheism and Wisdom) develops an argument for the conception of al-noor al-
Muḥammadīya which is believed to be the divine substance or nafs al-malakūtīyat al-
ilāhīya. Although it is self-existent, divine substance has originated from intellect (ʿaql), 
and returns to it after its completion (kamāl). The intellect, according to Gawhar, is also 
equivalent to the exalted divine essence (dhāt a-llāh al-ʿulyā), which is the cause of 
everything. Therefore, the Prophet’s self (nafsihī) is a symbol of nafs al-malakūtīyat al-
ilāhīya (the intellect), which is the cause of creation. In his interpretation of bismi llāhi 
r-raḥmān-i r-raḥīm, Gawhar, following his master, puts forward that the letter of “B”, 
which is the first letter of this āyah and symbolizes the status of the Prophet 
Muhammad, is the cause of the creation and Ali is the point beneath it (Gawhar, n.d., p. 
42 & 109).  
As an eternal reality, al-noor al-Muḥammadīya is both the inner reality of the 
Prophet and the Logos: “it is the archetype of the whole creation, containing within 
himself the ‘idea’ of the cosmos just as according to the Gospel of St. John all things were 
made by the Word of Logos” (Naṣr, 1992, p. 340). Al-noor al-Muḥammadīya is the 
continuity of a perennial spirit over history, and has found numerous instances such as 
Ali, who is not only the cousin, son-in-law and the successor of the Prophet, but more 
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than that, the Prophet himself, and also his walī. From this perspective, Ali is a mirror 
reflecting Muḥammedan Reality in himself. The chain of wilāya and awlīyā, which is a 
continuous uninterrupted string, starts with Ali and ends in his grandson, the twelfth 
Imām. Therefore, despite different names and persons, these spiritual figures are 
bearers of an everlasting reality or primal noor which is never extinguished (Naṣr, 
1992, chapter thirteen, pp. 337-353 & Elmore, 1998, pp. 82-83 & 187-188).  
Like his predecessor, Rashtī also had a love-hate relationship with mysticism, 
and especially with the school of ibn ʿArabī (Lawson, 2005, pp. 125-154). Addressing 
his conceptualization of the status of the absolute wilāya, of al-noor al-Muḥammadīya, 
and of the status of ḥamd which is designated to the Prophet and Ali, he seems to be 
more of a Sufi than a Shaykhī theologian. In the first volume of al-Khuṭbah he states that 
ḥamd is a mirror manifesting His names and attributes, such as greatness, power, and 
beauty (Gawhar, n.d. p. 122). Here, his words resonate of Akbarīan mystics who observe 
in the universe nothing but His theophany. The Deity has appeared to the word of ḥamd 
(a reminder of the word, ‘kalima’ in Christianity?) which symbolizes His absolute wilāya 
and due to the modulated-reality of it, the wilāya of His chosen people (Gawhar, n.d. pp. 
122-128). The name of Muhammad, which is His remembrance and His appearance in 
a name, is derived from the Primal Word or ḥamd. In the same manner, Ali should be 
understood as a divine name, and stands for the station of multiplicity (maqām al-tafṣīl) 
and His names (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, pp. 402-404). 
Ḥamd here is the First Emanated and has different names, such as light (Rashtī, 
1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 144), point (nuqṭah) (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 143), and 
the Muḥammedan Reality (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 134). The Arabic letter of Alif 
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“a”, is called the lawā of the point. Lawā literally means emblem or flag and Rashtī, by 
using it for the status of Ali, intends to say that he is the one who represents the Prophet 
Muhammad’s cause and mission after him (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 143 & 
Gawhar, n.d. p. 89).  
Rashtī’s Khutbah, as well as some of his other writings, such as Asrār al-Shahāda, 
Rasāʾil dar Jawāb-i Suleymān Khān Afshār, Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, Risāla-yi Ḥujjat-i 
Bālighi, Maqāmāt al-ʿĀrifīn, and Waṣāʾṭ-i Āqa Muḥammad Sharīf Kermānī, contain 
similar themes with those of Aḥsāʾī. Walī is the owner of the column of light (ʿamūd al-
noor/ʿamūd min al-noor), through which he sees the lives of people (Rashtī, 1421 
H/2001, vol. 1, p. 229). He is also a star, indicating His plans and power for His 
creatures, in the same way that he is the bearer of His mashīyya and divine light for His 
subjects (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 233). Rashtī distinguishes between two kinds 
of Divine Majesty (jalāl): the majesty of power (jalāl al-qudra) and the majesty of 
greatness (jalāl al-ʿaẓima).69 The latter exemplifies shams, which stands for the Prophet 
Muhammad and is higher than the former, which stands for the moon or the absolute 
wilāya of Ali. The moon (qamar al-wilāya), gains its light/existence from the Sun 
(Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 1, p. 248 & 250-253 & 385-387).  
Constructed on the covenant of wilāya is a house (bayt) which has four columns, 
each stands for [the acceptance of/testimony upon] His divinity (rubūbīya, also 
rubūbīyat), the Prophet Muhammad’s nubuwwa, Ali’s wilāya, and closeness and affinity 
with His friends and enmity with His enemies, respectively (Rashtī, 1421 H/2001, vol. 
2, p. 108 & Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, n.d., p. 73). Each of these levels accounts for one 
station of gnosis, and the last one, which is the gnosis of the faith of Shīʿīsm, indicates 
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the office of the specific vicegerency of the Hidden Imām (Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, n.d., 
pp. 91ff). In terms of the theory of the Fourth Pillar, Rashtī argues that in addition to 
the rightly guided ones (Rāshidūn) and trustees (umanā), the ʿ ulemā preserve the Faith 
from deviation and are the sources of divine knowledge. These visible towns are the 
signs of the path to the holy towns, or the Imāms (Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, p. 4). The 
gnosis to “the People of the Rightness” (ahl al- ḥaqq) (Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, n.d., p. 91) 
and their station is the fourth pillar of Shaykhīsm, which is the fourth station of gnosis 
(Rashtī, Ḥujjat-i Bālighi, n.d., pp. 73-74).  
 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter is indebted to the existing tradition of Shaykhīsm although, despite 
the contribution of the abovementioned figures, the question of wilāya and its nexus to 
nubuwwa and imamate, and to the stations of gnosis, has not been studied adequately. 
For this reason, the chapter sought to study and analyze the main Shaykhī texts in order 
to grasp the intention of the authors by examining their conceptions of wilāya. This has 
directed the study to the following conclusions about the nature of wilāya and of the 
Imām’s authority in the Shaykhī School:  
The Shaykhī conception of the notions of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate, is a 
classic one with apparent equivalences within the doctrine of wilāya in the School of 
Mullā Ṣadrā (which will be studied in the next chapter), as well as that of the Akbarīan 
ʿirfān (which was discussed in chapter one); despite the love-hate relationship of the 
Shaykhī ʿulemā with both70. In the case of the former, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the Shaykhī doctrine of wilāya can be regarded as the continuation of the 
philosophy of Ṣadrā. Wilāya is the inward of nubuwwa and its continuity, and 
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furthermore, wilāya is the hiddenness of God and hence needs to be mediated through 
a gate. The office of the rukn-i rābiʿ was invented in order to create a bridge between 
wilāya – which, like divinity is unreachable by Man – and people. Walī (imām) has a face 
toward people and a face toward Deity, and is regarded as the manifestation/theophany 
(ẓuhūr) of Him. The issue of manifestation and theophany are Akbarīan, and display the 
continuity of this tradition in the Shaykhī School. Walī is also Shāhid (lit. witness) of 
God upon people; it is through His eyes that His subjects are watched over. Shāhid, as 
the esoteric version of intermediacy (Corbin, 1391, vol. 1, pp. 507-508), is ḥujja (proof); 
a sign for those who believe in the Day of Judgment and the one who testifies to people 
on behalf of God. Believers come to understand everything by the help of these shuhadā 
(pl. witnesses), since in the absence of them no one is capable of understanding.  
The concept of ẓuhūr is important in the Shaykhī School and needs closer 
attention. As Rafati rightly maintains, the concepts of ẓuhūr, khātamīyya (sealing), 
Qāʾim, and the Day of Judgment, are given metaphorical interpretations in Shaykhīsm, 
and unlike the mainstream which adheres to the belief that the advent of the Qāʾim will 
occur on the Day of Judgment, the Shaykhīs believe that the appearance, and not the 
advent, of the Qāʾim ‘is’ the Day of Judgment (Rafati, 1979, pp. 173-174). Without 
entering into the debate of the nature of the Day of Judgment, I briefly mention that the 
Shaykhī ʿ ulemā did not believe that the Imām lived in the ghayb (occultation) and would 
arrive from it, but that he lived among people and would appear, as the Prophet 
Muhammad did (Rafati, 1979, pp. 175ff). 
Imām (walī) will become apparent on the Day of Judgment and his appearance 
is Deity’s manifestation, and since the office of wilāya has always represented the 
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hiddenness of God, now, the person of imām/walī/Qāʾim will be regarded as His 
theophany. It will happen at the end of time, and when the Imām appears the boundary 
between man and God will be removed. Reminiscent of the idea of waḥdat-i wujūd of 
ibn ʿ Arabī, in the Shaykhī doctrine of ẓuhūr, the unification of God and man is postponed 
until the end of time, and hence, gains a utopian aura. As it will be observed in the next 
chapter, the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qom developed similar arguments to 
conceptualize the office of wilāya, with two significant differences: the influence of al-
Shaykh al-Akbar is undeniable in their work, and as such they can be regarded as the 
true students of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā whose metaphysics found a new dimension 
in their writings. These figures were not only inspired by him, but also significantly 
added to the conceptualization of it. The other difference is that the Shaykhī emphasis 
on eschatology and messianism – as the continuation of esotericism - is absent in these 
two schools.  
And last, the passive Shaykhī millenarianism bore no fruit toward actualizing the 
Shaykhī dreams, as this duty was assigned to Seyyed Ali Muḥammad Shīrāzī (bāb, 1235-
1819/1266-1850) to declare himself: first, the special vicegerent of the Imām, second 
the Qāʾim (who abrogates the Islamic sharīʿa and whose appearance ‘is’ the day of 
Judgment), and finally the new prophet (another continuity with the Shaykhī tradition 
of the denial of the idea of khātamīyya/sealing). As has been observed, in Shaykhīsm 
the divine manifestation is postponed until the Day of Judgment, when the Imām will 
appear. Shīrāzī, himself the materialized Qāʾim, invented another messianic figure 
whose personage was said to be the origin of all divine names and attributes as well as 
divine manifestation. The utopia of the ẓuhūr, having been postponed until the end of 
time, is once again postponed (two thousand or more years) in the hands of Shīrāzī 
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(Shīrāzī n.d., p. 62), until the messianic figure of ‘He whom God shall make manifest’ 
(Man-yuẓhiruhullāh) (Smith, 2000, pp. 180-181), the promised figure of all religions, 
will appear.  
 
1 - Shaykhīya or Kashfīya, the appellation is due to the fact that kashf or mukāshifa (the ‘unveiling’ of 
inner meanings), plays an important role in this school of thought. It is also a point of difference 
between Shaykhīsm and other schools, though the adjectives of Shaykhī/Shaykhīsm derive from the 
title of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī. 
Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, Aḥsāʾī’s successor in Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn explains how one should understand 
Kashfīya in contrast to Bālāsarī, which refers to the rest of Shīʿas. In the Qajar period, Bālāsarī vs. 
Pāyīnsarī explained the notorious dispute between Shaykhīs and non-Shaykhīs in Iran and Ottoman 
Iraq. Since the former used to pray beneath the tomb of Imām al-Hossein in Karbala in order to show its 
extreme respect and love for him, they have been called Pāyīnsarī, literally those who stand beneath the 
Imāms. For Rashtī’s explanation, see: Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī, Dalīl al-Mutaḥayyarīn, n.d., (n.p.), p. 3 
onward. Rashtī claims that this name is chosen by God in the world of al-dharr, and refers to believers 
who, by choosing to leave the void path, walk in the righteous path (Rashtī, n.d., p. 17). In this work, I 
use the terms the Shaykhī School/ʿulemā, as they are the preferred terms used by the Shaykhīs 
themselves and primarily refer to a theological school of thought which came to find practical and 
sociological implications as well. Vahid Rafati has discussed the appellation of these terms as well as 
their implications in his Ph.D. thesis. See: Vahid Rafati, Op.cit, 1979, pp. 47-48.  
2 - The year of his death is controversial. In al-Abrār, http://www.alabrar.info/ which belongs to the 
Kermānī Shaykhīsm, the date of his death is mentioned as 1241 H/1826. Also, in Rayḥānat al-Adab 
there exist four years (1241, 42, 43, 44) as the year of his death.  
Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Mudarris Tabrīzī, Rayḥānat al-Adab fi Tarājim al-Maʿrūfīn bil Kūnyata aw Laqab 
(Biographical Evaluation of the People of Epithet and Title), vol. 1, 3rd edition, 1369 (Tehran: 
Khayyām), p. 81. 
3 - Aḥsāʾī is marked by multiple travels all over the Shīʿa world. He left his village for the Shīʿa shrine 
cities of Karbala and Najaf at the age of twenty. He settled there until a plague swept these cities. He 
went back home for a while, and for a second time left al-Ahsa for Iraq in 1212 H/1797. After staying in 
Basra briefly, he left Iraq for Iran in order to visit the holy shrine of the eighth Imām in Mashhad. En 
route to Khorasan, he stayed in Yazd; where he was warmly welcomed by authorities, locals, and 
ʿulemā. He left Yazd for Mashhad, and after staying there for a while, returned to Yazd. Apparently, his 
stay in Yazd was a source of benefit and blessing for him and the city too. As his reputation increased, 
not only local officials and ʿulemā, but Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah Qajar (d. 1249 H/1834) were willing to meet him. 
He accepted the invitation of the Shah, left Yazd for the capital, and stayed there for a short time. In 
Tehran, he engaged in dialogue with the Shah, because he had composed a-Rasālat ul-Sulṭānīya 
(Majestic Treatise) as an answer to the Majesty’s questions. The treatise is accessible here: Al-Jawāmiʿ 
al-Kalim, nine volumes, 1430 H (Basra: Al-ghadīr Publication), vol. 5, pp. 145-160. He also wrote 
another treatise as an answer to the questions put forward by the Shah, called a-Rasālat ul-Khāqānīya 
(the Treatise of the Great Khān) which was the title of the second Shah of the Qajar dynasty. In 1234 
H/1818, after returning to Yazd, he started writing, teaching, training, and initiating students and 
disciples, as well as answering numerous questions presented to him from different places and 
authorities. On his way back to Iraq, he resided in Kermanshah, next to the borderland of the Ottoman 
territory, where he was warmly welcomed by Prince Muḥammad ʿAlī Mīrza Dawlatshāh, the son of Fatḥ 
ʿAlī Shah and the governor of the city (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 14-18). Aḥsāʾī’s reputation was 
damaged by the excommunication fatwā which was issued against his ideas on corporal resurrection by 
Mullā Muḥammad Taqī Baraghānī (d. 1263 H/1846) known as ‘the third martyr’. He was therefore 
compelled to return to the shrine cities. Here for the second time and due to his ideas in the book Sharḥ 
al-Zīyārat about Imām Ali and his wilāyat al-takwīnīya, he left Iraq for Medina, where he passed away 
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and was buried in the cemetery of al-Baqīʿ (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, p. 19). In fact, and unlike what 
is mentioned in his book, the main reason for his departure from Iran was not his ideas on Imām Ali’s 
wilāya, but rather his opinion on the Hidden Imām as lives in the realm of hūrqalyā, and specifically his 
denial of the physical resurrection. Regarding Baraghānī’s excommunication fatwā, Samawi believes 
that “the spark ignited” by his and his associates “inexorably led to a polarization within the scholastic 
establishment between the supporters of Shaykh Aḥmad and his detractors” (Samawi, unpublished 
article, p. 16). 
4 - One of the most important texts, is The Dawn-Breakers, which is the English version of the Arabic 
Matāliʿ al-Anwār, having been documented by Nabīl Zarandī and translated into English by the late 
Guardian of the Cause of God (Walī-ya Amr-i llāh), Shoghi Effendi. In this book, Nabīl has distorted the 
Shaykhī chronicles in order to emphasize the emergence of Bābīsm. In this text, events, places and 
figures are, at times, reduced or promoted to help the reader get familiar with the Bābī cause.  
Mullā Muḥammad (Nabīl) Zarandī, Maṭāliʿ al-Anwār, (Tārīkh-i Nabīl), n.d. (n.p.). And the English 
translation is: 
Mullā Muḥammad (Nabīl) Zarandī, The Dawn-Breakers: Nabīl’s Narrative of the Early Days of the 
Bahāʾī Revelation, translated into English and edited by Shoghi Effendi, 1970 (Wilmette, Illinois, USA: 
Bahāʾī Publishing Trust).  
5 - D. M. MacEoin, Aḥsāʾī, Shaikh Aḥmad, Encyclopedia Irannica, vol. I, Fasc. 7, pp. 674-679. & Zayn al-
ʿĀbidīn Ibrāhīmī, Aḥsāʾī, Dāʾyratu-l-Maʿārif-i Buzurg-i Islāmī, vol. 6, 1373 (Tehran) pp. 662-667. & 
Alessandro Bausani, al-Aḥsāʾī, Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. 
Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds), 2016 (Brill Online).  
6 - D. M. MacEoin, the Messiah of Shiraz, 2009, chapter two, pp. 59-105. & Idris Samawi Hamid, Ph.D. 
thesis, Op.cit, 1998, pp. 26-56, and Todd Lawson, Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy in Twelver Shīʿīsm: 
Ahmad Al-Aḥsāʾī on Fayḍ Kāshānī, (the Risālat al-ʾilmīyya), in Religion and Society in Qajar Iran, Robert 
Gleave (Ed), 2005 (London & New York: Routledge), pp. 128-130.  
7 - This collection can be found here http://www.alabrar.info/ On the Basis of Ibrāhīmī’s biography, 
Henry Corbin has composed his Maktab-i Shaykhī az Ḥikmat-i Ilāhī-ya Shīʿī (L'ecole Shaykhie en 
Theologie Shi`ite), translation into Persian and introduction by Aḥmad Bahmanyār, 1346/1967 (n.p., 
Tābān Publication), pp. 14-42. 
8 - This book is mentioned as Sharḥ throughout this chapter.  
9 - Some sources such as Idris Samawi’s thesis, only mention the names of the three Imāms: the second, 
the fourth and the fifth. The twelfth Imām is not mentioned at all.  
10 - Rafati, Op.cit, 1979. 
11 - Henri Corbin in his Maktab-i Shaykhī az Ḥikmat-i Ilāhī-ya Shīʿī, claims that these ījāzas were not 
solely spiritual, but physical. He narrates a dream of the Tenth Imām by Aḥsāʾī in which the Imām gave 
him a number of papers (actually 12 papers) containing the ījāzas from each of the twelve Imāms. 
Corbin, Op.cit, 1346 Shamsī/1967, p. 22 & 24.  
12 - Such a controversy, as we saw in chapter one, was around the sources of knowledge of ibn ʿArabī as 
well, and since the so-called “esoteric knowledge” is a vast area with unclear boundaries and content, 
no one can admit or disprove whether a certain scholar has received his ʿilm from divine sources or not. 
Todd Lawson takes a different stance with MacEion and agrees with Corbin. He maintains that “Shaykh 
Aḥmad made it clear that the only religious authority he would submit to would be the Imāms 
themselves as opposed, say, to any marjaʿ al-taqlīd of the Uṣūlīs. This also implied that his own 
knowledge, thus derived directly from the Prophet and the Imāms, was qualitatively superior to that of 
others”. Lawson, Op.cit, 2005, p. 135.  
13 - Todd Lawson in the abovementioned article has elaborated on the nature of the relationship 
between Aḥsāʾī and Sufism in general, and Aḥsāʾī and Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī in particular. As he 
certainly points out, “it would appear from everything we know of Aḥsāʾī’s thought . . . and it is certainly 
not enough . . . that what others consider philosophical sophistication our author himself would view as 
irreligion, an abuse of the holy laws of intelligence”. Lawson, Ibid, pp. 129 ff.  
14 - Idris Samawi Hamid, the Metaphysics and Cosmology of Process According to Shaykh Ahmad Ahsai, 
Ph.D. thesis, State University of New York, 1998. 
15 - William R. Newman in his article the Occult and the Manifest among the Alchemists, has looked 
deeper into the issue. He distinguished between the alchemical theory of the occult and manifest, as 
opposed to Galeno-scholastic theory, and argues that the former, having originated in the Greek 
civilization of Hellenistic or Roman Imperial times, and passed through Islam and arrived finally in the 
Latin West via Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, is a striking example of the permutation of ideas by virtue of their 
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transmission. The significant point is that the alchemical theory was radically different from the 
medical and scholastic literature on occult qualities, though it shared some of the same original sources. 
According to the alchemical theory, the occult qualities of a substance could become manifest, because 
they were not by their very nature insensible, and that every material substance has a bāṭin and a ẓāhir 
(occultum and manifestum in Latin and interior and exterior) and they can invert literally. See: 
William R. Newman, the Occult and the Manifest among the Alchemists, in Tradition, Transmission and 
Transformation, F. Jamil Ragep, Sally Ragep and Steven Livesey (eds), 1996 (Leiden, New York and 
Koln: E. J. Brill), pp. 173-198.  
16 - One can classify Aḥsāʾī’s writings into two categories: the first category includes those 
commentaries, or independent texts and treatises, which are composed by a jurist and committed to 
the Uṣūlī tradition and its principles of writing and thinking, though trying to push it to its limits 
(Lawson, 2005, pp. 127ff). From a philosophical perspective, he was the true heir of some characters of 
“post-Avicennan philosophy in Eastern Islam, [especially having that] focused on the major part of his 
attention on the works” of the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā and his school, “as the last major philosophical 
school predating him” (Samawi, 1998, p. 41). In relation to his commentaries, I should say that the most 
prominent philosophers of the Sadrīan School are pilloried by him. In this regard, Mullā Ṣadrā’s (1045 
H/1640) Sharḥ al-ʿArshīya (the Commentary of the Wisdom of the Throne) and al-Mashāʿir (Intellects) 
(MacEion, 2009, p. 72, 95), as well as his pupil and son-in-law’s, Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1091 
H/1680), are being criticized by him. His comments of Fayḍ, include more than 2500 verses from his 
Risālat al-ʿIlmīyya (the Treatise on Knowledge) as well as other writings of Fayḍ (MacEion, 2009, p. 
72), though, for the detailed list of his commentaries on his contemporary scholars, see MacEion, 2009, 
pp. 72-73. On the other hand, he made huge efforts to integrate the Shīʿa imāms’ teachings into this 
tradition (Samawi, 1998, p. 40). It is from this perspective that he laid special stress on his dreams and 
visions of the imāms: Aḥsāʾī, through the very personal channel of dreams, is the recipient of the imāms’ 
divine knowledge on one hand, and its transmitter into the existing philosophical and theological 
tradition on the other. The second category embraces those writings that could be labeled as his 
esoteric/allegorical interpretations of some of Qurʾānīc verses, as well as central Islamic concepts such 
as imamate, wilāya, nubuwwa, creation, resurrection, and infallibility (ʿiṣma). Relevant to this, there are 
other materials explained by the “methodology” of jafr and the science of the letters. Sharḥ Khuṭbat al-
Tuṭunjīya by Seyyed Kāẓim Rashtī (though it is unfinished), is notable in this regard. 
17 - The Khuṭbah which is “only loosely and inadequately translated as is an Arabic sermon, discourse or 
oration ascribed to the first Shīʿī Imām Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib (d. 40 H/661). It is not found in the well-known 
compilation of around 400 sermons (and other materials) ascribed to Imām Ali entitled Nahj al-Balāgha 
compiled in about 400 H/1009-10  by Sharīf al-Raḍī ibn al-Hossein al-Mūsawī (d. 406 H/1015), or in 
other well-known collections of materials attributed to Imām Ali. The Khuṭbah has been infrequently 
published in the original, although it can be found, however, along with the allegedly Kufa delivered 
Khuṭbat al-Bayān also ascribed to Imām Ali in volume two of the Ilzām al-Nāṣib fī Ithbāt al-Ḥujjat al-
Ghāʾib (the Commitment of the Constitute to Prove the Ḥujja), 5th ed, 1404/1984 (Beirut: Mawsūʿat al-
Aʿlā) of Ḥājj Shaykh ʿAlī al-Yazdī al-Ḥāʾirī (d. 1333 H/ 1915). Very little studied and seldom commented 
upon in any language, the Khuṭbah is a challenging, magisterial oration containing important religious 
doctrines relating to Shīʿa walāya (on one level Imām centered "divine providence") and high 
imamology as well, for example,  as important Islamo-biblical or Isrāʿīlīyāt themes or motifs.” Stephen 
Lambden in: < http://hurqalya.ucmerced.edu/node/296/ >, last accessed 02/04/2017. As Amir-
Moezzi has argued, there is a great confusion regarding the title and text of the sermon, as it is reported 
by various authors (Shīʿa and Sunni) in different periods. The Khuṭbah is old and a long version of it 
was already reported “in Nuṣayrī texts dating from the end of the third century AH” (Amir-Moezzi, 
2001, p. 121). Along with the abovementioned ghālī source, the text is mentioned by “the Ismāʾīlī 
thinker and propagandist, Muʾayyad fil-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 470 H/1077)” (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 121), as 
well as “the Twelver theosopher and traditionist Rajab al-Bursī (d. 814 H/1411)” (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, 
p. 121) in his Mashāriq. Shaykh Kāẓim, like his predecessor Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī in his Kalimāt-i 
Maknūnah (Hidden Words) and his successor ʿAlī Yazdī Ḥāʾirī in his Ilzām al-Nāṣib fī Ithbāt al-Ḥujjat al-
Ghāʾib uses the version of Bursī (Amir-Moezzi, 2001, p. 122). 
18 - Perhaps, one of the most prominent differences between Gawhar and Kermānī was the latter’s 
belief in a visible vicegerent who is not only accessible to believers, but also carries all the 
responsibilities of the imām. Kermānī, focuses on the necessity of the availability of imām, and since he 
is not reachable by ordinary people (ʿawām), there ought to be a nāʾib, who actually occupies the 
imām’s place. The theory of the Fourth Pillar is resulted from such supposition (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, 
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vol. 4, p. 13ff). On the other hand, Gawhar, maintains that the occultation of the Imām should be 
understood by the principle of facilitating fayḍ (qāʿiday-i luṭf), which is well-known in the Shīʿa 
theology. Therefore, Gawhar takes it for granted that a Hidden Imām is sensible and his remoteness 
from his believers is not important. For more information, see: Mullā Mīrzā Ḥassan Gawhar, Sharḥ 
Ḥayāt Arwāḥ (the Commentary on the Life of Souls), 2nd edition, 1423 H/2002 (Kuwait: Jāmiʿay-i Imām 
Sadiq), pp. 570-581. 
19 - MacEion translates rukn-i rābiʿ as “the Fourth Support.” (MacEion, 2009, pp. 19ff). 
20 - He composed eight refutations on Bābīsm, two in Arabic and six in Persian. His successors, from his 
son, Muḥammad Khān Kermānī, to the last Shaykhī leader of his clan, Abdul Riḍā Ibrāhīmī, who was 
assassinated in Kerman in 1358 shamsī/1980, followed his path in getting themselves involved with 
the causes of Bābīsm and Bahāʾīsm. Shaykhīsm was accused of nurturing the Bābī movement, and it is 
understandable that by refuting it, they wanted to vindicate themselves of such an accusation. Kermānī 
has important treatise entitled Khātama-yi Nāṣarīya (the Seal of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah) in which he 
attempts to make it clear for the Shah that he and his school have been always loyal, both to the 
monarchy and to Islam. Khātama-yi Nāṣarīya, 3rd edition, n.d., (Kerman: Saʿādat publication). 
21 - Farhad Daftary in his studies on Ismāʿīlīsm in the Qajar period explains how the combination of 
political power, economic benefit and religious ambition, placed Ḥasan ʿAlī Shah, known as Āghā Khān I, 
forty-sixth Ismāʿīlī Imām of the Nizārī Ismāʿīlīsm against the Shah of the time Muḥammad Shah, who 
himself had appointed Āghā Khān to the governorship of Kerman. As a result of the dismissal of his 
service, Āghā Khān resisted against the central government in Tehran and finally fled to Afghanistan 
and India. See: Farhad Daftary, The Ismāʿīlīs; Their History and Doctrines, 1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 435 ff.  
22 - George Nathaniel Curzon (d. 1925), in his Persia and the Persian Question, called the Reuter 
Concession "The most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a 
kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of." Vol. I, 1966 (London. Frank Cass and Co. 
Ltd). p.480.  
23 - In general, up to the formation of the first messianic movement in the 18th century, there were three 
main courses of drives for modernization: the first one was led by Prince ʿAbbās Mīrzā, the unhappy 
heir and thus governor of Azerbaijan. His drive had striking military and administrative aspects limited 
to Azerbaijan and specifically to Tabriz. The second drive was more generalized and nationwide, 
started from the court in Tehran by Amīr Kabīr. His efforts, like those of ʿAbbās Mīrzā’s had been 
inspired by the Tanẓīmāt reforms in Turkey, but unlike ʿAbbās Mīrzā, he successfully won “the 
confidence of the heir apparent, the future Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah.” (Abrahamian, 1982, p. 53). The third 
phase was initiated by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah himself after the assassination of his prime minister. But these 
“innovations,” as Abrahamian has rightly noted, “instead of driving for rapid change, induced a slow 
drift toward change; instead of defending the state against external enemies, they were aimed at 
buttressing the court against internal opponents, and, instead of protecting the economy, they sought to 
tempt Western interests further into the Iranian economy.” (Abrahamian, 1982, pp. 54-55 & 2008, 
Chapter Two, pp. 34-62) 
24 - Addressing the modernization process, its effects on the social strata and reactions to it, it is worthy 
of note that the Shaykhī leaders, and specifically those who founded the Shaykhī School of Kerman, 
brought to the surface their dissatisfaction with the West in general and the thirst for economic and 
political change which was common among the mentioned social classes in particular. They not only 
criticized the whole process of modernization, but also took refuge in the most conservative 
interpretation of a role a Shīʿī leader could ever assume.  
25 - Abbas Amanat, Op.cit, 1989 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). 
26 - Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis; Safawid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan, 2012 (New York: I.B. Tauris & 
Cp. Ltd), passim.  
27 - Another sociologist of post-Revolutionary Iran has analyzed the causes of the formation of the 
Revolution of 1979 from this perspective. Saʿīd Ḥajjārīyān, Mawʿūdīyat dar Inqilāb-i Rūssīyeh va 
Inqilāb-i Islāmī-i Iran (Mahdīsm in the Iranian and Russian Revolutions), Ph.D. thesis, Tehran 
University, 1382.  
28 - For a historical account of the ‘demise’ of Akhbārīsm in the nineteenth century after the treatment it 
had received in the hands of Āqā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Bihbahānī, (d.1205/1791), and later 
engagements of some Akhbārī figures in anti-Shaykhī dispute, see Andrew Newman’s article in: 
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Andrew J. Newman, Anti-Akhbārī Sentiments Among the Qajar ʿUlemā: the Case of Muḥammad Bāqir al-
Khwānsārī (d.1313/1895), in Religion and Society in Qajar Iran, Robert Gleave (Ed), 2005 (London & 
New York: Routledge Curzon), pp. 155-173.  
29 - Probably this dispute provided an opportunity for them to take an independent position, as well as 
to present an alternative to both. This could by itself be the subject of a research project. 
30 - It was Corbin who coined this term to explain the very characteristic of the Shīʿa theosophy. In his 
book entitled Spiritual Body and Celestial Earth, he indicates to this point by saying that “While 
prophetology is an essential element of Islamic religion as such, in Shīʿa theosophy it is divided into 
prophetology and imamology. Beside the prophetic function, which delivers the message of the literal 
Revelation, there is the initiatic function, which initiates into the hidden meanings of revelations, and 
which is the function of the Imām” (Corbin, 1977, p. 58). 
31 - “Symbolic exegesis of the [Qurʾān] based on the claim that there is an inner (bāṭinī) meaning behind 
the external (zāhirī) text. By extension, it can be applied to other scriptures, as well as to rituals and the 
whole of nature. The theory and practice of this hermeneutical method was elaborated by Ismāʿīlī 
thinkers” (http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary/b) of the 11th century. According to these writers, “while the 
revelation (tanzīl) was delivered by the prophet to all people, the knowledge of its taʾwīl rests with the 
imām, the sole authoritative source of interpretation, and they considered that this taʾwīl should not be 
disclosed to the masses, lest it is misunderstood” (http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary/b). It was assumed 
that the esoteric and exoteric dimensions of the revelation and of the Qurʾān came together, but in later 
centuries, there appeared a number of sects/movements solely on the basis of the esoteric dimension 
of the Qurʾān, as well as that of the rituals and teachings. Bella Tendler in her article on the Nūṣayrī sect 
has argued that in the Nūṣayrī thought, knowledge only indicate esoteric knowledge and it is accessible 
through a properly conducted initiation. See: 
Bella Tendler Krieger, Marriage, Birth, and Bāṭinī Taʾwīl: A Study of Nūṣayrī Initiation Based on the 
Kitāb al-Ḥāwī fī ʿIlm al-Fatāwī of Abū Saʿīd Maymūn al-Tạbarānī, Arabica 58 (2011) pp. 53-75.  
32 - In Corbin’s text, cosmic Sophianity refers to Ḥaḍrat Fatima, because she is Sophia, “which is to say 
divine wisdom and power, embracing all he universes”. Corbin, Op.cit, 1977, p. 65, and that is why “the 
whole universe of the soul and the secret of the meanings given by the Soul is the very universe and 
secret of Ḥaḍrat Fatima” (ibid). 
33 - Sharḥ is a commentary on Zīyārat al-Jāmiʿa-t al-Kabīra, written at the request of Seyyed Ḥassan ibn 
Seyyed Qāsim al-Ḥusseynī al-Ishkiwarī al-Jīlānī in 1230 H/1814. The Zīyārat itself is a prayer of 
visitation of the holy shrines of the imāms, related on the authority of Imām Ali ibn Muhammad Naqi 
and is recorded by Ibn Bābwayh (Shaykh Ṣadūq) and Shaykh Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥassan al-
Ṭūsī. Sharḥ is a collection of the most important theological problems in Shīʿa thought and, the Zīyārat 
itself “is a master work in expressing the status of the imāms and Shaykh Aḥmad explains its status as 
such” (Rafati, 1979, p. 59). The prayer is famous among the Shīʿa and many scholars have written 
commentaries on it. Rafati, 1979, pp. 58-59. 
34 - Aḥsāʾī’s explanation of the four stations of awlīyā is based on a famous ḥadīth by the sixth Imām, 
Jafar al-Sadiq which is related by Abū Jaʿfar Moḥammad ibn al-Ḥassan ibn Farrukh al-Ṣaffār al-Qumī in 
Basāʾir al-Darajāt fī Fazāʾil Āl-i Muḥammad (Clear Proofs in the Sciences of the Household of the 
Prophet and on whatever is designated to them by God), in which the Imām says “inna amrinā sirr o fī 
sirr, wa sirr o mustatar, wa sirr o la yafīdu illā sirr, wa sirr ʿalā sirr wa sirr o muqannā bil sirr” (Al-Qumī, 
1404 H, p. 28).  
35 - There is no doubt that there is only one divinity, but here Rashtī wants to say that the offices of 
wilāya and nubuwwa share divine attributes and features and that’s why they can be called rubūbīyat 
al-thālithah and rubūbīyat al-thānīyah, respectively.  
36 - For a Shaykhī explanation of this concept and its nexus to other Shīʿa concepts such as infallibility, 
the greater infallibility, absolute imamate, absolute wilāya, and polarity (quṭbīyat), see: Kermānī, 1267 
H/1850, vol. 3, pp. 85-89, 138-141. 
37 - In the Akbarīan School, the presence of the Perfect Man is always regarded as all-encompassing 
since, from an outward perspective, it is physical man, but inwardly he comprehends the realities of all 
things. See: 
William C. Chittick, The Five Divine Presences: From Al-Qūnawī to Al-Qayṣarī, the Muslim World, Vol 
72, Issue 2, April 1982, pp. 107-128.  
38 - For a discussion of this pair, see:  
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Michel Chodkiewicz, Khātam al-Awlīyā: Nubuwwa wa Wilāya dar Āmūzayi Ibn ʿArabī (Le Sceau des 
Saints: Prophetie et Saintete dans la Doctrine dbn ʿArabī) translation into Persian by Hossein Murīdī, 
1389 (Tehran: Elhām) & 
Gerald T. Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in The Fullness of Time: Ibn ʿArabī’s Book of the Fabulous Gryphon, 
1999 (Leiden: Brill). 
39 - After him, his pupil Rashtī continued to pave the way his master had prepared for him earlier. Sharḥ 
al-Khuṭbat al-Tuṭunjīya is a good example.  
40 - As Aḥsāʾī maintains in the first volume of the Sharḥ, imāms are “the guardians of blessing,” because 
it is through their being that He pours down rain on people and on the earth, and grows plants and 
seeds in it (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 75-76, vol. 2, pp. 157-166). 
41 - Aḥsāʾī also instructs his readers to respect awlīyā and to express absolute obedience toward them in 
order to gain good morality, a purified soul and closeness to God. (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, pp. 271-
72) This idea is the idea of modulation or gradation of wilāya which is founded on the gradation of 
being. Later on, he describes wilāya as the atonement of sins; equating it with water by which 
impurities will be removed. (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 278).  
42 - I should emphasize once again that wilāya/walāya, as a modulated status, has two forms: the first 
one which is specified to the imāms and the Prophet, is a divine gift (or grace) and is donated to them 
from God. It is He who takes initiative in choosing them for Himself as His friends (awlīyā) and it is on 
the basis of this affinity that the right of absolute authority is given to them. On the other hand, there is 
another form of wilāya/walāya which starts from the side of the subject, from bottom to up and is 
dedicated to those who choose to take this journey to Him. But it is on the basis of the former that the 
notion of “discharge” is proposed. It is also likely that the main difference between these two forms is 
the concept of infallibility which is distinctively designated to the first group; the second group of 
awlīyā does not benefit from infallibility.  
43 - “The imāms are regarded to be the qurāʾ; whom are blessed by Allah”.  
44 - As an example, Aḥsāʾī mentions this concept in the second volume of the Sharḥ only once. See: 
(Aḥsāʾī, 1420 H/1999, vol. 2, p. 217). 
45 - From this perspective, it seems that there is no difference between the idea of the Fourth Pillar and 
the notions of tawallā (friendship/closeness with God and the Prophet), and tabarrā (dissociating 
oneself from friendship with God’s enemies). In the fourth volume of the Irshād, Kermānī explains that 
the Fourth Pillar is the most honorable and respected bond (ʿurwa) of the faith; and even stands higher 
than praying, fasting, alms, Ḥajj and jihād, and that is why it ought to be obliged and observed 
(Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, p. 68). As Corbin has explained, the two principles of tawallā and 
tabarrā are to be the fundamentals (uṣūl) of Shaykhīsm, whilst, for the mainstream Shīʿīsm, they are the 
furūʿ (branches). (Corbin, 1346/1967, pp. 91-92).  
46 - Corbin has shed light on the office of the fourth pillar and the gnosis related to it. See: Corbin, 
1346/1967, pp. 88-105.   
47 - Al-dharr literally means ant, and its appellation is that since awlīyā are the most honorable of all 
people and the rest of the creatures, everything else is worthless against them. Thus, the whole 
universe is as big as an ant in their eyes. (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 19). Al-dharr is the earth of 
resurrection; because it is believed that the world has been generated from Al-dharr, and will return 
back to it (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, p. 100), though, Kermānī’s explanation on the causes of the 
creation of the universe as well as on the Al-dharr, is but superstition (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, 
pp. 46-58).   
48 - Todd Lawson explains that in Shaykhīsm, the imāms are neither human nor divine, “but a different 
order of being, a separate and distinct species” (Lawson, 2005, p. 138), and the Perfect Man is not the 
Prophet (contrary to Sufism), nor is the idea presented by the Prophet and the imāms (contrary to the 
common Twelver Shīʿa understanding of the term), but rather, is “the one who recognizes the spiritual 
and ontological dignity of these figures. It is Salman and not Muhammad who represents the prototype 
here” (Lawson, 2005, p. 138). 
49 - Aḥsāʾī uses the words taṣāḥub (to capture), or taṣarruf (to possess something/act of disposal) to 
explain infallibility. Imāms are being held or captured by infallibility, in the sense that they do nothing 
but good, they say nothing but right, etc. (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 19). By claiming that Imāms are not capable 
of doing sin, he discharges them from any human attribute, and upgrades them to a level which 
traditionally belongs to the angels. Kermānī’s arguments are more fascinating. He not only, following 
his master, upgrades the imāms and the Prophet to the level of the angels, but also, by arguing that they 
have priority in creation, places them even higher than angels. In this regard, priority in creation results 
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in the superiority in existence. Kermānī goes beyond and claims that their position is higher than that of 
the Holy Spirit/Holy Ghost, not only because they were created sooner, but because they are received 
His grace and His knowledge first. So, the Holy Spirit is their servant which has been sent to serve and 
protect them (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 3, p. 70, 138-139). 
50 - Aḥsāʾī recognizes infallibility as a specifically Imāmī characteristic and emphasizes that other 
schools of thought, such as Ashʿarīte, Muʿtazilīte, Khawārij, etc, do not believe in the infallibility of the 
Prophet from sin before and after his first revelation, while Imāmī Sect assigns immunity from sin; both 
major and minor, to the Prophet (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, p. 28).  
51 - The Hidden Imām is also ghawth. It seems that ghawth is a modulated status too which starts from 
the Prophet and ends in the Shaykhī ʿulemā including Aḥsāʾī himself. Ghawth is a window through 
which God looks at people, and if the window is closed, there would be no relationship between God 
and His creatures.  
52 - The validity of the ḥadīth has been called under question by a number of scholars such as Mohsen 
Kadivar. He believes that it should be treated as an example of khabar-i wāḥid (singular tradition) as 
opposed to khabar-i mutawāṭir (traditions with multiple chains of transmissions), and as such could 
not be regarded as a basis for the fundamental principle of the Faith. See: < 
http://kadivar.com/?p=13649 >, last accessed 5/2/17.  
53 - Kermānī has famously termed “the Rescued Sect” and “the Honorable Sect” to refer to Shaykhīsm. 
(Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 105, 107).  
54 - The phenomenon is called “experiential religion”, and being constructed on dreams, visions and 
mediations. According to Cole, this feature came to make resemblance between Shaykhīsm and Shīʿa 
Sufism (Cole, 1994, p. 15).   
55 - All of these events happen during Jumād al-Awwal and end in Muḥarram, and, as we know, the main 
Shīʿa events occurred during these months. Focusing on these months indicates that Shīʿa 
historiography, and not necessarily eschatology in the exact sense of the term, occupies a central place 
in this text. The Twelfth Imām appears in the tenth day of Muḥarram in Mecca, where he establishes a 
just government which will endure seventy years. In the meantime, the third Imām al-Hossein, along 
with all of his fellows in the battle of Karbala returns to this world. Mahdi is killed by a bearded woman 
on the seventieth day of his authority. His martyrdom is the beginning of the kingdom of al-Hossein, the 
repetition of the battle of Karbala, the murder of al-Hossein’s killers by his hand, and finally his victory. 
Even Imām Ali is killed when he attempts to help his son. Al-Hossein is the ultimate winner of the event, 
since he is the Qāʾim and the founder of the just government. During his reign, which takes fifty 
thousand years, his father, along with the Twelfth Imām and the Prophet, return to this world again, 
because each believer enjoys two deaths and two returns. The future return of the Prophet, who is the 
last to return, is the beginning of the all-enduring just society and just government (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 
5, pp. 107-112).  
56 - The Shaykhī eschatology follows the typical paradigm of the Shīʿa eschatology. As Hussain has 
argued, the term al-Mahdi has always had a messianic and eschatological sense in Shīʿīsm, and a 
considerable body among Imamite applied the title of al-Mahdi in its messianic sense to each imām 
after his death (Hussain, 1982, pp. 14-15). Besides, the normative signs of the ẓuhūr, according to 
Hussain, are common among all Shīʿa sects, including the Shaykhīs. He mentioned five signs: the rise of 
al-Sufyānī in Syria and his domination for nine months, a rebel called al-Yamānī or al-Qaḥṭānī heading 
toward Mecca, the revolt of the Pure Soul (Nafs-i Zakīyyah) in Medina, the sinking of al-Sufyānī in the 
vicinity of Medina, and finally, the outcry in the sky which announces the name of al-Qāʾim al-Mahdī. All 
of these happen within one year (Hussain, 1982, pp. 116-117). 
57 - Aḥsāʾī’s ideas on hūrqalyā are considered in the following texts: 
Risāla fi al-Maʿād-i Jismanī (Treatise on Corporal Resurrection) in Javāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive 
Words), 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 525-533.  
Risāla fi al-Bayān al-muṣannif fi al-Jism Wa al-Jasad (the Treatise on Body and Corpse), in Javāmiʿ al-
Kalim (Comprehensive Words), 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 560-561.  
Kermānī has a lengthy debate on this concept and its relation to other concepts such as ascension 
(miʿrāj), See: 
Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 128- 140. Kermānī goes on by saying that the Prophet and the 
Imāms’ bodies “are the face (wajh, of God.” (Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, p. 130)  
Irshād al-ʿAwām, 1267 H/1850, vol. 2, pp. 70-95.  
Irshād al-ʿAwām, 1267 H/1850, vol. 3, 180-181, where he openly enunciates believers of the close 
return of the Imām.  
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Risāla fī Javāb-i Baʿḍī ʿUlemā fī Aḥvāl-i Barzakh wa al-Mulk-i Naghalah (the Response to the Questions 
of Some Scholars on Ithmus and the Realm of Transition), in Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words), 
1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 564-566.  
Risāla-ya Rashtīyah (Treatise on Rashtī), in Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, 1430 H, vol. 8. pp. 309-457.  
58 - On his research on the Shaykhī doctrines, Vahid Rafati, quoting Muḥammad Muʿīn shows that the 
term is derived from the Hebrew term habal qarnim and according to this derivation, the correct 
pronunciation should be havarqalyā and not hūrqalyā, as it is common. Aḥsāʾī was not the first to use 
this term and according to Muʿīn, the term was first used by Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash 
Suhrewardī, known as Shaykh al-Ishrāq (d. 587 H/1191). See: Rafati, Op.cit, 1979, pp. 106-107). Also, 
Corbin, on the basis of Suhrewardī’s understanding of the term, has set forth an interesting analysis of 
it. See: Corbin, Op.cit, 1391, vol. 2, pp. 293-305 & pp. 308-317.  
59 - For iqlīm-i hashtum and its background in the Islamic thought, see:  
Henry Corbin, Op.cit, 1977 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), pp. 73-84. & Henry Corbin, Op.cit, 
1994, pp. 1-12. 
60 - Noteworthy that dividing the earth into “seven climes” as well as “several other divisions”, has a 
long history in Islam. For more information, see: Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 
1992 (New York: Barnes & Nobel Inc.), p. 106.  
61 - Corbin refers to one of the treatises of “the eminent Shaikh Sarkar Agha,” [Abul Qāsim Khān 
Ibrāhīmī, the fifth successor of Aḥsāʾī], when he says that “one must become an inhabitant of the Earth 
of Hūrqalyā, a hūrqalyāvī”. See: Ibrāhīmī, Op.cit, n.d., p. 725. Corbin adds that by this statement, 
Ibrāhīmī wants to teach us that the expectation of the Imām and his return is not “an outward event to 
be expected sometime in the far distant future; it is an Event that here and now is taking place in souls 
and slowly progresses and matures there. … With this conception of eschatology, we come to 
understand that the whole of history is ‘seen in hūrqalyā’”. See: Ibrāhīmī, ibid, n.d., p. 723.  
62 - Aḥsāʾī’s viewpoint in relation to hūrqalyā, resurrection and his debate on the two sets of bodies are 
not clear and sometimes even paradoxical. For example, in his Risāla fi al-Maʿād al-Jismānī (Treatise on 
the Corporal Resurrection) Aḥsāʾī maintains that the second substance and corpus is temporal and 
belong to this world, while the first set is real and original. In the same text, however, he believes that 
the first set includes all the physical features, as it is additional and accidental, and the second 
substance and corpus are real (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 5, pp. 525-533). For a better analysis see: Yāsir 
Sālārī, and Mehdī Afchangī, Hūrqalyā: Rūykardī Intighādī bi Shaykhīyah dar Taṭbīq-i Hūrqalyā bar 
ʿĀlam-i Mithāl (Hūrqalyā: A Critical Approach to Shaykhīsm and the Shaykhī Identification with the 
Realm of Ideas), Research Journal of Islamic Philosophy and Theology of Shahid Beheshti University, 
Summer 1391 shamsī/2012, 138-161.  
63 - Aḥsāʾī has described the categories of jism, jasad and resurrection in: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, 1430 H, vol. 
8, pp. 375-380, pp. 421-426. Despite having a long history in Islamic philosophy (Corbin, 1391, Vol. 2, 
293-305, 308-317), the way hūrqalyā is understood and functions as the abode of the living Imām is 
new and innovative. The world of hūrqalyā is related to categories of ajsād/ajsām and of taʾwīl, which is 
“the hermeneutics of symbols, the exegesis, the bringing out of hidden spiritual meaning” (Corbin, 
1977, p. 53). Without hūrqalyā there would be no possibility of taʾwīl and of “transmuting the material 
data of external history into symbols, to penetrate to the inner meaning” (Corbin, 1977, p. 53). 
64 - For a later discussion on this category, see Kermānī, 1267 H/1850, vol. 4, pp. 70-73. 
65 - Avicenna’s Risālayi Shāqūl was published years ago by Rawzanih Publication in Tehran. Kashkūl, 
which is in fact a collection (jung) of Shaykh Bahāʾī’s favorite poems and prose, was also published 
many years ago in Tehran.  
66 - Seyyed Kāẓim wrote Khuṭba from jafr perspective, a methodology by which he analyzes the position 
of the Prophet, his daughter and the whole Nabawī household. He especially laid stress on the first 
Imām. This book is published by Lajna-yi Nashr wa Tawzīʿ, Imām Ṣādiq University, Basra, 1421 
H/2001.  
67 - It seems that compared to the first two Shaykhī leaders, Kermānī wrote less about this, as there is 
few examples of the occult sciences in his writings, and unlike Aḥsāʾī or Rashtī, he does not develop 
argument for the conception of the occult sciences. For example, in the first volume of Irshād, he states 
that these sciences were to help awlīyā and the prophets to control the world, therefore others should 
be banned from accessibility to them. These sciences are all stepping out of tradition and have 
miraculous effects. Kermānī, Op.cit, 1267 H/1850, vol. 1, pp. 128-129. There result two conclusions: 
first of all, he redefines the term ‘miracle’ by believing that it is not solely a “divine gift” donated to the 
chosen ones, but a very human attribute which is being achieved by training, instruction and practice. 
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Thus, everyone can learn and perform it. The second point is that Kermānī uses awlīyā in the broad 
sense of the term to include himself in it, and therefore, being eligible to practice these sciences.  
68 - According to the Aḥsāʾī, sīmīyā is the science of subjugation of triple angels and their adherents; 
since they are responsible for making images, imaginations, and ideas which are emanating down from 
sky to man. Līmīyā is an art of ṭālismān and is concerned with the transformation of evil forces to good 
forces. Rīmīyā is practised to create illusions of what is seemingly impossible or supernatural by using 
natural means. Hīmīyā is the science of stellar evolution, subjugation of stars and other creatures 
related to them, and are called the science of subjugations. Kīmīyā is the science that teaches how to 
transform and convert metals and minerals, and is called the science of elixir. The interesting point is 
that Aḥsāʾī, in this text, disapproves witchcraft and other similar magic performances, arguing that all 
this is forbidden by God, as it is close to polytheism which is supposed to be bigger and more dangerous 
than blasphemy. But in the same text, he instructs his believers how to practice austerity to get to this 
knowledge and perform the occult sciences. Aḥsāʾī, Op.cit, 1430 H, pp. 356-369.  
69 - This distinction is reminiscent of Najm al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s distinction between the “theophanies or 
apparitions of divine lights:” those of the Lights of Majesty and the Lights of Beauty. These two refer to 
the divine beings, though each manifests one dimension of it. Corbin, Op.cit, 1994, pp. 103-104. Here, 
power and greatness indicate His Essence, though one of them symbolizes shams and another one 
symbolizes qamar. 
70 - The love-hate relationship of the Shaykhī ʿulemā with Akbarīan ʿirfān is discussed in a number of 
sources, though the nature of the relationship and the exchanges between the Shaykhī ʿulemā and the 
ḥakīms of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā are yet to be studied. The one exception is Idris Samawi, who has 
made it his concern and emphasized it in his different writings.  
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Chapter Three: The Schools of Tehran and Qum and Wilāya 
In line with previous chapters, the subject matter of this chapter is the study and 
critical analysis of the concept of wilāya in Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy, having been flourished 
in the School of Tehran in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Although 
the School of Isfahan1 - the inheritor of the doctrine of al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya - is 
regarded as the cultivator of the School of Tehran (exemplified in the famous four 
ḥakīms of Tehran), this new School should be treated as an independent intellectual 
circle. Moreover, the School of Tehran had a particular distinction; that it was in Tehran 
“where the Islamic philosophical tradition in Persia encountered Western thought for 
the first time” (Nasr, 2006, p. 236), and from this perspective, a number of risālas 
(apologia) written as responses to the Christian priest Henry Martyn (d. 1224 H/1812), 
should be regarded as signs of this encounter.2 However, one more century was needed 
for ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm (the Principles of 
Philosophy and Realism) to be published.3   
The members of the School of Tehran included Mullā ʿAbdullāh Zunūzī (d. 1254 
H/1838) and his son Āqā ʿAlī Mudarris Tehrānī (d. 1307 H/1889), Mīrzā Abul Ḥassan 
Jilvih (originally Mīrzā Abul Ḥassan Ṭabāṭabāʾī Zavāreyī Nāʾīnī) (d. 1314 H/1896), and 
Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī (d. 1306 H/1888). There were two other key figures - 
or to be more precise, transmitters of, and commentators on the Mullā Ṣadrā tradition 
- who, because of their geographical distance from Tehran, cannot be regarded as the 
members of the School of Tehran, but as will be observed in the present chapter, heavily 
influenced the School. These two, namely Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (d. 1246 H/1830), who was a 
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resident of Isfahan and not Tehran, and Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (d. 1289 H/1873) - the 
most influential figure of the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat and a native and resident of Sabzivar - 
contributed to the Ṣadrīan legacy in different ways, such as training students, teaching 
and disseminating the ḥikmat in Persia and Persianate societies, and commenting and 
glossing on the late Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings.  
Their roles, however, were not merely glossing or commenting, but rather 
reviving and disseminating ḥikmat,4 ʿirfān, and in some cases, the Occult in Persia and 
beyond. If philosophical activities are stretched further to the early twentieth century, 
individuals such as ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī (d. 1360 H/1981) are 
encountered, whose works are the culmination of a type of philosophical activity which 
is the marriage of ʿirfān and al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya. It is important to study the 
intellectual biography of the founding fathers of the School of Tehran as it demonstrates 
an uninterrupted (or rather, construction of a continuous) tradition, dating back 
directly to renowned figures of the Safawid period as well as their attachment to the 
legacy of Mullā Ṣadrā.  
One can find different figures, such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1197 
H/1783), Mīrzā Abul Qāsim Mudarris Khātūnābādī (d. 1212 H/1797), Seyyed Ṣadr al-
Dīn Dizfūlī (d. 1258 H/1842), Seyyed Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad Nayrīzī (d. 1173 
H/1760), and many others who taught and practiced ḥikmat, ʿirfān, and in some cases, 
the Occult in Persia over two centuries until the School of Tehran was formed in 1237 
H/1821.5 As Sajjad Rizvi has pointed out, “the twin pillars of the ḥikmat tradition in the 
Qajar period became precisely ishrāqī philosophy and a more theoretically minded 
approach to mystical speculation within the paradigm of ‘philosophy as a way of life’” 
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(Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 3). This synthesis continued until the early twentieth century, 
and as will be seen, was manifested in the works and style of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.  
This chapter begins with an account of the historical context of the intellectual 
developments of the late Safawid to the early Qajar period. Then, by examining key texts 
of the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran, the conceptualizations of wilāya, imamate and 
nubuwwa, will be studied and critically analyzed. It will be observed how wilāya finds 
a new dimension and becomes connected to ontology.6 Finally, it wil be argued that 
despite noticeable differences between the School of Tehran and its contemporary 
school, Shaykhīsm, both dealt with concepts such as wilāya, wilāyat al-takwīnīya, 
imamate and nubuwwa in the same manner. It is also important to note that they are 
dialectically related; as they are all, including ʿirfān, regarded as ways of reading and 
digesting Mullā Ṣadrā, even where they are anxious about rejecting his influence. It is 
worth noting that one vehicle was through commentary on particular types of text and 
especially some specific ḥadīth. In terms of the research questions, the author seeks to 
study the innovations of the ḥakīms of the two Schools of Tehran and Qum in the 
conception of wilāya (if they had any), as well as the influence of ibn ʿArabī on these 
two schools.  
3.1. Historical Background 
At the time when the Shaykhī School was being shaped in the hands of Shaykh 
Aḥmad al-Aḥsāʾī and his successors in the mid nineteenth century, the inheritors of the 
philosophical school of Mullā Ṣadrā were occupied with reviving and disseminating the 
teachings of their Safawid master. The relative peace and tranquility brought about by 
the court, as well as the personal interest of the Qajar rulers in philosophical activities, 
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bore fruit in the revival and rebirth of ḥikmat in the new capital of Tehran. Isfahan 
preserved its status, both as the matrix of the School and “a vibrant philosophical 
center” (Nasr, 2006, p. 236), but the establishment of a number of the new madrasas in 
Tehran by notables or courtiers attracted scholars to the capital. The Marwī School, 
which was built in Tehran by Muḥammad Khān Marwī in 1232 H/1821 is one of these 
new institutions. As Muḥammad Javād Mahdawī Nizhād has discussed, in the 
thirteenth/nineteenth century, there have been built numerous masjid-madrasa all 
over the country, mainly by courtiers or local governors, and since these buildings were 
dual-purpose buildings, both mosque and school, one can imagine that the curriculum 
has been set up to cover the classic religious courses.7  
This patronage system was actually a well-established mode of interaction 
between the court and scholars, as courts either supported madrasas financially or 
encouraged figures to write about a particular subject. For example, most of the 
refutations on Henry Martyn’s polemic on Islam and the Qurʾān were written at the 
request of the court. Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī began to write his Radd-i Pādrī against Martyn at 
the request of the Shah and ʿ Abbās Mīrzā. At the beginning of Nūrī’s book, an entire page 
is dedicated to Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah and the author praises him profusely for the generous 
support he provided for the Muḥammedan Faith (Nūrī, n.d., p. 4).8  
In fact, it was Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah who invited Nūrī to emigrate from Isfahan to Tehran 
to teach ḥikmat there. The Shah, according to Naṣr, wanted Nūrī “to become the central 
mudarris (teacher) of the newly built school” of Marwī (Nasr, 2006, p. 237). Nūrī 
declined the Shah’s offer, but in his stead, sent one of his prominent students, Mullā 
ʿAbdullāh Zunūzī, whose circles of teaching were regarded as the mark of the 
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transference of intellectual activity from Isfahan to Tehran. Zuhair Ismāʿīl emphasizes 
the four madrasas of Sipahsālār, Ṣadr, Dār al-shifā, and ʿAbdullāh Khān as the host of 
“one of the four founding ḥakīms and thereafter their students. Abu-l-Ḥassan Jilvih 
taught at Dār al-shifā; Hossein Sabzivārī taught at ʿAbdullāh Khān; Qumshiʾī taught at 
Ṣadr and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī taught at the Sipahsālār” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 105). Before 
turning attention to the philosophical activities of the School, the conceptualizations of 
wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought should be discussed briefly. 
Mullā Ṣadrā is highlighted in order to show the intellectual lineage of his successors, 
including Nūrī, who came to revive the School of Isfahan.  
Mullā Ṣadrā’s entire body of work revolves around the elucidation of what is 
called by Henry Corbin ‘the prophetic philosophy’. Although this philosophy accepts the 
idea of sealing, it also maintains that “the final phase of prophecy (nubuwwa) was the 
initial phase of a new cycle, the cycle of the walāyah or imamate. In other words, the 
necessary complement of prophetology is imamology, and the most direct expression 
of imamology is the walayah” (Corbin, n.d. p. 26). The idea of wilāya contains the notion 
of spiritual guidance which is personified in the twelve immune figures of the 
household of the Prophet. Thus, wilāya is a twofold notion: the first one, indicates the 
notion of friendship with God, and the second refers to the functions of imām as the 
spiritual leader (quṭb) of the community of believers (Corbin, n.d. pp, 26-27). 
The office of wilāya, however, requires by necessity the esoteric knowledge of 
the Imāms, who themselves are the representatives of the esoteric aspect of the religion 
- Islam. As Corbin stresses, it is only the Faith of Shīʿīsm which encompasses both the 
esoteric (ḥaqīqa) and the exoteric (sharīʿa) aspects of Islam, and as such is regarded as 
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the manifestation of the unity of the message of Islam as well as the gnosis of it (Corbin, 
n.d. p. 27). In the light of such understanding, prophetology and imamology are 
inseparable from each other, and “the most direct expression of imamology is the 
walayah” (Corbin, n.d. p. 26) which is at the core of the function of ḥujja, whose 
presence and status testify the continuity of the message of Islam after the death of the 
Prophet. Ḥujja has two main characteristics: it is both pre-existent, taking us back to the 
gnostic theme of the celestial Anthropos, as well as transcendent (Corbin, n.d. p. 40).  
Along with wilāya, prophetic philosophy has other components, such as 
esotericism, which not only defend the idea of the esoteric knowledge of the Imāms as 
the continuity of the Prophet’s revelation, but also perpetuate the thought that their 
teachings come to shape the heart of Islam and Shīʿīsm (Corbin, n.d. pp. 36-38). Since 
the Prophet’s revelation is crystallized in the Book, and “the knowledge of such a Book 
cannot be grasped by the norms of ordinary philosophy,” then it should be “taken back 
(taʾwīl)” to its true meaning by the Imāms (Corbin, n.d. p. 45). Imām is the owner of the 
meaning of the Book and the teaching of Islam, and hence is called qayyim bil kitāb or 
qayyim al Qurʾān.9 As will be examined, these notions are repeated over and over again 
in Ṣadrīan texts of the Safawid and post-Safawid eras. It is worth remembering that it is 
not only the Book that crystallizes “the gnosiology of a prophetic philosophy”, but also 
the collections of the aḥādīth of the Imāms which contain such a gnosis (maʿrifa, also 
maʿrifat), and it is here that the three “differing modes of higher gnosis, hierognosis” of 
waḥy (revelation), of kashf (unveiling), and of ilhām (inspiration), are interrelated 
(Corbin, n.d. pp. 51-53).  
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Hierognosis has a pair which is hierohistory. Hierohistory signifies that in such 
a context history no longer “consists in the observation, recording or critique of 
empirical facts, but derives from a mode of perception that goes beyond the materiality 
of empirical facts” (Corbin, n.d. p. 61). Hierohistory (also meta-history and the sacred 
history), is a realm to which the Imāms and the Prophet belong, and “the complete 
cycle” of such a history – “the prophetic periods and the post-prophetic cycle of the 
imamate or walayah - forms a structure which is not that of some evolutionary process, 
but which takes us back to the origin”, to the Covenant of Wilāya (Corbin, n.d. p. 62). On 
the other hand, if the cycle of wilāya endures perpetually, then there should be a living 
imām who is the true and the last heir of the office of the imamate, “with whom the 
pleroma of … [it] is fulfilled”. Along with this kalāmī understanding, there is also an 
ʿirfānī reading in which the last Imām is regarded as the seal of wilāya, whose status is 
reminiscent of that of the sealing of prophecy of the Prophet. The notion of the Hidden 
Imām is intimately connected to an eschatology whose elements, events and actors are 
all perceived according to the supra-sensible world (Corbin, n.d. pp. 68-74). 
Both Mullā Ṣadrā’s writings and his legacy have much to say about the prophetic 
philosophy and its components, and are manifested in different styles such as original 
texts, glosses, comments on a number of Shīʿa treasuries of their predecessors, critics, 
and poetics. Mullā Ṣadrā himself was a prolific writer, and wrote both independent 
books and treatises, and glossed and commented on several Shīʿa books such as 
Kulaynī’s Uṣūl al-Kāfī. His glosses on Kulaynī’s book manifest the typical understanding 
of the office of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate in the Safawid era. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, it was during this time that the “exaggerated beliefs” about the status 
of the Imāms were developed, and Mullā Ṣadrā, among many others, made ample 
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contributions to notions such as wilāyat al-takwīnīya, which is “the existential and 
absolute cosmic authority of the Imāms” (Rizvi, 2013, p. 2). Regarding the philosophy 
of nubuwwa, Ṣadrā’s arguments are backed by a combination of rational approach and 
ʿirfānī perspective and terminology. He argues in favour of the necessity of the existence 
of a number of intermediaries between God and His people. Prophets - intermediaries 
- are His proof or ḥujja, and if the world needs to remain and people are to be completed, 
there should be prophets to guide them on the right way (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 
shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 391-395). 
In addition to the rational method that he used to study nubuwwa, and from a 
mystical perspective (obviously ibn ʿArabī’s School), Ṣadrā argues that nabī is the 
holder of the office of khilāfat al-kubrā and is the manifestation of the comprehensive 
name (ism al-jāmiʿ or Allah), by which fayḍ (emanation) and help emanate from God. 
The first emanation is called the Muḥammedan Reality which is a double-faceted status, 
inward and outward, each side having the absolute power to act upon the cosmos. Thus, 
it is by the Muḥammedan Reality that Deity manifests Himself to the cosmos (Ṣadr al-
Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 461).  
Ṣadrā retains the same perspective on the notions of imamate and wilāya which 
blend together philosophical method with ʿirfānī terminology. Narrating Imām Ali’s 
ḥadīth from a Sufi source, he states that the only way to know God and achieve true 
faith is to know Imām Ali and his status (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 396, 510 ff). 
Reminiscent of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī’s debates on the four stations of gnosis, Mullā 
Ṣadrā transmits the same ḥadīth to develop his argument on imamate: the second 
station – maqām al-maʿānī, or sirr al-sirr - “is the reality of the Imāms insofar as they 
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represent and manifest God in the totality of his essence and his names” (Aḥsāʾī, 1420 
H/1999, vol. 1, pp. 42-50). According to Ṣadrā, since knowledge of the pure Essence of 
God is incomprehensible and therefore outside of the realm of human understanding, 
the only way to know Him is to know those who are acquainted with Him (ʿārifūn bi l-
llah). Prophets and His close friends (awlīyā), are ʿārifūn to His knowledge and His 
revelation (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 396-97).  
Imām is qayyim bil kitāb or qayyim al-Qurʾān, which means that he is the only 
one who knows both the interpretation of the clear passages and also has the ability to 
clarify the passages in the book which may be unclear. Imām is the preserver of the 
secrets of āyāt  (verses of the Book),10 and the light of His indisputable evidences. He is 
the ḥujja after the Prophet and it is incumbent on followers to obey him (Ṣadr al-Dīn 
Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 396 ff). In a comparison with human physical 
characteristics, Ṣadrā argues that as each of the organs of a human body requires an 
imām, whose function is to guide the particular organ on the righteous way, the world 
also needs someone who demonstrates the difference between the right and wrong. 
Imām - deputy or khalīfa of God - is the one who calls people to goodness and justice 
and it is incumbent for people to obey him, because his obedience is submission to God 
(Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 404).  
Imamate and nubuwwa are identical and indicate the same and unified reality 
(Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 500), though nubuwwa has a hidden or inward side which 
is wilāya. Wilāya will never be interrupted, and it is regarded as the continuity of divine 
revelation which comes to an end by the coming of the last nabī, while closeness to God 
or wilāya continues to exist until the Day of Judgment (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 
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434). Walī does not receive revelation, but is connected to Deity by inspiration (Ṣadr 
al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 456). Wilāya has a higher status than ʿaql 
(intellect), because it is by the function of the light of wilāya that the light of intellect is 
shone (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 479). Walī/imām is the Perfect Man 
and the true ruler of the Cosmos and it is impossible for any age to be deprived of imām 
(Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, vol. 2, p. 488).   
In Mullā Ṣadrā’s conceptualization of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, the Imāms are aʿrāf; 
the superintendent and overseer of the Heaven and the Hell, those who see and know 
ahl al-nār wa ahl al-janna (people of the Heaven and of the Hell), and are informed of 
the status of people in both realms (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 540-
549). The office of wilāya requires that walī knows the realities of things as they are, 
and benefits those who are blind (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, p. 576). The 
Imāms are the owners (awlīyā) of His cause and the treasurers of His secrets. By 
“treasurer,” the people of ḥikmat, according to Ṣadrā, are those who are able to 
memorize cognitive images. Metaphorically, the Imāms are perceived to be the 
treasuries of His knowledge and are “intellectual substances and luminous essences” 
which are pure - free from impurity and pollution. Therefore, the imāms are 
intermediaries of His emanation and blessing to people, and they are His words 
(kalimat al-llāh), which never become annihilated or perish. They are pre-eternal 
essences and natures (Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 1366 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 616-618).  
This brief introduction will hopefully help entery into discussion with the 
scholars of the School of Tehran, close examination of their texts and study of their ideas 
to see how they understood and conceptualized wilāya. Regarding the study of the 
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concept of wilāya, three questions will be asked: How does Nūrī reflect on wilāya and 
conceptualize it? By what method(s) does he approach this reflection? And, finally, has 
he added anything to the doctrines of Mullā Ṣadrā? 
 
3.2. Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī  
A native of Nur/Noor in Mazandaran in northern Iran, ʿAlī ibn Jamshīd Nūrī’s 
educational background can be traced back to Mazandaran and Qazvin and later 
Isfahan. He studied ḥikmat with prominent figures such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī 
(d. 1197 H/1783) and Mīrzā Abul Qāsim Mudarris Khātūnābādī (d. 1212 H/1797) in 
Isfahan. Bīdābādī’s circle has been famously known to have “mystical and spiritual 
practices alongside their ʿirfānī orientation in their study of metaphysics” (Rizvi, 
forthcoming, p. 3 citing Kabūdarāhangī). To some extent, Bīdābādī’s circle has also been 
influential in the Shīʿa cities of Iraq (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 3 citing Rāʾid al-ʿIrfān). Nūrī 
had other teachers, such as Mīrzā Abul Qāsim Mudarris Iṣfahānī (who taught him 
ḥikmat and kalām in Isfahan), and Mullā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Gulpāyegānī (Suhā, n.d. 
pp. 143-144). Through his teachers and mainly Bīdābādī, Nūrī associated himself with 
the prominent intellectual scholars of the post-Safawid era, experts in three branches 
of ḥikmat texts, in mysticism, and in some cases, in the Occult. Moreover, they have not 
only been teachers and masters of ḥikmat and mysticism, but rather practised them 
(Rizvi, forthcoming, pp. 3-6).  
Nūrī had two skills that were common among Persian ḥakīms at that time: poetic 
taste and the art of calligraphy. Nūrī has commented on a number of Mullā Ṣadrā’s texts, 
such as Kitāb-i Ghaḍā wa Ghadar (the Book of Fate and Determination) ʿArshīya (of the 
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Throne) Shawāhid al-Rubūbīya (Divine Witnesses) Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb (the Keys of the 
Unseen) and Asrār ul-Āyāt (the Mysteries of Verses). He also commented on 
Mīrdāmād’s Nibrās ul-Ḍīyā wa Tiswāʿ ul-Sawā (the Lamp of Light and  the Acceptance 
of the Rectitude.) and glossed on Kulaynī’s Uṣūl al-Kāfī. Nūrī has written an ʿirfānī text 
entitled Ḥāshīya ʿalā Qurrat al-ʿUyūn (Glosses on Solace of the Eyes) and commented 
on a number of aḥādīth and āyahs of the Qurʾān. He wrote a gloss on Sharḥ Fawāʿid al-
Ḥikamīya (Commentary on the Theosophical Outcomes) of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī, and 
a refutation on Henry Martyn’s work, entitling both as Radd-i Pādrī and Burhān ul-
Millah. Over fifty years, he trained a number of students, among them Mullā ʿAbdullāh 
Zunūzī, Āqā Seyyed Raḍī Māzandarānī, Mīrzā Seyyed Abul Qāsim Sharīfī Shīrāzī, known 
as Rāz-i Shīrāzī (a Dhahabī quṭb), Mullā Muḥammad Taqī and his younger brother Mullā 
Ṣāliḥ Baraghānī and his son Mullā Ḥassan, as well as Nūrī’s son Ḥassan, Mullā 
Muḥammad Bāqir Qumshiʾī, Hāj Muḥammad Jaʿfar Majdhūb ʿ Alī Shah Hamidānī, and Ḥāj 
Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, who were the most prominent (Suhā, n.d. pp. 146-155). Nūrī died 
in 1246 H/1830 and was buried in Najaf, Iraq.  
For research purposes, I have chosen five of his key texts including three glosses 
on the previous scholars such as Sharḥ Fawāʿid al-Ḥikamīya of Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī,11 
as well as Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb and Asrār ul-Āyāt of Mullā Ṣadrā. I will also study his well-
known refutation on Henry Martyn’s polemic as it leads to his conception on wilāya and 
the Muḥammedan Reality, in addition to one of his comments which has been written 
on a ḥadīth called Ḥadīth al-Nūrānīya (the Ḥadīth of the Light). The reason for this 
selection is that these five texts manifest Nūrī’s philosophical discourse in its entirety, 
and all of the main ʿirfānī/kalāmī issues such as tawḥīd, the Muḥammedan Light, wilāya 
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and imamate are either discussed via a lettrist methodology, or are debated within the 
context of the ḥikmat rules and terminology.  
Nūrī in his gloss on Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid al-Ḥikamīya argues for the modulation of 
tawḥīd, starting from the highest station having been designated exclusively to the 
Prophet, to the tawḥīd of the elite, (either awlīyā, who are the people of delicacies, or 
those who are able to realize complexities, or prophets), to tawḥīd of the people of 
imagination and imaginative images (aṣḥāb al-wahmīya wa ṣuwar al-khīyālīya), and 
finally to tawḥīd of ordinary people (Nūrī, n.d., p. 5). Regarding the Muḥammedan 
Reality/Light, Nūrī has the typical viewpoint of a ḥakīm: the Muḥammedan Reality is 
described by a number of names and attributes; it is the greatest and the most 
comprehensive name (Ism al-Aʿzam al-Jāmiʿ), the first emanated, the spirit of the 
cosmos, the Universal Intellect, the Holy Spirit, Divine Pen, the Perfect Man, and the 
First Will (Nūrī, p. 31). It is the First Will because it is the first thing that has been 
created12 by His reality (bi nafsihī) and everything else is created by it. It is His light as 
it is flowing in and illuminating everything (Nūrī, pp. 32-37). As an eternal being, 
Muḥammedan Reality is assumed to have the absolute cosmic power and authority, and 
as such, has five stations: the station of providence (mashīyya) of will (irāda); the 
station of divine decree or qadar; the station of fate or qaḍā; and finally the station of 
execution or imḍāʾ (Nūrī, pp. 58-59). In this respect, Nūrī transmits a ḥadīth from the 
prophet indicating that “we are His creatures and people are our creatures, and their 
creation and death stand in our hands” (Nūrī, n.d. p. 115).  
The Muḥammedan Reality has two stations: the station of Muḥammadīya and of 
the awlīyā, though in practice, Ali and the Prophet have the same attributes and equal 
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status. Ali’s status is a double faceted one: He, as a human person, is the Prophet’s son-
in-law and cousin, but similar to the Prophet has a pre-eternal reality too, and as such 
is Ādam-i Awwal, the khalīfa and the Moon of Wilāya for the Muḥammedan Sun (Nūrī, 
n.d. p. 37). The Prophet and the Imāms have cosmic roles; they are His hands, His eyes, 
His ears and His tongue, and as such, are regarded as His delegates in the act of creation 
(Nūrī, n.d. pp. 56-58). Nūrī mixes his ʿirfānī perspective with a lettrist one and presents 
the well-known argument that the status of wilāya is the status of sirr (the secret), and 
the status of the truthful integrated limitless point (nuqṭay-i ḥaqīqīya basīṭah). It is 
integrated in the sense that it is indivisible into different parts, and it is limitless as 
nothing can confine it, but at the same time it is comprehensive and surrounding (Nūrī, 
n.d. p. 81).13  
The second text that is going to be examined here, is Nūrī’s glosses on Mafātīḥ 
al-Ghayb of Mullā Ṣadrā. The main issue which is discussed in this text is the 
Muḥammedan Reality. As mentioned earlier, the status of wilāya or ʿAlawīyat al-ʿUlyā, 
which is called Universal Spirit (Nafs-i Kullī), is embedded in the Muḥammedan Reality 
or Universal Intellect or aql-i kullī. Nafs-i kullī and its relation to aql-i kullī is equivalent 
to the relation of Eve to Adam and the Tablet (lawḥ) to the Primal Pen (Nūrī, 1363 
shamsī, p. 697). Nafs-i kullī, which indicates the status of Imām Ali through his marriage 
to the Prophet’s daughter, has been mixed with the Universal Body or jism-i kullī. The 
household of the Prophet, “which is the fruit of the marriage between nafs-i kullī and 
jism-i kullī, has the absolute power and authority over the Cosmos” (Rizvi, 2013, p. 3).  
On nubuwwa and the status of the Prophet, Nūrī maintains that the Qurʾān is not 
only his attributes, but also both his reality (nafsihī) and the gnosis of his reality 
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(maʿrifat bi nafsihī), and since the Prophet’s gnosis is equal to His gnosis, then the 
Prophet’s reality (nafs) is His reality.14 Muhammad is His reality because the 
Muḥammedan Reality as the first emanated is the manifestation of His names and 
attributes (Nūrī, 1363 shamsī, pp. 702-703). Nūrī goes on to say that the Muḥammedan 
Reality which is the Qurʾānīc Greatest Spirit (Rūḥ al-Aʿẓam Qurʾānī), is regarded as 
divine knowledge and contains the realities of things and their mysteries (Nūrī, 1363 
shamsī, p. 705). Nūrī classifies the people of the book (ahl al-kitāb) (those who read 
and understand the Qurʾān) into four categories: ahl al-ʿibāra (people of word), 
indicating those who are satisfied with the outward face of the book and do not try to 
dig into it, ahl al-ishāra (people of indication) or ḥakīms of divine knowledge who are 
the people of certainty, ahl al-laṭāʾif or awlīyā (people of subtlies) and finally, the 
prophets who were assigned a special mission, or anbīyāʾi ulul ʿẓm. Nūrī argues that 
each category has its own book and sharīʿa, though the last one, or the seal of prophets, 
enjoys a status in which his book and his laws are universal and comprehensive (Nūrī, 
1363 shamsī, p. 697 & Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 491).  
In his glosses on Asrār al-Āyāt of Mullā Ṣadrā, Nūrī develops an argument for the 
conceptualizations of the Muḥammedan Light and its nexus with divine knowledge. The 
Muḥammedan Light (or the Primal Pen, lit. Qalam Aʿlā) indicates the reality of the 
realities of things and Ism al-Aʿẓam al-Jāmiʿ, and as such encompasses Divine Cause. 
Divine Cause is the station of totality (Jāmiʿīyya) and entirety, which means that the 
Muḥammedan Reality in this station has the absolute and comprehensive authority to 
act upon the Cosmos because it has divine knowledge (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, pp. 227-
230).15 Nūrī’s understanding of the status of Muḥammedan Reality is analogous to the 
status of the preexistent eternal logos in Christianity that was with God from the 
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beginning of time, a primal force through whom all creation sprang and without whom 
nothing came into being. Muḥammedan Reality is called the most Comprehensive Word 
(Kalimaya Jāmiʿa) and through learning it in pre-eternal time, human beings came to 
learn His names and attributes in their entirety. This initial familiarity of man with the 
Absolute is also famous as the covenant (trust) of wilāya. Nūr-i Muḥammadī and wilāya 
are two faces of one reality, or His names, His attributes and His gnosis (Nūrī, 1385 
shamsī, pp. 234-244). Muḥammedan Reality is connected to Qāʾim and his right of rising 
and getting up to establish “absolute government” (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, 305). But who 
will stand up for absolute khilāfah and sovereignty and who is Qāʾim? Since the 
Muḥammedan Reality (al-insān al-kabīr) is a notion representing absolute unity – in 
contrast to plurality - there should be a number of human manifestations (al-insān al-
ṣaghīr) or a human person (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, pp. 301-305) who stands as the proofs 
of the fact that the notion of the Perfect Man is personified and multiplied on the earth. 
The Imāms are regarded as human examples of the ideal type of the Perfect Man and 
have legitimacy to claim leadership and authority over their believers.  
In his debate on the relationship between politics and religion, Nūrī argues that 
the former’s concern is regulating and organizing daily life, while the latter’s interests 
are both worldly and heavenly affairs (maʿāsh and maʿād), and the ruling ḥakīm (ḥakīm 
ḥākim) who is embellished with wisdom and walks on the path of intellect should be in 
charge of politics. Religion and legislation, on the other hand, should be at the hands of 
ḥakīm mutaʾallih, who enjoys divine knowledge and walks on the path of wilāya (or the 
path of love). These two, according to Nūrī, have no relation with one another, like the 
sky which is far away from the earth (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 337). Nūrī is clear enough: 
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the walī or prophet is the legislator (shāriʿ), whose status is different from that of a 
politician whose concern is worldly and ordinary affairs.  
Walī is khalīfat al-llāh, who, by learning divine names and attributes, knows the 
nature of things and can act upon the cosmos, and his wilāyat al-takwīnīya is prior to 
his wilāyat al-tashrīʿīya, which is the right of guidance and regulation (Nūrī, 1385 
shamsī, p. 341). Transmitting a ḥadīth which refers to Imām Ali’s status, Nūrī states that 
He is bāb il-llāh (the intermediary/gate between Him and people), and sirr al-llāh (His 
secret), and His love is blended with Ali’s flesh and blood to such a degree that He is 
mamsūs fi dhāt al-llāh (he is fascinated with, or lover of Allah) (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 
357). The status of intellect and ḥakīm ḥākim, who rules with the assistance of intellect, 
is clearly inferior to the status of love, and of the walī who is able to see the substance 
(essences/aʿyān) of things and their natures, because they are images (ṣuwar) of His 
names and shadows of His attributes, while ḥakīm ḥākim is only able to see the outward 
face of things (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 369). By such a distinction, Nūrī recognizes two 
types of authorities and leaderships: the first one, which is functioned by ḥakīm ḥākim 
can be carried out by everyone who benefits from wisdom, but legislation (inshāʾ) 
should only be occupied by ḥakīm ilāhī16 who is both the cause of creation and of 
bringing forth laws.  
Walī is al-insān al-kāmil who has absolute authority upon the cosmos and 
people, and is regarded as His aid in creation. The early understanding of wilāya, which 
was centered around walī’s closeness to God due to his piety and his efforts to purify 
himself on the path of sulūk, was replaced by a new image of walī; he is no longer the 
close friend of God but God himself. Walī is the one who causes creation and from him 
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everything else is created. Nūrī uses the verb ‘badaʿa’, which means to descend upon 
something suddenly and unexpectedly, and that is why it is rightful for him to legislate 
and bring forth laws (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 404). While Nūrī’s distinction between two 
types of leadership resulted in banishing ḥakīm al-ilāhī from any involvement in 
politics, and even from ordinary life, his contemporary jurists like Narāqī and Kāshif al-
Ghiṭaʾ tried to give a greater role to jurists, but this was not possible until jurists became 
more and more involved in the everyday lives of believers and in politics.  
The next text which will be examined here is Nūrī’s refutation on Henry Martyn. 
There exist two versions of his refutation on Martyn, called either Burhān al-Milla 
(Proof of the Faith) or Radd-i Pādrī (Refutation on Pādrī). They are of different lengths, 
the longer consists of two hundred and four pages, while shorter has one hundred and 
seventy-six pages. The first one is used here.17 The present refutation is “the longest 
piece that Nūrī wrote in Persian” though “it contains considerable passages in Arabic 
and hence was written for a scholarly audience” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 18).18 In Radd-i 
Pādrī, Nūrī responds to Martyn from a rational perspective and ḥikmat training (Rizvi, 
forthcoming, p. 19) and lays emphasis on wilāya and nubuwwa. His arguments for these 
two are typical: wilāya and nubuwwa are identical because both have the absolute 
power and authority to act upon things. The status of nubuwwa requires limitless 
power, and without it nabī no longer functions. Walī/nabī can act upon things in two 
different ways: aʿdād and ījāb. By the first one, Nūrī believes that walī is absolutely able 
to manipulate things and activate their capacities in order to be eligible to receive 
divine fayḍ. Walī has two faces: one face is turned towards God and the other towards 
people. His face turned toward people denotes his functions and duties in relation to 
believers. He exercises the first type of wilāya, which is wilāyat-i aʿdādī. In this phase, 
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nabī guides people on the right way and brings sharīʿa, while wilāya/taṣarruf-i ījābī 
enables nabī to accomplish miracles and kirāmat (also kirāma). Miracles manifest 
divine intervention in human and cosmic affairs and nabī endeavours to accomplish it 
because he has another side which is his divine dimension (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 17-19).  
The text entails a typical understanding of the status of the Perfect Man and its 
human examples (anmūdhaj-i insānī). The Perfect Man is highly praised with a number 
of names such as divine light, lawḥ-i qaḍā wa qadar (the tablet of fate and 
determination), and the column between sky and earth which prevents the cosmos 
from falling down (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 47-49). Like Muḥammedan Reality, which causes 
other things to be created by manifesting itself in them, the Prophet - who is one of the 
human examples of Muḥammedan Reality - has manifested himself in previous 
prophets and awlīyās. Therefore, for their existence, these prophets are dependent on 
the Prophet Muhammad (Nūrī, n.d., pp. 20, 64-65, 178).19 In another example, previous 
Prophets are likened to a mirror reflecting the Prophet’s wilāya and nubuwwa. They 
are appointed by God to enunciate the coming of the prophet of Islam, and as such their 
religions are regarded as phases of the Islamic faith (Nūrī, n.d., p. 178). Nūrī, like other 
Shīʿa thinkers, defends the idea that Ali is the seal of the absolute wilāya of the 
Muḥammedan Cause, and as such he is regarded as the authority for all previous 
prophets and walīs. They are but images of Ali’s wilāya, as he is sirr al-llāh and a close 
friend of God (Nūrī, n.d., p. 180). 
The last text which is considered here is Nūrī’s commentary on Ḥadīth al-
Nūrānīya. There are two accounts of Nūrī’s commentary on the ḥadīth: the first one is 
done by Sajjad Rizvi in his lengthy discussion on Nūrī’s life and work, and the second 
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one is by Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī, who has evaluated Nūrī’s commentary exclusively. 
According to Rizvi, Nūrī has a set of Arabic glosses on different aḥādīth of Imām Ali 
(Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 16), including the present ḥadīth, which is also called al-maʿārif 
bi al-nūrānīya. Along with Nūrī, Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī has also glossed on the ḥadīth 
(Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17 & Nājī Iṣfahānī, n.d. p. 2). The commentary focuses on the 
Muḥammedan Reality, the secrets of imamate, the status of the greatest walī or walī al-
aʿẓam, and his relation to God.20 Rizvi argues that the “text itself … is similar to other 
material on the divine nature of the Imām, such as the Expository Sermon (Khuṭbat al-
Bayān) and the sermon of illumination (khuṭbat al-nūrānīya)” and “entails an esoteric 
taste of the literal sense and only arises once a person on the mystical path understands 
the essentially monistic nature of reality” (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17). In addition, there 
is an analysis on monism, the “idea of God” and “the proof for the existence of God” from 
the Ṣadrīan perspective (Rizvi, forthcoming, p. 17).  
The manifestation of tawḥīd, the Muḥammedan reality or ḥaqīqat al-ʿalawīyat 
al-Muḥammadīya, is purified of any imperfection in material objects and shares 
attributes of divine essence, such as theophany - which is a transcendental station; and 
therefore, similar to divine essence is capable of manifesting itself in all existential 
worlds. The Muḥammedan Reality appears in three stations: the station of springing 
(badʿ) and creation of the cosmos, through which His Will is manifested in 
Muḥammedan Reality; the station of Universal Intellect or the Primal Pen, or the station 
of qāb-i qawsayn; and the station of Universal Spirit which indicates the reality of Ali 
and his status. It is the function of Ali’s reality to manifest itself in previous prophets 
and animate them to exist (Nājī, n.d., pp. 202-203). Muḥammedan Reality has temporal 
manifestations (ẓuhūrāt-i nāsūtī), which are the Prophet and the Imāms, and since 
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manifestations are regarded as faces of God, these immune holy figures are His face 
(wajh al-llāh) (Nājī, n.d., pp. 199-200). Nūrī brings up the archtypal discussion of 
different stations of gnosis, and argues that the gnosis of the Prophet and the Imāms 
are the same as the gnosis of God, because they manifest His unity in its entirety. 
Furthermore, previous prophets are manifestations of Muḥammedan Reality (Nājī, n.d., 
p. 201).  
In the entire body of his works – even those which are not examined here – Nūrī 
thought and wrote within the framework of the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat. In terms of method, he 
remained faithful to the principle of combining rational perspective - which culminated 
in his refutation on Martyn, with ʿirfānī terminology, although he added a lettrist 
viewpoint as well. His gloss on Aḥsāʾī’s al-Fawāʾid al-Ḥikamīyya is an example of the 
prevalence of the ʿirfānī method and lettrism. With regard to the offices of wilāya and 
nubuwwa and Nūrī’s conceptions on them, one should conclude that he not only refused 
to add anything to the doctrines of his masters, but also, by overstating them, ignored 
other parts of their tradition. Perhaps one can say that he reduced the entire Ṣadrīan 
apparatus into a number of concepts that are examined here. It is the author’s opinion 
that the study of Nūrī’s works is not by itself of value, if they are not observed as a sign 
of the existence of a trend in the whole intellectual system of the early eighteenth 
century: the prevalence of theology, mysticism and lettrism over philosophy and 
rational thinking. As will be observed in the following, Nūrī was in no way alone on this 
route.  
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3.3. Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī  
Fortunately, our information of the life and works of Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, 
the greatest ḥakīm of the School of Mullā Ṣadrā and the true reviver of ḥikmat al-
mutaʿālīya is sufficient enough. It helps to shed light on his personal and philosophical 
life, on his contributions to the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat and on his pupils. Many biographers 
and/or historians of the history of Islamic philosophy, from Manūchihr Ṣadūghī Suhā in 
Tārīkh-i Ḥukamā wa ʿUrafāy-i Mutiʾakhir (History of the Contemporary Ḥakīms and 
Gnostics), to Henry Corbin in his History of Islamic Philosophy, to Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
in Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, have written about him and his 
life.21 Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, the son of Ḥāj Mīrzā Mahdī, who himself was one of the 
great grandsons of Muḥammad Ṣādiq, a Sabzivārī merchant, was born in 1212 H/1797 
in Sabzivar, Khorasan. After staying in Mashhad for ten years, the young Sabzivārī 
moved to Isfahan, which was at that time the centre of intellectual activity and vitality 
(Dhukāʾī Sāwajī, 1372, p. 22). In that city, he attended circles with teachers such as 
Mullā Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Kalbāsī (or Karbāsī, d. 1261 H/1845), and Shaykh 
Muḥammad Taqī ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Iṣfahānī (d. 1248 H/1832). These two had studied 
with prominent figures such as Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1198 H/1783) and Shaykh 
Jaʿfar Najafī, Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ (d. 1227 H/1812), respectively. His other teachers were 
Mullā Ismaʿīl Darbkūshkī Iṣfahānī (d. 1268 H/1853) and Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (Rizvi, 2011, 
pp. 6-7). Suhā, in a quotation from Ḥirz al-Dīn claims that Sabzivārī was also a student 
of Mīrzā Muḥammad Ridhā Hamidānī, known as Kawthar ʿAlī Shah (Ḥirz al-Dīn in 
Ṣadūghī Suhā, p. 164). Addressing Sabzivārī’s direct and indirect teachers, one can 
stretch back his intellectual lineage to the main Ṣadrīan ḥakīms of the post-Safawid era, 
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though he was not a simple student and follower, but a real reviver of the School of 
Mullā Ṣadrā.  
Sabzivārī was a prolific writer. His body of works consists of forty-six writings 
in the form of glosses, comments and original treatises (Dhukāʾī Sāwajī, 1372, p. 22).22 
Sajjad Rizvi, in his discussion on the life and works of Sabzivārī, divides his works into 
four categories: “marginalia on the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, original works in philosophy, 
commentaries on supplications and Persian literature, and works on theology” (Rizvi, 
2011, p. 12).23 Sabzivārī, following a few pilgrimage trips to Mashhad and a ḥajj, and a 
one year stay in Kerman, finally settled in Sabzivār for the rest of his life. He died in 
1289 H/1872 and was buried in Darwāza Neyshābūr. His entire body of works is worth 
studying, as he not only glossed and commented on his predecessors, but rather, in his 
original writings, perpetuated ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya through developing a rational and 
ʿirfānī approach for the understanding of the essential philosophical notions such as 
wujūd, quiddity, and substantial motion. In order to maintain the focus of this research, 
attention will be concentrated on those writings which emphasize the conceptions of 
wilāya, imamate and nubuwwa. Accordingly, Sabzivārī’s Sharḥ-i Asrār-i Mathnawī 
(Commentary on the Mysteries of Mathnawī), Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ (Commentary on the 
Names), Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Ṣabāḥ (Commentary on Ṣabāḥ Supplications) and Sharḥ-i 
Nibrās al-Ḥudā (Commentary on the Light of Guidance) will be studied, beginning with 
a brief introduction to the relevant text.  
Sharḥ-i Asrār-i Mathnawī, which is a Persian commentary on difficult verses of 
Mathnawī, the magnum opus of Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 672 H/1274) was “commissioned 
by the Qajar prince Sulṭān Murād Mīrzā Ḥusām al-Salṭana, the governor of Khorasan 
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and lithographed in 1285 H/1868 by Āqā Muḥammad Bāqir Tihrānī” (Riḍā Nizhād in 
Rizvi, 2011, p. 15 & Cooper, 1999, p. 428). As John Cooper has rightly pointed out, “just 
as the Mathnawī was a summa of the knowledge of its time bound together by the 
spiritual teaching which it was used to set forth, Sabzivārī’s commentary is a summa of 
the knowledge of this nineteenth-century theosopher put to the use of exegesis on the 
Mathnawī” (Cooper, 1999, p. 428). In this text, Sabzivārī relates philosophical and 
mystical issues – and mainly the concept of the Perfect Man to Persian literature. In 
other words, for Sabzivārī, Mathnawī is a mirror through which he looks at ḥikamī and 
ʿirfānī themes and explains them. Furthermore, the sources of Sabzivārī are of a “very 
broad range,” including the Hellenic and Islamic Peripatetic philosophers, the Persian 
Neo-Platonists or Ishrāqī philosophers, Arabic poetry (both pre-Islamic and Islamic), 
and Persian poetry” (Cooper, 1999, p. 428). The text revolves around themes such as 
the reality of the Perfect Man (or walī), which is symbolized in the Prophet and his 
cousin, His names and attributes and their personifications, Muḥammedan Reality, and 
the notions of wilāya and wilāyat al-takwīnīya. 
The Perfect Man24 is the True Ruler (Sulṭān al-Ḥaqīqī) and the shadow of God, 
since he presents divine Beauty and Glory. It is he who knows all divine names and, 
since he manifests them by his example, teaches them to everyone and symbolizes ism 
al-aʿẓam, which is Allah. Since asmāʾ are the beginning and the end (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 
27-52), meaning that everything generates from them and after completion returns to 
them, it is al-insān al-kāmil who is the material cause of the Cosmos, and as khalīfat al-
llāh has absolute authority to act upon everything: he causes life and death, and as such, 
is a partner in creation. Sabzivārī continues that the absolute ordinance of walī must be 
obeyed by all, because walī is a name of God and as such needs to be manifested and 
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unveiled, and the office of wilāya is a perennial and perpetual one and this explains why, 
unlike nubuwwa which is temporary, wilāya is an everlasting, universal and modulated 
status and contains many stations and qualities (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 175-199). Although 
different, these two statuses are faces of the same reality: one side - wilāya - turns 
towards God and the other - nubuwwa – turns towards people, and as such the former 
indicates unity and totality, while the latter refers to multiplicity (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 
466-467).  
Al-insān al-kāmil (the Muḥammedan Reality), is an independent realm along 
with lāhūt (realm of divinity), the world of aʿyān al-thābita (fixed/permanent 
archetypes), Jabarūt (realm of souls), Malakūt (realm of the intellects), and Nāsūt 
(human realm, though it can sometimes be equated with al-insān al-kāmil), and 
therefore is intimately attached to the reality of the Holy Spirit, which is the Universal 
Intellect (Sabzivārī, n.d., pp. 235-239). Here again the typical understanding of the 
status and qualities of the Muḥammedan Reality is observed; which is the first 
emanated, or the Primal Will, and is created by His essence, though everything else is 
created from it (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 391). In interpreting this sentence ‘insān-i kāmil 
khudāvand-i dil ast’ (the perfect man is the lord of heart), Sabzivārī deploys the famous 
qudsī ḥadīth that “the heavens and the earth cannot burden my immensity and 
grandeur, but the heart of My faithful servant would do”, and argues that the heart of 
such a servant is His throne (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 345).  
As the true servant of God, it is only he who knows deity and has gnosis of Him. 
When on the Day of Judgment He comes to unveil Himself, it is only the Perfect Man 
who can shoulder His grandeur and greatness. So, the only way to get to know the 
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Perfect Man is by having true faith in him, as he is God’s agent on the earth (Sabzivārī, 
n.d., p. 447), and as such he is in effect the Kingdom of God personified. In 
understanding “how the true faith is developed in a believer”, Sabzivārī maintains that 
the gate of intellect (darwāza-yi aql) is a way towards the sacred sanctuary which is 
deity (Sabzivārī, n.d., p. 451). So, it is only by the assistance of intellect that believers 
will have both gnosis to Him and to His agent. It is this researcher’s opinion that there 
is petitio principia here: in order to know the Perfect Man a believer should have true 
faith in him, and in order to develop true faith to get to know him and God, a believer 
should pass across the gate of intellect which is the Muḥammedan Reality or the Perfect 
Man. It would appear as if everything originates from the Perfect Man and ends in it.  
In Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ and from a lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī interprets the name 
of Muhammad and maintains that the first letter of ‘mīm’ indicates the Prophet’s 
authority and dominion, while the second ‘mīm’ signifies the realm of malakūt or 
malakūt al-samāwāt, which is the Kingdom of Heavens. These two “mīms are gifted by 
Him to His Prophet in order to remind us that the Prophet knows both the secrets of 
authority and the secrets of the Kingdom and Heavens” (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 47). 
In his debate on the Muḥammedan Reality, Sabzivārī starts with the typology of being 
and its trilogy including Truthful Essence (Ḥaqq al-Mujarrad), indicating the pure 
abstract essence of God which is free from any name and attribute; Non-delimited Being 
(Wujūd al-Muṭlaq) or His deeds; and Delimited Being, (Wujūd al-Muqayyad) which is 
what he has created, such as the cosmos. Then he argues that the Muḥammedan Reality 
is the manifestation of His Truthful Essence in His names and attributes, and is also 
called the Absolute Being (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 56). Muḥammedan Reality also 
 
 
158 
equates to divine knowledge and/or the Light of Glory which is manifested in the 
fourteen immune figures (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 399). 
On the notion of the Perfect Man and from an ʿirfānī perspective, Sabzivārī states 
that Ali is the truthful example, the Human Form (Ṣūrat al-Insānīya) and the 
personification of it. Sabzivārī praises him by a number of qualities which are typical in 
his contemporaries and predecessors as well (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 67-68). With 
a combination of ʿirfānī and lettrist methods, he explains that the notion of ghawth, 
which means help and/or aid, is designated to awlīyā or men of God, who manifest 
either His light or His vigor and power. The members of the first group whose beings 
are illuminated by His light and compassion are not hidden from people and are not 
prohibited from revealing themselves, while those of the second group whose beings 
are embraced by His vigor, are to be hidden (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 101-102). 
On the meaning of ghawth, Sabzivārī argues that God has ninety-nine men, and 
that among them only one is the most prominent; because he knows His 
knowledge/secrets; he is called quṭb al-jāmiʿ (which is al-Qāʾim) of the household of the 
Prophet (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 101-103). As the seven great prophets correspond 
to the septet planets, the household of the Prophet corresponds the twelve astrological 
signs too. In the same way, as the previous prophets gain their glory and grandeur from 
the sun of the nubuwwa of the Prophet of Islam, the whole household of the Prophet 
gains its light from the moon of the wilāya of Ali (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 104-105 
& pp. 550-552 & p. 711). Sabzivārī uses this analogy to conclude that a: the physical 
world corresponds with the spiritual one and b: the cosmos relies on seven quṭb and 
twelve walīs (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 105-106).  
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Wilāya is fayḍ and equates to divine names descending from Him to His servants. 
He uses the term infitāḥ which literally means to open/unlock something to indicate 
the status of wilāya: by the acceptance of wilāya a believer exposes himself to divine 
fayḍ and blessing (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 129-130). The status of wilāya is 
different from that of nubuwwa, as walī is a name of God and has the absolute right and 
authority to act upon the cosmos. These two are not only different, but wilāya is higher 
than nubuwwa because it is perpetual and uninterrupted. The reality of the status of 
walī requires self-abnegation and servitude, in the sense that since wilāya and 
nubuwwa are two sides of the same reality, the former indicates the divine dimension 
of this reality and the latter the human worldly dimension of it (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, 
pp. 276-278 & pp. 552-553). Walī is translated with different names, such as the owner, 
the master, the lord (rabb), the help, the giver, the benefactor (munʿim), the lover 
(muḥibb), and the partner (sharīk) (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 530). 
Awlīyā are divided into six categories: nuqabā (leaders, directors) who consist 
of three hundred men and live in Maghrib, nujabā (nobles) who are seventy and live in 
Egypt, budalā (substitutes) who are forty men and are inhabitants of Sham, akhyār 
(those who are benevolent) are seven and wandering around the world, ʿ amūd (pillars) 
which are four and are scattered at the four corners of the earth, and finally ghawth 
(help, assistant) which is one and lives in Mecca (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 550). The 
imāms are the most beautiful names of God (asmāʾ ul-ḥusnā), without whose 
recognition God does not accept any action. Transmitting a ḥadīth from Imām Ali saying 
that ‘ana asmāʾ ul-ḥusnā’, Sabzivārī argues that “name is a sign and these holy figures 
are the great signs of God”. So, there is no difference between the status of His names 
and attributes and the status of the imāms, because their recognition is necessary for 
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Him to be recognized (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 576 & 715). The imāms are the 
authorized representatives (umanā) of God who preserve His covenant, which is 
wilāya, and bear witness upon everything (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 671). From a 
lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī correlates the status of the Prophet to the Muqaṭṭaʿāt (lit. 
abbreviated or shortened), or unique letter combinations of the Qurʾān, and argues that 
these divine words indicate the status of al-insān al-kāmil as khalīfat al-llāh and the 
Pillar of the Light of God (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 717). 
Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Ṣabāḥ (or Miftāḥ al-Falāḥ wa Miṣbāḥ al-Najāt) is attributed to 
Imām Ali and is considered by scholars as an important text.25 One of the main topics of 
the text is al-insān al-kāmil and its human examples, which are the Prophet and Imām 
Ali. Al-insān al-kāmil encompasses and manifests the names and the attributes of God. 
He is the Perfect Ten (Ashʿara-yi Kāmila), because God has ten manifestations in the 
entire spiritual hierarchy and they are all gathered in the Perfect Man (Sabzivārī, 1372 
shamsī, pp. 2-7 & p. 25). Sabzivārī explains the status of Imām Ali through the term of 
the Heavens of Wilāya (Falak-i Wilāya) which contain a number of things, such as the 
twelve Imāms, who correspond with the twelve astrological signs (shams-i wiṣāya) 
which is the allegory of the Universal Intellect, and shams-i qāʾim, who gains his light 
from shams-i wiṣāya. Shams-i qāʾim is the greatest light, the heart of the cosmos, the 
lord of the stars and the sign of His light (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 22-25).  
The office of nubuwwa is symbolic of a tree, Shajarat al-Ṭūbā (the Purified Tree), 
and refers to the famous āyah of the Qurʾān that: “God only desires to remove 
defilement from you, O people of the House, and to purify you completely” (33:33) 
(Nasr, 2015, p. 1029), whose leaves are the community of believers who will return to 
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him on the Day of Resurrection. In this sense, there is an intimate closeness between 
the reality (nafs) of the Prophet and his ummah (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, p. 73). 
Sabzivārī believes in the immunity of the Prophet even before his nubuwwa, and 
touches upon the topic from a pure kalāmī perspective. ʿIṣma is a spiritual 
quality/faculty which prevents its owner from sinning. This quality is invested in the 
angels, the prophets and the Imāms. Sabzivārī uses the principle of emanation as the 
famous principle in the Shīʿa theology in order to discuss infallibility for the Prophet 
and the Imāms. According to this principle, His kindness and beneficences require Him 
not only to send prophets and appoint imāms, but also to invest them with infallibility 
(Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 76-83). The holders of the attribute of infallibility are 
described as the sturdy mountains (jibāl al-shāmikha) of God, His rope (ḥabl), and His 
proofs, whose love and obedience are incumbent for every believer (Sabzivārī, 1372 
shamsī, p. 132).  
Regarding the notion of wilāya and its modulation, Sabzivārī in Sharḥ-i Nibrās 
al-Ḥudā26 mentions the hierarchy of awlīyā and maintains that some of them are higher 
than the others. In analyzing the status of the Imāms, he believes that, as the owner of 
wilāyat al-takwīnīya, they are the eyes and the ears of God – His intermediaries by 
which Deity descends emanation to the Cosmos (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 43 & 146). The 
status of the absolute wilāya contains two offices of nubuwwa and wilāya (imamate), 
because the realities of walī and nabī are the same (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 116). Only these 
purified figures can reach the station of ʿirfān-i tām (the absolute gnosis) of God, 
because they are the body of tawḥīd and the manifestations of divine names and 
attributes (Sabzivārī, 1384, p. 136). From a lettrist perspective, Sabzivārī argues that 
the word of ‘ḥamd’ in sūrat al-Ḥamd, the first sūrah of the Qurʾān, refers to al-insān al-
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kāmil and its human examples. Al-insān al-kāmil has been created according to the 
image of God, and as such has both the absolute right of authority to act upon the 
Cosmos (wilāyat al-takwīnīya), and the right of lawgiving (or tashrīʿ). One of the 
components of the right of tashrīʿ is teaching the names of God to people in order to 
train them in spiritual conduct (Sabzivārī, 1384, pp. 170-171 & p. 351).  
  3.4. Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī 
 Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā, then known as Ṣahbā, the son of Shaykh Abul Qāsim, 
was born in Qumshih (now Shahriza), in Isfahan, in 1241 H/1825. After preliminary 
instruction with his father as well as other teachers in Qumshih, Mīrzā Muḥammad Riḍā 
moved to Isfahan to study ʿirfān and ḥikmat there. In Isfahan, he attended the classes of 
notable ḥakīms such as Ḥāj Muḥammad Jaʿfar Lāhījī (Langarūdī - also the teacher of 
Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and Āqā ʿAlī Ḥakīm Mudarris Tehrānī), Mīrzā Ḥassan Nūrī, the son of 
Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, and Āqā Seyyed Raḍī Lārījānī (Mazandaranī), who taught Mīrzā 
Muḥammad Riḍā rational sciences. Until his departure to Tehran, which was around 
1288 H/1871, he taught ḥikmat and ʿirfān in Isfahan. His fame, both in Isfahan and 
Tehran, was in teaching ʿirfān and especially Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam of Qayṣarī, though 
he was expert in philosophy and Qurʾān as well. It seems that his interest in ʿirfān was 
not only a matter of teaching ʿirfānī texts or having an ʿirfānī taste, but experiencing an 
ʿirfānī lifestyle, in the sense that he was a dervish, having lived ʿirfān in practice. He was 
the worker of miracles (ṣāḥib-i kirāmat), and, according to the testimony of one of his 
students, had the ability of ṭayy al-arḍ (folding up of the earth). Qumshiʾī passed away 
in Tehran in 1306 H/1888 and is buried there (Nājī Iṣfahānī, 1378, pp. 19-48).27 
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Qumshiʾī was a prolific writer and composed numerous books on ḥikamt and 
ʿirfān which are either glosses, comments, or original texts, including a book of poems 
in Persian under the poetic pseudonym of Ṣahbā, and a number of books in Arabic. He 
has glossed on a number of texts, including ibn ʿArabī’s magnum opus Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, 
Khuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (the Excerpt of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam) of Qayṣarī, which itself is a 
commentary on the meaning of Fuṣūṣ, Tamhīd al-Qawāʿid (Scheming of Regulations) of 
ibn Turka Iṣfahānī, Miftāḥ al-Uns (the Key of Fondness) of Muḥammad ibn Ḥamza 
Fanārī, and two of Mullā Ṣadrā’s books: Asfār al-Arbaʿi and Shawāhid, and finally Sharḥ-
i Ishārāt wa Tanbīhāt (the Commentary on Indications and Reminders) of Khawjah 
Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. He also wrote original texts on a variety of topics such as science, 
essence and accidental properties (also accident or jawhar wa ʿaraḍ), the Names of the 
Essence, the Names of the Attributes and the Names of Acts. He wrote a commentary on 
some parts of Duʿā-yi Saḥar and an original treatise on a ḥadīth called ḥadīth-i zindīq 
(the Ḥadīth of Heretics). His body of work is composed of eighteen books (Nājī Iṣfahānī, 
pp. 46-47).28 In this collection, what is of use and relevance for the research here is his 
treatise on wilāya and khilāfa (succession of the Prophet), as it contains important 
points on the Perfect Man, the Muḥammedan Reality, wilāya and the sealing of wilāya 
(or khatm al-wilāya).  
3.4.1. Wilāya and Khilāfa 
Qumshiʾī’s glosses/critiques on Dāwūd ibn Maḥmūd Qayṣarī’s conceptions of 
wilāya and khilāfa can be found in the latter’s comments on Fuṣūṣ of ibn ʿArabī.29 
Qumshiʾī begins with a typology of wilāya and divides it into wilāyat al-kullīya and 
wilāyat al-khāṣṣah (general and specific wilāya, respectively). Wilāyat al- kullīya is 
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designated to every believer and emphasizes the right and authority that each of them 
has over the other. This understanding of wilāya is connected to the notion of faith as a 
modulated reality. The second type of wilāya is specified to the people of the hearts 
(aṣḥāb ul-qulūb), the people of Allah or those who are close to Him because of their 
practices. These people have experienced self-annihilation in God and are the most 
perfect. On the basis of the four journeys (asfār al-arbaʿi) that every believer should 
take, Qumshiʾī argues that the last journey, which is “the journey in God by God”, is 
specifically gifted to the Prophet, his household and his successors, and is called wilāyat 
al-muḥammadīya or the Muḥammedan Wilāya. Previous prophets and their successors 
can also experience this type of wilāya, but it is only a state not a station, which means 
that it is temporary and momentary (Qumshiʾī, 1381, pp. 61-62). 
Wilāyat al-muḥammadīya (the station) can be either absolute or delimited 
(muṭlaqah or muqayyadah, respectively). It is absolute since it encompasses everything 
and is not limited by any restriction, and it is delimited because it is specified to one 
name from among the names of God. Qumshiʾī uses the absolute and the general wilāya 
on one hand, and the delimited and particular wilāya on the other, interchangeably. 
These stations are also modulated and each of them has a sealing, because it is possible 
that one scholar from among Muslim scholars becomes khātam of the wilāyat al-
muqayyadah and one successor from among the successors of the Prophet becomes 
khātam of wilāyat al-muṭlaqah (Qumshiʾī, 1381, pp. 62-63). Qumshiʾī defines the term 
‘sealing’ in terms of gradation of wilāya and closeness of walī to God, so the sealing of 
the absolute and/or constrained wilāya means that walī enjoys the highest degree of 
closeness to God. From this perspective, the Prophet is the truthful walī, the absolute 
khātam and the manifestation of the name of Allah, which is the most comprehensive 
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name. Qumshiʾī argues that when wilāya overcomes a nabī, it eclipses nubuwwa, which 
means that his nubuwwa becomes concealed under the mantle of wilāya (Qumshiʾī, 
1381, p. 64). Wilāya as a divine attribute or the inward of divinity, is regarded as sirr or 
the most hidden sirr, and as such needs to be manifested and unveiled, and that is why 
it has become manifest in the most comprehensive name of God – Allah. In terms of its 
relation to the Muḥammedan Reality, Qumshiʾī maintains that divinity is the inward of 
the Muḥammedan Reality and therefore should be called divine, absolute wilāya 
(Qumshiʾī, 1381, p. 66).  
The permanent archetypes (aʿyān al-thābita) of the Muḥammedan Reality is the 
same as the permanent archetypes of the awlīyās and successors of the Prophet, and as 
such their wilāya is the same (Qumshiʾī, 1381, p. 67). In accordance with the typical 
understanding of the office of wilāya, Qumshiʾī emphasizes that wilāya is uninterrupted 
and eternal, while nubuwwa is a worldly attribute, and from this perspective, nubuwwa 
is wilāya which has become perfect, and the sealing of wilāyat al-muḥammadīya is the 
status which embraces the wilāya of previous prophets and their successors. In a 
concluding remark, Qumshiʾī argues that the sealing of wilāya and the sealing of wilāyat 
al-muḥammadīya have the same meaning in terms of time and station, in the sense that 
the seal of wilāya is not only the heir of wilāyat al-muḥammadīya, but also a light 
(mishkāt), through which all previous prophets and their successors reach the Truth. 
He is the closest one to the prophet and aware of his secrets and therefore of the secrets 
of all previous prophets. He is the source of emanation and blessing for every walī and 
waṣī after him (Qumshiʾī, 1381, pp. 67-89). 
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In terms of method, Qumshiʾī follows a blending of ʿirfānī and rational 
methodology which is obtained from the Owners of the Taste of Intuition (Adhwāq al-
Mukāshifīn), and the People of the Path of Truth and Certainty (Ahl al-Ḥaqq wa al-
Yaqīn). Khilāfa, as equivalent to wilāya, is a divine status and all provisions proceed 
from this status. So, it is incumbent for every prophet, whether the seal of prophets or 
not, to rule in accordance with the ordinances which are ruled by divine names and 
with permanent archetypes. Qumshiʾī maintains that there should only be one seal of 
the prophets as he is the quṭb of every age and quṭb cannot be more than one (Qumshiʾī, 
1381, pp. 90-91). In his debate on khilāfa after the Prophet, Qumshiʾī develops atypical 
arguments for the conception of the status of nubuwwa and its functions, and asserts 
that the Prophet should declare its cause and invite people to Islam by the use of force, 
and if people deny this after the proof (ḥujja) is brought to them, it is then legitimate to 
use the sword. It is necessary for the successors of the Prophet to follow the Prophet as 
an example and to spread and preserve Islam by the sword. The Prophet’s successor is 
the source of knowledge and the only legitimate power-holder. Moreover, Qumshiʾī, 
unlike other mystics, does not believe in the separation of khilāfa between outward and 
inward – ẓāhirī and bāṭinī, and/or between the most learned and the wisest (aʿlam wa 
aʿqal). He argues that by such a division, the office of khilāfa would be weakened and 
the community of believers would be dispersed. He adheres to a coherent 
understanding of the term and functions of khilāfa.30  
3.5. The School of Qum and its Historical Background 
Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī (d. 1306 H/1888) is the last ḥakīm from the 
School of Tehran whose thoughts are examined here. In the final part of this chapter, 
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study and analysis will be continued of Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy as it is florished in the 
School of Qum. Before focusing on the texts and authors, however, it is relevant briefly 
to review historical developments from the Qajars to their successor – the Pahlavi 
dynasty. The decline of the Qajars and the rise of Riḍā Khān Mīr Panj31 to the throne, as 
history proves, was a crucial event for Persia. His policies, from his decision to adopt 
the new solar calendar in place of the lunar Islamic calendar,32 to the reinstatement of 
the name of the country to Iran, to the position of women in society, to his ambitions 
for the modernization of Iran, and lastly, his clash with the clerics, dramatically changed 
every aspect of the Iranians’ life. Although his legacy remains controversial to this day, 
these changes, whether defended or criticized, have been so major that in all of these 
aspects, life in Iran has never been the same since.  
The research interest here is Riḍā Shah’s “programme of radical secularizing, 
centralizing measures” (Cronin, 2007, pp. 71-72), targeted to shake off the position of 
clerics directly and indirectly. In fact, he clashed with the class of ʿulemā on a number 
of issues including “the implementation of the … conscription” law, reorganizing the 
“judicial system … along secular lines,” and the introduction of “a civil code” and a dress 
law (Cronin, 2007, p. 72). As Stephanie Cronin has shown, the imposition of these 
measures on the society, and especially on the class of clerics, has been never without 
reaction and resistance from below, as middle ranking clerics led a number of 
oppositions in different cities, mainly in Shiraz, Tabriz, and Isfahan against the Shah and 
his policies (Cronin, 2007, pp. 72ff). 
Although many ʿulemā had welcomed Riḍā Khān’s appearance on the scene as a 
hopeful and positive sign for the restoration of the independence of the country, “by 
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1927 … [they] were aware that the balance of power between themselves and the 
regime was about to alter decisively to their detriment” and “although on the defensive, 
they were bracing themselves for a struggle” (Cronin, 2007, pp. 75ff). With regard to 
the ʿulemā’s economic status and social prestige in early twentieth century Iran, their 
discontent with the Shah’s policies is understandable. Secular orientation of Riḍā Shah’s 
programs aside, his measures, as I mentioned earlier, targeted the ʿulemā’s economic 
and social situation. By ʿulemā, I mean those jurists who belonged to the Uṣūlī School of 
jurisprudence, whose activities were mainly centred on fiqh (jurisprudence) and its 
principles and, since the Safawid era, have become one of the twin pillars of political 
power in the country.  
If the birth and later existence of “the Shīʿa hierocracy” (Amir Arjomand, 2005, 
p. 21) was the result of Safawid policies, the superiority of the Uṣūlī ʿulemā in the pre-
Qajar and Qajar eras was mostly due to their victory over their long-lasting rival - the 
Akhbārī School. Pertinent to this is the ʿulemā’s relationship with the Qajar court and 
its impact on their subsequent political activities. The rivalry of the two Schools of 
Akhbārī and Uṣūlī, as well as the inconvenient relationship between the state and 
religion, has been the subject of a number of researches. Addressing the former, as 
Andrew Newman has pointed out, Akhbārīsm actually originated in the Safawid period 
and, both in and after the decline of the Safawids, attracted attention and animosity 
within Twelver Shīʿīsm. The main disagreement between these two was “on the nature 
of clerical authority in the community [of believers on one hand] and the permitted 
scope of the relationship between that authority and the established political institution 
during the occultation [on the other] (Newman, 2005, pp. 155-156).33  
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During the Qajar period, the Uṣūlī ʿulemā defended and became involved in the 
definition of “the authority of the senior clerics over both the jurisprudential and 
practical affairs of the community as the representatives of the Hidden Imām during his 
absence” (Newman, 2005, p. 168). The core of these efforts was the refinement of the 
concept of General vicegerency (nīyābat al-ʿāmmah), “the notion of the senior cleric as 
the ‘general deputy’ of the Hidden Imām, and the notion of a single mujtahid with 
paramount authority among the ʿulemā”. They argued that “the mujtahid should 
exercise” the judicial punishments (ḥudūd) “during the Imām’s absence”. The 
culmination of these scholastic efforts was Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī’s (also Shaykh 
Murtaḍā Anṣārī Shūshtarī, d. 1281H/1864) innovation on matters of both 
jurisprudence and clerical authority which bore fruit in laying the foundation for the 
concept of marjaʿ al-taqlīd, the supreme exemplar (Newman, 2005, p. 168).34 
ʿUlemā’s relationship with the Qajar’s court, as is portrayed by Robert Gleave, 
has been one of “problematic legitimation of state activities by religious authorities” on 
one hand, and “the influence of religion on the workings of government, in particular 
the institutions connected with the judiciary”, on the other. In addition to these, Gleave 
mentions another reason for the inconvenient relationship between the court and the 
ʿulemā, which was the “growing independence of mind among the religious classes,” 
that, in later years bore fruit in a number of ulama-led movements which were openly 
oppositional to the state” (Gleave, 2005, p. 4). Gleave concludes that “the de jure 
illegitimacy” which was given to the Qajar state by the ʿulemā, especially with regard to 
the right of defensive jihād by the ruler, “was limited and specific” (Gleave, 2005, p. 5).  
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Having said this, there exists a number of factors here: the superiority of the 
Uṣūlī ʿulemā over the Akhbārīs, the relative weakness of the Qajar state, especially in 
their later years, and the ʿulemā’s reluctance or perhaps their caution in giving 
legitimacy to the Qajars. All of these, should be treated as indications of the ʿulemā’s 
weight and influence in social and political affairs. This situation was sustained until 
Riḍā Khān came to power in 1299 shamsī/ 1921. In such a context, it is comprehensible 
that Riḍā Shah’s policies, which targeted wealth, social situation and the ʿulemā’s 
accessibility to sources of power, raised opposition and dissatisfaction. Although the 
Shah won the battle for a short time and the ʿulemā proved not “to be able to arrest or 
divert Tehran’s centralizing drive” (Cronin, 2007, p. 92), the ultimate winners were 
members of the hierocracy who not only after the Shah’s departure gained back what 
they had lost, but for the first time in the life of Shīʿa jurisprudence, took control of the 
main centre of political power. As a result, the unfortunate years of Riḍā Shah’s 
presence in power were only a short break in the life of the Uṣūlī ʿulemā, as their 
hegemony, which had endured during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was 
sustained after the departure of Riḍā Shah and has continued to the present time 
(Amanat, 1390 shamsī/2011, p. 292). Moreover, Riḍā Shah’s manipulative policies 
activated political tendencies among the ʿulemā which are visible in the kalāmī and 
juridical texts of this period of time. 
The examination of the key texts of the ʿulemā and ḥukamā of this time 
demonstrates that notions such as wilāya, nubuwwa, and imamate maintained their 
centrality, though there seems to be a major shift from the ʿirfānī and kalāmī 
conceptions of wilāya to the juridical ones;35 a shift which above all confirms this 
research’s former analysis of the importance of jurisprudence. In these texts, as we will 
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see, the question of social leadership of the Shīʿī jurist is taken for granted, a dynamic 
that was absent in the writings of the previous ʿulemā. For the first time the ʿulemā 
began to conceptualize and theorize issues such as the question of governance in Islam, 
the necessity to establish an Islamic government, the notion of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah or a 
kind of guardianship which should be exercised by the Islamic government, and lastly, 
the necessity to spread among citizens the teachings of Shīʿīsm.36 Such tendencies, as it 
will be observed, gain particular prominence in the writings of ʿAllāmah Muḥammad 
Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī of the twentieth century, whose major texts, along with Mīrzā 
Aḥmad Āshtīyānī’s, will be examined here. It should be noted that Āshtīyānī’s treatise 
on wilāya, is centred on wilāyat al-khāṣṣah instead of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah and is very 
much inspired by Qumshiʾī’s glosses on ibn ʿArabī.  
3.6. Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī  
Ayatollah Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī is perhaps better known through his father 
who was a famous Ayatollah of the Qajar period. Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan Āshtīyānī 
(d. 1319 H/1901), whose participation in the Tobacco Régie and subsequent protest is 
well-known, was one of the three opponent mujtahids who stood against the tobacco 
treaty and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah’s (1275 shamsī/1896) concession which had been granted 
to Major G. F. Talbot for a full monopoly over the production, sale, and export of tobacco 
in Persia for fifty years. Along with Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan Shīrazī (d. 1312 H/1894) 
and Mīrzā Javād Tabrīzī (d. 1313 H/1895), Āshtīyānī sought to repudiate the 
concession, and in fact it was from his home in Tehran that the fatwā of Mīrzāy-i Shīrazī 
was declared and became known amongst the people. Nāṣir al-Dīn Shah threatened him 
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with exile, but before the Shah’s order was executed, his followers prevented him from 
leaving the capital. 
Mīrzā Aḥmad was Āshtīyānī’s youngest son and was born in Tehran in 1300 
H/1882. After obtaining preliminary instruction from his father, he continued his 
studies in rational and scriptural disciplines with other teachers, such as Mīrzā Hāshim 
Rashtī, Mīrzā Ḥassan Kermānshāhī, Shaykh Muḥammad Riḍā Nūrī and Seyyed 
Muḥammad Yazdī, and afterward started teaching at madrasa-yi Sipahsālār. From 1340 
to 1350 shamsī (1960-1970) he lived in Najaf, where he met Mīrzā Muḥammad Hossein 
Nāʾīnī who granted him ījāza of teaching and issuing fatwā. After returning to Iran he 
became involved in teaching, writing and training students. He passed away in 1395 
H/1975 in Tehran and was buried in the shrine precinct of Shah ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm in Rayy, 
south of Tehran. He was a prolific scholar and has left many writings – altogether sixty-
two, in the form of treatises, comments, exegesis, and original texts in various areas 
such as jurisprudence, theology, ethics, mysticism and ḥikmat; although many of them 
are still unpublished. He also used to write poetry under the pseudonym of Wālih 
(lovelorn). Of this lengthy list, two key texts will be examined here, entitled Risāla-yi 
Sarmāya-yi Saʿādat (Treatise on the Asset of Felicity) in Persian and Risālat al-Wilāya 
(Treatise on Wilāya) in Arabic (Ostādī, 1383 shamsī, pp. 9-25).  
Āshtīyānī wrote Risāla-yi Sarmāya-yi Saʿādat around 1381 H/1961 and by 1389 
H/1970 the book has been published five times. It is divided into four sections; tawḥīd, 
nubuwwa, imamate and maʿād. In terms of method, Āshtīyānī uses a rational 
methodology blended with transmitted sources in order to develop arguments for the 
conception of nubuwwa and its status. He maintains that the reasonability of deeds of 
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God requires him to send prophets to guide people on the righteous way to Him - or 
perfection, which is the desired rational goal of creation. In other words, sending 
prophets was necessary to achieve perfection (Ostādī, 1383 shamsī, pp. 137-138). On 
imamate, Āshtīyānī follows the same method and argues for the status of the Imāms 
from the perspective of a ḥakīm who believes that the Imāms are the intermediary of 
divine emanation to people and should be appointed by the Prophet and not by people, 
as they are ignorant and cannot distinguish between good and evil. He also argues that 
the Imāms should be the most learned and the wisest (aʿlam wa afḍal) of their time. 
Āshtīyānī concludes that the Prophet not only appointed Imām Ali as his first successor, 
but also appointed the rest of the Imāms (Ostādī, pp. 142-147).  
Āshtīyānī’s detailed discussion on the notion of wilāya, its definition and its 
typology which is presented in his Risālat al-Wilāya, is very much inspired by Qumshiʾī. 
Like Qumshiʾī, he starts with the etymological derivation of wilāya which is walī, 
meaning affinity and closeness, followed by the twin of wilāya (authority, kingship) and 
walāya (affection and kindness). Āshtīyānī maintains that wilāya dominates everything, 
whether it is contingent or necessary and, like being, is modulated. Wujūd’s modulation, 
however, should be understood on the basis of manifestation and the modulation of 
wilāya should be realized on the ground of its affinity and closeness to the Absolute. 
Āshtīyānī concludes that the more being/existence manifests itself, the more perfect it 
is, likewise, the closer something or someone is to God, the more it enjoys the attribute 
of wilāya. In interpreting this verse “Allah u-maʿa kulla shayʾ, God is with everything”, 
Āshtīyānī believes that it is the maxim of the status of wilāya and the closest place that 
a holder of wilāya can have. Wilāya is also intimately tied with faith, in the sense that 
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the more a believer is illuminated by the light of faith, the more attributes of beauty 
manifest in him (Ostādī, pp. 335-336).  
Wilāya could be absolute and delimited - muṭlaqah and muqayyadah 
respectively. It is absolute in as much as it is a divine attribute and as such is limitless, 
and it is delimited because it is designated either to a prophet or to a certain walī, and 
from this perspective, their wilāya is a part of the absolute wilāya. In addition to this, 
there is another typology of wilāya which is the classification of wilāya into general and 
particular. The first type could be designated to any muʾmin (believer) who believes in 
God and does good deeds as, according to the intensity of his or her faith to God, the 
believer enjoys the higher station in the hierarchy of wilāya. The second type, however, 
is specifically allocated to His seekers who have experienced self-abnegation and self-
annihilation and they are no longer the cause of their deeds; they have become 
perpetuated in God. What moves them forward is the love of God and what strengthens 
them is piety.  
Thus, there exist walī-ya muṭlaq and nabī-ya muṭlaq and the latter is designated 
to the Prophet of Islam, who is the holder of the office of real nubuwwa (nubuwwat-i 
ḥaqīqīya) as a pre-existent and perpetual office. The Prophet has the absolute right to 
act upon the cosmos and is entitled the Perfect Man, the Quṭb of Time, the Great Khalīfa, 
the First/Universal Intellect, and the Primal Man. As for wilāyat-i muṭlaqah one can say 
that it is the inward of such a nubuwwa and its holder, who is Ali, and has the same and 
equal status and authority as the Prophet does. Although Āshtīyānī adds that every 
nubuwwa and wilāya is absolute and general because it is an attribute of God and as 
such should be muṭlaqah, he also reminds us that since the offices of wilāya and 
 
 
175 
nubuwwa are to be designated to a particular nabī or walī, they are regarded as 
muqayyada as well (Ostādī, pp. 337-342). On the difference between wilāya and 
nubuwwa, Āshtīyānī brings the typical argument that the status of wilāya is pre-eternal, 
divine and of more inclusive than that of nubuwwa, as nabī is capable of being aware of 
truths and having knowledge only on the basis of his wilāya. Walī is a name of the names 
of God whose face is turned towards his Lord rather than towards this world or people 
(Ostādī, p. 340). Following other Shīʿa ʿārifs and ḥakīms, Āshtīyānī stresses that the 
Imāms are awlīyā and the successors of the Prophet who are precedent to creation 
(Ostādī, p. 346). 
 Āshtīyānī’s Risālat al-Wilāya has similarities with another important treatise on 
wilāya entitled Wilāyat Nāmih (Book of Wilāya) by Mullā Sulṭān Muḥammad Gunābādī, 
known as Sulṭān ʿAlī Shāh (d. 1327 H/1909). Gunābādī was primarily a pupil of the 
abovementioned Ḥāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, but after his conversion to Sufism, for thirty-
four years maintained the office of the quṭbīyat of the Niʿmatullāhī silsila known as 
Niʿmatullāhī-yayi Gunābādīya. His conversion to Sufism happened as a result of his 
fascination with the Niʿmatullāhī quṭb of the time, Muḥammad Kāẓim Isfahānī (d. 1293 
H/1876), and with the name in the sect as Saʿādat ʿAlī Shāh (also known as Ṭāwūs al-
ʿUrafā, lit. the peacock of the mystics), the thirty-fourth quṭb in the line of Niʿmatullāhī 
leaders.37 Like some of his predecessors, Gunābādī was martyred by a local governor. 
Both Āshtīyānī and Gunābādī belonged to the same epoch and despite being affiliated 
with two different blocks; one an uṣūlī jurist and a ḥakīm and the other a Sufi quṭb, they 
developed similar arguments for the conception of wilāya and the office of wilāyat al-
khāṣṣah. Sulṭān ʿAlī Shāh wrote a number of books; and among them the 
abovementioned Wilāyat Nāmih is significant.  
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The book revolves around the concept of wilāya, its reality, its nexus to divine 
names and attributes, and its relationship with the doctrinal principles of Islam and of 
the faith of Shīʿīsm. In terms of etymology, Gunābādī sticks with the old twins of wilāya 
and walāya, and argues that the former means rule and reign, while the latter indicates 
friendship and closeness (Gunābādī, 1384, p. 13). Wilāya is perennial and pre-existent 
and is regarded as the inward of nubuwwa, and as such is noor which has existed since 
the time of Adam. Along with the allegory of light, wilāya is likened to a divine tree 
(shajarat ul-ilāhīyah) whose fruit, after crossbreeding, is joined with insān. Therefore, 
wilāya is a benefaction, a khayr (good), having come from the divine tree which itself 
has hybridized with insān (Gunābādī, pp. 71-73). Gunābādī calls this type of wilāya 
‘covenant’ (also wilāyat al-taklīfīya), and argues that by the covenant between God and 
His servants, the heart of the servant will open to the Faith, whilst there is another type 
of wilāya (the absolute wilāya/wilāyat al-muṭlaqah) which is known as Divine Will 
(mashīyyat al-muṭlaqah) and is the main source of His emanations (Gunābādī, pp. 13-
15). As the holder of the status of the absolute wilāya, God’s essence remains 
unknowable to His creatures unless He wills Himself to appear through the mirror of 
His names and attributes – which is a classical Akbarīan argument to both explain His 
Essence and creation. In this status, He is light which shines or flows over everything, 
and as such is unified with them. Thus, wilāya in this usage is His deed or mashīyyat al-
ilāhīyah (Divine Will) (Gunābādī, pp, 22-31). Wilāyat al-taklīfīya, along with prayer, 
alms, fasting and ḥajj, is a principle of Islam and of the faith of Shīʿīsm, in the sense that 
by disobeying the wilāya of walī, a believer steps out of the boundaries of the faith. A 
believer, Gunābādī maintains, must accept the authority of walī (apparently Sufi quṭb) 
and his right to act upon him38 (Gunābādī, pp. 34-35).  
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For Gunābādī, wilāya has obvious temporal connotations; walī is a ruler who has 
the right of absolute authority to act upon his people, and by accepting the authority of 
the ruler, people are secured from suffering and calamity. In the same way, by entering 
the covenant of wilāya a believer is safe from His agony (Gunābādī, p. 37). The 
interesting point about Gunābādī’s conceptions of wilāya is that he excludes women 
from the referents of the covenant of wilāya and salvation. As a result, women will 
remain in everlasting ignorance and suffering, and along with four other groups of 
people39, are not eligible to receive khayr and emanation from God (Gunābādī, pp. 61-
63). I interject here that such a belief is in contrast to both the teachings of Islam and of 
ibn ʿArabī and his mystical doctrine which has always allocated a room to women. It 
also bears witness to a development by which ʿirfān has increasingly gained a 
theological and/or juridical aura. On the other hand, if according to Gunābādī, the faith 
is the fruit of the covenant of wilāya, by excluding women from attaining this fruit he 
argues against the comprehensive and all-encompassing message of Islam.  
Āshtīyānī and Gunābādī’s arguments are examples of what German philosopher 
Jurgen Habermas (d. 1929) has called ‘intersubjectivity’. In addition, it has already been 
observed that as a result of Mullā Ṣadrā’s synthesis between ʿirfān, Shīʿa theology and 
philosophy, particularly Illuminationist philosophy, the boundary between these areas 
became blurred and terms such as wilāya could have been conceptualized by Sufis, 
mutakallims (theologians) and uṣūlī mujtahids in the same way. The only difference 
was determining the referents; for the former the walī was the Sufi quṭb and for the 
latter, it was the uṣūlī scholar. 
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3.7. ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
Seyyed Muḥammad Hossein Qāḍī (Qāzī) Ṭabāṭabāʾī Tabrīzī, later known as 
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, was born in 1321 H/1904 in the village of Shadabad (or Shadagan) 
near Tabriz in Azerbaijan (Algar, 2006, p. 327), of the famous clan of Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who 
trace their genealogies to the second Shīʿī Imām, Al-Hassan, and specifically one of his 
progenies called Ibrāhīm ibn Ismāʿīl al-Dībāj, known as Ṭabāṭabā.40 From his mother’s 
side, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s genealogy goes back to the third Imām, al-Hossein. He received his 
preliminary instructions in Tabriz and then moved to Najaf to complete his education 
there. He stayed in Iraq for ten years, but due to the poor economic situation, he had to 
return to Iran and stay in his hometown for ten years. He moved to Qum and resided 
there for the rest of his life. He passed away in 1402 H/1981 and was buried in the 
shrine of Ḥaḍrat Maʿṣūma (Fātima bint Mūsa al-Kādhim) in Qum.41 Ṭabāṭabāʾī was a 
prolific writer and wrote on a variety of subjects such as metaphysics, Islamic ethics, 
mathematics (in which he was an expert), government and politics in Islam, wilāya and 
nubuwwa, the School of Shīʿīsm (maktab-i tashayyuʿ), resurrection and Islamic 
anthropology. His exegesis on the Qurʾān, entitled al-Mīzān fī Tafsīr l-Qurʾān, popularly 
known as Tafsīr al-Mīzān, consists of twenty volumes and was originally written in 
Arabic. For the study and exegesis of the Qurʾān, Ṭabāṭabāʾī was inspired by his cousin 
Seyyed ʿAlī Qāḍī (Qāzī) Ṭabāṭabāʾī,42 who had trained him in ʿirfān and in the works of 
ibn ʿArabī. Sajjad Rizvi maintains that Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s language in his exegesis “is 
deliberately theological, and in accord with his method he rarely cites extra-Qurʾānīc 
material. Thus he deploys arguments and perspectives from his training in philosophy 
and ʿirfān to explicate the text but occludes his sources” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 30).  
 
 
179 
His writings are altogether sixty-three original treatises and books, as well as 
glosses on different Shīʿa texts such as Kitāb al-Kāfī, Biḥār al-Anwār, Ḥikmat al-
Mutaʿālīya, and Kitāb al-Kifāya (Rizvi, 2015, pp. 46-50). His series of discussions with 
Henry Corbin (d. 1978) on a number of topics such as Shīʿīsm, ʿirfān and ḥikmat are 
notable, as they shed light on different aspects of his thought.43 Besides, Ṭabāṭabāʾī was 
not unaware of new intellectual trends in the West as he observed in them materialistic 
perils that could mislead young generations from the path of Islam and Shīʿīsm, and for 
this reason he wrote Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm on Islamic Epistemology. He 
also trained many students, most of them later prominent intellectual and political 
figures who helped the new political and theoretical system founded in post-
revolutionary Iran. Among them Murtaḍā Muṭaharī, (who commented on Uṣūl-i 
Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm, d. 1357 shamsī/1979), Hossein ʿAlī Muntaẓirī (d. 1388 
shamsī/2009), Muḥammad Hossein Bihishtī (d. 1359 shamsī/1981), ʿAbdullāh Javādī 
Āmulī, Ḥassan Ḥassanzādih Āmulī and Muḥammad Taqī Miṣbāḥ Yazdī, are famous 
(Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1429 H/2008, pp. 44-45).44  
In addition to his students who disseminated his thoughts in Iran and other Shīʿa 
societies, his books clearly manifest his ideas on Islamic epistemology, metaphysics in 
general and Islamic metaphysics in particular, tawḥīd, the School of Shīʿīsm, and most 
importantly the notions of wilāya, nubuwwa and imamate. So, for the purpose of this 
research, his key texts including Risālat al-Wilāya (the Book of Wilāya), a very 
important text on the notion of wilāya and related issues such as spiritual conduct 
(sulūk), perfection (kamāl), and man’s life in this world and in the hereafter, will be 
examined. This treatise originally in Arabic, is widely translated into Persian, 
commented is upon by a number of figures and is published under different titles such 
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as Ṭarīq-i ʿIrfān (the Path of Mysticism) Sulūk-i Nafsānī (Carnal Conduct) and Wilāyat 
Nāmih (the Book of Wilāya).45 Other texts that will be examined and analyzed here 
include Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s discussions with the French Orientalist Henry Corbin, namely 
Shīʿa: Majmūʿi Mudhākirāt bā Professor Henry Corbin (Shīʿīsm: the Collected 
Conversations with Henry Corbin). There exists another book entitled Insān az Āghāz 
tā Anjām (Man from Beginning to the End), containing Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s ideas on Shīʿa 
epistemology and eschatology. The last two, though separate books, are very connected 
to each other. They discuss the School of Shīʿīsm and related issues such as imamate, 
nubuwwa and wilāya, and particularly the ways Ṭabāṭabāʾī develops arguments for the 
conceptions of them, in works entitled Shīʿa dar Eslām (Shīʿīsm in Islam) and 
Maʿnawīyat-i Tashayuʿ (the Spirituality of Shīʿīsm). 
3.7.1. Wilāyat Nāmih 
In his Risālat al-Wilāya, Ṭabāṭabāʾī begins with the definition of wilāya, which is 
leadership and authority as well as closeness and affinity to God. In its second 
definition, wilāya is intimately tied with the stations of gnosis, in the sense that the 
more a believer knows God, the closer he is to Him. Ṭabāṭabāʾī then turns his attention 
to the typology of wilāya and its division into wilāyat al-ʿāmmah and wilāyat al-khāṣṣah 
(general and specific wilāya, respectively). This division is a typical of the ḥikmat 
tradition which has already been discussed adequately in this chapter. What is new in 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s arguments on the conceptions of wilāya is that he turns his focus from 
wilāyat al-khāṣṣah46 – which has traditionally been central in the ḥikmat writings, to 
wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, in the sense that it is actually this type of wilāya which is more 
important and has priority over another. This shift is intentional, as Ṭabāṭabāʾī sought 
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to reach out to a larger audience; either ordinary readers or young generation, to 
expose them to the message of Islam and Shīʿīsm. This new development should be 
understood with regard to societal changes in Iran during the era of Riḍā Shah: the 
literacy rate had been increased, various publishers facilitated the accessibility to 
ordinary readers of new books which were printed with higher circulation, and women 
had entered educational establishments such as colleges and universities. Knowledge, 
here mysticism, was no longer designated to a handful of the elite (khawāṣṣ, here the 
Imāms), whose status and privileges are believed to be pre-given and pre-exist, but to 
anyone who sought for it.  
In Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s entire body of work, except for short references to wilāyat al-
khāṣṣah, one can hardly find detailed conceptions for the term, and from this 
perspective, one can maintain that Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s argument reverses the typical 
understanding and conceptions of wilāya. Wilāya is neither understood in terms of 
wilāyat al-takwīnīya, nor even in terms of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah, but only wilāyat al-
ʿāmmah, which is accessible for every believer. In Wilāyat Nāmih, he assures that wilāya 
is a faculty which could be obtained through spiritual conduct (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1390, p. 
179). Again, contrary to most of the Ṣadrīan ḥakīms who taught seekers to avoid women 
as pitfalls on the path to God, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s teachings are devoid of any such misogynist 
connotations. He addresses man in general and promises his audiences that by doing 
jihād, which is a righteous deed, everyone is capable of reaching the status of wilāya 
and comprehending the hidden secrets of the Universe. Therefore, the rights of 
comprehending the secrets are not only designated to the Prophet and the Imāms 
(Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1390, p. 180). It is noteworthy that Ṭabāṭabāʾī, unlike his predecessors who 
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used to understand the status of wilāya only in terms of wilāyat al-takwīnīya, does not 
use this term at all.   
Pertinent to this is the term mukhlaṣ. The People of Purity (Ahl al-Ikhlāṣ or 
mukhlaṣūn, also sābiqūn or aṣḥāb al-asrār, lit. the People of Secrets which is wilāya)47, 
is one of the most frequent words in Wilāyat Nāmih and is used interchangeably for 
awlīyā. By this, Ṭabāṭabāʾī refers to those who grasp the true meaning of tawḥīd and 
worship God not according to their imaginations, but on the basis of their gnosis of God. 
So, not only is their worship the most purified one, because it is founded on a true basis 
which is gnosis, but also everybody can get to know Him and worship Him in an 
appropriate manner (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1390, pp. 209-210). Mukhlaṣūn have to walk a 
number of steps, including repentance, self-assessment, meditation, practising silence 
and seclusion, hunger and retirement, and keeping night vigil (tahajjud) in order to 
grasp His gnosis. Since the status of wilāya or ikhlāṣ requires turning face to God, to 
reach this goal, mukhlaṣ needs to process through all the aforementioned stages of 
spiritual conduct and become self-abnegated in Him. At the final step, the most beautiful 
names and attributes of God become manifested in them, and like Him they enjoy the 
absolute right of acting upon the cosmos (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1390, pp. 211 ff).  
In terms of method, Ṭabāṭabāʾī in Wilāyat Nāmih uses the transmitted approach, 
relying mostly on the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, though in other books he develops rational 
arguments for the conceptions of wilāya and nubuwwa. For instance, in Maʿnawīyat-i 
Tashayuʿ, Ṭabāṭabāʾī turns his attention to another meaning of wilāya, leadership and 
supervision, and develops a rational argument for the conceptions of wilāyat al-
ʿāmmah. Wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, is a natural supervision which is both exercised by every 
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believer over another, and is the undertaking of the administration of social issues such 
as guardianship of orphans or the sponsorship of the insane. The referent of wilāyat al-
ʿāmmah, then, could be both every believer and essential matters which need to be 
undertaken by a guardian. So, wilāya is a comprehensive term indicating both personal 
and communal leadership and supervision (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387a, pp. 70-71).  
Here wilāya is an axiom (badīhī), an evident premise to be accepted as true 
without controversy. Ṭabāṭabāʾī uses this axiom as a starting point for his reasoning to 
prove wilāya. From this perspective, wilāya or leadership in Islam is natural and no one 
is to abrogate it: “the abrogation of leadership and wilāya is the abrogation of Islam and 
original disposition (fiṭra)” (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387a, p. 86). But who undertakes the 
guardianship of social and political matters? According to the classification of 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, the issue of the formation of government is embedded in the category of 
social matters and is assigned to any individual who both holds piety and fear of God 
(taqwā), and has impressive understanding of current social issues. In terms of the form 
of the government, Ṭabāṭabāʾī recognizes consultative form of government (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 
1387a, pp. 86-88).  
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s doctrine of wilāya has been the subject of controversy among 
subsequent scholars. Muhsin Kadivar has discussed Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s ideas on wilāya and 
government in Shīʿīsm in two of his books.48 According to him, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s conception 
of wilāya is a typical one (Kadivar, 1378b, pp. 68-378), though his understanding of the 
term ‘ulu l-amr’ (the guardians of the cause) is different. Kadivar stresses that 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī in Tafsīr al-Mīzān rejects the common but false assessment that by ‘ulu l-
amr’, the Qurʾān means jurists, ʿulemā, khulafā of the Prophet, military officers, or even 
 
 
184 
the consensus of the ummah (community of believers), because this term refers only to 
the Prophet and the Imāms (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 177-178). A similar interpretation is 
given by Sajjad Rizvi in his abovementioned article on Ṭabāṭabāʾī, in which he explains 
how Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s conception of wilāya, as well as his Tafsīr al-Mīzān should be 
understood as claims to authority, as opposed to the authority of the fuqahā (Rizvi, 
2015, p. 16). On the other hand, Algar holds a completely different opinion and 
maintains that Ṭabāṭabāʾī has endorsed the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh “at the very least 
in its general outline” (Algar, 2006, Op.cit, p. 347). According to Ṭabāṭabāʾī, “the 
individual who excels all others in piety, administrative ability (ḥusn-i tadbīr), and 
awareness of contemporary circumstances, is best fitted for this position [the 
leadership of society]” (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, wilāyat wa zaʿāmat, pp. 91-2 in Algar, 2006, p. 346). 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s approach is a ‘holistic’ one, in which there is an identification 
between “the study and spiritual practice of philosophy and ʿirfān with the very faith of 
Shīʿī Islam” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 17), and by this, as it is mentioned earlier, he privileges “his 
areas of expertise over the main pursuits of the ḥawza” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 17). This 
approach is also perceived in his discussion with Henry Corbin, in which he maintains 
that the faith of Shīʿīsm is centered on the notion of wilāya; whether it is understood in 
terms of leadership and authority of the household of the Prophet, or in terms of 
closeness and affinity to God, and from both perspectives, the abrogation of wilāya or 
negligence from it will end in the abrogation of Shīʿīsm (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387b, pp. 51ff). 
From the viewpoint of the latter, wilāya is the path and the inward of nubuwwa, without 
which the status of nubuwwa and its functions would be ineffective and futile. In both 
meanings, wilāya is a perpetual and constant status. Along with rational methodology, 
 
 
185 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī also deploys transmitted sources to argue for the right of Imām Ali and his 
sons for the succession of the Prophet (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1387b, pp. 268ff).  
3.8. Conclusion 
We gained some observations from our examination of the conceptions of 
wilāya: 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s legacy flourished in the School of Tehran. The four ḥakīms of this 
school, namely Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī, Āqā ʿAlī Ḥakīm Mudarris Tehranī 
and Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī,49 not only perpetuated ‘the prophetic philosophy’ 
in their writings, but also followed Ṣadrā’s approach and terminology (a combination 
of ʿirfānī and rational method) to develop reasoning for the components of this 
philosophy, such as imamology, prophetology, gnosiology and the concept of the 
occultation. Along with the ḥakīms, who were intermediary links between the School of 
Isfahan50 and the School of Qum, there were two other generations of students that 
were either transmitters of the Ṣadrīan philosophy and ibn ʿArabīan metaphysics to the 
next generation, or were scholars who were to become the teachers of the School of 
Qum (Rizvi, 2014, p. 125). 
Ḥakīms came to understand and analyze the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat from both 
philosophical and ʿirfānī viewpoints, and they did that through commenting/glossing, 
“clarifying the meanings of obscure phrases in their works” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 132), or 
developing a tradition based “on its own interpretations and a plethora of works were 
written” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 132). Therefore, their writings were either regarded as a 
return to original source material (either philosophical or mystical), or as an addition 
to the existing Ṣadrīan tradition through glossing and commenting on them. From this 
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perspective, as Zuhair Ismāʿīl maintains, their works, in general, are important to the 
understanding of ḥikma, as well as to the application of it (Ismāʿīl, p. 132). In terms of 
their contribution to the conceptions of wilāya, the ʿ irfānī reading was dominant, whose 
culmination, as observed earlier in the chapter, was in the works of Āqā Muḥammad 
Riḍā Qumshiʾī.  
The writings of the ḥakīms of the School of Qum, unlike those of their 
predecessors, do not display the balance between the ʿirfānī and philosophical reading, 
as each of them represent a distinct dimension of Ṣadrīan ḥikma. In the works of 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī, there is a separation between philosophical, mystical and traditional 
discussions on one hand, and the dominance of the Periphatetic reading of Ṣadrā 
without the inclusion of theoretical ʿirfān, on the other. In his conception of wilāya, 
which is best illustrated in Wilāyat Nāmih, Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s arguments in contrast to those 
of Mullā Ṣadrā who had adopted a cohesive approach, are rooted in the Qurʾānīc and 
Shīʿa teachings. In addition, he had earlier shown his interest in Periphatetic philosophy 
in his two books, Bidāyat al-Ḥikma and Nihāyat al-Ḥikma, which, as Zuhair Ismāʿīl 
rightly argues, significantly exposed Islamic philosophy to a wider population (Ismāʿīl, 
2014, pp. 135-136).  
Probably one can refer to this ‘exposure’ as gaining a social aspect of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s 
teachings, and as Muhsin Kadivar has argued, his thoughts display a mixture of Shīʿa 
doctrines and social goals of human society (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 45). In volume four of 
Tafsīr al-Mīzān, Ṭabāṭabāʾī develops lengthy discussions for conceptions such as man 
and society, Islamic visions of society, and the social nature of human beings 
(Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1394 H/1974, pp. 92-138). Pertinent to this is his emphasis on personal 
 
 
187 
aspects of the teachings of Islam, such as individual perfection and the concept of 
wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, which is accessible to every believer. These two dimensions, social 
and individual, are interrelated as individual perfection, in which the status of wilāyat 
al-ʿāmmah is fulfilled only within the Islamic social context. It is also with the figures of 
the School of Qum that Islamic philosophy gains interaction with Western philosophy, 
and works such as Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm, in which Islamic philosophy is 
presented in a new way, were published. The School maintains this tradition to this day.  
There are two more differences between the Schools of Tehran and Qum: for the 
ḥakīms of the School of Tehran ḥikma was an end in itself, but for their successors in 
the School of Qum, ḥikma is a “tool to increase the depth of unrelated researches such 
as political philosophy in the scheme of walāyah al-faqīh, (guardianship of the jurist), 
Qurʾānīc hermeneutics, ethics and the environment” (Ismāʿīl, 2014, p. 138). Moreover, 
if the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran enjoyed the Qajar court’s respect and attention, 
the ḥakīms of the School of Qum took advantage of the well-organized social and 
financial networks of the late Pahlavi era that sustained them to survive the temporary 
shock of Riḍā Khān’s secularism.  
The Schools of Tehran and Qum are fascinating subjects for scholarly research, 
but a study and analysis of the conception of wilāya has been lacking. The intention of 
the author is to contextualize wilāya and other related terms to see how the ḥakīms 
contributed to the inherited tradition available to them, therefore, the perspective of 
this chapter could be regarded as an addition to the existing research. As will be 
observed in the next two chapters, it was this network, along with Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
defiance (another prominent figure of the School of Qum with ʿirfānī reading), to the 
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existing socio-political order that facilitated the actualization of the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat in 
Iran. In these chapters, it will be seen how the three currents of mysticism, theology and 
jurisprudence came together and created a context within which concepts such as 
wilāya, imamate, nubuwwa and vicegerency of the Hidden Imām are understood and 
actualized.  
1 - The term “school” was first coined by Henry Corbin and Hossein Nasr “to describe a philosophical 
movement within a specific location, but one should not assume that philosophical activity at a certain 
time was confined to these areas. Rather, the term denotes a burst of activity that primarily occurred in 
a certain place” (Zuhair ʿAlī Ismāʿīl, Between Philosophy and ʿIrfān: Interpreting Ṣadrā From the Qajars 
to Post-Revolutionary Iran, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Exeter, October 2014, pp. 79-80). Although, 
as it will be observed further in this chapter, there have been scholars who were not present in a 
certain place at the time of activity of the School, but significantly contributed to it. For example, the 
School of Tehran, had two relevant, though geographically distinct scholars, Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī and Mullā 
Hādī Sabzivārī who did not live in Tehran, but are regarded as members of the School of Tehran.  
2 - Karīm Mujtahidī in his Āshināyī-i Iranian bā Falsafihāy-i Jadīd-i Gharb (Iranians’ Familiarity with the 
New Western Philosophies) has given a historical record of Iranian’s intellectual and economic 
encounters with the West from the Safawid era onward. See:  
Karīm Mujtahidī, Āshināyī-i Iranian bā Falsafihāy-i Jadīd-i Gharb (Iranians’ Familiarity with the New 
Western Philosophies), 1388 (Tehran: Sāzimān-i inteshārāt-i Pazhūhishgāh-i Farhang va Andīshiy-i 
Islāmī & Muʾasasiy-i Muṭāliʿāt-i Tārīkh-i Muʿāṣir-i Iran).  
3 - Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm stems from Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s lectures in his classes in Qum before 
1332/1945, and consists of fourteen treatises divided into five volumes, which discuss pure 
philosophical issues from an Islamic perspective. By Riʾālīsm, Ṭabāṭabāʾī indicates al-ḥikmat al-
mutaʿālīya against sophism (safsaṭa) which is manifested whether in Marxism (Dialectical 
Materialism), or positivism. He calls these two ‘idealism’, and argues that the most reasonable 
philosophical school is that of Mullā Ṣadrā which is a synthesis of the two great philosophical heritages; 
Greek and Islamic (including Peripatetic and illuminationist trends), and is as old as the history of 
philosophy itself. Ṭabāṭabāʾī claims that Mullā Ṣadrā could reconcile a two thousand year old 
philosophical dispute, which had started from the Greek, and invent a new philosophical school called 
al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya.  
Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Uṣūl-i Falsafah wa Ravish-i Riʾālīsm (the Principles of Philosophy and 
Realism),  introduction and footnotes by Murtaḍā Muṭaharī, two volumes, 1364 (Tehran: Ṣadrā 
Publication). Murtaḍā Muṭaharī’s lengthy footnotes on the book are not descriptions, and as Dabashi 
emphasizes, in fact tackle the philosophical materialism, “not because of the inherent significance of 
this school of thought but because it had, through the agency of the Tudeh party, targeted the young 
people for conversion, [and] such intrusions into the intellectual domain of Islamic scholastic learning 
had to be challenged philosophically”. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, 1993, p. 155. Dabashi 
certainly maintains that Muṭaharī’s endeavour was to question and refute the validity of one of the 
materialistic premises which was the idea of relativity of the truth. At that time, as Dabashi argues, 
Marxism could challenge and rob militant Shīʿīsm of both “its metaphysical claim to truth and its 
ideological claim to political mobilization”. Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: the Ideological 
Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 2006 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers), p. 156.  
4 - Ḥikmat (also ḥikma), means transcendent wisdom and “divine science that combined gnosis (in 
particular the sapiential and metaphysical Sufi thought of the School of Ibn al-ʿArabī, q.v.), theosophy, 
and philosophy” (Nasr, 1966, p. 907, in Isfahan School of Philosophy, Sajjad Rizvi, 2012, p. 122), and is 
insisted to have prophetic roots. In the topography of ḥikmat, one should notice that it was Henry 
Corbin (d. 1978) and following him Hossein Nasr (1933-) that for the first time situated the idea of 
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ḥikmat within a certain geographical framework and particularly tied it to the ‘the School of Isfahan’, as 
representing “the high point of Persian Shīʿa civilization” (Rizvi, Op.cit, 2012, p. 122).  
5 - The analytical biographies of these masters are reflected in a number of studies:  
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present; Philosophy in the Land of 
Prophecy, 2006 (NY, State University of New York Press), pp. 235-259.  
Manūchihr Ṣadūghī Suhā, Tārīkh-i Ḥukamā wa ʿUrafāy-i Mutiʾakhir, n.d. (Tehran: Ḥikmat Publication), 
pp. 141-500.  
There also exist case studies focusing on individual scholars: 
Sajjad Rizvi, Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī: Inheritor and Reviver of Ḥikmat in Qajar Iran, in Qajar Philosophy, Sabine 
Schmidtke and Reza Pourjavady (Eds), forthcoming (Leiden: Brill). & Sajjad Rizvi, Ḥikma Mutaʿālīya in 
Qajar Iran: Locating the Life and Work of Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (d. 1289/1873), Iranian Studies 44.4 
(2011), 473-96.  
6 - In a general comparison, one can mention the writings of Sergei N. Bulgakov, the Russian Orthodox 
Christian theologian and philosopher (d. 1944) who has discussed the concept of Sophia, the wisdom of 
God, from this perspective. Sophia is the intelligible basis of the world – the soul of the world, the 
wisdom of the nature, the intermediary, or a boundary needed between “the Nothing of the Creator and 
the multiplicity of the cosmos” (Bulgakov, 1993, p. xvi). “Sophiology” here has similarity with the 
conceptualizations of wilāya in the writings of the ḥakīms, and is a multi-dimensional concept. Probably 
the one important difference is that Sophia is feminine, but wilāya, both as a desirable model of 
leadership and authority, as well as an ontological status, is masculine. Sophia at once is Divine, but at 
the same time, is in the world, throughout it, in the form of divine energies and spiritual beings, as its 
boundary (Bulgakov, p. xvii). Bulgakov argues that Sophia (the wisdom of God/the nature of God) is 
inseparable from Ousia (divine substance), and Ousia is disclosed and manifested as Sophia. There is 
also another striking figure, Shekinah (the Glory of God/refers to manifestation), “in the midst of which 
God manifests himself” (Bulgakov, 1993, p. 29). Therefore, Ousia, Sophia and Shekinah are inseparable 
and refer to one truth which is Deity. See: Sergei N. Bulgakov, Sophia, the Wisdom of God: an Outline of 
Sophiology, 1993 (Hudson: Lindisfarne Press). 
7 - A few of these masjid-madrasas belong to pre-Qajar period, and the rest were built in the Qajar era. 
See: 
Muḥammad  Javād Mahdawī Nizhād, Gūni Shināsī-ya Masjid-Madrasahā-ya Dawra-yi Qajar (the 
Typology of Mosque-Schools of the Qajar Period), Faṣlnāmay-i Muṭāliʿāt-i Shāhr-i Irānī, No. 11, Spring 
1392, pp. 8-9.  
8 - For a detailed account of Martyn’s job, journey and polemical treatise on Islam and the Qurʾān, the 
ʿulemā and Sufi’s responses, and the encouraging role of the court in writing refutations against him, 
see:  
Abbas Amanat, Mujtahids and Missionaries: Shii responses to Christian polemics in the early Qajar 
period, in Religion and Society in Qajar Iran, Robert Gleave (ed), 2005 (London and New York: Routlege 
Curzon), pp. 247-270. &  
Maḥmūd Riḍā Isfandīyār, Risālay-i Radd-i Pādrī (Refutation on Pādrī), 1387 (Tehran: Ḥaqīqat 
Publication), pp. 4-42.  
9 - The term qayyim bil kitāb (qayyim al Qurʾān) is used for the first time by Shaykh Shahāb al-Dīn 
Yaḥya ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī (d. 587 H/1191) in his book Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (Illuminationist 
Philosophy). In his discussions on nubuwwa and particularly on ‘the states of seekers’ (aḥvāl-i sālikān), 
Suhrawardī maintains that the one who is eligible to rule and govern, is the sālik who has the gnosis of 
the secret (ḥikmat) of the book (the book of ḥikmat al-ishrāq), because ḥikmat as it has become 
through this book, indicates divine secrets and truths. Therefore, the one who knows ḥikmat and arises 
to implement it, is the true sālik. Here again, the recurring theme which is inmost being/sirr plays a 
central role, as it is by the virtue of the sirr that the seeker is distinguished from peers. See: 
Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥya ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī, Kitāb Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (Illuminationist Philosophy), 
translation into Persian by Seyyed Jaʿfar Sajjādī, 2nd edition, n.d. (Tehran: Tehran University 
Publication), p. 401.  
10 - Shīʿa scholars have described the meaning of the sirr and its relation to ontological stations. Mullā 
ʿAbdullāh Zunūzī maintains that sirr is an ecstasy of contemplation (ḥāl), between God and His servant, 
which is hidden from anybody else. In interpreting this ḥadīth that “our cause is secret, does not avail it 
but secret and secret of secret, the secret which is hidden by secret”, Zunūzī mentions that in this 
ḥadīth, sirr refers to the absolute wilāya and the comprehensive khilāfa which is divine side of the 
cause of God and its human side is nubuwwa. The station of sirr /wilāya, then, is the highest station 
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(Zunūzī, 1354, pp. 75-80). In the present book, Anwār Jalīyyah (the Manifest Lights) Zunūzī puts 
forward that the station of tawḥīd, which is sirr and unveiling of the sirr, is analogous to the station of 
wilāya or invisible/hidden (Zunūzī, pp. 300-301 ff). It seems that the extremist understanding of the 
status of wilāya - which was wilāyat al-takwīnīya - had so preoccupied scholars of the post-Safawid era 
that they used to analyze everything in terms of it. Zunūzī, as do many of his contemporaries and 
predecessors, turns wilāya into an incomprehensible fact and therefore outside of the realm of human 
understanding, whose boundaries are blurred with those of tawḥīd. In the following pages, Zunūzī 
stresses that by the Truth, Imāms meant the absolute wilāya which contains all other kinds of wilāya 
(Zunūzī, p. 358). Alongside philosophical understanding of the meaning of sirr, there was a pure ʿirfānī 
interpretation of this notion around this period of time that understood sirr and wilāya the same: “sirr 
is the source of the hidden intuition and the mine of divine knowledge,” so, wilāya of the Imāms is their 
sirr. See: Umm u-Salamah Beygum Nayrīzī, Jāmiʿ al-Kullīyāt; Kullīyāt-i Masāʾil-i ʿIrfānī-ya Shīʿa (the 
Comprehensive of Generalities; the Generalities of Mystical and Shīʿa Problems), Mahdī Iftikhār (ed), 
1386 (Qum: Maṭbūʿāt-i Dīnī), pp. 172-73 footnotes.  
11 - Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī (d. 1239 H/1826) has two risālas entitled al-Fawāʾid or Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid, and 
they are published in different volumes of Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim (Comprehensive Words). The first one, 
entitled Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid, is published in the first volume of Jawāmiʿ, and as a lengthy writing (Aḥsāʾī, 
1430 H, vol. 1, pp. 275-635) consists of twelve fāʾida and is written as an answer to the questions of 
someone called ‘Mashhad ibn Hossein ʿAlī’. On the importance of this risāla, Aḥsāʾī himself claims that 
he writes it because none of the ʿulemā or ḥukamā prior to him has come to touch upon these questions 
thus far, and his ability to write it stems from the fact that he is assisted by the esoteric knowledge of 
the Imāms. The present risāla is mainly on being (or existence or reality, lit. wujūd), His being, or wujūd 
al-ḥaqq, and the gnosis to His being and quiddity. For the address of the book, see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim 
(Comprehensive Words), vol. 1, 1430 H (Baṣra: al-ghadīr), pp. 275-635.  
The second risāla entitled al-Fawāʾid fi l-Ḥikma (the Theosophical Outcomes) is published in the second 
volume of the same book, Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim and is shorter than the first risāla (Aḥsāʾī, 1430 H, vol. 2, pp. 
175-221), though it discusses the same issues. For more information see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim 
(Comprehensive Words), vol. 2, 1430 H (Baṣra: al-ghadīr), pp. 175-221. Nūrī’s gloss seems to be on this 
particular risāla. Aḥsāʾī has three other risālas called al-Fawāʾid al-Sabʿa (Septet Outcomes), (pp. 223-
251), Fāʾida fi l-Istiṣḥāb (Benefit in Acqiring) (pp. 135-137) and al-Fawāʾid fī Mabānī al-Uṣūl (Benefit in 
the Foundations of Principles) (pp. 141-173), and they are published in volumes two and six of the 
same collection, respectively. For more information see: Jawāmiʿ al-Kalim, vol. 6, 1430 H (Baṣra, al-
ghadīr), pp. 135-137 & 141-173.  
12 - Sufi contemporaries of Nūrī preferred to use the term ‘spring’ instead of ‘creation’ for the 
appearance of the Muḥammedan Reality. They insisted to prove that creation (khalq), is both general 
and is signified to lower levels, not to the Muḥammedan Reality which is the highest degree of creation. 
See: Umm u-Salamah Beygum Nayrīzī, Op.cit, 1386 (Qum: Maṭbūʿāt-i Dīnī), pp. 52-53.  
13 - Idris Samawi Hamid has discussed Nūrī’s commentaries on Sharḥ al-Fawāʾid al-Ḥikamīya in his 
unpublished article Shaykh Aḥmad Ibn Zayniddīn al-Aḥsāʾī (Samawi, unpulished article, Op.cit, pp. 35-
38). These commentaries could be regarded as an example of interdiscursive dialogue between two 
significant scholars, that, despite the “strenuous disagreement” between them over some of Aḥsāʾī’s 
criticisms of Mullā Ṣadrā, Nūrī “still considered him at least equal in stature to his then late teacher Āqā 
Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1197hl/1783ce), another powerful spiritual personality” (ibid, p. 7). Samawi 
believes that Nūrī was both an admirer, and a critic of Aḥsāʾī at the same time (ibid, p. 16). 
14 - These two ḥadīth of Imām Ali that, “I am the ṣalāt (prayer) of believers” and “I am the qibla of 
ʿārifūn (the prayer direction of the gnostic),” refer to the same point. Nūrī interprets it by saying that 
since the reality of the essence of imām is the reality of the glorification of God (tasbīḥ), believers by 
doing everyday prayer which is His glorification, recalls the reality of imām (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 339). 
15 - This prophetic ḥadīth which says that: “Ali and I are the fathers of this nation (ummah)” (Nūrī, 1385 
shamsī, p. 316), mentions the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya and the right of walī to have the absolute 
authority over their believers. 
16 - The status of ḥakīm al-ilāhī is shared both by awlīyā and prophets (Nūrī, 1385 shamsī, p. 418). 
17 - In the Library of Majlis, the first one is numbered 2065 and the second is 3958.  
18 - Henry Martyn was “a chaplain to the military of the East India Company, having served as a 
missionary in India from 1806 to 1810 and translated the New Testament into Urdū” (Rizvi, 
forthcoming, p. 18), Hindī, and other local languages of India (Isfandīyār, 1387 shamsī, p. 14). In India, 
he became famous as Pādrī, and it was there when he started controversial disputes with Muslims. He 
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was known for his negative opinions about Iranians (Isfandīyār, 1387 shamsī, p. 15), though at the 
same time, he “turned his attention to a Persian New Testament and visited Iran in 1811” (Rizvi, 
forthcoming, p. 18). He sought to present copies of the Persian translations to Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah and ʿAbbās 
Mīrzā. In Isfahan, Shiraz and Tehran he became involved in disputations with some Sufis and a number 
of ʿulemā, but never found a chance to visit the Shah. For a lengthy analysis of Henry Martyn’s 
adventures in the East, See: Maḥmūd Riḍā Isfandīyār’s introduction to Risālay-i Radd-i Pādrī, Op.cit, 
1387, pp. 4-42.  
Maḥmūd Riḍā Isfandīyār has listed all of the refutations on Martyn’s polemical writing against Islam. 
They were either written by Sufis or ḥakīms such as Nūrī, though the latter apparently does not find 
mystical responses appropriate and convincing. There exist ten refutations on Martyn altogether, 
among them Nūrī’s treatise is famous. In addition to Nūrī, Mīrzā ʿῙsā Khān Qāʾim Maqām Farāhānī 
(Mīrzā Bozorg whose refutation is one of the first responses to Martyn), Mullā Muḥammad Riḍā 
Hamidānī (two risālas), Mīrzā Abul Qāsim Gīlānī known as Mīrzāy-i Qumī, Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī, Sayyīd 
Muḥammad Husseyn ibn Mīr ʿAbdul Bāqī Khātūnābādī, ʿAlī Akbar Izhiʾī Iṣfahānī, Muḥammad Bāqir 
Bihbahānī, Hossein ʿAlī Shāh Iṣfahānī and Muḥammad Mahdī ibn Saʿīd Khalkhālī wrote refutations. 
Martyn’s polemic has also received a response from the head of the Shaykhī School of Kerman, 
Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (d. 1288/1871) entitled Nuṣrat al Dīn (Helping the Faith). Nūrī’s 
controversy with Sufis over their responses to Martyn and his attack on them is an example of 
misunderstanding between the people of sharīʿa and those of ṭarīqa.  
19 - It seems that Sufis elaborated more on the issue of the manifestation of the Prophet to previous 
prophets. For example, the abovementioned Umm u-Salamah Beygum Nayrīzī in her Jāmiʿ al-Kullīyāt 
stresses that this manifestation happens with the mithālī body of the Prophet and is not restricted to 
manifestation in humans, as it also contains a manifestation in the whole cosmos. By his manifestation, 
people and cosmos will return to their Permanent archetypes. See: Nayrīzī, Op.cit, 1368, pp. 59-60 & 63.  
20 - The ḥadīth is narrated by ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī in Biḥār al-Anwār (Oceans of the 
Lights), vol. 26, pp. 1-7.  
21 - Manūchihr Ṣadūghī Suhā, Op.cit, n.d., pp. 161-205, Henry Corbin, History of Islamic Philosophy, 
Op.cit, n.d., pp. 358-362, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Op.cit, 2006, pp. 235-259. More recent works have 
been published such as Sajjad H. Rizvi’s Ḥikma al-Mutaʿālīya in Qajar Iran: Locating the Life and Work 
of Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (d. 1289 H/1873), Iranian Studies, volume 44, number 4, July 2011.  
22 - Dhukāʾī Sāwajī’s bibliography of Sabzivārī’s writings is comprehensive, as contains his published 
and unpublished works both, and in some cases, mentions the published and unpublished volumes of 
the same text. He also names works that are about Sabzivārī’s life and heritage. See: Murtaḍā Dhukāʾī 
Sāwajī, Kitāb Shināsīy-i Hāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (Bibliography of Hāj Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī), Keyhān 
Farhangī, Farvardīn 1372, No. 96, pp. 22-28.  
23 - Sabzivārī commented on a number of classics such as Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq … of Suhrawardī (d. 1191 
H/1777), Shawāriq al-Ilhām (Roaring of Inspiration) of Lāhījī (d. 1071 H/1661), Zubdat al-Uṣūl (Gist of 
Principles) of Shaykh Bahāʾ al-Dīn ʿAmilī (d. 1030 H/1621), Sharḥ Alfīya (the Commentary on One 
Thousand) of ibn Mālik … of Jalāl al-Dīn Suyūtī (d. 910 H/1505), and al-Abḥāth al-Mufīda (the Fruitful 
Discussions) of ʿAllāmah Hillī (d. 725 H/1325)” (Rizvi, 2011, p. 12). He also commented on the 
important writings of Mullā Ṣadrā, such as al-Asfār al-Arbaʿi, al-Mabdaʾ wa-l-Maʿād (Beginning and 
Resurrection), al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbīyya (Divine Witnesses) Mafātīh al-Ghayb, and Asrār al-Āyāt. 
Among Sabzivārī’s commentaries on supplications and literature, one can name Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ 
(Commentary on the Names) Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Ṣabāḥ (Commentary on the Ṣabāḥ Supplications) and 
Sharḥ-i Asrār. He had poetic talent and “composed verse under the pen-name Asrār” (Rizvi, 2011, pp. 
12-15). He taught and trained a large number of students who were all active in disseminating his 
heritage both in Persia and Persianate territories (Suhā, n.d., pp. 161-205). Addressing his 
contributions, he is regarded as “one of the four axial philosophers of the Qajar period who represented 
the major tendencies in philosophical and rational mystical speculation” (Suhā, n.d., p. 22). Although 
Sabzivārī never resided in the capital, but studied with scholars such as Āqā ʿAlī mudarris Zunūzī 
(known as Ḥakīm-i Mudarris, d. 1307 H/1890), Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī (d. 1306 H/1889), and 
Mīrzā Seyyed Abul Ḥassan ibn Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabāʾī Jilvih (d. 1314 H/1896) and therefore, he is 
enlisted as a member of the School of Tehran. The only exception to this is Henry Corbin, who has 
classified him as a member of the School of Sabzivār (Corbin, n.d., pp. 358-362). 
24 - John Cooper in his article on Rūmī and ḥikmat has mentioned the attributes of the Perfect Man. The 
Perfect Man is the Supreme Sign of the Truth and of the Supreme Theophanic Exposition, and he is an 
all mirror and illustration of both types of divine Attributes, the transcendent and the immanent. It is a 
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mirror of harmony, forming the temple of divine Unity. See: John Cooper, Rūmī and Ḥikmat: Towards a 
Reading of Sabziwārī’s Commentary on the Mathnawī, in The Heritage of Ṣūfīsm; Classical Persian 
Ṣūfīsm from its Origins to Rūmī (700-1300), vol. 1, Leonard Lewisohn (Ed), 1999 (Oxford: Oneworld), 
pp. 409-433.  
25 - This is the second writing of Sabzivārī after Sharḥ al-Asmāʾ and was finished in the Ramadhan of 
1267, and Sabzivārī himself has commented on it. This text is divided into several parts and for each 
part the author gives a detailed explanation of the literary meaning of the sentences, then he describes 
the sentence and finally interprets it. According to each sentence, Sabzivārī discusses philosophical, 
theological and mystical topics (Sabzivārī, 1372 shamsī, pp. 7-9). 
26 - A collection of juridical and mystical themes which has been composed and commented upon by 
Sabzivārī has a poetic style, and is composed of one thousand seven hundred verses, by which the 
author tried to present juridical problems, as well as to explain the ʿirfānī secrets behind them. The text 
should be treated as a juridical book which is divided into parts (called maḥāfil), such as purification, 
prayer, alms, fasting, ḥajj and marriage. In terms of method, he does not use rational argument, but 
rather employs ʿirfānī terminology (Sabzivārī, 1384, pp. 11-13). 
27 - One can trace Qumshiʾī’s intellectual lineage back to the ḥikmat scholars of the post-Safawid era, the 
very dark years of the devastation of the seminaries of Isfahan as a result of the assault of Maḥmūd 
Afghān. His first teacher, Muḥammad Jaʿfar Lāhījī, was the son of Mullā Muḥammad Ṣādiq, who himself 
was the teacher of philosophy in Isfahan and commented on Mashāʿir of Mullā Ṣadrā. His son, 
Muḥammad Jaʿfar, was the student of ḥakīm Mīrzā Abul Qāsim Mudarris Khātūnābādī (d. 1202 
H/1787) and Mullā Miḥrāb Gīlānī (d. 1217 H/1802) (Jalal al-Dīn Humāʾī in Nājī Iṣfahānī, 1378, p. 21). 
Addressing the former, Mīrzā Abul Qāsim was a member of Khātūnābādī clan and they themselves were 
the children of ʿAllāmah Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī. In philosophy, Khātūnābādī was the student of Mullā 
Ismāʿīl Khawjūyī and Shaykh Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī, and in jurisprudence the student of Seyyed 
Baḥr ul-Ulūm.  
The intellectual genealogy of Bīdābādī merits attention as well. Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī (d. 1198 
H/1783), was originally from Gilan and his father’s ancestors went back to Shaykh Zāhid Gīlānī (d. 700 
H/1300). His father moved to Isfahan and settled down in Bidabad, a district in the north west of the 
city of Isfahan, where he got his family name. His son, Āqā Muḥammad was born and studied in Isfahan. 
Along with his fame in rational and scriptural sciences, he was a pious ʿārif and an expert in the Occult 
as well. His intellectual activities as a teacher coincided with the devastation of Isfahan in the aftermath 
of the Afghān assault. He was a reviver of ḥikmat in the seminaries of Isfahan in the eighteenth century, 
and used to teach a number of disciplines such as jurisprudence, ḥikmat, ʿirfān, ethics, and ḥadīth. He 
was the most prominent student of Mullā Ismāʿīl Khawjūyī (d. 1173 H/1759), Mīrzā Muḥammd Taqī 
Almāsī (d. 1159 H/1746) of the Majlisī family and Seyyed Quṭb al-Dīn Nayrīzī Shīrāzī (d. 1173 H/1759). 
For more information about his life and philosophical activities see:  
ʿAlī Karbāsī Zādih Iṣfahānī, Ḥakīm-i Mutaʿallih Bīdābādī; Iḥyāgar-i Ḥikmat-i Shīʿa dar Gharn-i 
Dawāzdahum, 1381 shamsī (Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh Ulūm-i Insānī wa Muṭāliʿāti Farhangī). The second 
teacher of Qumshiʾī was Mīrzā Ḥassan, the son of Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī, and I have discussed Mullā ʿAlī’s life, 
intellectual contribution and lineage in detail earlier in this chapter. Qumshiʾī’s third teacher was Āqā 
Seyyed Raḍī Lārījānī (d. 1270 H/1853), who was a practising Sufi and also observed the Occult, and a 
student of Āqā Muḥammad Bīdābādī, Mullā Muḥammad Jaʿfar Ābādiʾī and Mullā ʿAlī Nūrī (Suhā, Op.cit, 
n.d. pp. 261-264 & Nājī Iṣfahānī, p. 26). 
28 - For a lengthy biography of Qumshiʾī see these sources: 
Manūchihr Ṣadūghī Suhā, Op.cit, n.d., pp. 259-319.  
Ḥāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī, Majmūʿi Ashʿāri Ḥakīm Ṣahbā, Hamrāh ba Zindigīnāmay-i ʿĀrif-i Ilāhī Ḥakīm Āqā 
Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī (the Book of Poetry of Ṣahbā, Along With the Biography of the Ḥakīm Āqā 
Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī), 1378 (Tehran: Kānūn Pazhūhish). 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Op.cit, 2006 (NY, State University of New York Press), pp. 242-246.  
29 - Qaysarī’s book is called Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam.  
30 - Qumshiʾī’s understanding of the office of khilāfa is reminiscent of Jean Bodin’s conceptualization of 
sovereignty as an indivisible, coherent, concept. Jean Bodin (d. 1596), the French jurist and political 
philosopher, is best known for his theory of sovereignty; he was also an influential writer on 
demonology. 
31 - On 21 February 1921, Riḍā Khān entered Tehran with Cossack Brigade, seizing control of the capital 
in the coup d’état, became prime minister in 1302 shamsī/1923 and accessed to the throne in 1304 
shamsī/1925. 
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32 - From now on, I try to give dates of the years in shamsī (solar calendar) as well.  
33 - We have discussed the topic in the previous chapter, 2.2., pp. 20-21.  
34 - Abbas Amanat has evaluated the anti-Bābī and Shaykhī sentiments of the Shīʿa ʿulemā of the mid-
Qajar era as a sign of the further intervention of the Uṣūlī ʿulemā in public affairs, and argued that as a 
result of the generation of concepts such as marjaʿ al-taqlīd, which gave ʿulemā confidence and strength, 
they began encroaching on socio-political affairs. Pertinent to this, is the relative weakness of the Qajars 
that fostered ʿulemā’s further presence in a number of socio-political turmoils such as the four Bābī 
upheavals, the Tobacco Régie protest of 1891, and the Constitutional Revolution of 1907. It is worth 
mentioning that the Uṣūlī jusrists operated with the help of a vast and organized supportive network of 
financial aid, master-student relationship, religious endowments, and private investments (Amanat, 
1390 sh/2011, pp. 291-293). 
35 - Though as it will observed in the following, with the exception of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.  
36 - Such a tendency is remarkable in the works of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī.  
37 - Both Gunābādī’s Wilāyat Nāmih and the website below have discussed his conversion.  
< http://www.majzooban.org/fa/index.php/2016-01-20-18-31-19/6206-2016-01-19-09-34-38 > last 
accessed 3/8/17.  
38 - Needless to remind that this is the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya which has been discussed 
extensively throughout this thesis.  
39 - Chapter four of Wilāyat Nāmih (the Book of wilāya) focuses on the Classes of People (aṣnāf-i 
mardum) and their advantage or disadvantage from wilāya. The first class is children, women and some 
men who are not mentally mature and eligible to benefit from wilāya. Wilāya is not for them and they 
never have accessibility to it. The second class is composed of the majority of people who are imitators 
and followers of their ancestors’ religion. The third class is agnostics who do not believe in any religion, 
and the last one is misguided people who accept their religion as the most perfect one. Gunābādī 
maintains that these four types of people are deprived of benefiting from wilāya (Gunābādī, pp. 62-63).  
40 - For the family and the progenitors of Ṭabāṭabāʾī, see: Hamid Algar, ʿAllāmah Seyyed Muḥammad 
Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī: Philosopher, Exegete and Gnostic, Journal of Islamic Studies 17:3 (2006) pp. 326–
327.  
41 - Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s legacy in teaching, writing and training students is rich and significant, though before 
turning attention to it, it is probably better to take a look at his teachers in Najaf (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1429 
H/2008, pp. 13-42). He started his education in Iraq attending the classes of authorities such as 
Ayatollah Abū Ḥassan Iṣfahānī, Mīrzā ʿAlī Ῑravānī, Ayatullāh Mīrzā ʿAlī Asghar [Malikī], and Muḥammad 
Hossein Gharavī Iṣfahānī Kumpānī (Algār, 2006, p. 328). Then for eight years he was the student of 
Ayatollah Nāʾīnī (d. 1355 shamsī/1936), who taught him complementary studies in jurisprudence. For 
ʿilm-i rijāl (science of narration), he studied with Ayatollah Kūhkamaraʾī and for Islamic Philosophy he 
attended the classes of Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Bādkūbiʾī (d. 1358 H/1939). Sajjad Rizvi evaluates his 
studies in philosophy with Bādkūbiʾī (himself a student of Seyyed Abu-l-Ḥassan Jilvih (d. 1314 H/1896) 
an Avicennan critic of Mullā Ṣadrā), important and determinant. He believes that Bādkūbiʾī “developed 
his logical and analytic skills, and in order to hone them, directed Ṭabāṭabāʾī to study Euclidean 
mathematics with Seyyed Abu-l-Qāsim Khwānsārī” (Rizvi, 2015, p. 11). Rizvi also gives an account of 
the sources Ṭabāṭabāʾī studied with Bādkūbiʾī. See: Rizvi, Op.cit, 2015, pp. 10-11.  
The list of the books that Ṭabāṭabāʾī studied with Bādkūbiʾī shows his basic familiarity with, and later 
proficiency in Ṣadrīan ḥikmat. He also attended the classes of astronomy and mathematics of Seyyed 
Abul Qāsim Khwānsārī. Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s other teachers in Najaf included Shaykh Aḥmad Āshtīyānī, Mīrzā 
ʿAlī Āqā Tabrīzī, Seyyed Muḥammad Ḥujjat, and his cousin Seyyed ʿAlī Qāḍī (Qāzī) Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who had 
a profound impact on him.   
For the significance of Qādhī and the attachment of Ṭabāṭabāʾī to him, see: Hamid Algar, Op.cit, 2006, 
pp. 329 ff.  
He obtained ījāza of teaching and issuing fatwā from seven individuals, including his master Mīrzā-yi 
Nāʾīnī (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, pp. 42-43), and was recognized in Najaf as a mujtahid (Rizvi, 2015, p. 10). Algar 
explains that even though he attained the rank of ijtihad while in Najaf, but “disinclined by 
temperament to extensive social involvement, he never sought to become a marja’ al-taqlid” (Algār, 
2006, p. 329). 
42 - Qādhī himself had promoted a method of exegesis which was called ‘tafsīr al-Qurʾān bi-l-Qurʾān’, 
and “was supposedly the foundation of Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s method in al-Mīzān” (Rizvi, Op.cit, 2015, p. 11), and 
was used by himself to author a commentary on a famous supplication Duʿāʾ al-Simāt (ibid).  
43 - These discussions are mentioned in some sources and are published in:  
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Hādī Khusrushāhī (ed), Risālat-i Tashayuʿ dar Dunyāy-i Imrūz; Guftugūyī Dīgar bā Henry Corbin (the 
Mission of Shīʿīsm in the Contemporary World: Dialogues with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i 
Kitāb). 
Hādī Khusrushāhī (ed), Shīʿa: Majmūʿi Mudhākirāt ba Professor Henry Corbin (Shīʿīsm: the Collected 
Conversations with Henry Corbin), 1387 (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb). 
There is also another version of it, entitled: Muḥammad Amīn Shāhjūyī (ed), Shīʿa: Muṣāḥibāt-i 
ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī bā Henry Corbin (Shīʿa: the Dialogues of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Henry Corbin), 
n.d. (n.p.).  
These discussions were also translated into Arabic: al-Shīʿa: Naṣ al-Ḥawār maʿa Mustashriq Curban, 
translator: Tawfīq Khālid, n.d. (Beirut: Umm al-Qurāʾ Institute). For an analysis of the scholarly 
encounter between these two figures, see: Hamid Algar, Op.cit, 2006, pp. 341-346. 
44 - There is also another biography of him by his student Ayatollah Ḥassan Ḥassanzādih Āmulī which is 
published in: Muḥammad Badīʿ (ed), Maʿnavīyat-i Tashayuʿ be Ḍamīmay-i Chand Maqālay-i Dīgar, 1387 
shamsī (Qum: Tashayuʿ), pp. 13-28.  
45 - These books are published as: 
Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Ṭarīq-i ʿIrfān (the Path to Mysticism), translated into Persian by Ṣādiq 
Ḥassanzādih, introduction by: Ayatollah Ḥassan Ḥassanzādih Āmulī, 4th edition, 1390 shamsī (Qum: 
Ishrāq). 
Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Sulūk-i Nafsānī (Carnal Conduct) translated into Persian by Mīrzā 
Aḥmad Asadī, 1st edition, 1389 shamsī (Qum: Ishrāq). 
Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Wilāyat Nāmih (the Book of Wilāya), translated into Persian by 
Humāyūn Himmatī, 1387 shamsī (Tehran: Rivāyat-i Fatḥ). 
46 - This type of wilāya, as mentioned earlier, is designated to the Prophet and the Imāms who, in this 
position, enjoy a number of qualities such as being aʿrāf, witness, and conveyers of blessing and 
emanation to people, and/or being emanation per se. For more information see:  
Muḥammad Hossein Ṭabāṭabāʾī, Insān az Āghāz tā Anjām (Man from Beginning to the End), translated 
into Persian by Ṣādiq Lārījanī, 1388 shamsī (Qum: Būstān-i Kitāb). This book is originally in Arabic and 
is entitled: Insān wa al-ʿAqīda (Man and Belief), n.d. (Qum: Bāqīyāt).  
47 - He stresses that ‘mukhlaṣ’ should be distinguished from ‘mukhliṣ’, those who are still at the 
beginning of the path, while the former have already abnegated them in Him and reached the status of 
wilāya (Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1390, pp. 209-211). 
48 - The first one is the typology of the theories of government in Shīʿa jurisprudence, and the second 
book is the classification of wilāya. These two are entitled:  
Muhsin Kadivar, Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shīʿa (the Theories of State in the Shīʿa 
Jurisprudence), 3rd edition, 1378 b (Tehran: Nay Publication). 
Muhsin Kadivar, Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī (Divine Government), 3rd edition, 1378 a (Tehran: Nay Publication). 
49 - Once again I should emphasize that Sabzivārī, both is and is not regarded as a member of the School 
of Tehran. He is regarded as a member, because he was a Ṣadrīan ḥakīm, and in fact the most influential 
one, and a figure “who would later become the most important traditional philosopher of the Qajar 
period” (Rizvi, 2011, p. 475). On the other hand, he is not regarded as a member because he did not live 
in the capital. Besides, scholars such as Mullā ʿAbdullāh Zunūzī, the student of Nūrī and the father of 
Āqā ʿAlī Ḥakīm Mudarris Tehrānī, as well as Mīrzā Abu al-Ḥassan Jilvih are not studied here because 
their writings were not relevant to the purpose of this research.  
50 - For a discussion of the School of Isfahan, see Sajjad Rizvi’s entry in Encyclopaedia Iranica, online 
version which is published in 2007. < 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/I%E1%B9%A3fah%C4%81n-school-of-philosophy > last 
accessed 5/5/2017.  
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Chapter Four: Khomeini, Wilāya and the Influence of Ibn ʿArabī 
 
The subject matter of this chapter is the study and critical analysis of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s key texts concerning the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. In line with previous 
chapters, the author seeks to analyze Khomeini’s mystical writings to study his 
conceptions of wilāya as well as his contribution to both Ṣadrīan philosophy and 
Akbarīan mysticism. After all, as will be discussed, Khomeini was a student of the school 
of Mullā Ṣadrā, and the mark of Akbarīan mysticism on his ʿirfān was in large part due 
to the sages of the School of Tehran; among them Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī was 
notable. Parallel to his inspiration from the School of Tehran, Khomeini was largely 
stunned by al-Shaykh al-Akbar’s mysticism - which was the dominant form of ʿirfān in 
Shīʿa Iran - directly and through ibn ʿArabī’s disciples and exponents who had written 
commentaries and glosses on Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam. Therefore, Khomeini’s familiarity with, 
and specialization in, Akbarīan mysticism became possible through two channels: the 
School of Tehran and, ibn ʿArabī’s non-Shīʿa expositors. He not only glossed on Sharaf 
al-Dīn Dāwūd Qayṣarī’s (d. 751 H/1350) commentary on Fuṣūṣ, but also wrote 
commentaries on both Miftāḥ al-Ghayb (the Key of the Unseen) of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī 
(607or 605 H/1207-673 H/1274), and Miṣbāḥ al-Uns bayn al-Maʿqūl wa al-Mashhūd 
(the Lamp of Fondness Betwixt the Sensible and Evident) of Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad 
ibn Ḥamzah al-Finārī (d. 834 H/1430), itself a commentary on Miftāḥ al-Ghayb.  
In the following, a brief introduction to the genealogy of the theory of wilāyat al-
faqīh will be given, and then attention will turn to Khomeini’s glosses on Qayṣarī’s text 
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entitled Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (Glosses on the Commentary on al-Fuṣūṣ 
al-Ḥikam and Miṣbāḥ al-Uns). A study and analysis of the conception of wilāya, 
nubuwwa, and imamate in his mystical text will be done subsequently. And finally, 
Khomeini’s doctrine of the Four Journeys, with regard to its roots in both Ṣadrīan 
philosophy and Akbarīan mysticism, will be studied.  
4.1. Genealogy of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh 
The theory of wilāyat al-faqīh is the official theory of governance and statecraft 
in post-Revolutionary Iran, and it is based on the four epistemological and 
anthropological assumptions of guardianship, divine appointment, jurisdiction and 
absolutism, and defends the unconditional right of just jurists, as the general 
vicegerents of the Hidden Imām, to wield political power over the community of 
believers. The idea of vicegerency along with the notion of marjaʿ and reference to the 
ʿulemā when the Imām is not accessible, appears for the first time in the aḥādīth 
belonging to the fourth century; when the ʿulemā were vested with some of the Imām’s 
authority as his vicegerent in the Shīʿa community. However, the marjaʿ, “as a 
referential model for his followers, is peculiar to the thirteenth/nineteenth century 
Shīʿa community” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 280). 
Kazemi Moussavi has studied the evolution of the notions of taqlīd and mujtahid 
(a scholar who is qualified to perform ijtihād), and has shown how the former “in its 
rudimentary form” can be found in the aḥādīth of the fourth century of Hegira, in its 
technical sense, or following the “the speculative opinion of a mujtahid in the absence 
of a specific legal rule”, appears in the post-Mongol era with the Shīʿa School of Ḥillah, 
which provided new definitions for both taqlīd and ijtihād (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 
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280). He also discusses “the juxtaposition of taqlīd with marjaʿ and the advent of the 
concept of marjaʿīyyat al-taqlīd in Shīʿa juridical thought” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1994, p. 
280), which are regarded as developments of the nineteenth century “during which the 
Uṣūlī structure of the religious hierarchy proposed the obligation of following both the 
legal opinions and rulings of the most learned mujtahid as a referential model” (Kazemi 
Moussavi, 1994, p. 280).1 
From this perspective, there existed two intertwined trends during the 
thirteenth/nineteenth century: the mandate of the office of fiqāhat (also fiqāha, but not 
the authority of a single individual faqīh) over the community of believers as the only 
legitimate heir of the legacy of the Prophet and the Imāms, and the birth of the idea of 
“the monarchy of the Shīʿī king”. Later in the century, the conception of ‘wilāyat-i 
intiṣābī-yi ʿāmma-yi fuqahā’ was engendered (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 12, footnote, no. 3).  
According to this conception, the Prophet and the Imāms are directly appointed 
by God to the office of wilāya to rule over the ummah (community of believers) and to 
execute sharīʿa and the divine laws. On the basis of both transmitted and intellectual 
sources, in the time of the occultation of the Imām, the just jurists are appointed by God 
to exercise authority and guardianship over the community of believers. So, the 
lawgiver is the one who confers wilāya, the just jurists are the awlīyā and the people 
are the ones under the guardianship (Kadivar, 1378b, pp. 80-81). The theory of 
‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi ʿāmma-yi fuqahā’ is the predecessor of the theory of wilāyat al-
faqīh, and it is believed that the Uṣūlī ʿulemā, as general vicegerents, are in charge of 
worldly interests and the daily religious life of believers. Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī and 
Shaykh Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭā are the representatives of this narration of the role and 
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responsibilities of the ʿulemā. According to Kadivar’s classification of Shīʿa political 
thought,2 the theory of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi ʿāmma-yi fuqahā’ should be treated as the 
dominant discourse of the second age (thirteenth/nineteenth century), and it was in 
this time that the idea of the political wilāya of jurists was invented (Kadivar, 1378a, 
pp. 13-14).  
Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī’s formulation that, the Shīʿa jurisprudence which “could 
assume the Imām’s authority in its full sense” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 37), is known 
as ‘wilāyat-i ḥākim’ (the guardianship of ruler). This should be understood in the 
historical and intellectual context of nineteenth century Persia, as well as in the power 
competition between the Qajar court and the Uṣūlī ʿulemā on one hand, and the ʿulemā 
and other tendencies such as Akhbārī School, Shaykhīsm, popular Sufism and Bābīsm 
on the other. In nineteenth century Persia, the authority of the ʿulemā and their learned 
hierarchy were challenged by their Akhbārī, Shaykhī, Sufi and Bābī rivals; as all of them 
proposed several alternative positions, such as walī, quṭb, rukn-i rābiʿ (this doctrine is 
discussed in Chapter Two), and finally bāb, “whose occupancy required an esoteric 
initiation which hardly fit into fiqh” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 105). In terms of their 
uneasy relationship with the Qajars, and despite the fact that the ʿulemā were reluctant 
to give fully fledged legitimacy to the court (Gleave, 2005, pp. 41-71), they also did not 
aim at “furthering the legitimacy of jurisprudents at the expense of weakening the 
ruling government’s power” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 155). Therefore, one can 
conclude that the favorable situation for them was a controlled court, crushed rivals 
and a powerful hierocracy.  
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Given the above, Narāqī’s theory of ‘wilāyat-i intiṣābī-yi ʿāmma-yi fuqahā’ is 
widely regarded as the background of Ayatollah Khomeini’s conceptions of wilāya and 
the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.3 There are, however, a number of differences between 
these two: first, Narāqī believed in general guardianship and Khomeini in an absolute 
one. Second, Narāqī’s theory is not ambitious enough to assume the political authority 
for the vicegerent, while the role of faqīh in Khomeini’s theory is political with his 
authority embracing political affairs as well. This theory, to be more precise, was 
invented to be stretched into political sphere. Third, Narāqī believes in the collective 
office of the vicegerency. Fourth, Narāqī does not take the bold step of his successor in 
interpreting the controversial Qurʾānīc phrase of ‘ulu-l-amr’ (the guardians of the 
cause) as the Shīʿa jurists; though both of them use the same aḥādīth and 
argumentations to prove wilāyat al-faqīh on one hand, and believe in divine and 
immediate legitimacy of the Shīʿī faqīh on the other (Kadivar, 1378b, p. 48).  
Having said this, the present chapter will proceed with a review of the 
intellectual genealogy of Khomeini with particular emphasis on his teachers, his 
education and his writings on mysticism. Khomeini’s ‘interest’ in ʿ irfān, which has so far 
been a topic of interest for many scholars, needs to be defined and clarified: this interest 
was not limited to writing ʿirfānī texts and training interested students. More than that, 
Khomeini lived an ʿirfānī lifestyle and since Shīʿa mysticism after the School of Mullā 
Ṣadrā has been tightly intertwined with philosophy, both mysticism and Ṣadrīan ḥikma 
gave Khomeini a wide and rich perspective about Man, his place and his spiritual 
journeys in this world. It is this “mystical and philosophical outlook” that makes him as 
“perhaps the greatest, or at least the most influential, Muslim political leader of the 
twentieth century” (Knysh, 1992, p. 632). Furthermore, as Ridgeon ascertains, for 
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Khomeini, as for his master Shāhābādī, ʿirfān had significant political implications and 
was a medium to express socio-political discontent (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 215).  
4.2. Khomeini’s Intellectual Background 
Rūḥullāh Khomeini’s (d. 1368 H/1989) interest in writing flourished when he 
was a student. Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar (the Commentary on the Dawn Prayer) which is 
his first work in ʿirfān, was written when he was twenty-seven years old and attending 
the classes of Ayatollah Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāhābādī (d. 1369 H/1950) in Qum,4 
himself an influential teacher and master who had a great impact on the development 
of the young Khomeini’s personality.5 Before finding Shāhābādī, Khomeini had other 
masters in ʿirfān, such as Mīrzā ʿAlī Akbar Mudarris Ḥikamī Yazdī6 who taught him 
Sharḥ-i Manẓūmih (the Commentary on Manẓūmih of Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī).7 After 
death of Yazdī, Khomeini continued his studies in ʿirfān with Mīrzā Javād Āqā Malikī 
Tabrīzī8 who passed away immediately after Yazdī (Moin, 1999, p. 42). Khomeini’s 
presence in Shāhābādī’s classes lasted five or six years.9 Together they would read a 
number of key ʿirfānī texts such as the abovementioned Miftāḥ al-Ghayb (the Key of the 
Unseen) of Qūnawī10, Sharḥ-i Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (the Commentary on Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam) of 
Dāwūd Qayṣarī,11 and Manāzil al-Sāʾirīn (the Abodes of Travelers) by Khāwja ʿAbdullāh 
Anṣārī.12 According to Knysh, he also studied Ṣadrā’s Kitāb al-Asfār al-Arbaʿi (Book of 
Four Journeys) with Shāhābādī (Knysh, 1992, p. 634).  
Even a cursory look at his studies in ʿirfān and the texts he read (all of them key 
mystical and philosophical compositions), shows that from early age Khomeini was 
committed to a serious training in ʿirfān and metaphysics. Ironically, ʿirfān “had always 
been to some extent frowned upon by orthodox Islam, as with its supposition of 
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individual union with God and, in its more extreme form of pantheism, the presence of 
God in all things, it undermined the orthodox concept of divine transcendence” (Martin, 
2007, p. 33), but many clerics like Khomeini and Shāhābādī preferred to start their 
career with it. Mysticism, due to “it’s more purely spiritual manifestation” (Martin, 
2007, p. 33), has always been able to challenge both orthodox Islam and the state. The 
case of Najm al-dīn Kubrā (d. 618/1221) and after him ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah Simnānī of the 
late seventh and the early eighth century (Chapter One, pp. 31-32), are notable 
examples of this regard. For these figures, so for Shāhābādī and his student, ʿirfān was 
not only a matter of self-empowerment, but also social responsibilities. Therefore, ʿ irfān 
was seen “as a means of assuming the hardest responsibilities and duties” (Martin, 
2007, p. 34).  
However, after the Revolution of 1979, Shāhābādī became famous as “the 
Philosopher of Nature” (fīlsūf-i faṭrat) (Shāhābādī, 1386, p. 21). A number of his 
writings including Rashaḥāt al-Biḥār (Trickles from the Oceans) Rashaḥāt al-Maʿārif 
(Trickles of Gnosis) Shadharāt al-Maʿārif (Golden Particles of Gnosis) and Sih Risāla-yi 
Uṣūlī (Three Treatises on Principles of Jurisprudence) have been published, and there 
have been a few books written about him and his contribution to the Shīʿa ʿirfānī and 
kalāmī heritage (Shāhābādī, 1386, p. 23).13 Shāhābādī moved to Tehran, though, 
Khomeini’s interest in ʿirfān and Ṣadrīan philosophy continued and bore fruit in his 
practice of ʿirfān and adopting a Sufi lifestyle (Knysh, 1992, p. 635 & Ridgeon, 2014, 
passim). Finally, Khomeini emerged as an expert in theoretical mysticism14 (Ḥāʾirī, 
1381, p. 58). 
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Another decisive turning point in the intellectual life of Khomeini was his 
acquaintance with Shaykh ʿAbdulkarīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī (known as Ayatollah Muʾassis, d. 
1276 H/1959). He became a student of Ḥāʾirī when he was studying in the ḥawza of 
Arak which was re-established by Ḥāʾirī in 1333 H/1915.15 Ḥāʾirī was followed from 
Arak to Qum by most of his students, including Rūḥullāh Khomeini – then twenty years 
old (Algar, 2002, p. 6). In Qum, Khomeini continued saṭḥ (intermediate level of the 
ḥawzawī schooling)16 with Ayatollah Seyyed ʿAlī Yathribī Kāshānī (d. 1379 H/1959),17 
Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿ Alī Adīb Tehrānī (d. 1369 H/1949),18 and Ayatollah Muḥammad 
Taqī Khwānsārī (d. 1371 H/1951),19 and after five years started khārij with Ayatollah 
Ḥāʾirī. Once he found Ḥāʾirī, Mahdī Ḥāʾirī claims, he did not attend any other scholar’s 
class (Ḥāʾirī, 1381, p. 52).20 After completing three steps of religious education, by the 
early 1930s, Khomeini became a mujtahid.21  
As an expert in theoretical mysticism, he wrote extensively on ʿirfān and 
metaphysics. Along with the aforementioned Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, which will be 
discussed in the following, he wrote other ʿ irfānī texts, such as Ādāb al-Ṣalāt (the Rituals 
of Prayer), Taʿlīqāt ʿalā Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ ul-Uns (the Glosses on the 
Commentary on Fuṣūṣ and the Lamp of Fondness), Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd (the 
Commentary on the Sūrat al-Ḥamd), Tahzīb-i Nafs (Self-Refinement), Jihād-i Akbar (the 
Greater Jihād), Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya (the Lamp of Guidance 
toward Vicegerency and Guardianship), and Chihil Ḥadīth (Forty Ḥadīth).22 Khomeini’s 
entire body of sixty works, can be divided into seven fields: philosophy and mysticism, 
theology, principles of jurisprudence, ethics, commentary on the Qurʾān, literature and 
poetry, and politics and statecraft.23 His conceptions of wilāya and nubuwwa are cited 
both in ʿirfānī texts (comments, glosses and original texts) and juridical books. From 
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among his ʿirfānī writings, Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, Sirr al-Ṣalāt (the Mystery of Prayer), 
Ādāb al-Ṣalāt, Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd, and Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya (the Lamp of Guidance) are 
analyzed here to discuss his arguments for the conceptualization of the perfect man, of 
the office of wilāya and its relation to that of nubuwwa and the doctrine of the Four 
Journeys.  
4.3. Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-Uns 
Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam is the product of Khomeini’s classes with 
his favorite master Shāhābādī in Qum, written in 1355 H/1935, when he was thirty-five 
years old. 24 The book has two sections: first is Khomeini’s glosses on Qayṣarī’s 
commentary on al-Fuṣūṣ, and the second his glosses on al-Finārī’s commentaries on 
Qūnawī’s Miftāḥ al-Ghayb. The fact that he wrote glosses on one of the main products 
of Akbarīan philosophy is itself a witness to his fascination with, and inspiration by, this 
type of philosophy. The book revolves around typical Akbarīan themes: waḥdat al-
wujūd, aʿyān al-thābita (permanent archetypes), two kinds of emanations; fayḍ al-
aqdas and fayḍ al-muqaddas, ḥaḍarāt al-khams (the Fivefold Presences), the doctrine 
of the names and attributes (one of Khomeini’s favourite topics, on which he is an 
expert) and the status of al-insān al-kāmil as the culmination of all names which are 
reflected in al-ism al-jāmiʿ – Allah. In terms of the method, he blends transmitted 
sources (including Shīʿa ḥadīth traditions) with examples of classic Persian poetry, and 
from this perspective he is an heir to the legacy of prominent figures such as Shaykh 
Maḥmūd Shabistarī and the above-mentioned Mullā Hādī Sabzivārī (chapter three, 3.3., 
pp. 25-35).  
 
 
204 
Khomeini asserts his skill and in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of Akbarīan 
mysticism throughout the text, but since the task at hand is the conception of wilāya in 
Khomeini’s writings, particular emphasis is given to his arguments for the status of the 
perfect man and its nexus to the doctrine of divine names and attributes. His arguments 
are classic: insān (Man) is the manifestation of al-ism al-jāmiʿ, umm al-kitāb; itself the 
full theophany of ḥaḍrat-i wāḥidīyya or Divine Essence which stands beyond Man’s 
capacity to grasp. It is called umm al-kitāb because it is both the intermediary of 
creation and destruction (khalq wa al-inʿidām), and since creation and destruction 
occur continually and uninterruptedly, every moment, by means of al-ism al-jāmiʿ, and 
particularly the two names of raḥmān (the Merciful) and qahhār (the Subduer), insān, 
who is the manifestation of this name, lives in a never-ending process of annihilation 
and renewal. From a mystical perspective, Khomeini argues, every creature including 
insān is regarded umm al-kitāb because it encompasses divine commandments such as 
khalq wa al-inʿidām. One of the main sources used by Khomeini in the Taʿlīqah, is Duʿāy-
i Saḥar (upon which he had written his first ʿirfānī commentary), from which he brings 
sentences to sustain his arguments for the status of the names, and their zurwa (lit. 
pinnacle), al-insān al-kāmil.  
The synthesis of ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism with philosophy and Shīʿa theology 
which had started with Mullā Ṣadrā and continued into its fully-fledged Persianization 
in the writings of Iranian sages like Shabistarī and Sabzivārī, now culminates in 
Khomeini’s glosses on these two important texts. He may not have been innovative and 
his arguments look old and even reproduced, but they neither detract from the value of 
his work, nor question his expertise in Akbarīan mysticism. His commentaries on 
Duʿāy-i Saḥar and his symbolic exegesis of ṣalāt, having been conducted from a Shīʿa 
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perspective, are indicative of his immersion into the deep ocean of mysticism that 
provided him with the competencies to look into his Shīʿa tradition from a new 
viewpoint. In the following, and in the study of Khomeini’s conception of wilāya, ibn 
ʿArabī’s influence on his thought will be discussed.  
 
4.4. Walī and the Office of Wilāya in the ʿIrfānī Texts 
As observed, Khomeini’s fascination by the “rationalizing interpretation” of ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings (Knysh, 1992, p. 636) bore fruit in his Taʿlīqah ʿalā Sharḥ al-Fuṣūṣ al-
Ḥikam wa Miṣbāḥ al-Uns. In addition, he was attracted by al-Asfār al-Arbaʿi (the Four 
Journeys) of Ṣadrā, as his first exposition to the Ṣadrīan metaphysics. His ʿirfānī texts 
are written from this perspective and should be treated as an addition to these two 
traditions. Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar which is written in Qum in 1347 H/1928 (Khomeini, 
1388, Introduction) is a summary of “Khomeini’s philosophical studies and spiritual 
labors” (Knysh, 1992, p. 636). The Duʿā upon which this commentary is written is 
famous among Shīʿas and is also known as Mubāhila (lit. to curse or take out mercy from 
someone who engages falsehood or lie). It is believed that it contains divine wisdom 
and meanings, as a spiritual tie between the lover and the Beloved. Khomeini, like his 
predecessors, believed that divine names and attributes bridge the gap between Deity 
and creation, and this is the main reason behind his decision to comment upon Duʿāy-i 
Saḥar, because the Duʿā contains the greatest name (al-ism al-aʿẓam) and the full 
theophany of God in this name.  
Shāhābādī’s presence is clearly observable throughout the text, as Khomeini 
shows his respect and devotion to him and praises him as “the perfect mystic” and “our 
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master” (Khomeini, 1388, pp. 2-3). The other figure who is mentioned occasionally is 
Khomeini’s second teacher in ʿirfān, the abovementioned Mīrzā Javād Āqā Malikī 
Tabrīzī (Khomeini, 1388, p. 21). Khomeini’s concern in this text is to demonstrate “the 
compatibility of the sharīʿa with Irfan”, as well as his debt to ibn ʿArabī and his 
inspiration by the Akbarīan doctrine of the perfect man (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 214). He 
deploys transmitted sources (the Qurʾān and ḥadīth) to develop his argument for the 
status of insān and his identification with God. As Deity encompasses the names of both 
Beauty and Glory (ṣifāt-i jamāl wa jalāl), His khalīfa/perfect man, due to his closeness 
to God, contains antithetical attributes such as luṭf (beneficence) and qahr (wrath) and 
therefore, the office of khilāfa is an all-encompassing one (Khomeini, 1388, pp. 26-27). 
His other major ʿirfānī book is Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya, in 
which Khomeini discusses asmāʾ wa ṣifāt (divine names and attributes) and their nexus 
to the doctrine of khilāfa. It seems that the book was written immediately after Sharḥ 
in 1349 H/1930 when he was only twenty-eight, and therefore, suffers from a number 
of features which are “common to many others early, but not yet mature” texts (Knysh, 
1992, p. 636). In terms of the form and writing, as Knysh maintains, the book lacks a 
“compositional perfection which in Khomeini’s case is the disparity of the parts 
constituting the discourse, an unnecessary repetition of rather trite metaphysical 
propositions, and the absence of a clearly defined approach. The impression of 
immaturity is reinforced by constant references to the Muslim thinkers whose writings 
determined the course of Khomeini's reasoning and his overall attitude toward 
religion” (Knysh, 1992, p. 636 & 648).  
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One of these Muslim thinkers who is often mentioned and his impact on 
Khomeini’s thought is clearly visible is Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī, the ḥakīm of the 
School of Tehran whose ideas are discussed at length in the previous Chapter (3.4., pp. 
41-47). In different places Khomeini praises him and quotes from “his noble words” 
(Khomeini, 1376, pp. 57ff). As Qumshiʾī’s conceptualization of wilāya, khilāfa and 
nubuwwa was noted, he argued in favour of a coherent understanding of the term and 
functions of khilāfa, and that’s why he was compared to the French thinker Jean Bodin 
(Chapter Three, p. 47). Following him, Khomeini, both in the present text and his other 
mystical writings, develops arguments for a coherent, indivisible office of khilāfa whose 
authority cannot be divided among any other sources of authority. To be more precise, 
there are no other sources to claim authority and hegemony over believers; it’s walī on 
one side; who rules on behalf of God, and the cosmos on the other. In a long quotation 
from Qumshiʾī, who is called “our perfect mystic”, Khomeini argues for the role and duty 
of the perfect walī after he returned from his fourth journey to warn people of and 
forbid them from evil-doing (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 87-88). 
Using transmitted sources, mainly ḥadīth Qudsī, Khomeini argues that the 
philosophy behind the appointment of khalīfa/walī by God is His desire to be known 
and loved by people25, and therefore, al-insān al-kāmil is signified to be the locus of all 
divine names and their secrets, and as such, the permanent archetype of him (of al-
insān al-kāmil) has authority over other permanent archetypes. He is the full 
manifestation of al-ism al-aʿẓam (or al-ism al-jāmiʿ, the Greatest Name), and since this 
name encompasses all other names and attributes, the status of khilāfa is total and all-
encompassing (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 29-61).  
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Linked to the doctrine of the permanent archetype(s) (ʿayn/aʿyān al-thābitah), 
are other important notions in Islamic mysticism such as fayḍ (emanation) and its two 
manifestations of fayḍ al-aqdas (the Most Holy Emanation) and fayḍ al-muqaddas (the 
Holy Emanation). One can summarize Khomeini’s theory on the permanent archetype 
and its nexus to two typologies of emanation as follows: it is through fayḍ al-aqdas that 
the permanent archetypes come into existence. In other words, the first sign of creation 
of the permanent archetypes in the presence of divine knowledge happens through fayḍ 
al-aqdas. Whereas, it is by fayḍ al-muqaddas that the permanent archetypes find 
external existence in the real world. The difference between these two types of 
emanation is that the former (the Most Holy Emanation) helps the internal existence of 
the permanent archetypes be possible, while the latter (the Holy Emanation) 
externalizes it (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 68-69). The existence of the permanent archetype 
of the perfect man depends on fayḍ al-aqdas, and that’s why it is the most important of 
all permanent archetypes, because it is externalized and multiplied through fayḍ al-
muqaddas (Khomeini, 1376, p. 70).  
Drawing upon the legacy of the School of Tehran, both through Mullā Ṣadrā and 
his metaphysics and via the abovementioned commentaries on Fuṣūṣ, Khomeini 
develops his argument in the context of the synthesis of wilāya26 and wujūd (ousia), 
both of them modulated (mushakkak) entities. As it is observed in the previous chapter, 
the nexus between wilāya and ousia was one of the main concerns of the philosophers 
of the School of Tehran and the literature was developed out of the commentaries on 
the faṣṣ of Seth (faṣṣ Shaythī) in ibn ʿArabī’s Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam. The faṣṣ discusses “wilāya 
as the expiration of the ‘Breath of the Merciful’ (nafas-i raḥmānī)” (Rizvi, 2005, p. 118). 
It is on this ground that Khomeini articulates his doctrine of the greater vicegerency 
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(Khilāfa). Khilāfat al-kubrā is under the rule of the name of Allah, and since Allah is a 
comprehensive name; encompassing both the names of Beauty and Glory, khilāfat al-
kubrā is all-encompassing too. Khilāfat al-kubrā is identical to the eternal individuality 
of the perfect man, and as such, the relationship between it and other eternal 
individualities is the same as the relationship between the Great Name – Allah, and 
other divine names. 
The reality of wilāya is embedded in the comprehensive status of the 
Muḥammedan Khilāfa (Khilāfat al-Muḥammadīyah) and as such, enjoys a number of 
qualities like closeness, love, wilāyat al-takwīnīya and absolute authority. From this 
perspective, both the status of wilāya and that of khilāfat al-kubrā have the same 
authority and absolute power to act upon the cosmos. Khomeini calls this ‘to command 
and to create’ (inshāʾ al-amr wa al-khalq), referring to the well-known āyah “Be, and it 
is” that occurs several times in the Qurʾān. The Muḥammedan Khilāfa is a double-
faceted status; in the sense that the office of wilāya is bāṭin (inward), while the office of 
nubuwwa is ẓāhir (outward) (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 13-38). The Muḥammedan Khilāfa 
has a status in which all divine realities and hidden names are aggregated (Khomeini, 
1376, p. 51) and is manifested in the office of nubuwwa. In other words, these realities 
and names are hidden as long as nabī does not exist, but once he is appointed by God 
he will make them manifest. Since wilāya is the inward of nubuwwa, walī (here Imām 
Ali and other imāms from the household of the Prophet) is regarded as the 
manifestation of divine secrets (Khomeini, 1376, pp. 53-61).  
Before taking leave of Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya, it is necessary to remember that in this 
text, Khomeini shows his disagreement with Qayṣarī’s interpretation of ibn ʿArabī. 
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However, his arguments and reasoning are nothing but a “slight reformulation of ibn 
ʿArabī’s favorite themes” which had been stated several centuries ago (Knysh, 1992, p. 
643). Khomeini’s other ʿirfānī texts, including Ādāb al-Ṣalāt, Sirr al-Ṣalāt and Tafsīr-i 
Sūray-i Ḥamd focus more on the theory of the perfect man. Ādāb al-Ṣalāt which was 
written in 1361 H/1942 in Qum, contains Khomeini’s ideas on spiritual mysteries of the 
daily prayer. The book has a pair which is Sirr al-Ṣalāt and is written for the elite (those 
who have knowledge of ʿirfān), but Ādāb al-Ṣalāt targets a wider audience among 
ordinary people in order to teach them the spiritual meanings of the daily prayer in 
simple language. The book contains Khomeini’s ʿirfānī anthropology and his 
instructions for the seeker who attempts to reach the station of the perfect walī. He 
makes an argument which is typical of a Ṣadrīan scholar and a jurist: mankind, 
according to his original disposition (fiṭra) is able to be the manifestation of divine 
names and enjoys the right of authority and power to act upon the cosmos. He is 
superior to angels due to his ability and eligibility to learn God’s names and to reach the 
status of the name of Allah, which rules over the eternal individuality of the perfect man 
(Khomeini, 1378, p. 206).  
Referring to the famous Qudsī ḥadīth which concerns the status of the Prophet: 
“I take oath that I created the cosmos because of you”27, Khomeini concludes that the 
creation of the cosmos is a prelude to the creation of the perfect man. When a seeker 
reaches the station of self-annihilation, he becomes walī and therefore wilāya is the 
final step, the last journey, in a seeker’s travel to God (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 262-263). 
At the end of this path, the seeker is able to breach veils and understand whatever has 
been forbidden to be seen before, such as the secret laws of the Day of Judgment (Yawm 
al-Dīn) (Khomeini, 1378, p. 272). Along with the Prophet, Ali is the only one who has 
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reached such a station (Khomeini, 1378, p. 298). To enlarge on this and the four 
journeys, a sālik endeavours to reach the station of wilāya in the following way. 
Addressing the office of nubuwwa and wilāya of the Prophet, Khomeini argues that due 
to the exalted status of the Muḥammedan Reality, the religion of the seal of the prophets 
is the most perfect and the most comprehensive one, and not only encompasses the 
previous religions, but also reveals them in their best manifestations (Khomeini, 1378, 
p. 309). In explaining the office of wilāya, Khomeini uses the verb kashf (to veil) and 
indicates that walī (the Prophet and the imāms) is an individual that, due to his 
closeness to God, can approach all that is exclusively apparent to God, and as such 
participate in divine knowledge. Enjoyment of the right of kashf endows walī with the 
right of absolute authority to act upon the cosmos (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 343ff).  
Sirr al-Ṣalāt which is Khomeini’s sixth book, was published in 1358 H/1939 
(Naqvi, 2015, pp. XIV-XV). Recently, Amjad Shah Naqvi has provided an elegant 
introduction as well as a translation of the book. Naqvi locates the text in the context of 
the intellectual developments of Iran’s early modern period, and rightly believes that it 
should be treated as the outcome of Khomeini’s personal interest in mysticism, ḥikma 
and theology on one hand, and “the end of a venerable set of religious and scholarly 
traditions”, on the other (Naqvi, 2015, p. XX). Sirr al-Ṣalāt is also important as it sheds 
light on the formulation of Khomeini’s political theology through the questioning of 
prayer and “its link to one’s journey within reality towards God” (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXI), 
and demonstrates “his concern with askesis and what Faucault called ‘care for the self’ 
- and ‘technologies of the self’-, as the ways in which humans mediate experience and 
make” (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXI).  
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The text draws on an expansive variety of sources from the Qurʾān and ḥadīth 
compilations, to poetry and theology, ethics and philosophy (Naqvi, 2015, pp. XXII-
XXIII). It is a treatise on the inner meaning and dimension of prayer, particularly 
indebted to two similar works, one by Zayn al-Dīn ibn ʿAlī al-Āmilī known as al-Shahīd 
al-Thānī (the Second Martyr, d. 911 H/1506) and the other by the aforementioned Qāḍī 
Saʿīd Qumī (Naqvi, 2015, p. XXIX). Sirr al-Ṣalāt revolves around wujūd and its degrees, 
and contains Khomeini’s ʿirfānī anthropology which is intimately connected to the 
modulated stages of reading, comprehending and interpreting the Qurʾān. He classifies 
five types of reading (qirāʾa), including the reading of ordinary people (ʿāmmah), the 
reading of the privileged (khāṣṣah), the reading of the people of knowledge (aṣḥāb-i 
maʿrifa), the reading of the people of the heart (aṣḥāb-i ghulūb), and finally of the 
people of wilāya (aṣḥāb-i wilāya). The last one is the most perfect reading and 
designated to awlīyā who have reached the station of unification with God. Each of them 
also has inner stages, though Khomeini does not mention them (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 
80-81).  
The last ʿirfānī text, Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd (the Commentary on the Sūrat al-
Ḥamd) contains similar arguments for the offices of wilāya and nubuwwa, the theory of 
the perfect man, spiritual conduct, and the nexus of divine names and the status of the 
Muḥammedan Reality. The text is composed of four sections, each of them is written at 
a different time. The first part which is a concise exegesis of the sūrat al-Ḥamd, the first 
sūrah of the Qurʾān, was written in 1358 H/1939. The second part could be regarded as 
a more detailed exegesis of the same sūrah and was written three years later in 1942. 
The third part contains Khomeini’s lectures on tafsīr al-Qurʾān which were broadcast 
on Iranian TV in 1980, and the last part is a collection of his remarks about different 
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sūrahs which had been disseminated in his other books and treatises (Khomeini, 1378 
shamsī, p. 3). Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd is an ʿirfānī and ḥikamī exegesis and revolves 
around the importance of divine names and attributes and their relationship to the 
status of insān. He deploys names to explain the problematic of unity and its 
relationship to multiplicity, and this method, as we know, belongs to both the ḥikmat 
and Sufi traditions, and not that of theologians.28  
Addressing the status of al-insān al-kāmil, he is the pivot of the cosmos (a typical 
argument which is guided by using transmitted sources), and His khalīfa on earth and 
turning face toward insān is equivalent to turning face toward Allah, because insān is 
annihilated in Him. Once again, Khomeini uses the names to explain the issue of sin 
which is an important question in Islamic mysticism. Addressing these two questions 
that ‘if insān is khalīfat al-llāh, why does he commit sin?’ and ‘how one can explain him 
being sinful’, Khomeini argues that the secret of insān committing sin is because he 
becomes amused with the multiplicity of the names and his inability to see oneness in 
all names. Paying attention to the multiplicity of the names (kathrat-i asmāʾī) is the Tree 
of Evil (Shajarat al-Munhīya or Khabītha) as opposed to the Tree of Good (Shajarat al-
Ṭayyibah) from which Man has been warned (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 18-27). 
As it is mentioned previously in chapter one (1.4., p. 32), ibn ʿArabī invented the 
doctrine of names and attributes and their relationship to the Essence for the first time 
in the history of Islamic mysticism in order to explain the problematic of badʾ (spring, 
creation in the terminology of the mystics). Dealing with this vital question of ‘how one 
(wāḥid), with regard to the fact that His Essence is unknowable and will remain so, can 
create countless things in the real world’, ibn ʿArabī sought to approach it by the 
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doctrine of unity vs. multiplicity. The theory has been used extensively by his 
successors to describe the gap between deity and people (khalq). All Khomeini’s ʿirfānī 
texts which were examined here are written from this perspective. As observed in the 
discussion of Khomeini’s glosses on Qayṣarī’s commentary on Fuṣūṣ, he deploys the 
doctrine of names and attributes to elucidate the status of Man in the cosmos, and his 
relation to Deity. For Khomeini, it is a doctrine that can also explain the question of sin 
committed by Man, the khalīfat al-llāh: he commits sin because he gets stuck in the 
darkness of multiplicity.  
Khomeini’s fascination with Akbarīan mysticism is more apparent when he tries 
to interpret the word al-raḥmān (the Merciful) in the phrase ‘bism i-llāh-i raḥmān-i 
raḥīm’. Khomeini quotes al-Shaykh al-Akbar in his book al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah (the 
Meccan Revelations) in which he says “the cosmos (al-ʿālam) appears by bism i-llāh-i 
raḥmān-i raḥīm” (Khomeini, 1378, p. 81). Or, quoting Qayṣarī in his commentary on the 
Fuṣūṣ, Khomeini maintains that al-raḥmān is rabb ul-awwal (the Primal Lord) which is 
the station of totality as opposed to the station of particularity which belongs to the 
word al-raḥīm (the Compassionate). Al-raḥīm is nafs-i kullī (the Universal Self) 
(Khomeini, 1378, p. 84). 
In overall assessment of Khomeini’s ʿirfānī wilāya and the status of walī, one can 
say that he does not mention wilāyat al-ʿāmmah which was very prominent in ʿAllāmah 
Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s writings. The importance of this and also its contrast to wilāyat al-khāṣṣah, 
which is Khomeini’s concern, will be emphasized when we discuss Khomeini’s doctrine 
of the Four Journeys, as well as the identification of the individual who finishes the last 
journey. With regard to the centrality of the conception of wilāyat al-khāṣṣah and, the 
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absence of wilāyat al-ʿāmmah in Khomeini’s thought, one can safely conclude that he is 
the faithful disciple of the scholars of the School of Tehran.29 Wilāyat al-ʿāmmah, as it is 
elaborated by Ṭabāṭabāʾī, is innovative and unique; in the sense that he not only 
switched the centre of gravity from wilāyat al-khāṣṣah (the specific wilāya which is 
signified to the elite; the Prophet and the imāms) to wilāyat al-ʿāmmah (the general 
wilāya which is accessible by any believer), but also founded his entire philosophical 
system on this concept. It is no longer wilāyat al-khāṣṣah which is at the heart of his 
philosophy, but the type of guardianship that is signified to every believer through his 
or her deeds and efforts. Besides, wilāya is not a divine gift endowed exclusively to the 
Imāms and the Prophet, but an attainable virtue which is gained by the good deeds of 
believers.  
 
4.5. The Four Journeys 
Khomeini’s discussion of the Four Journeys is a different reformulation of the 
idea of ibn ʿArabī; though the latter’s influence is undeniable. It is called ‘a different 
reformulation’, because, as it was stated in chapter one (1.4., pp. 34), al-Shaykh al-
Akbar only mentions the first two journeys and his conception of them is different from 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s interpretation which became the dominant reading of the Four Journeys 
and influenced later scholars, among them Khomeini (Ḥassan Zādih, 1390, pp. 11-13). 
There are two points here: what Khomeini had inherited from his predecessors was 
through the commentaries of ʿAfīf a-Dīn al-Ṭilmisānī (d. 690 H/1291), ʿAbd al-Razzāq 
Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, d. 736 H/1335), and Sharafadīn Dāwūd Qayṣarī (d. 751 
H/1350). It was these figures who elaborated on ibn ʿArabī’s idea (and not theory) of 
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spiritual journeys and turned it into a coherent doctrine of the Four Journeys of the 
seeker. Mullā Ṣadrā’s reading was perpetuated in his book entitled al-Asfār al-Arbaʿi. 
The second point is that, compared with other themes and concepts, Khomeini’s 
conception of the Four Journeys is brief and scattered through his ʿirfānī texts.  
Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya ila-l-Khilāfa wa-l-Wilāya is one of the main texts containing 
Khomeini’s doctrine of the Four Journeys. The book was written in 1309 shamsī/1349 
H, two years after Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, when Khomeini was twenty-nine years old. 
The political implications of the text, as well as Khomeini’s discussion of the asfār al-
arbaʿi, have been emphasized by scholars like Lloyd Ridgeon who gives a lengthy 
account of Khomeini’s reading of the doctrine and its political consequences (Ridgeon, 
2014, pp. 213-232). Before starting on an analysis of the text, it is worth remembering 
that Miṣbāḥ is the only text in which the asfār is discussed in full and, in this book as in 
Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, Qumshiʾī’s influence in evident. In fact, Khomeini’s conception of 
the Four Journeys is a restatement of Qumshiʾī’s theory. Qumshiʾī is praised as ‘the 
perfect gnostic’ and ‘our great shaykh’. The first journey (min al-khalq ila l-ḥaqq), 
during which three veils of the carnal soul (nafs), intellect (ʿaql) and his spirit (ruḥ) are 
breached, starts from leaving creation/people (allegory of worldly attachments) for the 
delimited Truth (ḥaqq-i muqayyadah). Fanā (self-annihilation) and confession to 
servitude (iqrār bi ʿubūdīyat) are gained at the end of this journey (Khomeini, 1360 
shamsī, pp. 205-206).  
The second journey (fi al-ḥaqq bil ḥaqq), which is a “traveling from the Truth 
towards the Truth by means of the Truth” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 215), becomes possible 
for the traveller because he has reached the status of wilāya as the result of the first 
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journey. The status of wilāya, Khomeini maintains, is an expression of the traveller’s 
fanā in terms of his total dissolution of personal identity (dhāt), attributes (ṣifāt) and 
doings (afʿāl), as well as a journey from delimited Truth to absolute Truth (Khomeini, 
1360 shamsī, p. 206). The third journey (min al-ḥaqq ila l-khalq bil ḥaqq), which is the 
station of total sobriety and traveller’s voyage in divine presences (Khomeini, 1360 
shamsī, p. 206), results in the office of nubuwwa, though the traveller does not enjoy 
the right of lawgiving (tashrīʿ). The fourth journey (fi al-khalq bil ḥaqq), or the journey 
from creation to the creature by the means of the Truth, bares fruit in bringing religion 
and law to the traveller, in informing people of God and of His names and attributes 
(Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 207) and in making “exoteric commands pertaining to the 
body and, esoteric laws pertaining to the heart” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 216).  
Khomeini’s outlook that only the fourteen infallible figures are capable of 
reaching subsistence with God and finishing the fourth journey which is emphasized in 
this text (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, pp. 211-212), is in fact a culmination of the Shīʿa 
interpretation of Akbarīan mysticism and, at the same time, a deviation from the entire 
Sufi tradition which never restricted spiritual conduct to any specific person. One of the 
historical reasons for the attraction of Sufism was its exposure to everybody, from any 
rank, through its emphasis on character building and the hope that every individual can 
reach fanā fi al-llāh and become a walī by austerity and detachment from world. Quoting 
Shāhābādī, another influential figure in his ʿirfān, Khomeini maintains that along with 
the Prophet, Ali was also eligible to bring a new law, but since the Prophet proceeded 
him and brought Islamic sharīʿa, Ali follows his law (Khomeini, 1360 shamsī, p. 212). 
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 The second text in which the doctrine of the Four Journeys is discussed is the 
abovementioned Sharḥ-i Duʿāy-i Saḥar, although Khomeini’s conception of it is brief. 
Shāhābādī’s influence is visible throughout the text, and is Khomeini’s main source 
when he discusses the Four Journeys, Shāhābādī is the main source (Khomeini, 1388, 
footnote, p. 2). Quoting his master and skipping the first two journeys Khomeini 
mentions that at the end of the third journey, it will become possible for the ʿārif to 
recognize what makes people good and helps them to be closer to God. Since the ways 
to reach God are equal to the number of people, the ʿārif will be have to be able to 
distinguish between these paths and recognize which is the right path for every person. 
It is also in this station that the ʿārif /walī can legislate (tashrīʿ). Here again, Khomeini 
clarifies that it is only the first Imām and his sons who have reached this station and are 
able to bring laws, but since Ali is the successor of the Prophet and has come after him, 
he has to follow the Prophet’s sharīʿa and submit to it (Khomeini, 1388, footnote, p. 2).  
 As Khomeini proceeds with the text, he expands on Shāhābādī’s idea and 
discusses the journeys a traveller should make in order to reach self-annihilation and 
subsistence with God. In terms of method, he deploys a vast range of ʿirfānī as well as 
Islamic sources (the Qurʾān and ḥadīth tradition) to explain the Four Journeys, 
although, unlike Miṣbāḥ al-Hidāya, the journeys are not discussed separately and in an 
orderly manner. The last station is ḥaḍrat-i aḥadīyat (the Presence of Divine Unity) in 
which other presences, multiplicities (kathrāt) and concrete determinations 
(taʿayyunāt) are annihilated. It is the status of sobriety or ‘the Absolute Will’ 
(mashīyyat-i muṭlaq) 30, wherein the traveller is able to observe the unity behind the 
multiplicity of names and attributes. Khomeini identifies the individual - the Prophet - 
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who has completed the last journey when Adam “was between water and clay”31 
(Khomeini, 1388, pp. 12-16).  
Khomeini’s discussion of the Four Journeys in Sirr al-Ṣalāt is a dialogue of the 
symbolic value and meaning of daily prayer (ṣalāt) and its importance in the spiritual 
mission of the seeker. The mystery of prayer is to reach God and by breaching the veils 
(kharq-i ḥijāb), the traveller becomes annihilated in Him (Khomeini, 1390, 
Introduction, p. 12). In Sirr al-Ṣalāt, all journeys are mentioned, albeit briefly and, the 
author seeks to connect every journey to one of the rituals of the prayers. For example, 
prostration (sujūd) symbolizes total disappearance (ghayb-i muṭlaq) from the world, 
while tashahhud (lit. to witness or to testify) stands for sobriety (ṣaḥw) when the 
traveller returns to the world after being in the station of ghayb (Unseen). At the end of 
tashahhud, the traveller testifies to the nubuwwa and wilāya of the Prophet and his 
household and finishes the ṣalāt. Salām (lit. peace) which is the last step of ṣalāt 
symbolizes unity vs. multiplicity (or the station of totality) and stands for the last 
journey (min al-khalq il al-khalq) (Khomeini, 1390, p. 114). The present text is the only 
writing of Khomeini in which he raises the possibility for every believer finishing the 
spiritual journeys (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 114-115). In other texts, he restricts the Four 
Journeys to the fourteen illuminated figures. In another text, the afore-mentioned 
Tafsīr-i Sūray-i Ḥamd, he briefly mentions the Four Journeys without elaborating on 
them, and maintains that the Perfect Man, who is ‘the Most Beautiful Name’ (asmāʾ ul-
ḥusnā) and ‘the Greatest Name’ (ism-i aʿẓam), is able to reach the last stage or tawḥīd 
which is subsistence (baqā) with God (Khomeini, 1378, p. 19).  
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Ādāb al-Ṣalāt is the last text in which Khomeini discusses the doctrine of the Four 
Journeys. He distinguishes between two groups of seekers, both of whom have carried 
out the journey to God (safar-i ila l-llāh), although the first group never returns to the 
world and to people because it dies after finishing the journey. Transmitting the famous 
ḥadīth al-qudsī that: “My friends are hidden under my mantle (qibāb, ḥijāb), no one 
knows them except for Me” (Introduction, pp. 3-4), Khomeini argues that the first group 
will remain hidden under God forever. The second group includes those who return to 
the world in order to guide people on the righteous path and to restore cities (takmīl-i 
ʿibād wa taʿmīr-i bilād) (Khomeini, 1378, pp. 347-348). This phrase has caused 
commentators such as Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād, to interpret it as Khomeini’s intention 
(as a political ʿārif) of rising against the status quo to establish an Islamic government 
(Muḥaqiq Dāmād, n.d., p. 2)32. Khomeini, however, does not elaborate further on this 
idea to provide his reader with a more accurate understanding of what he means by 
this phrase. In addition, there is no convincing evidence to prove that Khomeini 
referred to himself as the walī who, after returning to creature from God, wants to guide 
people on the righteous path.  
Likewise, there exists no direct indication of “restoring cities” being stated in any 
other source. It seems that the lens through which Muḥaqiq Dāmād and others are 
reading this phrase, as well as Khomeini’s intention of having political ambitions to 
stand for government, is an a posteriori one based on subsequent socio-political 
developments in the Iranian milieu after the Revolution of 1979. Another example is 
Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥijāzī (d. 1386 shamsī/2007), whose flattering statements at the dawn of 
the Revolution, and in Khomeini’s presence, have been renowned for years. He goes far 
beyond Muḥaqiq Dāmād’s scholastic reading and asks for a global, just government by 
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Khomeini. Verbalizing what many others had in mind but dared not say, Ḥijāzī calls 
Khomeini “the Suleymān of the time and Dāwūd of the Age”, and asked him to rise up 
to establish a global kingdom and to administer justice all over the world. Khomeini 
responded to Ḥijāzī by saying that: “I fear that if I believe Mr. Ḥijāzī’s statements about 
myself, they may result in bringing arrogance and personal decline (inḥiṭāṭ) to me. I 
shall take refuge in Almighty God”33. Khomeini’s reaction shows that he obviously did 
not imagine any role and/or responsibility for himself other than rising up against the 
Shah, of course more as a faqīh than as an ʿārif, and establishing an Islamic 
government.34 
To sum up Khomeini’s theory on the asfār, there are two points here: there exists 
no connection between having a Sufi, or perhaps it is better to say, a spiritual lifestyle 
on one hand and being an insān al-kāmil on the other. The first one does not necessarily 
result in the second. Khomeini had followed a spiritual path all his life.35 His interest in 
ʿirfān was not limited to reading mystical texts or having a mystical training, but rather 
to declaring that being an insān al-kāmil is not easy to prove. Secondly, Knysh’s analysis 
that “very probably Khomeini’s four-stage venture is simply a further particularization 
of ibn Arabi’s vision of an exemplar human destiny and self-fulfillment” (Knysh, 1992, 
p. 647), does not seem plausible; because ibn ʿArabī himself is brief about the Four 
Journeys and only mentions the first two, and Khomeini’s outlook, compared with his 
other ideas such as wilāya, nubuwwa, the Perfect Man and, most importantly, the 
doctrine of names and attributes, is short. As for the identity of the individual who 
completes the journeys, in all his texts examined here, with the exception of Sirr al-
Ṣalāt, Khomeini leaves no doubt that only the awlīyā (the Prophet and the Imāms) have 
been able to complete this spiritual venture.  
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4.6. Conclusion 
There are some lessons from this survey of Khomeini’s mysticism and its roots 
in the Akbarīan tradition. First and foremost, ibn ʿArabī and his apparatus had gained a 
Shīʿa aura by the time of Khomeini, and the process of adjusting ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism 
to the Shīʿa creeds, had in fact started with figures such as ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, 
Seyyed Ḥaydar Āmulī, ʿAlāʾ al-Dawlah Simnānī, and continued with Shaykh Maḥmūd 
Shabistarī as well as Shīʿa ʿirfānī orders (Chapter One, 1.4., pp. 31-35). During the 
Safawid period, as it was observed, the role of Mullā Ṣadrā and his students, particularly 
Qumshiʾī, in the process of making the Akbarīan School Shīʿa, was undeniable. The 
ʿirfānī conception of wilāya (and other related concepts), however, remained 
immutable and unchanged, and it is from this perspective that Knysh evaluates 
Khomeini’s ʿirfānī writings as “timeless, in so far as they could have been written three, 
four, or five centuries ago” (Knysh, 1992, p. 649).  
With regard to the forms and content, there is no major difference between his 
writings and the writings of the ḥakīms of the Schools of Tehran and Qum, with the only 
exception of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who, as it was observed in the previous chapter 
(3.6.1., pp. 57-63), switched the centre of gravity from wilāyat al-khāṣṣah to wilāyat al-
ʿāmmah. Another development which had started with ibn ʿArabī and had been firmly 
established by the time of Khomeini, was the analogy between the humane and the 
divine, having been crystalized in the theory of the perfect man. The personality of the 
perfect man is the consummation of the divine plan, “combining in himself both the 
traits of God, and the features of the engendered universe, [by which] he rises to such a 
preeminence that he becomes invested with divine ‘deputyship’ (nayāba) and 
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vicegerency” (Knysh, 1992, p. 649). As it will be discussed in the next chapter, divine 
deputyship, here through the channel of the Hidden Imām, will play an important role 
in Khomeini’s juridical theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.  
 Perhaps as important as ibn ʿArabī’s influence on Khomeini’s mysticism, is the 
reconciliation of the two sources of authority (mysticism and jurisprudence) in his 
thought and personality, each representing a distinct form of authority, although 
reinforcing each other in different ways.36 The former emphasizes qualities such as 
purity of the heart of the leader, piety and devotion; while the latter is an expression of 
the qualities of justice, knowledge, and wisdom. How did our scholar reconcile these 
two, when jurisprudence carried a heavier weight and influence than mysticism? One 
can look for the answer in Khomeini’s charismatic personality, the socio-political 
circumstances of Iran in 1960s and 1970s, and developments in Shīʿa jurisprudence 
which had begun in the early nineteenth century. At the same time, mysticism had not 
undergone significant changes, particularly in terms of the theory of wilāya. Before 
reading Khomeini’s juridical texts and contextualizing them, both intellectually and 
from a socio-political perspective, one cannot reach a final answer to these questions, 
and that’s what the author will do in the next chapter.  
 However, before turning our attention to juridical wilāya in Khomeini’s writings, 
it is worth remembering the research questions propounded in the Introduction (B. p. 
13). With respect to these questions, in this chapter, the author sought to study how 
wilāya has been conceptualized in Khomeini’s ʿirfānī texts and how his inspiration by 
Akbarīan mysticism influenced his outlook. It was questioned whether wilāya had 
undergone any changes during the eighteenth to the twentieth century, and whether its 
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conception in the writing of our scholar - who stands at the end of this timeline - 
displays any difference from those of his predecessors. His arguments and the method 
he deploys, as discussed above, look ageless. Pertinent to this, is his gloss on a number 
of original ʿ irfānī texts that can be ranked as genuine additions to the exiting scholarship 
on Akbarīan mysticism, though at the same time, remain classic and typical.  
1 - Moussavi has discussed taqlīd, ijtihād, marjaʿ, as well as the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in other 
articles/books as well. See: 
A New Interpretation of the Theory of Vilayat-i Faqīh, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.28, No.1, January 
1992, pp. 101-107.  
The Establishment of the Position of Marjaʿīyyt-i Taqlīd in the Twelver-Shi'i Community, Iranian 
Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Winter 1985, pp. 35-51.  
Religious Authority in Shīʿa Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of Marjaʿ, 1996 
(International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization: Kuala Lumpur).  
And two more sources that have discussed the topic in length:  
Todd Lawson (ed), The Attitude of the Ulama towards the Government in Nineteenth-Century Iran, in 
Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought (Essays in 
Honour of Hermann Landolt), 2005 (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers & the Institute of 
Ismaili Studies), pp. 522-536.  
Abbas Amanat’s article entitled, From Ijtihād to Wilāyat-i Faqīh: The Evolving of the Shi’ite Legal 
Authority to Political Power, Logos, 2.3, Summer 2003, discusses the subject in detail.  
2 - Along with Kadivar’s classification of the Shīʿa political thought which is used here, Ahmad Kazemi 
Moussavi in his book entitled Religious Authority in Shīʿa Islam: From the Office of Mufti to the 
Institution of Marjaʿ, has also classified the stages of the development of the Shīʿa jurisprudence, but the 
emphasis is on jurisprudence and not the Shīʿa political thought, though the former can include the 
latter as well. See: 
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Op.cit, 1996, Chapter 1, pp. 7-44. 
3 - There is a number of scholars who regard Narāqī as the forerunner. For example:  
Mashaallah Ajudani, Mashrūṭa-yi Ῑrānī, 1997 (London: Faṣl-i Kitāb).  
Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, Op.cit, 1996. 
Said Amir Arjomand, III: Shīʿīsm in History; the Pahlavi Era, in Expectation of the Millennium, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (eds), 1989 (New York: State University of 
New York Press), p. 231. 
Hamid Dabashi, Op.cit, 1993, pp. 11-12.  
In addition to these scholars, Muhsin Kadivar in his books, and particularly in Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī (Divine 
Government) and Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shīʿa (The Theories of the Statecraft in Shīʿa 
Jurisprudence) traces the intellectual genealogy of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh back to the 
developments of the nineteenth century, and indirectly points to Narāqī as a pioneer figure. 
4 - Shāhābādī was the son of Shaykh Muḥammad Javād Bīdābādī from Bīdābād, Isfahan; though he is 
famous as Shāhābādī due to his residence in Shāhābād, a city district of Tehran which is now famous as 
Jumhūrī Eslāmī Avenue.  
5 - Shāhābādī’s political and mystical influence on Khomeini are mentioned in a number of sources. See:  
Baqer Moin, Khomeini: the Life of the Ayatollah, 1999 (I.B. Tauris Publishers: London & NY), pp. 43-44. 
Asghar Seyed-Gohrab, Khomeini the Poet Mystic, Die Welt des Islams 51 (2011) 438-458, p. 441.  
Alexander Knysh, “Irfan” Revisited: Khomeini and the Legacy of Islamic Mystical Philosophy, Middle 
East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Autumn, 1992), p. 633.  
Idris Samawi Hamid, Al-Qurʾān wa al-ʿItrah: a Treatise from the Rashaḥāt al-Biḥār of Mīrzā Muḥammad 
ʿAlī Shāhābādī, International Journal of Shiʿi Studies 2(1), 2003, 121-158. 
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6 - Alexander Knysh mentions “Mīrzā ʿAlī Akbar Ḥakīm” which is obviously not correct (Knysh, Opcit, 
1992, p. 633). 
7 - Āqā Mīrzā ʿAlī Akbar Mudarris Ḥikamī Yazdī (d. 1344 H /1925) was the master of ḥikmat and ʿirfān 
of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. He was the student of Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān Qashqāʾī and Āqā 
Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī, both the renowned ḥakīms of the School of Tehran. It seems that Yazdī was 
one of the key figures who attached Khomeini to the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā via the mediation of the 
School of Tehran. According to the brief note of Khomeini in the introduction of Yazdī’s book entitled 
Rasāʾil al-Ḥikamīya (the Theosophical Treatises) during the years of studentship in Qum, both he and 
other young students were very content with the coming of Yazdī to Qum and teaching philosophy and 
ʿirfān there (ʿulūm-i bāṭinī in his words), because at the same time Shaykh ʿAbdulkarīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī 
taught uṣūl and jurisprudence (ulūm-i ẓāhirī) and therefore the students had the opportunity to learn 
both the ẓāhirī and bāṭinī sciences at the same time (Ḥikamī Yazdī, 1372 shamsī, p. 13). Before the Qum 
years, when Ḥikamī Yazdī was living in Tehran and taught at Madrasay-i Shaykh ʿAbdul Hossein, figures 
such as Hossein Qumī Ṭabāṭabāʾī and Ḥāj Mīrzā Aḥmad Āshtīyānī attended his circle (Ḥikamī Yazdī, 
ibid, p. 17). Yazdī’s book is published in Tehran in 1372 shamsī by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance (Wizārat-i Farhang wa Irshād-i Islāmī).  
8 - Mīrzā Javād Āqā Malikī Tabrīzī was born in Tabriz and when he was young moved to Najaf to study 
in the ḥawza. He studied jurisprudence with Ayatollah Ḥāj Āqā Riḍā Hamidānī, uṣūl with Mullā 
Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī and ʿirfān and ethics with Mullā Hossein qulī Hamidānī. After returning 
home from Najaf, he moved from Tabriz to Qum to assist Shaykh Ḥāʾirī Yazdī to establish the ḥawza of 
Qum. He died in 1343 H/1924 and buried in the Shaykhān cemetery in Qum. Malikī Tabrīzī, 1372, pp. 3-
4. His book entitled Asrār al-Ṣalāt (the Mysteries of Prayer) is published in Tehran in 1372 by Payām-i 
Āzādī publication.  
9 - According to Moin, seven years. See: Baqer Moin, Op.cit, 1999, p. 43. 
10 - In Moin’s book, it is Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb (the Keys of Unseen) which is not plausible. Khomeini read 
Miftāḥ al-Ghayb of Qūnawī and wrote a commentary on it which is known as Miftāḥ al-Ghayb wa 
Miṣbāḥ al-Uns (the Key of Unseen and the Lamp of Fondness). For more elucidation on the particular 
commentary and his impact on Khomeini (Knysh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 635). 
11 - Knysh believes that this work, together with the commentary on the Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam (the Bezels of 
Wisdom) written by Qayṣarī’s teacher, ʿAbd al-Razzāq Kāshānī, “are probably the most influential and 
widely read elucidations of ibn ʿArabī’s masterpiece” which had “a profound and lasting effect on 
Khomeini’s outlook in general and his metaphysical views in particular” (Knysh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 635). 
12 - In this book, which in fact is an ʿirfānī exegesis of the Qurʾān, Khawja relates Qurʾānīc themes and 
concepts with one of the spiritual stations in ʿirfān. The point is to show that the Path (ṭarīqa) and the 
laws (sharīʿa) are identical. For more information see: 
Mahdī Mutīʿ and others, Jilvihāy-i Tafsīr-i ʿIrfānī-yi Qurʾān dar Bāb-i Akhlāq-i Manāzil al-Sāʾirīn (the 
Dimentions of the Mystical Exegesis of the Qurʾān on the Ethics of the Abodes of Travelers), the Journal 
of Tafsīr wa Zabān-i Qurʾān, No. 1, Fall and Winter 1391, pp. 99-114. 
13 - Shāhābādī started his education with his father Shaykh Muḥammad Javād Bīdābādī, himself a 
student of Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥassan Najafī (d. 1228 H/1813) known as Sāḥib al-Jawāhir and Shaykh 
Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1281 H/1864). In 1320 Hegira, Shāhābādī moved to Najaf and stayed there for 
seven years, where he studied with Ākhund Mullā Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī (d. 1329 H/1911), 
Shaykh Fatḥullāh Sharīʿat (known as Shaykh ul-Sharīʿa), and Ayatollah Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan 
Khalīlī. After the death of Khurāsānī, Shāhābādī moved to Samarra and attended the classes of Mīrzā 
Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī (d. 1338 H/1919) who granted Shāhābādī the ījāza of teaching and issuing 
fatwā. Along with Shīrāzī, nine more mujtahids issued Shāhābādī the ījāza, including the 
abovementioned Shaykh ul-Sharīʿa, Seyyed Ismāʿīl Ṣadr and Mīrzā Khalīl Tehrānī (Shāhābādī, 1386, pp. 
31-33). Before turning his attention to Shāhābādī, Khomeini had another teacher in ʿirfān and ḥikma, 
and unlike Knysh’s opinion, he learned Asfār al-Arbaʿi with Seyyed Abu al-Ḥassan Rafīʿī Qazvīnī (d. 
1354 shamsī/1976) in Qum, himself a student of ʿAbdulkarīm Ḥāʾirī Yazdī. See: 
<http://fa.wikishia.net/view/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D
9%84%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86_%D8%B1%D9%81%DB%8C%D8%B9%DB%8C_%D9%82%D8%
B2%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C > last accessed 2/17/17. 
14 - Murtiḍā Muṭaharī in his ʿUlūm-i Islāmī (Islamic Sciences, two volumes) has elaborated on the 
theoretical mysticism and practical mysticism – ʿirfān-i naẓarī wa ʿamalī, respectively. In volume two of 
the present book, Muṭaharī explains that the practical mysticism refers to spiritual conduct (sulūk), and 
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the way masters initiate young novice in order to help him to access the station of unity with God. So, 
ʿīrfān-i ʿamalī talks about a process which ends in self-annihilation or subsistence - baqā - with God. On 
the other hand, ʿirfān-i naẓarī is about the explanation or interpretation of existence (wujūd/hastī) and 
elaborates on the elements of the existence such as God, the cosmos and Man. See:  
Murtiḍā Muṭaharī, ʿUlūm-i Islāmī (Islamic Knowledge,), vol. 2 (Kalām, ʿIrfān, Ḥikmat-i ʿAmalī), 6th 
edition, 1368 (Tehran: Ṣadrā Publication), pp. 81-96. 
15 - Ḥāʾirī himself was the student of Mīrzā Muḥammad Ḥassan Shīrāzī (known as Mīrzāy-i Shīrāzī and 
Mīrzāy-i Mujaddid, d. 1194 H/1814) and other principle teachers, such as Mīrzā Ibrāhīm Maḥallātī, 
Shaykh Faḍlullāh Nūrī, Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Shīrāzī, and Seyyed Muḥammad Fishārakī Iṣfahāni, all of 
them Mīrzā Ḥassan Shīrāzī’s associates (Algar, 2002, p. 3). On the death of his mentor, Ḥāʾirī left 
Samarra for Najaf to study under the celebrated Ākhund Khurāsānī. After returning to Iran, he resided 
in Arak for some eight years (Algar, 2002, p. 4) and then moved to Qum to establish the ḥawza of that 
city (Algar, 2002, p. 6). Algar believes that it was the “matchless” efforts of Ḥāʾirī which turned Qum to 
an elevated city as a “position of centrality in the religious life of Persia, almost if not fully competitive 
with the shrine cities of Iraq” (Algar, 2002, p. 6). There is also another account for Ḥāʾirī’s studies and 
administration. See:  
Muḥsin al-Amīn, Aʿyān al-Shīʿa (the Shīʿa Figures), VIII, 1403 H/1983 (Beirut: Dār ul-Taʿāruf lil 
Maṭbūʿāt), p. 42.  
16 - A young student of ḥawza has three levels to go through to become a mujtahid or a faqīh. These are 
as follows: 
Muqaddamāt (Introductory Level), saṭḥ (Intermediate Level), and khārij (Advanced Level). It would 
normally take seven years to complete muqaddamāt, which consists the following books: Jāmiʿul 
Muqaddamāt (the Comprehensive of Introductions, fourteen small volumes in Persian and Arabic) 
includes Arabic grammar, syntax, logic, method of reading and exercises in conjugation are taught. The 
objective of the course is to teach introductory Arabic syntax to the student and to prepare him for 
learning the subsequent courses. Along with that, students study Suyūṭī which is mostly on syntax. 
Ḥāshīyah (Gloss) on basic logic and the new book used in the field is al-Manṭiq (The Logic). There is 
also Muṭawwal (Detailed, or a summary of it) which teaches rhetoric and speech. The new books used 
for the course are Balāghat (Eloquence) or Jawāhir ul-Balāgha (the Jewelry of Balāgha). After 
Muqaddamāt students are promoted to saṭḥ and are taught theology and jurisprudence. It takes eight 
years to finish this level. Sources such as Maʿālim ul-Uṣūl (Guides of Principles), Qawānīn (Laws) by 
Mīrzāy-i Qumī on theology, Lūmʿah (Spangle) by Shahīd Thānī, al-Makāsib (Transactions) by Shaykh 
Murtiḍā Anṣārī, Rasāʾil (Treatises), Kifāyat ul-Uṣūl (Adequacy of Principles) by Mullā Muḥammad 
Kāẓim Khurāsānī, Manẓūma and Ishārat (Indications) both on philosophy and mysticism, Bidāyat ul-
Ḥikma (Beginning of Wisdom) and Nihāyat ul-Ḥikma (Extremity of Wisdom) on philosophy, Asfār 
(Four Journeys) of Mullā Ṣadrā, Sharḥ-i Tajrīd (Commentary on Tajrīd) and Maqāmāt-i Ḥāʾirī (Stations 
of Ḥāʾirī) and Maqāmāt-i Hamidānī (Stations of Hamidānī) on Arabic literature. After mastering these 
two levels, students start khārij with the object of becoming marjaʿi taqlīd. In the advanced level, other 
courses are also taught including: Rijāl, Dirāya, history of Islam, ethics, interpretations and astronomy.  
< http://www.islam-laws.com/howzasystem.htm > last accessed 2/17/17.  
For a socio-anthropological study of the ḥawza of Qum in pre-revolutionary Iran, see:  Michael M. J. 
Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 2nd edition, 1980 (Cambridge & London: Harvard 
University Press), pp. 31-42 & 77-86. And for the levels of studying and curriculum of the ḥawza of 
Najaf in the early twentieth century, see: 
Chibli Mallat, the Renewal of Islamic Law; Muhammad Baqer Sadr, Najaf and the Shi’i International, 
1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 39-50.  
17 - Born in Samarra, studied in Kashan and Najaf, he moved to Qum in 1341 H/1922, and when he was 
studying with Ḥāʾirī, founded an independent ḥawza for himself. Along with Khomeini, his other 
students were Ayatollah Marʿashī Najafī and Ayatollah Dāmād. He finally re-settled in Kashan and is 
buried there.  
< http://www.tebyan.net/newindex.aspx?pid=37928 > last accessed 2/17/17. 
18 - Moin brings in Adīb Khurāsānī which is not plausible. It is Ayatollah Āqā Mīrzā Muḥammad ʿAlī Adīb 
Tehrānī, who was born in Tehran and studied under Shaykh ʿAbdulhusseyn Rashtī. Both in Arak and 
Qum, Adīb Tehrānī attended the classes of Ḥāʾirī and after leaving Qum and settling in Tehran, taught 
uṣūl and jurisprudence there. He was famous in literature.  
< http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Book/View/45232/17329/8-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%AA-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A2%D9%82%D8%A7-
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%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7-
%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-
%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%A8-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C > 
last accessed 2/17/17.  
19 - Born in Khwansar, he moved to Najaf to continue his studies with Ākhund Khurāsānī and Seyyed 
Muḥammad Kāẓim Ṭabāṭabāʾī Yazdī (1248-1337 H). After their deaths, he started learning uṣūl with 
Ayatollah Muḥammad Hossein Nāʾīnī (1276 H/1861-1355 H/1936). He had the ījāza of fatwā and 
transmission of ḥadīth from Ayatollah Zīyā ʿArāqī. After returning to Iran, he resided in Qum and 
started teaching and training students in the ḥawza. When Ḥāʾirī died, along with Ayatollahs Ḥujjat and 
Ṣadr, he played an important role under their tripartite leadership to protect the ḥawza from 
governmental threat.  
< http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Mostabser/View/3200 > last accessed 2/17/17.  
20 - I had access to the book through this website: 
< http://honarvarnet.blogspot.com/2010/07/1_22.html > last accessed 2/17/17.  
21 - See also Baqer Moin, Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi, in the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic 
World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, < 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0457 > last accessed 2/17/17 
22 - The lengthy list of his ʿirfānī books is available in: <  
http://www.noorlib.ir/View/fa/CreatorList?SearchText=%D8%AE%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB
%8C%D8%8C%20%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%20(%20
%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A8
%20%D9%88%20%D8%A8%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%20%DA%AF%D8%B0%D8%A7
%D8%B1%20%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%20%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9
%84%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%20%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86)&SearchKind=
Creator  > last accessed 2/17/17.  
23 - < http://en.imam-khomeini.ir/en/n3120/Biography/Immigration_to_Qom > last accessed 
2/17/17.  
24 - Vanessa Martin has discussed the subject in details. See:  
Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, 2007 (New York: I. 
B. Tauris), pp. 34-45.  
25 - The actual ḥadīth reference is: “I was a hidden treasure, I loved to be known, therefore I created 
people in order to be known”. The ḥadīth is not transmitted by any Shīʿa ḥadīth compilation, and in 
Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisī’s Biḥār al-Anwār (the Oceans of Lights) is mentioned as khabar-i wāḥid (a 
ḥadīth which is transmitted only by one transmitter and it lacks a chain of transmitters), indicating its 
unreliability; though it is a famous ḥadīth in Sufi literature and has always been used by Sufis. See: 
< http://www.islamquest.net/fa/archive/question/fa8094 > last accessed 2/20/17. 
26 - For an adequate explanation of the Perfect Man in Khomeini’s writings and its nexus to imamate, 
see: Furūgh al-Sādāt Raḥīm Pūr (ed), Imamate wa Insān-i Kāmil az Dīdgāh-i Imām Khomeini (Imamate 
and the Perfect Man in Imām Khomeini’s Thought), 3rd edition, 1387 (Tehran: Muʾasasay-i Tanẓīm wa 
Nashr-i Āthār-i Imām). 
27 - For the ḥadīth and its Shīʿa background, see: < 
http://fa.wikishia.net/view/%D8%AD%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AB_%D9%84%D9%88%D9%84%D8
%A7%DA%A9 >, last accessed 2/20/17. 
28 - Knysh maintains that Khomeini has hardly had sympathy with “Muslim speculative theologians”, as 
he mostly took sides with Sufis and sages (Knysh, Op.cit, 1992, p. 641). 
29 - His closeness to, and inspiration by, Qumshiʾī is already mentioned.  
30 - The Absolute Will is also called ‘the Holy Emanation’ (fayḍ al-muqaddas), ‘the All-encompassing 
Mercy’ (raḥmat-i wāsiʿa), ‘the Greatest Name’ (ism-i aʿẓam) and ‘the Absolute Muḥammedan wilāya’ or 
‘maqām-i ʿalawī’ or ‘quṭbīyat’ (Khomeini, 1388, p. 16). 
31 - Referring to the famous ḥadīth that “I was prophet when Adam was between water and clay”. 
Khomeini transmits the ḥadīth from Asrār ul-Sharīʿa wa Aṭwār ul-Ṭarīqa wa Anwār ul-Ḥaqīqa (the 
Secrets of Sharīʿa, the Alterations of the Path and the Lights of the Reality), pp. 46 & 92 in Khomeini, 
1388, p. 16.  
32 - I am grateful to the author, Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād who supplied me with a copy of his 
unpublished article years ago when I was still in Tehran. The article entitled wilāyat-i Insān-i Kāmil az 
Didgāh-i Imām Khomeini (the Guardianship of the Perfect Man in Imām Khomeini’s Thought) and a 
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copy of it entitled ʿIrfān wa Shahrīyārī (Mysticism and Kingdom) is published in Dīn, Falsafa, Qānūn 
(Religion, Philosophy, Laws), Muṣṭafā Muḥaqiq Dāmād, 1378 (Tehran: Sukhan publication), pp. 125-
141.  
33 - Fakhr al-Dīn Ḥijāzī’s statements and Khomeini’s reaction are to be found in this one-minute youtube 
< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66DRInZGH7I >, last accessed 5/10/17.  
34 - Ridgeon in his article, Hidden Khomeini points to his email correspondences with Hamid Algar, in 
which the latter supports the same perspective: “the assertion that Imam Khomeini believed that he 
had completed the four journeys and therefore, attained the status of insan-i kamil is, I think, 
unwarranted”. See: 
Lloyd Ridgeon, Hidden Khomeini: Mysticism and Poetry, in A Critical Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin 
Adib-Moghaddam, (ed), 2014 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 217.  
35 - Ridgeon has expanded on this in Hidden Khomeini, ibid, 2014, p. 215.  
36 - Ridgeon calls it “the juxtaposition of Khomeini as a faqih … with that of the mystic who is able to 
commune with the divine …” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 213), while Martin calls the former (mysticism), “a 
subtle unseen authority” which acts behind the visible, “manifest one” (Martin, 2007, pp. 202-3). 
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Chapter Five: Khomeini as the Jurist and Wilāya 
The present chapter seeks to study and analyze the juridical wilāya, as well as 
the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, from the perspective of socio-political developments in 
early twentieth century Iran. The author argues that the changes that can be explained 
as ‘radical Shīʿīsm’ (including, but not limited to, the politicization of Qum seminary, the 
birth of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, and the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as a 
combatant faqīh) were not only greatly influenced by transformations in the political 
arena, but were also reactions to them. Considering the research questions 
(Introduction, section B. p. 13), the author seeks to explain how the conceptualization 
of juridical wilāya underwent a tremendous shift from being purely juridical, to having 
a political reading. The jurisdictional changes that had started with Constitutional 
jurisprudence, now, and in the mid-twentieth century, came to bear fruit in assuming a 
political role and responsibility for the Shīʿa faqīh. Therefore, unlike the ʿirfānī wilāya 
which has remained stagnant and unchanged, its juridical conception displays the 
vitality of the Shīʿa jurisprudence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Riḍā Khān’s coup of February 1921 (1299 shamsī) was a turning point in the 
history of Iran. His policies profoundly transformed the face and fate of the country 
from a politically disintegrated and economically poor society to a unified nation with 
a centralized political system. The state had a multi-dimensional policy that spanned all 
aspects of people’s lives, including stabilizing the country, building a strong army, 
enforcing dress code for both men and women, reforming the language, implementing 
new party politics, changing the name of the country from Persia to Iran, reorganizing 
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the fiscal system, and last but not least, implementing legal and judicial reforms. Having 
centred on ‘secularizing’ and ‘centralizing’ as the essence of these policies, the state 
became the agent of authoritarian, radical, change in the post-Qajar era.1  
These policies, which symbolized the era, started two or three years after the 
stabilization of the new dynasty (Cronin, 2003, p. 6). Addressing the state and the 
clerics, Riḍā Shah’s Westernizing and secularizing policies - which went hand-in-hand 
with implementation of centralizing policies – affected the whole of the hierocracy. The 
policies which targeted the hierocracy’s autonomy and financial power, included the 
state’s intrusion into the judicial domain, the abolishment of the mujtahids’ civil courts 
and their replacement with a state-controlled judiciary, the confiscation of charitable 
endowments (awqāf)2, and the establishment of modern education institutions (which 
grew in number from the mid-1920s) that rivalled traditional madrasas. These 
developments undermined the ʿulemā’s social status and affected their economic 
influence (Amanat, 2003, p. 8). It was not only the state’s policies that shook the 
hierocracy, but also the growth of the secularized or semi-secularized middle classes, 
and also the popularity of a variety of religious and ideological challenges that 
negatively affected them. Amanat describes the clerical community of that time as 
“demoralized and shrunken” and that sought to “reorganize the madrasa and to solidify 
its network at the national level” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8 & Martin, 2007, pp. 15-17).  
The emergence of a tendency toward a centralized marjaʿīyyah under Ayatollah 
Muḥammad Husayn Burūjirdī (d. 1340 shamsī/1961), should be regarded as a “belated, 
albeit inevitable, response” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8) to the state’s intrusion into the 
hierocracy’s domain.3 Reaching the goal of having a ‘centralized marjaʿīyyah’, however, 
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would not have been attainable without first fixing the financial affairs of the ḥawza of 
Qum (a legacy of ʿAbdul Karīm Ḥāʾirī). To this aim, Burūjirdī followed a disciplined 
policy of strengthening the economic and financial foundations of the ḥawza, 
concurrently with increasing the number of students (ṭullāb). In addition, in order to 
organize more effectively the revenues of the ḥawza, he “had a register drawn up of” 
(Algar, 1989, p. 6 & Akhavi, 1980, p. 125) all his wukalā (lit. agents, those who were 
involved in gathering the religious taxes), as opposed to the ḥawza’s voluntary way of 
organizing financial affairs which had been prevalent before. Another “administrative 
innovation” (Algar, 1989, p. 6) of Burūjirdī that helped to reinforce the centrality of 
Qum and the office of marjaʿīyyah, “was his institution of a register of correspondence, 
permitting the [ʿulemā] at the ḥawza to build up a further network of contacts 
throughout the country” (Muṭaharī, n.d., p. 248, in Algar, p. 6).4  
Other initiatives may be added to this list, such as building new madrasas to 
“demonstrate the compatibility of Islamic commitment with the acquisition of modern 
knowledge” (Algar, 1989, p. 7), promoting a Shīʿa-Sunnite rapprochement and sending 
representatives to Muslim and non-Muslim countries. All these, together with 
maintaining “an almost unwaveringly quietist stance”, helped him to remain “more or 
less neutral in the stormy political contests of the postwar period” (Algar, 1989, p. 8). 
Along with the centralized marjaʿīyyah and reorganization of the traditional education 
institutions, the hierocracy underwent another significant shift, a moving away from 
the duality of the state-ʿulemā alliance toward fresh sources of raising money and 
strengthening social solidarity namely the bazaar community, a new class of urban and 
urbanized poor. These three, “offered a pool for clerical recruitment and an enthusiastic 
mosque congregation” (Amanat, 2003, p. 8).  
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The withdrawal of the jurists, mainly Ayatollah Burūjirdī and earlier his peer 
Ayatollah ʿAbdul Karīm Ḥāʾirī (d. 1355 H/1937), into the stronghold of political 
quietism is also mentioned by Said Amir Arjomand. He maintains that during Riḍā 
Shah’s reign, the clerics were “too surprised and stunned to react effectively” (Amir 
Arjomand, 1988, p. 84), and hence they tried not to altercate with the Shah. This 
perplexity, and at the same time caution, is reflected in a number of political writings, 
including Khomeini’s Kashf al-Asrār (the Unveiling of the Secrets) which was written 
immediately after the abdication of the Shah. As will be observed in the following, 
Khomeini wavered between adhering to Constitutionalism or instigating his notion of 
the ideal of Islamic government. His belief in Constitutionalism, however, meant belief 
in the second article of the amendment of the constitution (approved 1285 
shamsī/1906), according to which a council must be formed composed of five jurists to 
ensure that the legislation of the majlis (the Parliament) is not contradictory to the 
Islamic sharīʿa5. Amir Arjomand believes that the hierocracy maintained its hostility 
toward Constitutionalism (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85), even in subsequent years, 
probably because the jurists did not perceive Constitutionalism as something of their 
own, and their adherence to it was in fact an act of necessity.  
In addition to the state’s attacks on the hegemony of the hierocracy, the jurists 
monitored another threat which was the emergence of secularist tendencies among the 
society. By ‘secularist tendencies’, reference is especially made to Ahmad Kasravi, 
whose polemical writings on Persian poetry and literature, as well as on Shīʿīsm, had 
caused uproar amongst many Iranians, including the hierocracy. For the clerics and 
mainly Khomeini, Ahmad Kasravi was not a person, but the representative of “the 
general secularising trend of the times” (Ridgeon, 2006, p. 9), whose critiques on the 
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Sufi and Shīʿa heritage of Iran had raised the need to defend these two pillars of Iranian 
identity. As Lloyd Ridgeon ascertains, “his steadfast rejection of superstitious beliefs 
(including Sufism and Shīʿīsm) and his opposition to the wholesale absorption of 
Western culture into Iran struck a chord with many Iranians” (Ridgeon, 2006, p. 9). The 
danger of Kasravi’s anti-Islamic views (which, compared with his anti-Sufi critiques 
seemed to be more important), caused the radical Shīʿa group of Fadāʾīyān-i Islam 
(Devotees of Islam) to shoot him dead in 1946 (1324 shamsī) “during the last session 
of the preliminary hearings of the heresy charges brought against him” (Ridgeon, 2006, 
p. 9). Yet it was not only Kasravi who was treated brutally by the hierocracy. To a lesser 
extent, ʿAlī Akbar Ḥikamī Zādih (d. 1366 shamsī/1988), a disciple of Kasravi, was also 
pilloried by Khomeini. The above-mentioned Kashf al-Asrār, which will be analyzed 
shortly, was written as a response to Ḥikamī Zādih and his ‘assaults’ on Islam and 
marjaʿīyyah.  
 5.1. Kashf al-Asrār: A Political Manifesto 
Kashf al-Asrār (Unveiling of the Secrets), written in 1321 shamsī/1942-43 as a 
response to Asrār-i Hizār Sālih (One-Thousand Years of Secrets) by ʿAlī Akbar Ḥikamī 
Zādih, should be treated as Khomeini’s first step into the world of politics.6 At that time 
he was forty years old. Kashf has a polemical tone and in it the boundary between 
politics and jurisprudence is blurred; in the sense that political issues are discussed 
from a juridical perspective and vice versa. In 1321 shamsī/1942-43, ʿAlī Akbar Ḥikamī 
Zādih published a short treatise (forty-nine pages) in which he propounded thirteen 
questions from “Muslim scholars and the People of Knowledge” (ʿulemāy-i Islām wa 
ahl-i maʿrifat), and by doing that, challenged them to reply to him. Ḥikamī Zādih never 
 
 
234 
received any response from them, and therefore published the questions and answers 
as his own. Although Khomeini’s long treatise (three hundred and forty-one pages) was 
not sent to him, the work is apparently regarded as Khomeini’s response to Ḥikamī 
Zādih. The treatise is dateless; though from the content it can be presumed that it was 
written circa 1942-1943/1321 shamsī (Khomeini, n.d. p. 2).  
Khomeini’s Kashf contains a number of theses and presuppositions: 
First: Ḥikamī Zādih and writers like him are accused of breaking community 
cohesion by creating division and schism, as well as destroying the “foundations of 
belief of the people” (Khomeini, n.d., p. 2). Even if the author is anonymous to the 
reader, from this very first phrase it would be clear that the author has ʿirfānī and 
juridical concerns. In mysticism, as previously mentioned, unity with God, with nature, 
and with the cosmos is one of the main concerns of a Sufi. The concept of waḥdah 
(unity) is a central concept around which major mystical ideas are shaped, though since 
the human reason cannot grasp the reality of God let alone unite with Him, and if 
humanity ever hopes to know God, He (Deity) has to grasp humanity. In Islamic 
mysticism, the idea of God ‘coming down’ into the cosmos is prevalent, and it is only in 
this way, which is “the heart’s imagination”, and not through intellectual efforts, that 
Man “draws near this God”, and becomes one with Him (Singh, 2003, p. 103). On the 
other hand, jurists were conceived of as the only legitimate preservers of the 
community of believers, as well as aides in the prevention of dispersion of the 
community. By such a treatise, Ḥikamī Zādih, in Khomeini’s view, has created schism in 
the unity of Muslims.  
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Second: Khomeini makes an argument for the defence of hierocracy7, i.e. jurists, 
and maintains that the Shīʿa hierocracy is equal to Islam, and imitation of a jurist 
(taqlīd) is essential for the survival of the Faith (Khomeini, p. 2 & 4).  
Third is Khomeini’s terminology in terms of the frequency of concepts such as 
nation, Iranian Shīʿīsm, fatherland and national solidarity (Khomeini, pp. 55ff), and 
from this perspective, his emphasis on nationalism is in line with the Constitutionalist 
ʿulemā and is inspired by Riḍā Shah’s measures to unify Iran. Khomeini internalizes 
Riḍā Shah’s nationalistic discourse.  
Fourth: Khomeini’s role in this text is ambivalent between a reformist clergy 
who speaks about nation (both as a large group of people united by common descent, 
history, culture, or language, and as religion), the importance of the revival of Persian 
as the Iranian national language, notions such as countrymen and women, and the 
necessity of reformation (Khomeini, p. 74)8 on one hand, and a combatant faqīh who 
advocates the notion of ‘the Government of Islam’ (and not the Islamic Government), as 
one of the referents of ‘the guardians of the cause’ (ulu al-amr) on the other (Khomeini, 
p. 109). He is careful not to refer to fuqahā and their role as the founders of such a 
government, although for the first time Khomeini uses the term government of Islam 
(ḥukūmat-i Islām). He borrows the rhetoric of both intellectuals and advocates of 
monarchy to sustain his arguments. 
From the former, among them Ahmad Kasravi, he borrows ideas such as ‘pure 
brothers’ (barādarān-i pāk) and ‘faithful co-religionists’ (hamkīshān-i dīndār) which 
are both self-appointed, as well as ‘our Persophone Friends’ (dūstān-i pārsī zabān-i 
mā). After stripping them of their true meaning, Khomeini uses them for his own 
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purpose to deride Ḥikamī Zādih and other ‘impure seeds’ including Kasravi and his 
followers (Khomeini, p. 74).  
Fifth: he makes a classic argument according to which belief in the Hidden Imām 
and his recognition are fundamental principles of Shīʿīsm, and since the twelfth Imām 
is in the Occultation, the establishment of government is indisputable and self-evident 
(Khomeini, pp. 181ff). Considering the necessity of having government in the time of 
Occultation on one hand, and the idea of ‘the government of Islam’ on the other, 
Khomeini plays an ambivalent pendulum-like role, moving between a modern clergy, 
which believes in the classical separation of politics and religion when the Imām is 
absent and his interest in the notion of ‘ḥukūmat-i Islām’ which violates such a duality.  
Accepting the former, he argues that “the intention of the ʿulemā of Islam is not 
to destroy the foundation of the monarchy, but rather they disagree with a certain 
person who, according to their understanding, acted in contrast to the interests of the 
country” (Khomeini, p. 186, 232ff). He maintains that “even every wise person knows 
that the best government is the one which is founded on the basis of divine rule and 
justice”, but since the idea was viewed with suspicion by the Monarchy, the fuqahā had 
to compromise with “this half-government” (nīm-i tashkīlāt) and the corrupt system 
(Khomeini, p. 186) of the Pahlavis. Regarding the importance of establishing a 
government during the Occultation and Khomeini’s arguments for it, one can come to 
the conclusion that, unlike his genuine fondness for the Islamic Government, and not 
merely the Government of Islam, he remains a Constitutionalist and defends the 
supervisory role of jurists; the one that had been predicated in the amendment of the 
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Constitution of 1285 shamsī/1907. Khomeini maintains that when the structure is 
Islamic, he can tolerate the content - the Shah.  
An analysis of the kashf will provide a better understanding of the ‘intention’9 of 
Khomeini by the conceptualization of wilāya in his juridical texts. There are two reasons 
for this: first, the ideas that are brought forth for the first time in this text, will be 
expanded later in his juridical texts. Second, if we believe that the author has followed 
a coherent and uninterrupted line of thinking in his life, then, the theory of wilāyat al-
faqīh should be treated as the fulfilment of his thought, which is set out in the Kashf. As 
mentioned, he had always advocated the ideal of the government of the jurist 
(ḥukūmat-i fuqahā); though he did not reveal it in the Kashf because, Ayatollah 
Burūjirdī was against any kind of political activity by the ʿulemā (especially his 
students) towards the Shah and the regime. The stance of Ayatollah Burūjirdī towards 
the monarchy, his relationship with both the Shah and with Khomeini, is mentioned in 
a number of sources.10 The fact is that whilst he was alive, due to the privileged position 
he held, the general policy of the ḥawza was to support the monarchy and the Shah. 
5.2. From 1942 to 1979: Westernization, Modernization and Political Antagonism  
The relationship between the court and the hierocracy became conciliatory in 
the interim between the abdication of Riḍā Shah and the succession of Muḥammad Riḍā 
Shah. The hierocracy tried to forget its “old grievances against the first Pahlavi”, and 
moved on to “an accommodation with the young Shah, who was more than conciliatory 
while his rule remained precarious” (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85). The clash between 
them, however, seemed inevitable when the new Shah, under pressure from the United 
States, launched his reform programme in 1961. The political sociology of the then 
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White Revolution11 cannot be considered here, since the task at hand is an analysis of 
the conceptualization of wilāya in the writings of Khomeini; though in order to 
contextualize his theory, a brief reference to the events of that time is necessary. An 
example is the chronology of the Land Reform Bill. The Land Bill of 1959 was ratified 
on May 17 1960.  One year later, on May 9 1961, the Shah dissolved the Majlis and on 
November 11 1961 he issued an edict ordering the government to implement the May 
1960 Land Law. On January 9 1962 the cabinet approved a new version of that law 
which eliminated most of its defects (Akhavi, 1980, p. 94). 
With regard to the agenda of the White Revolution, the conflict between the 
clerics, headed by Khomeini and the court, was not only a confrontation on the sources 
of power and re-distribution of political values, but also “had its roots in the clergy’s 
perception that the government lacked a legal mandate and could only regain it by 
abiding by the Constitution” (Akhavi, 1980, p. 117). Khomeini saw the Shah’s initiative 
as “replete with motifs already encountered during the dreadful reign of the first 
Pahlavi” (Amir Arjomand, 1988, p. 85), and hence started his anti-government protest 
against it. It was not Khomeini who, by taking a radical stance, tried to provide an 
alternative vis a vis the regime. The regime’s new decision, as well as the death of 
Ayatollah Burūjerdī, motivated the ḥawza to take the initiative for a reconsideration of 
the relationship between the court and hierocracy on one hand, and hierocracy and 
believers on the other. Concomitantly, was the necessity to reexamine the ḥawza’s 
organization from the perspective of marjaʿīyyah.  
Ann Lambton in her article, a Reconsideration of the Position of the Marjaʿ Al-
Taqlīd and the Religious Institution, has studied the office of marjaʿīyyah in the context 
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of the long-term, historical, relationships between the hierocracy and the monarchy, 
and the efforts of latter to bring the former under control. Without going too far into 
examining this relationship, from its beginning after the Occultation of the Imām until 
the twentieth century, it is more fitting to put it in the context of the short-term 
intellectual and socio-economic developments of Iran in the first half of the 1340s 
(1961), and to analyze it as a non-radical reading of the office of marjaʿīyyah and the 
role of marjaʿ al-taqlīd. However, Khomeini and the writers of Baḥthī Darbāra-yi 
Marjaʿīyyat wa Rawḥānīyat12 (A Discussion on Leadership and Hierocracy), had three 
things in common: first, they came to the fore after the death of Burūjerdī, who was the 
main obstacle to any kind of political activity within the hierocracy. Second, they 
reacted to Burūjerdī’s policies in the ḥawza and the court. Third, they responded to the 
regime and its efforts to control the ḥawza after Burūjerdī. Burūjerdī’s manner may be 
termed ‘autocracy’ if not ‘despotism’, because due to his belief in the sole/centralized 
marjaʿīyyah, the life of the ḥawza was in his hands and he was impatient towards the 
independent activity of the clerics. The book, however, is composed of ten short articles 
written by both clergymen and laymen, with particular emphasis on the necessity to 
reexamine the mutual relationships between the ḥawza and the court, and the ḥawza 
and the masses. Whilst authors, and mainly Murtiḍā Muṭahharī, highlighted the 
matchless role of Burūjerdī, it was apparent that they appealed for a more active role, a 
revival, for marjaʿīyyah and for the relationship between marjaʿ and believers.  
Ann Lambton assuredly evaluates the initiative as “the first attempt by a group 
of writers in modern times in Persia to examine and re-appraise the different aspects 
of a fundamental issue of the faith” (Lambton, 1964, pp. 134-135), though the writers 
were not agreed on the ideal government; probably because the ideal government was 
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not their main concern. Their political preferences, however, covered a wide range from 
the philosopher king, to the establishment of the kingdom of God upon earth, to political 
quietism, and to violent revolution (Lambton, 1964, p. 135). But since all of them, with 
the exception of Muḥammad Husayn Ṭabāṭabāʾī, soon lined up behind Khomeini and 
took a radical stance vis a vis the Shah, one can safely argue that perhaps it was only 
Khomeini who knew exactly what he wanted from his opposition against the regime – 
Islamic Government.  
Baḥthī Darbāra-yi Marjaʿīyyat wa Rawḥānīyat is also important from another 
perspective: the Shīʿa jurisprudence and kalām were no longer concerned with 
concepts such as the perfect man, but “a solution of the problems raised be sought 
rather in consultation and organization, to emphasize the need for continued growth in 
the religious institution, and to press the responsibility of the individual” (Lambton, 
1964, p. 135).13 The Shah’s modernizing discourse had impacted on the entire Iranian 
society including the most traditional, aloof, section of it - the hierocracy -, and 
therefore, “just as the state began to modernize and reform in organizational terms, so, 
in parallel, did the religious institutions” (Martin, 2007, p. 28). Shīʿa Islam emphasized 
the importance of modernization and institutionalization of the ḥawza and of the 
financial relationships of the clerics and their followers in order to maintain their 
independence. 
Twenty years after Kashf al-Asrār, in a reply to both Ḥikamī Zādih and Riḍā Shah, 
and in line with simultaneous reform movements, Khomeini spoke out against the 
regime. His radicalization was both a reaction to the White Revolution and the 
requirements of his followers; mainly low calibre clerics, bazaar and urbanized poor on 
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one hand, and landowners who had suffered hardship due to land reform on the other. 
Khomeini, however, used this new opportunity to attack the regime and the Shah. 
Compared with his peers’ reaction to the regime, Khomeini’s strategy was more 
inclusive, aggressive and brave.14 Therefore, Abrahamian’s analysis that he, unlike 
many other clerics who “opposed the regime because of land reform and women’s 
rights … scrupulously avoided the former issue and instead hammered away on a host 
of other concerns that aroused greater indignation among the general population” 
(Abrahamian, 1982, p. 425), does not seem to be plausible. He attacked the regime on 
land reform too.15  
Mohammad Gholi Majd shows how the clerics and landowners from 1959, at the 
time he revealed his land distribution programme, were able to forge an effective and 
powerful alliance against the Shah. Among the clerics, Khomeini was the loudest. The 
opposition to the programme, however, started with Ayatollah Burūjirdī and his fatwā 
(issued in December 1959), in which it had been declared that the programme of land 
reforms and other similar measures, were “contrary to the sacred laws of Islam and 
thus invalid” (Majd, 2000, p. 196). The fatwā had addressed the Majlis deputies and 
resulted in the enactment of the Land Reform Law of May 1960, but when Burūjirdī 
died on 30 March 1961, the landlords, who had gathered in the Agricultural Union, on 
November 1961, appealed to the senior ʿulemā of Najaf and Qum for help. Majd reports 
that the ʿulemā of Najaf and mainly Ayatollah Ḥakīm (Seyyed Muḥsin Ṭabāṭabāʾī Ḥakīm, 
d. 1390 H/1970), were disappointing in their response to the appeal and instead were 
encouraging to the court, and to the ʿulemā of Qum; it was only Khomeini who stood for 
the rights of landowners and attacked the Shah on both secular and Islamic grounds 
(Majd, 2000, pp. 204 ff).  
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Yet, it was after the radical stance of Khomeini and subsequent actions by 
Ḥassan Arsanjānī (d. 1348 shamsī/1969),16 which had “provoked and further 
embittered the religious establishment” that, the clerics took a stance by issuing fatwās 
(Majd, p. 208). In order to obtain national approval for the new decrees of 17 January 
1963,17 the Shah held a referendum on 26 January 1963 and in response, the 
Agricultural Union again appealed to Khomeini to elicit his opinion on the new 
development. His fatwā, which was issued in response to the appeal, removed the 
possibility of any reconciliation between the regime and the ḥawza (Majd, 2000, pp. 
218-220). Appraising Khomeini’s fiery speeches at the Fayḍīyah School shows how the 
radical Shīʿa discourse was created by him and used extensively in later years. He took 
advantage of the latent possibilities of a number of Shīʿa concepts such as wilāya, 
martyrdom, resistance, and expectation, and went far beyond the limit of the classical 
dualism of the ʿulemā and the monarchy. Moreover, he tried to nullify the decision of 
the Shah by turning to his followers and calling the referendum “compulsory” and 
flaunting its un-popular aspects. He mobilized people to come to the streets to show 
their opposition to the regime, but when it was suppressed, he asked them to stay 
indoors and boycott any kind of interaction with the establishment. A combination of 
civil disobedience and political struggle having been wrapped in the cover of radical 
Shīʿīsm, Khomeini’s defiance was a warm-up for the Islamic revolution.  
The land redistribution policy, as already observed, was unconsidered and 
hasty, and alienated the regime from the landowners, as well as from the ḥawza and its 
allies. It had also impacted on the middle class (both new and traditional) by driving it 
to purchase agricultural lands as an investment, which itself resulted in the loss of 
savings. Given this, one can safely conclude that the land reforms smashed the 
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traditional class structure of Iran which had lasted for centuries, and replaced it with 
resentful landowners (humiliated by their own peasants as well as by the confiscation 
of their properties), and the radicalized ḥawza headed by Khomeini (Majd, 2000, pp. 
223-224). Thus, at the end of the 1960s, the Shah, representing a corrupt autocrat who 
had adopted a wrong policy towards his people, endowing rights and freedom to 
women, by reshaping the culture of the society through modernization and 
secularization, and by opening the door of the country to foreigners, mainly Americans, 
had become a ruler without justice (ḥākim-i ẓālim) (Akhavi, 1980, p. 95.). 
Khomeini was sent to Turkey on November 4 1964, and almost one year later, 
on October 1965 he was allowed to move to Najaf, Iraq where he stayed until 1978. It 
was in this city that he wrote his main juridical texts, containing the conception of 
wilāya and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.18 To the degree that the Shah was enforcing 
his Westernizing and modernizing programmes and, at the same time, moving towards 
a military dictatorship, Khomeini, sitting in Najaf, was intractable in his opposition to 
the Shah, radicalizing his tone and attracting the increasingly alien mass to his magnet. 
Along with writing and teaching in Najaf, his other concern was developing a well-
organized network of his students (as a more elaborated version of the old relationship 
between master and disciples), in order to disseminate his ideas among his followers, 
to keep his ties with the bazaar, and to push forward the struggle with the regime. All 
these figures played significant roles in the victory of the Revolution of 1979, among 
them Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī (d. 1388 shamsī/2008) whose commitment was notable. 
Before turning attention to Muntaẓirī and his services to the Revolution, and later to the 
newly established government, this chapter will now focus on Khomeini’s conception 
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of wilāya and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh with regard to its intellectual background 
in Shīʿa jurisprudence from the eighteenth century onward.  
5.3. Walī and the Office of Wilāya in Juridical Texts 
Addressing Khomeini’s discussion of wilāya and wilāyat al-faqīh, it is necessary 
to first give a brief introduction to ‘juridical wilāya’ in general and its background in the 
writings of the former Shīʿa scholars in particular. ‘The former Shīʿa scholars’, are those 
figures whose thoughts paved the way for Khomeini’s arguments on the conceptions of 
wilāyat al-faqīh. These thoughts are: 
First, from a juridical perspective, during the Imām’s Occultation no one under 
normal circumstances, and without a justifiable reason can exercise any kind of wilāya 
or special prerogative over another person, and every individual is in charge of his or 
her life. In other words, Islam prohibits believers from interfering in each other’s life, 
and if one person wants to take custody over another, he or she needs to have a valid 
religious reason. Following this, there comes another hypothesis that the “jurists 
cannot claim to be privileged or possess a special mandate to manage the public affairs” 
(Mavani, 2013, p. 161). In Shīʿa jurisprudence, therefore, it is an axiom to assume that 
people are wise, sane and eligible to take responsibility for their lives. Quoting Shaykh 
Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ, Kadivar concludes that, “this grand jurist of the Qajar period” is 
considered to be the first one to discuss “the principle of the lack of abdication” of 
individuals (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 56-57).  
Second, similar to the ʿirfānī wilāya which is discussed in the previous chapter, 
the juridical wilāya has an established tradition in Shīʿa jurisprudence. Briefly, there are 
twelve types of wilāya, including the Guardianship of the Ruler (wilāyat-i ḥākim), which 
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are recognized in fiqh. Pertinent to this is the belief that where walī has not been 
appointed by the lawgiver, the area needs to be placed under the authority of the Just 
Jurist (faqīh-i ʿādil). Historically speaking, this area is called “Islamic market 
regulations” (umūr-i ḥisbīya/ḥisba), and was the first region in which the term wilāyat 
al-faqīh was deployed. Kadivar adds, however, that it is disputable whether a jurist’s 
authority to take responsibility in this area is generated from the right of taṣrīf 
(disposal) that he possesses, or is a result of his guardianship which is a more 
comprehensive right. In other words, the term wilāyat al-faqīh refers to religious and 
juridical guardianship and presupposes the abdication of those under guardianship; 
while the acceptance of the right of taṣrīf for the jurist does not entail abdication 
(Kadivar, 1378a, p. 52). Wilāya, Kadivar states, necessitates the abdication of those 
under guardianship as a requirement.  
The juridical wilāya on ḥisba, in the broadest sense of the term, has been 
discussed for the first time by Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī (Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Mahdī Fāḍil 
Narāqī, d. 1245 H/1829), the prominent scholar of the nineteenth century. In chapter 
fifty-four of his classic ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām (Achievements of the Years) entitled An 
explanation of the wilāya of the ruler and everything on which he has wilāya, he 
develops arguments for an elementary type of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. He 
advocates the typical juridical viewpoint in which no one has the right to exercise 
authority and guardianship over another and every individual is in charge of his or her 
own life. This principle, however, is not absolute and unconditional; since God, or the 
Prophet or one of the Imāms can appoint a certain individual as walī to exercise wilāya 
in a particular matter. From this perspective, awlīyā are many, including just jurists, 
fathers, and grandfathers from the father’s side, vicegerents (waṣīs/awṣīyā), husbands, 
 
 
246 
lords (mawālī), and deputies (wukalā). These types of awlīyā (awlīyā of children, wives, 
properties and clients), have limited wilāya upon one under guardianship, which 
should be clearly defined in advance (Narāqī, 1375 shamsī, p. 529). Narāqī, however, 
makes it clear that ʿ Awāʾid only refers to wilāyat-i fuqahā who are both rulers (ḥukkām) 
at the time of the Occultation and the general deputies of the Imāms (Narāqī, 1375, p. 
529). Addressing the office of ʿulemā, the chapter is divided into two sections 
(maqāmān); one section is about the aḥādīth on the right of fuqahā who enjoy the office 
of general wilāya, and the other on the explanation of fuqahā’s responsibilities on the 
daily religious life of believers.  
Regarding the latter, Narāqī maintains that just jurists are accountable for two 
things: whatever the Prophet and the Imāms are responsible for, and for whatever 
belongs to the worldly interests or the daily religious life of believers (Narāqī, 1375, pp. 
531-536). In terms of transmitted sources, Narāqī maintains that just jurists are but 
referents of ulu al-amr (Narāqī, 1375, p. 535), though he stresses that if the affairs of 
believers are to be administered and the community of Muslims is not to be dispersed, 
the lawgiver (shāriʿ) must appoint fuqahā in order to be in charge of the worldly 
interests and the daily religious life of believers (Narāqī, 1375, p. 538). Narāqī lists the 
scope of authority and responsibilities of fuqahā in the time of the Occultation in the 
following twelve areas: issuing fatwā, judgeship, ḥudūd and taʿzīrāt,19 wilāya on 
orphans, wilāya on the abdicated and the one in absentia, conducting marriage 
ceremonies, wilāya on bodies of the abdicated, adjudication, possessing properties of 
imām, whatever the imām has had supervision and authority on it, and finally, anything 
that walī has to intervene in with the discretion of religion or reason (Narāqī, 1375, pp. 
539-582). 
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Recently Dāwūd Feyraḥī in his discussion of the two categories of 
‘Constitutionalist Jurisprudence’ and ‘Political Jurisprudence’, has shed light on 
Narāqī’s conception of wilāyat-i ḥākim. Feyraḥī explains that in Narāqī’s view, there 
appears to be two types of relationships between human action and the lawgiver’s 
decree; first, there exists a situation in which no decree has been issued by the lawgiver 
and second, the lawgiver has given a decree on a particular issue. In terms of the former, 
individuals have authority to make their own choices, and in terms of the latter, there 
are five conditions: wājib (farḍ/farīḍah), harām (sinful/forbidden), mustaḥabb 
(recommended), makrūh (detestable or offensive act) and mubāḥ (neither forbidden 
nor recommended, or religiously neutral) (Feyraḥī, 1390, p. 135). Feyraḥī neither 
explains further the categorization of wilāyat-i ḥākim by Narāqī, nor discusses how he 
comes to categorize it. 
Third, Shaykh Murtaḍā Anṣārī (d. 1281 H/1864), the prominent Shīʿī jurist of 
the nineteenth century, discusses wilāyat al-faqīh under the category of ‘the Parties of 
Contract’ (awlīyāy-i ʿaqd) in his book al-Makāsib.20 By ‘the Parties of Contract’, Anṣārī 
means the guardianship of father and/or grandsire from the father’s side over the 
abdicated or underage. Kadivar gives examples from several other juridical books, such 
as ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām of Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī, ʿAnāwīn (Subjects) of Mīr ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ 
Ḥusseynī Marāghiʾī, al-Khazāʾin (Treasuries) of Mullā Āqā Darbandī and others who 
have debated wilāyat al-faqīh alongside the guardianship of jurist over the abdicated 
and one in absentia (qaṣṣir wa ghayyib). These jurists, Kadivar stresses, have not 
mentioned the difference(s) between wilāya on people and wilāya on the abdicated 
and/or the one in absentia, which indicates the unity of meaning and connotation of 
wilāya in these texts (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 109-110). Kadivar wants to remind us that 
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wilāyat al-faqīh, both in the theory of Ayatollah Khomeini and in the texts of the 
aforementioned jurists, presupposes maḥjūrīyah (the state of being ward or minor) of 
one under guardianship and, if the person is not abdicated, underage, or in absentia, 
then he/she does not need a guardian.  
Fourth, Just Jurists are appointed to this office from God. Fifth, wilāyat al-faqīh 
in these texts, is discussed as a juridical and not a theological issue.21 Therefore, the 
problematic of wilāyat al-faqīh is not one of the fundamental principles of Shīʿa 
jurisprudence, but a branch (farʾ) of it. It is not one of the fundamentals because there 
are disagreements both on the existence and the scope of it (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 112). 
Quoting from Kashf al-Asrār, Kadivar argues that Khomeini is in line with other jurists 
who discuss this topic from a juridical perspective (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 111-112). As 
will be observed in the following, Khomeini in the book Wilāyat-i Faqīh; Ḥukūmat-i 
Eslāmī22 (Guardianship of the Jurist; the Islamic Government), maintains that belief in 
wilāyat al-faqīh is a principle of the Faith of Shīʿīsm and therefore it cannot be regarded 
as a juridical problematic. Sixth, wilāya encompasses all public areas, including social 
and political issues. Therefore, addressing the question of eligibility, there is an 
inequality between those under guardianship and those who enjoy the right of 
guardianship – or jurists (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 112-114).  
5.4. Wilāyat-i Faqīh 
From among Khomeini’s juridical texts, Wilāyat-i Faqīh focuses on the theory of 
wilāyat al-faqīh and the question of Islamic government. In this text, Khomeini is no 
longer the young and enigmatic scholar of Kashf al-Asrār, but a combatant faqīh who is 
to establish his utopia on the ruins of Pahlavi kingship. The book is composed of 
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thirteen lectures given by Khomeini in Najaf during a very short period of nineteen days 
(from the first to twentieth of January 1970/1348 shamsī). Due to censorship in Iran, 
Wilāyat-i Faqīh was published in Beirut, Lebanon, and only available to be used by his 
followers the next autumn. One year before the Revolution of 1979, in 1356 
shamsī/1977-78, the book appeared in Iran as Nāmiʾī az Imām Mūsawī Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ 
(A Letter from Imām Mūsawī Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ) as an appendix to his other book Jihād-i 
Akbar (the Greater Jihād).23 In terms of bibliography, the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh had 
also appeared once before in the second volume of Kitāb al-Bayʿ (the Book of 
Transaction, both Persian and Arabic volume).24  
In Wilāyat-i Faqīh Khomeini’s arguments are made on a number of propositions:  
First: wilāyat al-faqīh is self-evident (badīhī)25 in the faith of Shīʿīsm (Khomeini, 
1379, p. 9) and, “the state’s preservation … [is] a primary injunction [al-aḥkām al-
awwalīyyah]”, while “rituals (e.g., the obligatory prayers and fasting) … [are 
downgraded to] secondary injunctions [al-aḥkām al-thānawīyyah]” (Mavani, 2013, p. 
209). Wilāyat al-faqīh is inclined to be a kalāmī (theological) problematic and in fact is 
read from this perspective by one of Khomeini’s students Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī (1312 
shamsī/1933 - ).26 As stated earlier, Kadivar’s reading was grounded on Kashf and not 
on the book Wilāyat-i Faqīh (Kadivar, 1378a, pp. 111-112).  
Second: the whole text revolves around a political (and false) interpretation of 
the history of Islam, and of the key Islamic and Shīʿa terms such as nubuwwa, imamate 
and wilāya.  
Third: belief in the necessity of the establishment of government in Islam is 
embedded in the belief of wilāya, which is the issue of succession and authority after 
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the Prophet. Thus, belief in wilāya requires attempts to establish the Islamic 
government and execute Islamic laws (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 20-21).  
Fourth: the office of nubuwwa is a political one, because the Prophet - the 
guardian of the cause - was regarded as the head of the executive branch too (Khomeini, 
1390, pp. 21-26).  
Fifth: jurisprudence (fiqāha) is the foundation of Islam, and just jurists are in 
charge of the affairs of believers (Khomeini, 1390, p. 50). This statement has a 
presupposition which is the abdication of those under guardianship. In addition, the 
term “just jurist” has two components: to be expert in the most honourable of all 
sciences or fiqh, and to be just (ʿādil). 
Sixth: the just jurists have the same authority and guardianship that the Prophet 
and the Imāms had and therefore it is incumbent for every believer to obey them. 
Despite the different statuses that the Prophet and jurists have, since their duties are 
the same and equal, their rights for establishing government is the same and equal 
(Khomeini, 1390, pp. 50-51ff).  
Seventh: by wilāya of the Prophet and the Imāms, Khomeini means government, 
authority and administration, and by wilāya of jurists he means a contractual non-
divine office by which an individual is appointed to take responsibility of the other. 
Interestingly enough, he equates the office of the wilāya of the just jurists to the 
appointment of custodian for the abdicated (Khomeini, 1390, p. 51).  
Eighth: the establishment of the Islamic government is farḍ/farīḍa (duty) or 
wājib al-ʿaynī for jurists, and they must rise either individually or collectively to fulfil 
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this mission. Thus, the subject matter of Wilāyat-i Faqīh is duties fulfilled by jurists and 
among them the execution of ḥudūd (divine ordinances, legal punishments) is the most 
vital (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 52-53ff).  
Ninth: in terms of method, he only uses transmitted sources which entail aḥādīth 
of the Prophet and of the Imāms which are about the office of the imamate and of the 
role of ʿulemā as the heirs of the mantle of the Prophet. According to these aḥādīth, 
ʿulemā not only inherit his science, but also his guardianship and power as well 
(Khomeini, 1390, p. 103). These aḥādīth depict fuqahā in the age of the Occultation as 
“the successors of the Prophet”, “the citadel of Islam”, “the proof of the Imām for 
people”, and “the trustees of the prophets” (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 59-75).  
Tenth: In his arguments for the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, Khomeini goes beyond 
the typical understanding of the office of fiqāha, in which the two functions of judgeship 
and issuing fatwā had traditionally been recognized for fuqahā (Khomeini, 1390, p. 
76ff). He took this a step further and argued for the duty of fuqahā in the establishment 
of the Islamic government in order to execute the ḥudūd. For Khomeini, judgeship and 
statecraft are two faces of one coin (Khomeini, 1390, p. 84ff). In fact, Khomeini’s 
argument that the right of ʿulemā to exercise authority in public and politics, which 
originates from the office of judgeship, has a well-established tradition in Shīʿa 
jurisprudence; since it was Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413 H/948) who, for the first time, 
argued that ʿulemā have the right “to run the important office of qāḍī [judge] on behalf 
of the Imām” (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 71).  
The reason for that is self-evident. Early Shīʿa jurists had to cooperate with the 
Sunni governments in administrating justice, and therefore scholars such as the above-
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mentioned al-Mufīd and his student Shaykh (Seyyed/Sharīf) al-Murtaḍā ʿAlam ul-Hudā 
(d. 436 H/1044) suggested ways to justify and legitimize working under a non-Shīʿa 
government (Kazemi Moussavi, 1996, p. 71). Finally: the Islamic government is a 
“unique unprecedented” type of governance which could be classified as a 
constitutional domination in which rulers are conditioned to the Qurʾān and the 
tradition of the Prophet (Khomeini, 1390, p. 43). Regarding this, wilāya, which indicates 
the execution of the religious laws or ḥudūd, is not inconsistent with this interpretation 
of constitutionalism and is actually the executive dimension of it (Khomeini, 1390, p. 
51).  
It is not only Wilāyat-i Faqīh which entails Khomeini’s conception of wilāya, as 
he has elaborated on this theory in al-Rasāʾil as well.27 In this all-juridical text, 
Khomeini, “relying upon both rational and traditional proofs … [supports] this case that 
during the messianic infallible Imām’s prolonged Occultation, the jurisconsult, by virtue 
of being his indirect deputy, has both the mandate and the responsibility not only to 
interpret Islamic rulings on matters of devotion and personal affairs, but also in the 
social realm, and to manage the state’s affair on behalf of the Imām” (Mavani, 2013, p. 
180). Therefore, the jurist’s authority is not only regarded as the extension of the 
Imāms’, but also “reveals the intimate and organic relationship between the imamate 
and wilāyat al-faqīh” (Mavani, 2013, p. 180). Mavani calls this ‘revolutionizing of the 
imamate’, “such that it came to be viewed as uninterrupted and continuous 
(mustamar), with the right to rule assigned to jurists during the Occultation” (Mavani, 
2013, pp. 180-181).28 
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In terms of his transmitted methodology, Khomeini mainly focuses on two 
ḥadīth, one by Omar ibn Ḥanẓalih, famous as ‘Maqbūla-yi Omar ibn-Ḥanẓalih’ 
(Khomeini, 1368 shamsī/1410, vol.2, pp. 104-107), and the other, known as ‘Mashhūra-
yi abī-Khadījah’ (Khomeini, 1368 shamsī, vol. 2, pp. 109-111). These are not, however, 
the only aḥādīth being used by him, but are the most reliable ones. His arguments in 
Wilāyat-i Faqīh were also developed on the basis of these two ḥadīth, which are about 
the office of fiqāha and that of the just jurist as the heir of the Prophet and the Imāms; 
given that just jurists have the right to issue fatwā and sit on the seat of the Prophet to 
judge among people. On the basis of these two functions, Khomeini argues that if jurists 
are the heirs of the Prophet, they should inherit his legacy entirely, including the right 
of governance. (Khomeini, 1368 shamsī, vol.2, pp. 94ff). Khomeini’s other transmitted 
source is verse fifty-nine of the sūrat al-Nisāʾ of the Qurʾān, which says: “O you who 
believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” (Nasr, 
2015, p. 219). In his interpretation of the verse, Khomeini maintains that ulu-l-amr 
(those in authority) refers to just jurists who occupy the office of political guardianship 
over people (Khomeini, 1390, pp. 83ff)29.  
The idea of rulers as ulu al-amr was not confined to Khomeini, and should be 
understood in the context of the “Renaissance of Islamic law” (Mallat, 1993, p. 14) 
which had started in other parts of the Shīʿa world. As Chibli Mallat observes, the ʿulemā 
of the Najaf seminary, and particularly Muḥammad Bāqir as-Ṣadr as the pioneer whose 
exegesis was “peculiar in the Shīʿa world” (Mallat, 1993, p. 65), had the same 
understanding of the Qurʾānīc term, though their cornerstone was verse forty-four of 
the fifth sūrah (al-Māʾidah, lit. the Table Spread). In it, Sadr found “the legitimation of 
the Islamic state and of the institutionalization of the ʿulemā’s position in it” (Mallat, 
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1993, p. 62). In addition to Sadr, the Egyptian scholar, Seyyed Quṭb (d. 1966), had the 
same insight30 and emphasized “the political dimension of the verse, as well as on the 
foundation of a ‘nucleus’ of the Islamic state in the Qurʾān” (Mallat, 1993, p. 65).31 
Muhsin Kadivar in Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī (Divine Government) has not only discredited 
these two, and other similar aḥādīth, but has also argued that since in this verse 
obedience from ulu al-amr comes immediately after obedience to God and to the 
Prophet, ulu al-amr are not jurists, but the Imāms. He stresses that these three types of 
obedience are assumed to be equal, therefore the referent of ulu al-amr cannot be just 
jurists, because they are not equal to the Imāms and the Prophet. He adds that the 
prerequisite of absolute obedience is immunity from sin (ʿiṣma), which is gifted to the 
Prophet and to the Imāms. Kadivar concludes that the whole idea of wilāyat al-faqīh 
lacks rational as well as sufficient jurisdictional foundation, and as such the problematic 
of the political wilāya of the jurists remains doubtful and questionable (Kadivar, 1378a, 
passim). 
The politicization of wilāya by Khomeini and his thought on the Islamic state, as 
Vanessa Martin ascertains, “emerged from a debate that had been in progress since the 
nineteenth century. ... The debate focused not simply on Islam as religion but on Islamic 
law, Islamic institutions, particularly those of education, and Islam as a political 
ideology” (Martin, 2007, p. 100), itself as a reaction to Westernization and 
modernization policies which had started with Riḍā Shah and culminated in the reform 
programmes of the 1960s and 1970s. During these two decades, the hierocracy had 
found itself on the defensive (Akhavi, 1980, pp. 91-116 & pp. 132-143), and, as has been 
observed, other reform programmes that had started simultaneously with the White 
Revolution and the death of Burūjerdī, neither received a wide circulation among the 
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population nor accomplished their purpose to affect the regime and conservative 
clerics. Yet, the theory of Khomeini offered an alternative to the crises of sovereignty 
and nation-building of the Pahlavi era. As Bakhah states, “the revolution, after all, 
defined itself in part against what was seen as the Shah’s excessive deference toward 
the United States and his excessive zeal for Westernization. The revolution, by contrast, 
stressed Islamic authenticity and identity” (Bakhah, 2011, p. 34). 
Khomeini laid particular emphasis on Islamic law and its implementation 
through the apparatus of the Islamic government as the only sovereign ruler in post-
revolutionary Iran. Distinguishing Islamic precepts into two categories of primary and 
secondary, Khomeini argues that the Islamic government and its laws should be treated 
as the referents of the former, or aḥkām-i awalīyya. For him, the Islamic government 
led by the just jurist has the absolute authority to issue decrees which not only stand 
superior to the constitution and the positive laws, but also have power over the 
precepts of Islam. In a letter to the president of the time, Ali Khamenei, Khomeini is 
certain that “the most important of divine precepts is the wilāya and government 
(ḥukūma) of the Prophet which is endowed to him by God and is superior to all 
secondary precepts. And since the Islamic government is a branch (shuʿba) and 
continuation of the wilāya of the Prophet, therefore, it should be treated as one of the 
primary precepts of the religion. Such a government as one of aḥkām-i awalīyya, is not 
only legitimate to suspend the secondary precepts, but also the primary ones like ṣalāt, 
fasting, and ḥajj, as well”.32 
Regarding Khomeini’s belief in the status of the Islamic government and of the 
faqīh, scholars like Moin argued that his absolute power originates from his ʿirfānī 
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wilāya and stands in contradiction to orthodox Islam in which nothing is above divine 
rules (Moin, 1999, p. 296). Moin’s outlook on Khomeini’s ʿirfānī wilāya, with regard to 
our discussion on the latter’s mystical guardianship in the previous chapter, does not 
seem plausible. Besides, as Ridgeon discusses, Khomeini’s appeal for “the full extent of 
power that the Islamic government could exercise” (Ridgeon, 2014, p. 219), should be 
understood in the shadow of the events of 1987-1988 in which Khomeini not only 
finally accepted the priority of the Islamic government over all divine commandments, 
but also commanded the formation of the Commission for the Determination of the 
Interest of the Islamic Order (majmaʿ-i tashkhīṣ-i maṣlaḥat-i niẓām).33 As a jurist, 
Khomeini believed in political jurisprudence, and since the most central question in 
political jurisprudence is ‘Islamic government’, his arguments for government in Islam 
and its legal status in the constitution of the post-revolutionary Iran should be 
understood from the perspective of a faqīh. The preservation of Islamic government as 
well as the implementation of Islamic laws were his main concerns. However, Moin is 
right that Khomeini’s belief in the suspension of primary precepts of Islam contradicts 
orthodox jurisprudence, but, this does not stem from his position as an ʿārif, but as a 
statesman who had to deal with the requirements of state-building and constitution-
making in post-revolutionary Iran.  
5.5. Wilāyat al-Faqīh: Post-Khomeini Era 
5.5.1. Muntaẓirī, the Movement of Reform and the Evolution of the Theory of 
wilāyat al-faqīh 
Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī was born in 1301 shamsī/1922, into a humble family in 
Najaf Abad, twenty-four kilometres to the west of Isfahan. He entered the seminary of 
Isfahan when he was twelve years old and stayed there for seven years. In Isfahan he 
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studied with scholars such as Ḥājj Āqā Raḥīm Arbāb (d. 1355 shamsī/1977) and Shaykh 
Muḥammad Ḥassan ʿĀlim Najaf Ābādī (d. 1344 shamsī/1966)34, himself the student of 
Jahāngīr Khān Qashqāʾyī (d. 1290 shamsī/1910) and Mullā Muḥammad Ākhund 
Kāshānī, known as Ākhund Kāshī (d. 1294 shamsī/1914). Before moving to Qum to 
complete his studies in jurisprudence and philosophy, Muntaẓirī through his masters 
in Isfahan, was connected to and inspired by two significant intellectual trends of his 
time: the uṣūlī jurisprudence which was the predominant juridical school and Ṣadrīan 
ḥikmat; though during his entire life, he remained more of a faqīh than a ḥakīm. In Qum, 
he was acquainted with Ayatollah Khomeini, whose interest and skill in Akbarīan 
mysticism, Ṣadrīan ḥikmat and uṣūlī jurisprudence were discussed extensively in the 
previous chapter.  
During Khomeini’s exile in Najaf, Muntaẓirī was appointed as his plenipotentiary 
representative and played a key role in disseminating his master’s ideas to his followers 
in Iran and maintaining Khomeini’s connection with the bazaar. Muntaẓirī was elected 
to a number of important offices after the Revolution of 1979, most notably leadership 
of the Assembly of Experts of the Constitution (majlis-i khubrigān-i qānūn-i asāsī), the 
Friday prayer of Qum and finally, one-time heir apparent to Khomeini. He wrote 
extensively on jurisprudence, the principles of jurisprudence, political jurisprudence, 
modern laws and criminal laws. He trained many students, all of whom became in 
different ways key figures of the Islamic regime, and a few of them in later years, 
became religious reformers and intellectuals who played important roles in the 
movement for reform which had started in late 1360 shamsī/1980. From among the 
latter, one can mention figures such as the late Aḥmad Qābil (also Ghābil, d. 1391 
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shamsī/2012), ʿImād al-Dīn Bāqī, and Muhsin Kadivar, whose ideas on the theory of 
wilāyat al-faqīh will be discussed briefly.35  
If it were not for the ceaseless efforts of Muntaẓirī, the idea of wilāyat al-faqīh 
would not have been incorporated into the Constitution of the new establishment. Since 
the task at hand is the study and analysis of the developments of the theory of wilāyat 
al-faqīh in the subsequent years, the debates of the Assembly of Experts of the 
Constitution in the formative days of the Islamic system, will not be discussed.36 Much 
research has been conducted on the role of Muntaẓirī in the Council and, on the debates 
of the members on the nature and articles of the new Constitution. Comparing the 
stances of figures such as Seyyed Muḥammad Ḥusaynī Bihishtī (d. 1360 shamsī/1981), 
Akbar Hāshimī Rafsanjānī (d. 1395 shamsī/2017), Abuʾl-Ḥasan Banīṣadr and Maḥmūd 
Ṭāliqānī (d. 1358 shamsī/1979), all of them members of the Council, Ulrich von 
Schwerin believes that it was Muntaẓirī who was “the most senior clerical defendant” 
of the article on wilāyat al-faqīh (Schwerin, 2015, p. 54). Addressing Muntaẓirī’s 
‘radical’ position on the necessity of incorporating the article of wilāyat al-faqīh into the 
Constitution, Schwerin clarifies that Muntaẓirī warned of endorsing a Constitution in 
which the article is not mentioned; because for him, the goal of the revolution was to 
have the clergy elected as the head of the State and to write an Islamic Constitution 
(Schwerin, 2015, p. 55).  
Muntaẓirī’s reading of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh had three phases: the first 
position he held (from the beginning of his career until 1979), was ‘the collective 
guardianship of jurists’, which had seemingly been adopted under the influence of 
Ayatollah Burūjerdī’s concept of wilāya and the role of faqīh in society. Secondly, 
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Muntaẓirī revised this viewpoint in favour of the single role of the faqīh who is 
appointed by God and not people and acts as the representative of the Imām during his 
Occultation. The position was adopted as the official reading of the theory of wilāyat al-
faqīh and, as has already been observed, incorporated into the final draft of the 
Constitution. The third position taken by him around 1364 shamsī/1985, shortly before 
his election to the office of heir apparent to Khomeini37 (the main concern of the 
research here), looked for a “greater respect of the interests of people and better 
control of the government” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86), and can be regarded as a return to 
his first position. Given this, however, Schwerin is certain that the new position, neither 
allowed for a democratic reading of the role of people, nor was clear on how respect for 
the interests of people should be achieved (Schwerin, p. 86).  
5.5.1.1. Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī  
Dirāsāt fi al-Wilāyat al-Faqīh wa al-Figh al-Duwal Islāmī (Studies on Wilāyat al-
Faqīh and the Jurisprudence of the Islamic States), was a series of lectures given by 
Muntaẓirī circa 1364 shamsī/1985, in which he discussed political jurisprudence and 
the responsibilities of the just jurist to society and to people. The Arabic edition was 
published in four volumes, of which two volumes were translated into Persian three 
years later and published as Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī.38 In the introduction to the 
first volume of the book, Muntaẓirī uses transmitted sources (the Qurʾān and ḥadīth) to 
argue that according to a juridical primal principle (aṣl-i ūlā) Man is created free by his 
natural disposition and no one has guardianship or authority over another (Muntaẓirī, 
1379, vol. 1, p. 111). Quoting from al-Makāsib of Shaykh Murtaḍā Anşārī (d. 1281 
H/1864), he maintains that the above-mentioned principle is a juridical axiom and 
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should be used as a stepping-stone for any juridical arguments; although God, the 
Prophet, the Imāms, and the just jurist are excluded from this principle as they have 
right to exercise wilāya over people (Muntaẓirī, 1379, vol. 1, pp. 111-113).   
Muntaẓirī applies evidence from transmitted sources to sustain his arguments 
for the necessity of having a just government. Man is a social animal by nature, he 
maintains, and having government is sufficiently self-evident not to require proof 
(Muntaẓirī, 1379, vol. 1, pp. 89-90).39 Therefore, the community of people needs to have 
a guardian/government (Muntaẓirī uses both these terms interchangeably) to establish 
order and security (Muntaẓirī, 1379, p. 90 ff). In the second volume of the book 
subtitled, Imamate wa Rahbarī (Imamate and Leadership), he lists the qualifications for 
the ideal Islamic leader according to transmitted and rational sources. Quoting from 
Muslim philosophers, theologians, jurists like Aḥmad Narāqī and scholars such as ibn 
Khaldūn, Muntaẓirī develops his arguments for the office of the Just Leader (ḥākim-i 
ʿādil). Using the same ḥadīth sources, and also the Qurʾānīc āyah of ulu al-amr, as 
Khomeini and prior to him Burūjerdī, he argues that during the Occultation of the Imām, 
the fuqahā are regarded as his general vicegerents (nāʾib al-ʿāmm) (Muntaẓirī, 1379, 
vol.2, pp. 211-218). His interpretation of the term ulu al-amr is also reminiscent of his 
master’s, in that the just jurists are the guardians of the cause and, since the office of 
wilāya is modulated, they stand after God, the Prophet and the Imāms; however, their 
wilāya is confined to the execution of the sharīʿa laws and not creating law (Muntaẓirī, 
1379 vol.2, pp. 224-229).  
 Muntaẓirī sets himself apart from Khomeini and his theory when he gives people 
their rights in choosing the leader.40 He uses the verb inʿiqād (lit. to ratify) to argue that 
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the office of political leadership (imamate in Muntaẓirī’s words) achieves legitimacy 
only by the people’s ratification. To this end, he brings a variety of transmitted and 
rational sources, among them the first āyah of the sūrah al-Māʾidah is significant: “O you 
who believe! Fulfill your pacts” (Muntaẓirī, 1379, vol.2, p. 286). It is notable because he 
reads the Qurʾānīc term ‘contracts’ (ʿuqūd, single. ʿaqd) from a modern perspective and 
like a contractarian.41 His argument for imamate as a contract goes beyond the classical 
term of shurā (consultation), which had been used by his predecessors to sustain their 
arguments for the legitimacy of the Islamic government after the Constitutional 
Revolution. Unlike shurā, the concept of ʿaqd actively involves people as signatories of 
the contract that actualizes the office of imamate.  
Along with the āyah of ʿaqd, Muntaẓirī transmits several ḥadīth as well as 
historical examples of bayʿah (lit. a sale or a commercial transaction, though in Islamic 
terminology it is an oath of allegiance to a leader), to sustain his arguments for the new 
wilāyat al-faqīh (Muntaẓirī, 1379, vol.2, pp. 304-326). In contrast to Khomeini’s kalāmī 
reading, Muntaẓirī’s interpretation of the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh acquires a 
philosophical aura, not only because he is inspired by, and quotes from Muslim 
philosophers, but also because he offers a new reading of the Qurʾānīc term ‘ʿaqd’ which 
endorses the role of people in choosing the leader.  
 Evaluating Muntaẓirī’s new reading, Schwerin is certain that although his 
lectures “clearly showed that he wanted greater respect of the interests of the people 
and better control of the government, … it remains unclear how this should be 
achieved” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86). In addition, the new wilāyat al-faqīh should not be 
regarded as a democratic government, nor as a check and balance mechanism to ensure 
 
 
262 
the control of the government (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86). Muntaẓirī lacked knowledge of 
Western philosophy and modern political thought which could definitely have provided 
him with an understanding of what a modern democratic government looks like. 
Moreover, in terms of new arrangements such as popular election, democratic checks 
and balances, and modern understanding of the sovereignty of the state, Shīʿa 
jurisprudence is poor and unprepared to be exposed to modern questions. Despite this, 
Muntaẓirī’s new reading was not only in contrast to Khomeini’s wilāyat al-faqīh which 
had been incorporated into the post-revolutionary constitution, but also it stood in 
opposition to “the doctrine of the absolute guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat-i muṭlaqa-
yi faqīh) which was adopted as the official doctrine in 1988” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 86).  
  
5.5.1.2. People’s Rights  
Muntaẓirī’s revised theory centres on the concept of people’s rights (ḥaqq al-
nās). It seems that Man and his rights had become his main concern after his dismissal 
from the office of heir apparent in 1368 shamsī/1990. He wrote an independent book 
entitled Risāla-yi Ḥuqūq (the Book of Rights) on the conception of ḥaqq (rights) and its 
place in Shīʿa jurisprudence. The book was written in 1383 shamsī/2004 and discusses 
the concept of people’s rights from different perspectives, such as natural rights (and 
the classification of the rights to life, living, and the right of determination), Man’s rights 
toward society and toward himself, the rights of nations, and the reciprocal rights of 
Man and society. Distinguishing between natural laws (ḥuqūq-i fiṭrī) and positive laws 
(ḥuqūq-i qarārdādī), Muntaẓirī argues that the latter are man-made laws that oblige an 
action, describe the establishment of specific rights for an individual or group, and, as a 
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double-faceted entity, produce both rights and responsibilities. The former (natural 
laws), however, comprise inherent rights, having been conferred not by act of 
legislation but by God, nature, or reason (Muntaẓirī, 1383 shamsī/2004, pp. 11-21).  
Quoting Imām Ali in Nahj al-Balāgha, Muntaẓirī argues that people’s rights and 
the rights of God (ḥuqūq-i ilāhī) are inseparable, because in Islamic tradition people’s 
rights have priority over the rights of God, and are regarded as an introduction to them. 
The right of human dignity (ḥaqq-i karāmat-i insānī) is one of Man’s essential rights 
and should act as a foundation for positive laws (ḥuqūq-i mawḍūʿa). Referring to the 
Qurʾānīc āyah which indicates Man’s exalted status in the cosmos and his office of 
vicegerency (khalīfat al-lāhī)42, Muntaẓirī maintains that Man has inherent dignity and 
respect (karāmat wa ḥurmat) and therefore, their violation is abominable (Muntaẓirī, 
1383 shamsī/2004, pp. 31-39). Turning his attention to positive laws, he makes 
arguments for the reciprocal rights of people and government and argues that people 
are obliged by God to choose their rulers (the right of determination) (Muntaẓirī, 1383 
shamsī/2004, pp. 60-63).  
Along with Risāla-yi Ḥuqūq, Muntaẓirī’s conception of people’s rights is cited in 
another book containing the questions submitted to him by his followers and/or 
students. Answering these questions, Muntaẓirī clarifies his stance on people’s rights 
which had been theorized before, either in Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī or in the 
Risāla-yi Ḥuqūq. Ḥukūmat-i Dīnī wa Ḥuqūq-i Insān (Religious Government and People’s 
Rights) was written in 1387 shamsī/2008, one year before his death, and contains the 
ideas of a jurist who is at the climax of his knowledge, experience and political activity. 
On the nature of government and politics in Islam, Muntaẓirī argues that ḥukūmat-i Dīnī 
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(religious government or wilāyat al-faqīh) is the preferred form of governance and 
statecraft, although the political leader (the just jurist) is not appointed by God but is 
an elected ruler by popular election. People use the right of governance (ḥaqq-i 
ḥukmrānī) which has been conferred on them by God to choose walī and to remove him 
from the office whenever he acts against their interests (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, 
pp. 9-12). Therefore, the office of wilāyat al-faqīh does not entail absolute power and 
an unlimited term (Schwerin, 2015, p. 177). 
According to Muntaẓirī, there exists two readings of wilāyat al-faqīh: the first 
one which is called the theory of appointment (naṣb), is the official reading and as it 
sounds, defends the idea of divine appointment of the jurist in which there is no room 
for the people’s right to choose their leader. According to the second reading which is 
called the theory of [popular] election (nakhb) and is Muntaẓirī’s principal concern, the 
guardianship of the jurist is actualized only when people elect him as their leader. This 
is because the office of wilāya entails the right of taṣrīf/taṣarruf (lit. to take upon one 
under guardianship) and without the vote of the people, the walī will not be able to 
govern them and take responsibility for their lives. Therefore, the legitimacy of the 
office of wilāya depends on people as the owners of the right of sovereignty. In terms of 
the form of religious government, Muntaẓirī clarifies that as long as the content is 
religious and the government meets the spiritual needs and requirements of people, the 
form can be different, although religious government is founded on the basis of the 
separation of powers (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 12-15). 
In such a government, the role and the authority of the walī is limited to issuing 
fatwā and supervision and he cannot execute laws (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, p. 
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14).43 Muntaẓirī’s argument for the impossibility of divine appointment of the jurist is 
founded on a rational (ʿaqlī) basis: it is not possible for him to be appointed by God, 
because rationally no one is able to prove such an appointment. In other words, human 
intellect and reason are not enough, and therefore, the divine source of walī’s 
guardianship remains controversial in the time of Occultation (Muntaẓirī, 1387 
shamsī/2008, p. 15). Muntaẓirī extracts the people’s right of sovereignty from the right 
of determination, which, as observed earlier in this chapter, is itself a natural law and a 
part of human dignity (karāmat-i insānī) (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 16-17). 
Addressing the significance of people’s rights, Schwerin is certain that while Muntaẓirī 
“was ready to compromise on the sharīʿa if this was in the interest of the State, he was 
not willing to sacrifice his principles for the sake of personal power or to close his eyes 
to the systematic violation of people’s rights” (Schwerin, 2015, p. 88). 
Supervision (niẓārat) and not guardianship of the jurist is the desirable form of 
the wilāyat al-faqīh, and it will be achieved only when people are able to elect the leader. 
In addition to internal mechanisms of checks and balances like justice (ʿidālat), external 
mechanisms should also be established to prevent the transformation of supervision to 
guardianship (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 22-23). Muntaẓirī does not clarify 
what he means by these mechanisms, however, one can imagine the separation of 
powers is one of them to ensure the people have the right to vote. The faqīh also cannot 
impose his viewpoint on minority, and therefore, his authority remains confined to 
supervision of the process of legislation to ensure that the laws which are ratified by 
the parliament are not contradictory to Islam (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 22-
23). His new theory has the potential for rebellion and resistance and allows people to 
break their contract with government (here Islamic government) whenever they are 
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not satisfied with it, or, when it rules arbitrarily (Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 56-
57).  
To sum up, Muntaẓirī’s conception of wilāyat al-faqīh needs to be understood in 
the light of the concept of people’s rights, which enabled him to revise his initial theory 
in which people were devoid of any subjectivity or agency. However, the appearance of 
this concept in the terminology of Muntaẓirī was a necessity of its time. To this end, he 
started with a juridical axiom that nobody has wilāya over the other, because Man is 
born free. Therefore, jurisdictionally, wilāya is not self-evident as Khomeini argued, but 
an exception. In other words, sufficient rational reasons are needed to prove wilāya for 
a guardian in personal affairs, but the extension of wilāyat al-faqīh into the public 
domain, is not only possible but necessary (iḍṭirār) to prevent chaos and disorder 
(Muntaẓirī, 1387 shamsī/2008, pp. 144-145). The just jurist gains legitimacy and 
popularity from election through which his wilāya becomes actualized, and since 
rational reasons are insufficient to prove the divine source of the wilāya of the just 
jurist, wilāyat al-faqīh lacks a credible foundation in Islamic jurisprudence. In his quest 
to limit the powers of the jurist, Muntaẓirī not only redefined the office of wilāya more 
as supervision and less as guardianship, but also sought to “strengthen the people’s 
participation in politics in order to safeguard their will and to prevent the abuse of their 
rights” (Schwerin, 2015, pp. 147-148).  
Muntaẓirī believed in renewing his theory, and the footprint of his era was 
visible in his revision. He wrote two articles after the victory of Seyyed Muhammad 
Khatami to presidency in 1997, entitled Wilāyat-i Faqīh wa Qānūn-i Asāsī (the 
Guardianship of the Jurist and the Constitution) and Ḥukūmat-i Mardumī wa Qānūn-i 
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Asāsī (Popular Government and the Constitution), both of them centred on the idea of 
people’s rights. In the former, he rejected the idea of the absoluteness of the wilāya of 
the Prophet and the Imāms, arguing that it is only God, and not any individual, that has 
absolute guardianship over people (Muntaẓirī, 1377 shamsī/1998, pp. 31-65). In the 
latter work, he maintained that even the Prophet and the Imāms needed popular 
legitimacy to actualize their wilāya (Muntaẓirī, 1378 shamsī/1999, pp. 171-233). From 
the time of writing Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī in 1988, until the publication of his 
last book Ḥukūmat-i Dīnī wa Ḥuqūq-i Insān in 2008, in which the imprint of the Green 
Movement was undeniable,44 Muntaẓirī maintained his outlook about the nature of the 
office of wilāya as being elective and not appointive. For him, wilāyat al-faqīh was equal 
to wilāyat al-fiqh or the correct implementation of religion in society; a goal which is 
only attainable through supervision and not guardianship (Muntaẓirī, 1378 
shamsī/1999, pp. 181-184).  
Muntaẓirī’s ideas were taken further by one of his students, Muhsin Kadivar, 
whose critiques on wilāyat al-faqīh have, so far, been some of the most serious on this 
theory. Kadivar criticizes Muntaẓirī’s theory both on the basis of the transmitted 
sources he uses (Maqbūla-yi Omar ibn-Ḥanẓalih and Mashhūra-yi abī-Khadījah),45 and 
the ways he makes arguments to sustain his thesis. Moreover, he has always been an 
open opponent of the leadership of Ali Khamenei, whose wilāya stems from the rights 
given to him in the revised Constitution. Following Muntaẓirī, Kadivar believes that 
from the two rights of judgeship and issuing fatwā, which are traditionally designated 
to the jurists, as well as the mandate of the office of fiqāhat over the community of 
believers as the only legitimate heir of the legacy of the Prophet and the Imāms, one 
cannot bring about the wilāya of any individual jurist, let alone the absolute 
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guardianship.46 Yet, if in Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī, Kadivar is doubtful whether the right of 
governance in the Islamic jurisprudence is extractable from the wilāya of the jurist, or 
from the area which is called “Islamic market regulations” (umūr-i ḥisbīya/ḥisba) 
(Kadivar, 1378a, p. 52), in his recent writings he adopts a different stance and questions 
the whole idea of wilāyat al-faqīh. Both Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī and Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar 
Fiqh-i Shīʿa were written almost twenty years ago and do not represent the view point 
of a scholar who, in recent years, has reviewed his initial ideas.47 
In his recent article entitled wilāyat al-faqīh and Democracy, Kadivar maintains 
that the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh “lacks any credible religious basis for its deployment 
in the political sphere” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 219). Studying its background in Shīʿa 
jurisprudence, Kadivar is certain that “wilāyat al-faqīh has risen out of a sort of false 
expectation of the purview of Islamic jurisprudence” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 221), and 
should rather be regarded as  
“a reflection of the Iranian theory of kingdom and Eastern despotism in the 
mind and essence of Shīʿa jurists, which has also been corroborated by the 
Platonic theory of the philosopher-king. Its absolutism can be traced in the 
absolute wilāya of the perfect human being in ibn ʿArabī’s Sufism. It seems 
that traditional Islamic jurisprudence imbued with such notions as the 
principle of non-wilāyat, the principle of sovereignty (all people are the 
masters of their properties), and the principle of consensus (rulership over 
the people is not legitimate without their consent), cannot be compatible in 
the public sphere with the notion of wilāyat al-faqīh” (Kadivar, 2011, p. 
221).48  
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5.6. Conclusion  
Some lessons have been learnt from the conception of wilāyat al-faqīh in the 
juridical writings of Khomeini, as well as its further development in the reform 
movement initiated by Muntaẓirī and later implemented by Kadivar:  
Unlike mystical wilāya which is as old as Islamic mysticism, the idea of wilāyat 
al-faqīh is a new chapter in Shīʿa jurisprudence and dates back to Shaykh Murtaḍā 
Anṣārī’s al-Makāsib which was written two hundred years ago (Kadivar, 1378a, p. 109), 
though despite its short life, it has undergone transformation. As observed in the 
previous chapter, by the time of Khomeini, the mystical conception of wilāya had 
already reached its culmination and from this perspective, Khomeini’s contribution 
looks old. In terms of the arguments he makes and the sources he uses, it is as if it had 
been written hundreds of years ago. The juridical wilāya, in contrast, has gone through 
a tremendous change; not only in the hands of Khomeini but also his preceding jurists 
like Mullā Aḥmad Narāqī and Shaykh Jaʿfar Kāshif al-Ghiṭāʾ. The politicization of Shīʿa 
jurisprudence, which coincided with Fatḥ ʿAlī Shah’s reign (d. 1213 shamsī/1834), in 
later years led to significant changes, among them the emergence of the constitutional 
jurisprudence and the formation of the political jurisprudence of Khomeini are notable. 
Socio-political developments acted as a midwife to facilitate the delivery of the theory 
of wilāyat al-faqīh. In other words, political jurisprudence and particularly the 
conception of wilāya have been exposed to external environment and for its part, 
impacted on it as well.  
By ‘external environment’ I mean the two political systems of Qajar and Pahlavi, 
their policies (secularization and westernization), and their relationships with foreign 
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countries which, in the eyes of the hierocracy, had resulted in the domination of non-
Muslims over a Muslim land. Therefore, for the hierocracy, Islam was both a safe haven 
in which they could take refuge, and a rich source of inspiration that could help them 
find a solution to the crisis of state-formation and nation-building. Although Khomeini, 
by the time of the revolution, did not have a “specific vision of the Islamic state” (Martin, 
2007, p. 127), his objective from the time of the writing Kashf, was a state governed by 
jurists. To be more precise, he never gave up his belief in the superiority of the Islamic 
sharīʿa over all other kinds of laws, nor in the legitimacy of the ʿulemā as the only 
legitimate political leaders.  
In the case of the political jurisprudence of Muntaẓirī, the footprint of time is 
more identifiable. His theory, in contrast to Khomeini’s, underwent considerable 
change and revision. He had enough courage to review and criticize his ideas to make 
them responsive to new questions, and from this perspective, he is unique among 
Iranian politicians. His example, as Schwerin observes, highlights “it’s changing motives 
and objectives and its internal rules and external limits as well as the evolving role of 
religious authority and political power in the shaping of the discourse” (Schwerin, 
2015, p. 5). Muntaẓirī’s latest theory, which advocates the idea of the popular election 
of the just jurist, seems to be a return to a view he had expressed forty years earlier, but 
the emphasis he puts on people’s rights and on the limited terms of the faqīh’s 
leadership are new, and can be traced back to socio-political changes in the past two 
decades of the Iranian politics. Therefore, scholars like Kadivar who have put 
themselves in anguish to prove that Muntaẓirī’s theory should be regarded as a 
continuation of Khomeini’s wilāyat al-faqīh, need to revise their outlook, as these two 
theories have a resemblance in name only (Kadivar, 1378 a, pp. 148 & 211). Muntaẓirī’s 
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revised theory, unlike that of Khomeini, recognizes two sources of legitimacy: divine 
will and people’s sovereignty.  
Kadivar’s example displays an actual break from the existing tradition of 
political jurisprudence in general, and the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh in particular; not 
only because he believes in the incompatibility of democracy (his political ideal) and 
the guardianship of the jurist (in which he has already lost his hope and belief), but also 
because he cannot identify any jurisdictional element or heritage in it. Like Muntaẓirī, 
his belief in the wilāyat al-faqīh underwent changes and finally resulted in total 
rejection of the right of the just jurist to govern. For Kadivar, this theory is groundless 
in fiqh and its roots should be traceable in areas other than jurisprudence. For him, both 
as an intellectual and a political activist, the life of wilāyat al-faqīh, as a theory and in 
action, has come to an end. Regardless of its internal paradoxes and inconsistencies, 
Iran’s existing political apparatus, which is founded on this theory, due to the socio-
political developments of time and the weight and force of republicanism as the second 
wing of the Islamic Republic, is doomed to failure.  
Recapitulating the methodology used, all the three scholars whose outlooks on 
wilāyat al-faqīh are studied in this chapter, shaped their ‘webs of beliefs’ as “networks 
of interconnected concepts with the concepts and the connections between them; being 
defined in part, by beliefs about external reality” (Bevir, 2004, pp. 191 ff), against the 
inherited tradition of their time, though in contact with it. Khomeini and his Sunni peers 
broke away from traditional jurisprudence by replacing it with a radical reading of 
some Qurʾānīc verses. In the same way, Muntaẓirī formed his ‘webs of beliefs’ against 
the official theory of wilāyat al-faqīh as the inherited tradition, though he maintained 
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his loyalty to it. For him, this theory, had been distorted and needed to be corrected by 
the razor of the reform. Kadivar’s gradual, but consistent, move away from the tradition 
of political Islam resulted in his denial of wilāyat al-faqīh. He is still a student of the 
school of the reform movement, but with no concern or interest in political dimension 
of it. Addressing the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, Kadivar shaped his ‘web of beliefs’ in 
contrast to the inherited tradition of his time and with no reciprocal connection to, or 
exchange with it.  
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Islamic revolution of 1979.  
12 - Akhavi mentions another initiative which was conducted shortly before the abovementioned book. 
He calls it the first reform movement which started immediately after the death of Burūjerdī. Akhavi, 
Op.cit, 1980, pp. 117-119.  
13 - For a comprehensive review of the book and the context in which the book is written, see: Akhavi, 
Ibid, pp. 119-129.  
14 - Akhavi has categorized the “pattern of ʿulemā’s behavior” into four factions of radicals, social 
reformers, the conservatives, and finally those who wanted to cooperate with the court. Khomeini, as it 
is mentioned above, was leading the radicals and it seems that the more his status was lower, the more 
radical his stance was. Akhavi, Ibid, pp. 100-105.  
15 - As Vanessa Martin shows, the hierocracy during 1960s had experienced a growing power, and as 
the country and the state that grew wealthier, so did the clergy. The increased contribution from the 
believers and the increased number of mosques, madrasas, and religious students testify to the fact that 
“the clergy remained an important source of referral on personal law and conduct. They also branched 
out into publishing, the establishment of Islamic societies, and welfare activities, all of which ensured 
their influence among the Shīʿa community remained high” (Martin, 2007, p. 24).  
16 - With the full name of Dr. Seyyed Ḥassan Arsanjānī, the minister of agriculture in the cabinet of Dr. 
ʿAlī Amīnī (d. 1371 shamsī/1992), and the main figure who introduced the program of land reform in 
Iran.  
17 - The cabinet of Assadullāh ʿAlam (d. 1357 shamsī/1978) issued two new decrees on 17 January 
1963. One was the Additional Articles and the other nationalized Iran’s forests and pastures. In order to 
obtain national approval of these and previous decrees, the Shah held the referendum (Majd, 2000, p. 
218). 
18 - For the chronology of Khomeini’s exile see this website: 
< http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine/View/130/3638/17006/%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-
%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B9%DB%8C%D8%AF-
%D8%AD%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-
%D8%AE%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-(%D8%B3) >, last accessed 3/25/17. 
19 - In Islamic Law, taʿzīr refers to punishment, usually corporal, and that can be administered at the 
discretion of the judge as opposed to the ḥudūd which have been defined by the lawgiver. 
20 - Anṣārī discusses the issue in his book al-Makāsib (Transactions). Many of his works also centre on 
fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh (the principles of jurisprudence). Al-Makāsib is a detailed exposition of Islamic 
commercial law and is taught in today’s ḥawzas.  
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21 - Ayatollah Jawādī Āmulī in his Wilāyat-i Faqīh; Wilāyat-i ʿIdālat wa Fiqāhat (the Guardianship of the 
Jurist, the Guardianship of Justice and Jurisprudence), stresses that in the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh, the 
kalāmī and not the juridical reading of the office of wilāya, is preferred. 
22 - The book is referred to as Wilāyat-i Faqīh throughout this chapter.  
23 - The phrase ‘kashf al-ghiṭāʾ’ (to breach the veils) is a reminder of the abovementioned Kashf al-
Asrār, or can be indicative of the influence of mysticism on Khomeini. Kashf (to unveil, to reveal) of an 
obstacle between God and servant is an important topic in Islamic mysticism.  
24 - Khomeini discusses wilāyat al-faqīh in Kitāb al-Bayʿ and there is a reason for that. When he was in 
Najaf, his old students who had moved with him from Iran to Iraq, asked him to continue his lectures 
from where they had stopped in Qum and he started his classes with transaction or Bayʿ. In the 
following, “he broached the topic of the role and responsibility of the Islamic jurist as guardian or 
custodian of minors and the mentally deranged, in cases where the latter were involved in a 
transaction. It was at this point that Khomeini intentionally strayed from the normal legal trajectory of 
his subject matter to advance a political theory” (Rahnema, 2014, p. 89). Ali Rahnema has discussed the 
topic and its background extensively. See:  
Ali Rahnema, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Rule of the Guardian Jurist From Theory to Practice, in A Critical 
Introduction to Khomeini, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (ed), 2014 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 88- 114.  
25 - Obviously, reminiscent of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s definition of wilāya as “immutable law of nature” 
(Ṭabāṭabāʾī, 1341 shamsī, p. 75). 
26 - Hamid Mavani has the same reading and argues that “it appears that he [Khomeini] regards this 
concept as part of the madhhab’s fundamentals, like justice and imamate, that ought to be grouped 
under “beliefs” rather than as a juridical opinion under jurisprudence. Of course, such a perspective 
would severely constrain the sphere of tolerance, deliberation, and disagreement on this concept” 
(Mavani, 2013, p. 183) 
27 - The book is composed of two volumes and is written in 1385 H/1343 shamsī (1964).  
< http://www.noorlib.ir/View/fa/Book/BookView/Image/3830 >, last accessed 3/31/17.  
28 - Mavani argues that Khomeini’s theory, as well as his understanding of the role and the office of 
imamate “is primarily political in nature” (Mavani, 2013, p. 9) and stands in contrast to the viewpoint of 
scholars such as Amir-Moezzi and Corbin who overemphasize Shīʿīsm as a “suprarational esoteric 
tradition” (Amir-Moezzi, 1994, p. 19 in Mavani, 2013, p. 9). 
29 - Ayatollah Khomeini brings this āyah in al-Rasāʾil as well, though omits the controversial part which 
is on ulu-l-amr. So, the āyah is cited incomplete. See: Khomeini, vol. 2, pp. 111-117.  
30 - For the similarities between Khomeini’s Nahḍat and its Sunni peer, Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, 
See: Martin, Op.cit, 2007, pp. 197-202.  
31 - Along with the aforementioned verse, Ṣadr interprets the verse on ulu-l-amr as well to sustain his 
argument that the Islamic state is qualified to be part of ulu-l-amr. Mavani, like Mallat, estimates Ṣadr’s 
reading as “novel” which has paved the way for other Shīʿa scholars – such as Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī – to 
argue that “jurists have a mandate to govern during the messianic Imām’s concealment” (Mavani, 2013, 
p. 150). Mavani, estimates Muntaẓirī’s elaboration on the theory as “quite anomalous in post-
Occultation Shīʿa scholarship, [which] expanded the jurist’s scope of power and eliminated the plurality 
of authority in government … [though] he advocated a role for the jurisconsult that was based on a 
social contract between the jurisconsult and the public” (Mavani, 2013, p. 155). 
32 - Khomeini’s letter as well as explanation on the concept of ḥukūmat-i Islāmī is stated in this website: 
< http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Article/View/5350 >, last accessed 5/17/17.  
33 - Said Amir Arjomand discusses the developments that led to Khomeini’s decision in detail, and calls 
these developments “the constitutional crisis of the 1980s and Khomeini’s second revolution”. See: 
Said Amir Arjomand, Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Developments in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History, Rainer Brunner and 
Werner Ende (eds), 2001 (Leiden, Brill), pp. 301-333.  
34 - Muḥammad Ḥassan Najaf Ābādī was born in 1230 shamsī/1852 in Najaf Abad and entered the 
seminary of Isfahan to study jurisprudence and philosophy with figures such as Jahāngīr Khān 
Qashqāʾyī and Mullā Muḥammad Ākhund Kāshānī. After completing saṭḥ (intermediate level of the 
hawzawī schooling), Najaf Ābādī emigrated to Najaf to attend the classes of Ākhund Khurāsānī (1329 
H/1911) and Seyyed Muḥammad Kāẓim Ṭabāṭabāʾī Yazdī (d. 1337/1919). He received the ījāza of 
fatwā from both Khurāsānī and Yazdī and came back to Iran to teach and train students in the seminary 
of Isfahan. Due to his skill in jurisprudence he became famous as ʿĀlim (lit. learned, erudite scholar). He 
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died in 1344 shamsī/1966 and was buried in Isfahan. He wrote a book entitled Faḍīlat al-Sīyāda wa 
Faḍāʾil al-Sādāt (the Virtues of the Household of the Prophet).  
< 
http://www.hawzah.net/fa/Magazine/View/2689/6585/76779/%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B
8-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A2%DB%8C%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%91%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-
%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%81-
%D8%A2%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C >, last accessed 4/21/2017. 
35 - The information about Muntaẓirī’s biography, teachers, studies, books and students are gained 
through: 
< https://amontazeri.com/biography >, last accessed 4/21/17.  
< http://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2009/01/090129_ir_montazari.shtml >, last accessed 4/21/17. 
36 - The Assembly was founded in the summer of 1358 shamsī/1979, headed by Muntaẓirī, to write a 
new constitution for the Islamic regime. It convened on August 18 to consider the draft constitution 
written earlier and completed its deliberations on the rewriting of the constitution on November 15 of 
1979. Finally, the constitution was approved by referendum on December 2 and 3 1979 by over 98 
percent of the vote. The draft of the constitution was written by Ḥassan Ibrāhīm Ḥabībī (d. 1392 
shamsī/2013) without any indication to wilāyat al-faqīh. Wilāyat al-faqīh as the form of the new 
government was incorporated into the final draft of the constitution by the efforts of Muntaẓirī. Muhsin 
Kadivar gives a lengthy account of Muntaẓirī’s stance on the article of the wilāyat al-faqīh in the Islamic 
constitution in his book Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī, Op.cit, 1378 a, pp. 185-187.  
37 - Even before Muntaẓirī became appointed as the heir apparent to Khomeini in 1364 shamsī/1985, 
he had started reviewing his opinion about wilāyat al-faqīh by giving lectures on the theoretical 
foundations and practical implications of this theory. The lectures were published in Arabic in 1988, 
though became translated into Persian entitled Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī (the Jurisdictional 
Foundations of Islamic Government), and is the main text containing Muntaẓirī’s reinterpretation of the 
theory of wilāyat al-faqīh.  
38 - Husayn ʿAlī Muntaẓirī, Mabānī Fiqhī Ḥukūmat-i Islāmī (the Jurisdictional Foundations of the Islamic 
Government), translated into Persian by Maḥmūd Ṣalawātī and Abuʾl-Faḍl Shakūrī, 8 volumes, 1367 
shamsī (Tehran, Sarāʾyī publication).  
39 - As it is observed earlier in this chapter, Khomeini used the same argument to prove the necessity of 
wilāyat al-faqīh for believers.  
40 - Muhsin Kadivar insists that Muntaẓirī’s revised theory is in fact in line with Khomeini’s reading of 
wilāyat al-faqīh and should be regarded as the continuation of the latter’s theory, and not in opposition 
to it. See: Muhsin Kadivar, Op.cit, 1378 a, p. 148 & 212.  
41 - With regard to the centrality of the concept of the contract, Kadivar calls Muntaẓirī’s theory ‘wikālat’ 
(also wikāla, lit. agency, delegation). See: Muhsin Kadivar, Op.cit, 1378 a, p. 151, though in his other 
book, Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shīʿa, Kadivar calls Muntaẓirī’s theory ‘naẓarīya-yi wilāyat-i 
intikhābīya faqīh (the theory of the elective and constrained guardianship of the jurist), See: 
Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shīʿa, Op.cit, 1378 b, pp. 148-158.  
42 - There is a number of āyahs on Man’s vicegerency, but Muntaẓirī brings two of them; one in the sūrat 
al-Asrāʾ (the Night Journey): “We have indeed honored the Children of Adam, and We carry them over 
land and sea, and provide them with good things, and We have favored them above many We have 
created” (Nasr, 2015, pp. 714-715). And the other in al-Muʾminūn (the Believers): “Then of the drop We 
created a blood clot, then of the blood clot We created a lump of flesh, then of the lump of flesh, We 
created bones and We clothed the bones with flesh; then We brought him into being as another 
creation. Blessed is God, the best of creators!” (Nasr, 2015, p. 852).  
43 - While in the Mabānī, Muntaẓirī had maintained that the walī can execute the sharīʿa laws. In terms 
of restricting the rights and the authority of the walī-ya faqīh to supervision and not execution of the 
laws, Ḥukūmat-i Dīnī is a more radical book and contains Muntaẓirī’s latest revision of the theory of 
wilāyat al-faqīh.  
44 - As Sussan Siavoshi is certain, the evolution of Muntaẓirī’s views on state-society relations did not 
end with the essay he wrote during the presidency of Khatami. She maintains that “the greater the state 
oppression and violation of people’s rights after 2005, the more he objected and distanced himself from 
his earlier authoritarian position” (Siavoshi, 2016, p. 44). 
45 - As it is observed, Khomeini uses the same methods and sources. 
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46 - Kadivar’s opinions are cited in his books, Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī and Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i 
Shīʿa; both of them used extensively throughout this thesis.  
47 - Schwerin, on the basis of Ḥukūmat-i Wilāyī and Naẓarīyahāy-i Dawlat dar Fiqh-i Shīʿa, which were 
written long time ago, comes to this conclusion that Kadivar does not provide his readers with his final 
opinion about wilāyat al-faqīh and leaves it to them to draw their own conclusion (Schwerin, 2015, p. 
186). Considering Kadivar’s recent writings, such an outlook does not seem to be plausible. 
48 - Vanessa martin also emphasizes the Platonic root of Khomeini’s theory. Martin, Op.cit, 2007, p. 203.  
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Conclusion 
 
The present research has had two main objectives: to discuss and analyse the 
conception of wilāya in certain key texts of the Shīʿa thinkers from Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsāʾī 
to Ayatollah Khomeini  with particular emphasis on the influence of ibn ʿArabī and his 
mysticism on later scholars. Parallel to this, is the importance of studying the nature of 
authority in Shīʿa Islam. Has authority in Shīʿīsm, which is crystalized in the concept of 
wilāya, changed and developed over time (from the eighteenth to the twentieth 
century)? Or can the fallible, visible, representative/vicegerent of the authority of the 
Imām, himself the infallible, invisible, bearer of the esoteric wisdom and divine wilāya, 
claim the same authority as the Imām? I lay particular emphasis on ‘authority’ because 
wilāya is stuffed with the authority and with the right of taṣṣaruf. Walī is friend, but it 
is precisely due to his friendship that he can exercise absolute authority. Pertinent to 
this is the question of whether Shīʿa Islam is a faith (madhhab) of subordination, 
submission and subjugation.1  
The present study gains significant when viewed in light of the transformations 
that occurred in Shīʿa political thought, as well as in the public life of the community. By 
‘transformation’, I mean the politicization of wilāya, and I prefer the term ‘public’ to 
‘political’; as the extent of the changes brought about by this marriage embraces a wider 
realm than polity. As discussed in the Introduction, wilāya has its roots in Islamic sacred 
sources including the Qurʾān and Shīʿa ḥadīth compilations, and since in the Shīʿa 
tradition, the words and behaviours of the Fourteen Illuminate Figures (maʿṣūmīn) 
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have the same authority as the Qurʾān and are binding, the guardianship (both as 
authority and affinity) of the prophet and the Imāms, are of secondary importance after 
the wilāya of God.  
Discussion of the sacred sources helps us to delve into conceptual developments 
of wilāya over time, and therefore, the present research can be regarded as a 
contribution to the existing tradition of modern Shīʿa intellectual history. The author 
sought to focus on the doctrines of wilāya from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, 
as well as to position debates within historical contexts in an attempt to pinpoint the 
way that wilāya took on the characteristics of its time, and how it should be read in light 
of historical developments in every age. The question was asked whether the 
conceptions of wilāya have remained faithful to the classical understanding of the term, 
in which the connection between wujūd and wilāya (the ontological notions of this 
term) was emphasized.  
Tracing the fate of wilāya guided the study towards dramatic changes in the 
history of this concept and to the conjunction of theology and jurisprudence with 
politics having culminated in the theory of wilāyat al-faqīh. Jurists and theologians, as 
has been observed, were bearers of the change, and therefore, the ontological notion 
has been replaced by the political one. The last inheritors of the apolitical, classical 
conceptions of wilāya were the ḥakīms of the School of Tehran, as after them, and from 
the nineteenth century onward, wilāya came to be understood in terms of the political 
functions it had. Unlike previous scholars who have focused on the conceptions of 
wilāya in a particular text or a certain thinker, this thesis advances our knowledge of 
the subject in an original way by contextualizing wilāya in the intellectual and political 
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arenas of eighteenth to twentieth century Iran, and from this perspective, it can be 
regarded as an addition to the existing scholarship in this area.  
The pair wilāya/walāya (meaning authority, dominion, leadership and affinity, 
sanctity and love, respectively) which brings about the reciprocity of lordship/love (or 
obedience) portrays an ideal type that, perhaps except for the days of the 
administration of the Prophet in Medina and the short reign of the first Shīʿa Imām, has 
had no other equal in the whole history of Islam. Wilāya is also a modulated 
(mudarraj/mushakkak) term, and Allah himself is the walī who bestows mastery and 
lordship upon every believer. Therefore, the divine wilāya is the source of the 
affirmative wilāya, as opposed to the negative one which is the wilāya of non-Muslims. 
The divine wilāya is a sacred pre-temporal covenant (mīthāq/ʿahd, of allegiance, 
loyalty), having been taken in pre-eternity when nothing was yet created. The term al-
mīthāq is used more than twenty times in the Qurʾān, and refers to an alliance between 
God and humanity in general, and between God and the prophets in particular. As 
observed, mīthāq is significant in the Imamite tradition; as other conceptual 
developments have been elaborated around this central concept. Wilāya is a mega-
term, embracing a number of related terms and ideas such as light, knowledge (hiero-
intelligence in the classic Imamite sources), ḥujja, and most importantly, Truth (al-
ḥaqq), among others. It is with the Truth that wilāya finds an ontological dimension and 
connection to wujūd. In the Imamite conceptions of wilāya, wilāya is inseparable from 
imamate and constitutes the cornerstone of Twelver Shīʿīsm, and as such is a kalāmī 
problematic. Imām is the proof (ḥujja) and, the uninterrupted chain of the 
Imāms/proofs started with Adam and ended in the Hidden Imām. In this discourse, 
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wilāya is the face of God (ousia), and is transformed into messianic expectation of ẓuhūr 
(Parousia).  
In our discussion of the ʿirfānī wilāya, the conceptions of wilāya were dated back 
to the third century (between 205 and 215 H/820-830), when ḥakīm Tirmidhī 
developed the idea of wilāya into a coherent theory on the seal of the wilāya, as well as 
a systematic Islamic theory of wilāya; a measure by which the false claimants of wilāya 
are distinguished from the true ones. Ḥakīm’s initiative is significant, as for the first 
time in the history of Islamic mysticism, wilāya is defined as a modulated status, and 
classified into the two types of walī allāh and walī-yi ḥaqq allāh2; each is referred to as 
a station in the spiritual progress of the walī. Ḥakīm constructs his theory of wilāya on 
the basis of the concept of the ḥaqq allāh; a term which refers to the domination and 
kingdom of God over the cosmos. According to this theory, there exists only two groups 
of people who recognize and submit to His authority, namely walī allāh and walī-yi ḥaqq 
allāh. The former is a servant; who, by performing his religious duties expects a reward, 
while the latter beholds God and does not wish to exchange duty for reward. The former 
is the owner of the status of ʿibāda (service and worship), while the latter holds the 
office of servitude (ʿubūdīyyah) (Sūrī, 1385, pp. 96-97).3 Tirmidhī’s main argument is 
the idea of the modulation of prophethood, starting with Adam and ending with the 
Prophet of Islam. The office of wilāya is modulated as well and is sealed by one of His 
most ascetic servants who is not necessarily a member of the household of the Prophet, 
as the term ahl al-bayt can also refer to people who inherit the spiritual legacy of the 
Prophet and not his blood.  
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Ibn ʿ Arabī was the heir of such a legacy. His conception of wilāya which is studied 
in the context of the ethics of wilāya, khilāfa, nubuwwa and risāla, is analogous to the 
classic Imamite understanding, as both are perennial, pre-existent, and the face of God 
(wajh allāh). In Akbarīan mysticism, walī has two features: he is both cognizant of the 
divine names and attributes, and the one who has completed the status of totality 
(jāmiʿīyyah) and unity. Walī is the Perfect Man, and as such the face of the cosmos, and 
the intermediary between Him and creation. Due to his exalted status, walī is the only 
one who has the privilege of access to divine knowledge; a groundbreaking idea which 
became the central idea of the theory of wilāya in later years, and approached the 
Imamite understanding of it. Wilāya, as a result, intertwined with and became 
inseparable from ʿilm (knowledge, maʿrifa).  
It is the importance of attaining ʿilm from the divine source, as well as the 
continuity of the office of wilāya (unlike that of prophethood and apostleship) that 
endows it with a sublime status: walī is a partner in the science of prophecy. In the 
Akbarīan School, however, wilāya can embrace nubuwwa which happens when a 
prophet dies and God sends a walī as a sign of His mercy to the people. This mercy, as 
we observed, is called the general nubuwwa (nubuwwa ʿāmmah). It was also through 
ibn ʿ Arabī that the idea of wilāyat al-takwīnīya became an inseparable part of the theory 
of wilāya (which is another similarity with the Imamite tradition), though despite the 
similarity, it is observed how his idea of the seal (khatm) resounded with controversy 
into the Shīʿa world. Without digging into these disputes again, it is briefly mentioned 
that the Akbarīan idea of the khatm and ibn ʿArabī’s reading of the term ahl al-bayt, 
motivated Shīʿa mystics to achieve a synthesis of their theology with the Akbarīan 
mystic-political thought. Their endeavours had two main characteristics: the 
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identification of walī and the Shīʿa imām to the point that the two concepts of wilāya 
and imamate were completely merged into one another, and their emphasis on the 
uninterrupted chain of walīs from Adam to the Hidden Imam.  
In keeping track of the concept of wilāya in the Shaykhī School, we observed the 
ways wilāya maintained its central position and began to be understood as the 
hiddenness of God, mediated by a gate (bāb). The significance of the office of rukn-i 
rābiʿ originates from the fact that God is completely driven away from man’s cognizance 
and wilāya is the latent dimension of Deity, and as a result, it is hidden and unknown. It 
is important to remember that prior to the Shaykhī conception of the office of wilāya, 
in the classic Imamite tradition, as well as in the Akbarīan School, wilāya was typically 
understood as the face of God and the outward dimension of Deity. An important 
development that happened with Shaykhīsm was that the office of wilāya was moved 
to the corner of the hiddenness of God and turned into a latent, hidden and ever 
unknown status. It was then that the idea of the ‘gate’, which is manifested in the office 
of rukn-i rābiʿ, was created as a bridge between the hiddenness of Deity and wilāya on 
one hand and, wilāya and believers on the other.  
The conceptions of wilāya in the ḥikma tradition are tied to a number of factors, 
such as the doctrine of wujūd (which is the recapitulation of wilāya from the early 
period), the doctrine of wilāyat al-takwīnīya (predates ibn ʿArabī), and the authority of 
the uṣūlī ʿulemā. Walī is the Imām and the Prophet, who himself is the personification 
of the Universal Intellect and the Primal Pen, and as such the first being emanating from 
God. As the heirs of the legacy of the Ṣadrīan ḥikma and Akbarīan mysticism, each of 
these schools offered their own reading of Ṣadrā’s legacy; the ḥakīms of the Qajar period 
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went with the ʿirfānī reading of wilāya, while the scholars of the School of Qum had a 
philosophical understanding. The culmination of the former, as observed, was the 
writings of Āqā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumshiʾī, and that of the latter was the conception of 
wilāya in the thought of ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, who, in his reading of the Sadrīan ḥikma 
distinguished between the philosophical and the ʿirfānī approaches.  
The politicization of the concept of wilāya and its crystallization in the theory of 
wilāyat al-faqīh should be considered as a result of long-term developments in Shīʿa 
jurisprudence which started from the early nineteenth century. Beginning with wilāya 
as marjaʿīyyah and ending in divine kingship, the conception of wilāya in the tradition 
of political jurisprudence (including constitutional jurisprudence of the early twentieth 
century), unlike its mystical peer which had remained stagnant and inert, underwent 
tremendous changes. As an infusion of mysticism into political jurisprudence (chapters 
four and five), Khomeini’s theory had a number of wellsprings including the Imamite 
and the Akbarīan traditions, the Platonic philosophy, as well as the rich tradition of 
kingship in ancient Persia. One can add to it his inspiration by Shīʿa and Sunni scholars 
who, shortly before him, had already started offering a political reading of some 
Qurʾānīc phrases. In addition, compared with previous theories on wilāya which were 
studied in this research, the influence of his era on Khomeini’s thought is undeniable, 
and hence, it should be understood in the context of socio-political ups and downs of 
pre-revolutionary Iran. Addressing these developments, the author has sought to offer 
a better understanding of both the ʿirfānī and juridical wilāya in the writings of 
Ayatollah Khomeini by comparing the contexts and genealogies of these two 
conceptions. Since they had different intellectual traditions and backgrounds, they bore 
fruit in two distinct understandings of wilāya, although the core of both relates to the 
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same problematic, which is the question of authority and control. From this outlook, the 
present research is an original contribution to the existing knowledge.  
Unlike his predecessors, however, Khomeini invites his readers to submit to the 
unquestionable and self-evident privilege of the uṣūlī ʿulemā to establish government 
in the time of Occultation; a fact which gives his theory a kalāmī aura. One cannot call a 
halt to rethinking juridical foundations, or to the critical analysis of the Qurʾānīc verses 
in order to find answers to queries (and dreams) of a questioner, and that is why the 
theory of Khomeini was not, and should not be, regarded as the maximal understanding 
of the political role and authority of the just jurist. We called this Khomeinism 
(Introduction, D.4., pp. 24-25), which indicates the political culture of pre-
revolutionary Iran and is centred on political jurisprudence and the theory of wilāyat 
al-faqīh. Khomeini trained a number of students whose writings and political activities 
are indicative of their inspiration by this culture as an alternative to both traditional 
jurisprudence adhering quietism and the Pahlavi regime.  
The conception of wilāya underwent a new reading by Hossein ʿAlī Muntaẓirī 
who, by emphasizing the doctrine of people’s rights, distanced himself from the kalāmī 
reading of his master. His theory is groundbreaking, in so far as the wilāya of the just 
jurist is no longer fundamental of Shīʿīsm and therefore is not self-evident. One needs 
to bring sufficient jurisdictional evidence (both transmitted and rational sources) to 
prove the political wilāya for the faqīh. Besides, his wilāya will not be actualized and 
come into effect until he is elected by popular election. Moreover, his term is limited to 
a certain period of time which is defined in the constitution and he is only able to 
supervise, and not to execute laws. From this perspective, the office of wilāyat al-faqīh 
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in Muntaẓirī’s theory is more reminiscent of the office of presidency than that of religio-
political leadership. Kadivar, Muntaẓirī’s one-time student, in the end completely broke 
away from this tradition. He argued that this theory, in terms of transmitted and 
rational sources and the divine source of the appointment of the jurist, is not 
jurisdictionally verifiable, and therefore should be abandoned in favour of democracy.  
1 - Fazlur Rahman has a very helpful discussion on this topic and his critical eye on Shīʿīsm would help 
Shīʿa reader/researcher to reach impartial conclusions. See: 
Fazlur Rahman, Islam, 2nd edition, 1968 (New York: Anchor Books), passim.  
2 - Tirmidhī is the first and also the only ʿārif in the entire history of Islamic mysticism that coins and 
uses such a term, as neither before nor after him has this term (walī-yi ḥaqq allāh) been used. Besides, 
he uses this term in only one of his books entitled Sīrat al-Anbīyāʾ. See:  
Muḥammad Sūrī, Ḥakīm Tirmidhī wa Naẓarīyayi Wilāyat, (Ḥakīm Tirmidhī and the Theory of Wilāya), 
the Journal of Falsaphah wa Kalām, Vol 4, Winter 1385, p. 96. 
3 - Ḥakīm clarifies that ʿibāda and ʿubūdīyyah are different as the former refers to the optional tasks of 
man, while the latter indicates man’s as well as the whole creation’s indigence and dependence on God. 
Muḥammad Sūrī, Ibid, 1385, p. 96. 
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Glossary 
 
Abu al-ʿAlā ʿAfīfī (1314-1385 H/1897-1966), the Egyptian scholar and writer. Upon 
obtaining his doctorate in philosophy from Cambridge University in 1930, he started 
teaching at the University of Cairo, and in 1941 he joined the University of Alexandria. 
His specialization was Akbarīan mysticism.  
Abul al-Faḍl ʿAbdu Razzāq Kāshānī (also Qāshānī, ?-736 H/1335), the famous mystic of 
the eight century and expert in both esoteric and exoteric sciences. His commentaries 
on Fuṣūṣ of ibn ʿArabī and Manāzil ul-Sāʾrīn of Khwāja ʿAbdullāh Anṣārī are famous. He 
exchanged a number of letters with another exponent, and also critic of ibn ʿArabī, ʿAlāʾ 
al-Dawlah Simnānī on waḥdat-i wujūd.  
Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Mahdī Fāḍil Narāqī (1185-1245 H/1771-1829), the Iranian 
jurist and poet of the eighteenth century. He issued the fatwā of jihād against Russians 
in the second Russo-Persian War (1804-1813). Along with ʿAwāʾid al-Ayyām which is 
in Arabic, he wrote other books such as Miʿrāj ul-Saʿādah on ethics in Persian, Mustanad 
al-Shīʿa fi al-Aḥkām al-Sharīʿa and two books of poetry ‘Dīwān’.  
Ahmad Kasravi (1269-1324 shamsī/1890-1946), born in Tabriz, Iran, he initially 
enrolled in a seminary in his birthplace, but became a radical Constitutionalist. Later 
on, he abandoned his clerical training and became an anti-cleric. He was a lawyer, a 
reformist, and a political activist affiliated with Iran’s Democrat Party. He was 
assassinated by the radical Shīʿa group of Fadāʾīyān-i Islam (Devotees of Islam) in 1946 
(1324 shamsī).  
Akbarīan School refers to a school of thought which was developed by a number of ibn 
ʿArabī’s students such as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī (607-673 H/1207-1274), ʿAfīf a-Dīn al-
Ṭilmisānī (610-690 H/1213-1291), the abovementioned ʿAbdu Razzāq Kāshānī and 
Sharafadīn Dāwūd Qayṣarī (658-751 H/1260-1350). These figures were influential in 
elaborating on a particular brand of mysticism centring on the theory of waḥdat-i 
wujūd. It is needless to say that al-Shaykh al-Akbar never used this term and it was 
mostly his disciple and step-son Qūnawī who coined it for the first time.  
Akhbārī School of jurisprudence. The Akhbārīs refused to consider reason (ʿql) and 
consensus (ijmāʿ) as ‘legal principles’ (uṣūl-i fiqh), and therefore recognized the Qurʾān 
and the ḥadīth. The School was active from the third to the twelfth century, but lost its 
supremacy over its rival, the Uṣūlī School, after the Safawid period.  
Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah (with the full name of Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah fi al-Maʿrifat al-
Asrār al-Mālikīyyah wa al-Malikīyyah), the most significant book of ibn ʿArabī 
containing the revelations and intuitions (mukāshifāt wa shuhūdāt) he received when 
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he was doing ḥajj. The book is written over thirty-five years and was finished in 
Damascus in 634 H/1236. Al-futūḥāt was published for the first time in 1910 in Cairo, 
Egypt and was republished in Beirut, Lebanon in 1970. There exists another edition of 
the book by the Syrian scholar, ʿ Uthmān Yaḥyā (1337-1417 H/1919-1997); though only 
ten of thirty-seven volumes have been published so far.  
Al-habāʾ (dust), the atomic or cosmic realm in which God hollows out/builds up the 
bodies of this world.  
Al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah, coined for the first time by ibn ʿArabī, the term refers to 
the first emanated (ṣādir-i awwal) or the Greatest Name (ism-i aʿẓam). It is the origin 
of all other creatures and is fully manifested in the perfect man.  
Asfār al-Arbaʿi (with the full name of al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿālīya fi al-Asfār al-ʿAqlīyata al-
Arbaʿi), one of the most famous books of Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī. The book contains his 
ideas on ḥikmat al- mutaʿālīya and has four chapters, each is named after one of the four 
mystical journeys. 
Aʿrāf (lit. the people of the heights), refers to awlīyā/imāms. The office of aʿrāf is to 
identify the people of Heaven (ahl al-janna) and to separate them from the people of 
Hell (ahl al-nār), in the sense that those who accept their wilāya are allowed to enter 
Heaven, and those who deny it will exist in Hell forever. 
Aʿyān thābitah (lit. permanent archetypes, also fixed entities or essences). Ibn ʿArabī 
discusses the things known to God as permanent archetypes. These entities are things 
inasmuch as they are nonexistent in themselves but known to God. They are exactly the 
same things to the extent that they have been given a certain imaginal or delimited 
existence by the engendering command. 
ʿĀlam-i asghar wa akbar (lit. microcosm or minor cosmos vs. macrocosm or macro 
cosmos), allegories of the perfect man and the cosmos respectively. As a central idea in 
Islamic mysticism, it is believed that al-insān al-kāmil encompasses all the 
characteristics of the macrocosm and is regarded as its spirit. He is created according 
to God’s names and attributes and as such has the authority to act upon the cosmos.  
Bāb (lit. gate), either refers to an intermediary status between Deity and people or, the 
Hidden Imām and his believers. As a central idea in the Imamite Shīʿīsm, it is believed 
that the twelve Imāms are regarded as abwāb between people and God, though in later 
elaborations, the idea of bābīya (also bābīyat) was extensively used to indicate the 
intermediary office between the Imām - who is in occultation - and believers. The 
doctrine of bābīya is prominent in Bāṭinī trends such as Shaykhīsm. In addition, in the 
Akbarīan mysticism al-insān al-kāmil (the perfect man) is depicted as a medium by 
which Deity looks at His creatures.  
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Baqā (lit. subsistence with God, perpetuation). As the last station in the spiritual 
journey of novice, he recognizes all existence, including him or herself, as being non-
existent in and of itself, and discovers in his or her consciousness that every being, living 
and non-living, is a manifestation or shadow of the light of the Divine Knowledge and 
Existence. Baqā is achieved when the servant of God annihilates him or herself in God 
and takes down all human attachments.  
Baqīyatallāh (lit. the Remnant of God). It is both a common title for all the Imāms, and a 
specific title used exclusively for the last Imām.  
Bāṭinī (lit. esoteric) meaning or dimension. It can refer to the bāṭinī taʾwīl of the Qurʾān 
or, bāṭinī schools like Shaykhīsm or the Ismāʿīlī movement. It can also imply the status 
of wilāya as the internal face or dimension of nubuwwa.  
Dhāt-i ilāhī (lit. Divine Essence or Absolute Essence). Also called al-Ḥaqq or Reality, is 
that to which names and attributes belong in their real nature, not as they appear in 
existence. It denotes the Self (nafs) of God and it stands beyond any expression or hint 
of what the Essence is, since it has no opposite or like.  
Fanā: (lit. total dissolution of personal identity, self-annihilation or extinction). In 
Islamic mysticism it is believed that the servant of God must die to himself in order to 
reach subsistence or baqā. Fanā and baqā are correlated.  
Faṣṣ (lit. bezel). The name of each chapter of the book of Fuṣūṣ as it is designated to 
each prophet. Faṣṣ is used in two meanings: the abstract or summary of something and 
the ring of stone, but in the Akbarīan context it implies the ḥikma (divine gnosis) of 
every prophet.  
Fiqh-i mashrūṭah (lit. constitutional jurisprudence). A type of jurisprudence which 
deals with Constitutionalism. Fiqh-i mashrūṭah emerged around the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1907. Constitutionalist jurists produced valuable 
literature, among them Tanbīh al-Ummah wa Tanzīh al-Millah (to Warn the Community 
and to Distance the Nation) of Muḥammad Hossein Nāʾīnī Gharawī (1239-1315 
shamsī/1860-1936) is the most notable.  
Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, another book of ibn ʿ Arabī on mysticism, which is written in the seventh 
century. Fuṣūṣ (lit. bezels) is composed of twenty-seven faṣṣ (a metaphor of ḥikma), 
each of them dedicated to a prophet. The author claims that he received the book in 
dream from the prophet and was commanded by him to write it. It is believed that one 
hundred and ten commentaries have been written on this book.  
Ghawth (lit. help or aid). In the hierarchical chain of awlīyā, the highest status belongs 
to ghawth, who is one (wāḥid) and it is impossible for any age to be deprived of him.  It 
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is also through him that God looks at His creatures, and it is by him that He helps those 
who are seeking aid.  
Ghullāt (lit. extremists). Indicating a group of companions of the Imāms who held 
metaphysical attributes and powers for them, and/or regarded the office of imamate as 
supra-natural, having been involved in creating the cosmos. They were renounced and 
in some cases even cursed by the Imāms.  
Ḥadīth (lit. reports) and describe the words, actions and habit of the Prophet 
Muḥammad. In Shīʿa Islam, ḥadīth includes the sayings of the Imāms too, which have 
been collected in ḥadīth compilations.  
Ḥakīm (lit. adept in al-ḥikmat al-mutaʿālīya or transcendent philosophy). The term in 
its contemporary usage gained popularity during the Safawid era and referred to the 
exponents of the Ṣadrīan ḥikmat which was a new school of thought having been 
founded by Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī (979-1045 H/1571-1640). 
Henry Corbin (1903-1978). French Orientalist and scholar who made a great 
contribution in introducing Shīʿa Islam into Western thought. His areas of interest were 
extensive, from the Imamite Shīʿīsm to the Akbarīan mysticism and to Shaykhīsm. His 
conversations with ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī are famous.  
Hossein ʿAlī Muntaẓirī (1301-1388 shamsī/1922-2008). The Iranian jurist, human 
rights activist, student of Ayatollah Khomeini, and one of the most significant figures of 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979. He was designated as successor to Khomeini in 1985, 
though four years later and due to a serious disagreement with Khomeini on domestic 
and foreign policies and, mainly the latter’s fatwā of executing thousands of Iranian 
Leftists prisoners in 1988, was removed from his post. He resided in Qum and became 
the symbol of opposition to the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, the successor of 
Khomeini. He died shortly after the Iranian Green Movement in 2008.  
Hūrqalyā (originally havarqalyā or, mundus imaginalus). The intermediate world or the 
world of subsistence images. It was Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥya ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī (549-
632 H/1145-1191) who used it for the first time. In the Shaykhī context, it is equal to 
ʿālam al-mithāl or the abode of the Hidden Imām, because the Imāms’ bodies belong to 
this world and are deprived of any temporal impurity. Therefore, forms, figures and 
bodies of the world of hūrqalyā have maximal transparency and purity.  
Ījāza: a juridical authorization which endows a jurist to issue fatwā or narrate ḥadīth.  
Ijtihād: (lit. physical or mental effort). It is an Islamic legal term referring to 
independent reasoning or, the thorough exertion of a jurist's mental faculty in finding 
a solution to a legal question.  
Imamology: to know the reality of the imamate and prophethood.  
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Irshād al-ʿAwām (the Guidance of the People), the name of the main book of Muḥammad 
Karīm [Khān] Kermānī containing the Shaykhī creed.  
ʿIṣma (lit. immunity from doing sin or error). In the Shīʿa culture, it is believed that the 
Prophet, his daughter Fatima and the twelve Imāms comprise the fourteen infallible 
figures. Infallibility is an inseparable part of the office of imamate and prophethood. 
Fatima is the mother of imamate and daughter of prophethood and as such shares this 
attribute with her father and sons.  
Jafr, the science of letters and one of the Occult sciences. It is a methodology to interpret 
divine names, themes and letters. 
Kalām (lit. speech/argument). It refers to theological reflection using rational 
philosophical argumentation to study and express the content of the faith in a coherent 
manner. A discipline among other religious sciences of Islam such as jurisprudence and 
mysticism. Free will vs. determinism is one of the main kalāmī subjects. 
Kashf or mukāshifa (lit. unveiling the inner meanings). A significant component of the 
Shaykhī School. The Shaykhī ʿulemā claimed that they enjoyed the esoteric knowledge 
of the Imāms which enabled them to unveil the hidden meanings of the scripture and 
aḥādīth.   
Khatm al-wilāya (lit. the sealing of the sainthood). A walī who completes the status of 
wilāya. The station of the sealing is divided into the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya 
and the seal of the general wilāya.  
Maqām al-jāmiʿ (lit. the station of totality). In Shaykhīsm, it stands for nubuwwa which 
is a station after rubūbīya (lit. the station of Divine Essence). 
Maqām al-tafṣīl (lit. the station of multiplicity). In the Shaykhī School, it stands for 
imamate which is the last station of gnosis after nubuwwa and rubūbīya.   
Marjaʿīyyah (lit. the office of religious reference). In Shīʿa Islam, it is the highest 
authority on religious laws after the Qurʾān, the Prophet and Imāms.  
Murtiḍā Muṭaharī (1298-1358 shamsī/1919-1979). The Iranian cleric, ideologue and 
philosopher. He was a student of Ayatollah Khomeini and appointed by him to different 
posts after the Revolution of 1979. He formed “the Council of the Islamic Revolution” at 
Khomeini’s request, and was the chairman of the council at the time of his assassination 
in Tehran by a member of the Furqān Fighters.  
Mīthāq (lit. covenant/trust). A pre-temporal covenant, promise or oath. The notion of 
such a pledge is rooted in the Qurʾān and was first given to the Prophet Muhammad. In 
the Shīʿa context, it means wilāya which has been given to the Imāms in the World al-
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Dharr and true believers of the Imāms by following them are included in this covenant 
too.  
Naqalah (lit. transmitters), referring to the Shaykhī jurists/faqīhs.  
Naẓarīya-yi wilāyat-i intikhābī-ya muqayyada-yi faqīh (the theory of the elective and 
constrained guardianship of the jurist). The theory is offered by Ayatollah Muntaẓirī in 
his book Dirāsāt fi al-Wilāyat al-Faqīh wa al-Figh al-Duwal Islāmī, between 1363 - 1368 
shamsī (1384-1389/90), defending the dual source of legitimacy of the jurist; both 
divine and elective. It underwent further reform by Muntaẓirī to put more emphasis on 
people’s rights, though the core of it remained untouched.  
Niʿmatullāhī/Niʿmatullāhīyah. A Sufi order originating in Iran. It gained its name from 
its founder Shah Niʿmatullāh Walī (730-834 H/1330-1430), originally from Aleppo, 
who settled down in Mahan, Kerman. The ṭarīqa gained popularity in Persia and the 
Indian subcontinent in the post-Safawid era and, during the Qajar period it was popular 
among the courtiers, but it lost its popularity among the elite after the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1907. It also split into several different branches. 
Quṭb (lit. pole/pivot). In the Akbarīan mysticism, it is equal to ghawth, khalīfa and ṣāḥib 
al-waqt (the Lord of Time). There is one quṭb per era and ibn ʿArabī calls him apostle 
(rasūl). Due to his accessibility to divine knowledge, he enjoys wilāyat al-takwīnīya and 
the right of lawgiving (tashrīʿ) both, though his sulṭat ul-bāṭinīyah (inward domination) 
is more important than tashrīʿ, because it enables him to conquer the hearts of people. 
Quṭb al-aqṭāb is identical to al-ḥaqīqat al-muḥammadīyah.  
Rukn-i rābiʿ (lit. The Fourth Pillar). Level of being/gnosis which has been invented by 
Muḥammad Karīm Khān Kermānī (1225-1288 H/1810-1871), the third Shaykhī leader. 
Rukn-i rābiʿ is love and belief of believers in the Shaykhī ʿulemā. It should be regarded 
both as a station of gnosis (maʿrifa) and a religious principle, only through which a 
believer is able to know his imām. 
Sulūk (lit. spiritual conduct). In Sufism, it indicates the path that every traveler (sālik) 
should take to leave his worldly attachments in order to reach self-annihilation and 
subsistence with God.  
Sirr (lit. secret). Another name for wilāya with an established tradition in the Imamite 
Shīʿīsm and its branches like Shaykhīsm and Shīʿa mysticism. From the classic ḥadīth 
compilations to the contemporary conceptions of wilāya, walī is depicted as the owner 
of the secret (ṣāḥib al-sirr) and the station of awlīya is that of sirr. Sirr refers to the 
covenant between God and the Imāms on one hand and the Imāms and their believers 
on the other, all that testifies to the fact that Shīʿīsm has a strong esoteric dimension.  
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Tuṭunj (lit. gulf). In Kermānī Shaykhīsm, it indicates the status of Imām Ali and one of 
the proofs of aʿrāf; the one who stands at the origin of mercy and/or agony.  
ʿUlūm-i khafīyah/gharībah (the Occult sciences). It is a study of occult practices such as 
magic, alchemy and astrology, as well as the sciences of numbers and letters, and has 
been one of the branches of science which has been taught in the classical education 
system in the Muslim world. It is both significant in the Akbarīan mysticism and the 
Shaykhī School.  
Uṣūlīsm. It is based on the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) and utilizes ijtihād 
by adopting reasoned argumentation in finding the laws. Mujtahids are important 
because they are capable of independently interpreting the sacred sources as an 
intermediary of the Hidden Imām and thus serve as a guide to the community. 
Uwaysī (mystics). Related to Uways al-Qaran (29 before hijra to 37 H/594-657), who 
lived during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, but never had a chance to visit him. 
Uwaysī is a Sufi with no visible master among men.  
Waḥdat-i wujūd (lit. unity of existence/unity of being), an important term in the 
Akbarīan mysticism which is used frequently by later mystics, though ibn ʿArabī has 
never mentioned it. According to this doctrine, existence/being is one but its 
manifestations are many. God manifests Himself through His names and attributes, 
each of them like a mirror reflecting a reality of His Essence.  
Wilāyat al-ʿāmmah vs. wilāyat al-khāṣṣah (lit. General and Particular wilāya 
respectively). The seal of wilāya in ibn ʿArabī’s mysticism is divided into two types of 
the seal of the Muḥammedan wilāya (wilāyat al-khāṣṣat al-Muḥammadīya), and the seal 
of the general wilāya (wilāyat al-ʿāmmah). Jesus is the referent of the former and ibn 
ʿArabī is the referent of the latter. In subsequent conceptualizations, however, wilāyat 
al-ʿāmmah indicates nubuwwa and wilāyat al-khāṣṣah refers to wilāya.  
wilāyat al-faqīh, the official theory of governance and statecraft in post-revolutionary 
Iran. Coined by Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, it advocates a kind of political system 
relying upon a just and capable jurist (faqīh) to assume the leadership of the 
government in the absence of an infallible Imām.  
Wilāyat al-takwīnīya or wilāyat al-taṣarruf (lit. existential guardianship), is the right or 
authority to act upon the cosmos.  
Ẓāhir (lit. exoteric). The outward or apparent meaning or dimension of the Qurʾān, 
ritual or religious prescriptions, from which the bāṭin is educed.  
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